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FOREWORD 
At the request of the European Parliament's Committee on External Economic Relations 
and Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, the Directorate-
General for Research commissioned a study on the economic impact of dumping and the 
European Community's anti-dumping policy. 
Following a restricted invitation to tender, the Managment Consultants Ernst & Young 
of  London were instructed to carry out the study. 
The purpose of the study is to provide Members with information on the impact of 
various  forms  of dumping  on  specific  industrial  sectors,  on  the  basis  of empirical 
investigations. 
The second part of the study analyses the Comn1ission's anti-dumping policy and its 
impact on market participants (manufacturers, importers, users, consumers and so on) and on 
competition and employment in the EC. 
The study concludes by  setting out possible options for a future Community anti-
dumping policy.  Men1bers may find these useful as  a basis for discussion in the political 
debate. 
DIRECfORA  TE GENERAL FOR RESEARCH 
VORWORT 
Auf  Wunsch  des  Ausschusses  fUr  AuBenwirtschaftsbeziehungen  sowie  des 
Ausschusses flir Wirtschaft, Wahrung und Industriepolitik des Europaischen Parlaments hat 
die Generaldirektion Wissenschaft eine Studie tiber die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des 
Dumping und der Antidun1pingpolitik der Europtiischen Gen1einschaft in Auftrag gegeben. 
Auf der  Grundlage  einer  beschrankten  offentlichen  Ausschreibung  wurde  das 
Beratungsinstitut Ernst & Young, Management Consultants, London, mit der Durchftihrung 
der Studie beauftragt. 
Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, den Abgeorclneten Inforn1ationen iiber die Auswirkungen 
der verschiedenen Formen des Dun1ping auf bestitnn1te Industriesektoren an : Hand empirischer 
Untersuchungen zu vernlittlen. 
In einem zweiten Untersuchungsschritt wird  sodann  die  Antidumpingpolitik der 
Kommission der Europaischen Gen1einschaften analysiert und deren Auswirkungen auf die 
Marktteilnehmer  (Hersteller,  Importeure,  Verwender,  Konsumenten  etc.)  sowie  auf 
Wettbewerb und Beschaftigung in der EG. 
Die Untersuchung schlieBt ab mit einer Darstellung der moglichen Optionen fi.ir eine 
ki.inftige  Gestaltung  der  gemeinschaftlichen  Antidumpingpolitik.  Diese  konnen  den 
Abgeordneten als Diskussionsgruncllage fUr die polititsche Debatte dienen. 
GENERALDIREKTION WISSENSCHAFT 
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AVANT-PROPOS 
Conformen1ent au souhait de la commission des relations economiques exterieures 
comme de la cotnmission economique, monetaire et de la politique industrielle du Parlement 
europeen, la Direction generale des etudes a confie a  un organisme une etude relative aux 
incidences economiques du dumping et de la politique antidumping de la Communaute 
europeenne. 
Sur la base d'un appel d'offres restreint, c'est l'institut de consultatns Ernst & Young, 
de Londres, qui a ete charge de !'execution de cette etude. 
L'etude visait a  presenter aux  parlementaires, a  partir d'analyses empiriques, des 
informations relatives aux consequences que peuvent avoir les diverses formes de dumping sur 
divers secteurs industriels. 
Dans une deuxieme etape, il est procede a  une analyse de la politique antidumping de la 
Commission des Communautes europeennes, ainsi que de ses effets sur les acteurs du marche 
(producteurs, importateurs, utilisateurs, conson1mateurs, etc.), et sur la concurrence et l'emploi 
a  l'interieur de la CE. 
L'etude se conclut par la presentation des options possibles concernant la mise en forme 
future de la politique antidumping de la Communaute.  Ces options peuvent servir de base de 
discussions dans le debat politique auquel se livreront les parlementaires. 
DIRECTION GENERALE DES ETUDES 
Luxembourg, February 1993. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
In  this sun1n1ary we present an overview of our report to the European Parliament on the 
economic impact of dumping and the Community's anti-dumping policy, highlighting our 
principal conclusions and recommendations. 
Outline of Report 
Section I describes the background to our study, our terms of reference, our work 
pro&Tfanlme and the approach we have adopted; 
•  Section  II  outlines the  principal features of the  Community's Anti-Dumping 
Regulation and the relevant GA TI  provisions; 
•  Section III  analyses the economic impact of dumping and describes some of the 
Community's experience; 
•  Section IV considers the economic rationale for anti-dumping measures; 
•  Section V discusses the Community's use of anti-dumping measures; 
•  Section VI discusses the economic impact of dumping and anti-dumping measures 
on key dimensions of the Community interest; 
Sections  VII  and  VIII  discuss  the  key  criteria of dumping,  injury  and  the 
Community interest; 
•  Section IX  discusses the selection of the appropriate measures and Section X 
considers institutional issues; 
•  Section  XI discusses some broader policy issues relating to dumping. 
Background, Terms of Reference and Work Programme (Section I) 
Background and Terms of Reference 
In the last decade, the European Parliament has taken a close interest in the Community's 
anti-dumping policy and the GATT Anti-Dumping Code.  Most recently, in  1990, the 
Parliarnent adopted a Resolution which endorsed the need for anti-dumping measures and 
n1ade  a nurnber of specific recommendations for policy changes to make anti-dumping 
measures more effective, equitable and transparent. 
In order to irnprove the Parliament's understanding of the economic effects of dumping and 
of the Community's anti-dumping policy, Ernst & Young was commissioned in December 
1991  to undertake a study which would: 
assess the economic effects of dumping and anti-dumping policy in the Community; 
evaluate  the  relevance  and  effectiveness of the  Community's anti-dumping 
rncasures; 
•  present and assess options for changes in both Community and international policy. 
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Work  Programme 
In the course of the study we have: 
•  developed a conceptual framework within which to analyse the impact on the 
Community of dumping  and  anti-dumping measures which  takes  account of 
important developments in  the last decade in  the economic analysis of trade in 
international markets; 
•  undertaken a desk analysis of the economic characteristics of the industries and 
markets  in  which  there  have  been  _anti-dumping  proceedings  and  of the 
Community's use of anti-dumping measures in the last decade; 
undertaken more detailed case studies of five anti-dumping proceedings1•  The 
selection of the case studies was made in consultation with the Commission and the 
Parliament's Research Directorate; 
•  had  many meetings with  the Anti-Dumping Directorate of the Commission to 
discuss all aspects of  Community anti-dumping policy; 
undertaken a programme of interviews with other Commission services, the GA TI 
Secretariat, Ministries and competition agencies in some Member States, industry 
associations, consumer bodies, trade union bodies, government representatives of 
exporter interests, trade lawyers, and academic commentators; 
•  reviewed the anti-dumping measures and experience of the three other largest users 
of anti-dumping measures-Australia, Canada and the United States. 
Scope and Approach 
Our approach has  been  to  start from  the presumption that the Community's overall 
econon1ic interests are, in the main, maximised by free trade and then to assess the impact 
of dumping and  whether anti-dumping measures increase economic  welfare in the 
Community, either in  all or in  some cases, when an  industry has suffered injurious 
dumping.  In  doing so, we consider whether other policy measures would be a more 
appropriate response to problems created by dumping. 
Our five ca'ie studies were of the anti-dumping investigations of imports into the Community of: 
denim - a fabric  used in  the manufacture of clothing - from  four countries (Turkey, Indonesia, 
Hong  Kong and Macao).  Only very limited dumping was found and the Commission concluded 
that this had  not caused material injury to the Community industry.  No measures were therefore 
imposed; 
mini ball bearings- which arc used in motors and a wide range of other products to reduce friction 
between moving parts- from  Japan, Singapore and Thailand.  Undertakings were accepted on 
imports  from  Japan  in  the  1970s.  Duties  were applied  in  1984  to  imports from  Japan and 
Singapore and subcqucntly extended to Thailand.  The measures remain in force; 
photocopiers from Japan.  Provisional anti-dumping duties were applied in 1986 and are currently 
being reviewed; 
polyvinyl chloride - a plastic used in the manufacture of a wide range of products - from four East 
European countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and the former GDR).  Measures were 
applied in  1982183 and lapsed in 1987/88; 
small colour televisions.  Provisional duties were applied on imports from  Korea in  1989 and 
subsequently on imports from Hong Kong and China. 
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To achieve a full  understanding of the impact of dumping and anti-dumping measures in 
particular cases would have involved access to highly sensitive information and would have 
placed a considerable burden on Community industry and exporters-we would have had 
to re-run the investigation and undertake a detailed analysis of subsequent events.  This 
would not have been practicable.  Our report therefore takes the form of an  economic 
analysis  of the case for anti-dumping policy which has been (deeply) informed by our 
study of five cases and our discussions with the Commission and other observers and 
participants in the Community's anti-dumping policy. 
In addition to the issues analysed in this report, there are a number of  other economic and 
political considerations which are important in practical policy-making: 
•  anti-dumping measures  may  help  to open  third  markets,  thereby conferring 
economic benefits.  A much wider study of trade relations would be required in 
order to judge whether anti-dumping measures make an  effective and efficient 
contribution to the liberalisation of world markets.  This was outside our terms of 
reference; 
•  a widely held view is  that if there were no anti-dumping measures, in practice, 
protectionist pressures would then be accommodated in ways which have a greater 
distortionary effect on world trade.  On this view, anti-dumping measures are a 
form of  safety valve; 
• 
• 
the notion that dumping is "unfair".  This has a powerful emotional appeal, but  it 
has to be considered whether there is an economic case for retaliatory action; 
there may be  strong pressures to accommodate the interests of well-organised 
groups. 
Limitations 
As envisaged by  thew Parliament's terms of reference and in our proposal, our work 
programme has focused on the Community itself.  The extent to which overseas markets 
arc closed to Community industry and the trade and industrial policies adopted by major 
trading partners of the Community are important issues and have implications for the 
Comrnunity's anti-dumping policy.  The Research Directorate of the Parliament did not feel 
our study should be broadened to research these issues. 
For legal reasons, we were not able to have access to the Commission's files for our case 
studies.  It was agreed that we could see details of individual exporters dumping margin 
calculations with their agreement.  Unfortunately, this was not forthcoming and inevitably 
lin1ited  the value of the case studies.  More generally, our case studies suffered from a 
reluctance on the part of some exporters to assist our study; and we sensed that in some 
cases Community firms and industry associations were guarded in their co-operation. 
The Community's Anti-Dumping Policy (Section II) 
The Con1n1unity's anti-dun1ping measures follow closely the provisions of the GAIT Anti-
Dumping Code.  Anti-dumping measures may be applied when the following three criteria 
arc met: 
•  exports to the Community have been dumped.  It tends to be assumed that dumping 
implies that exporter's prices in its domestic market are higher than those charged to 
Community importers.  But this  need not be  the case since, if the exporter's 
domestic sales are not profitable, the export price will be compared to a constructed 
domestic price which includes all overheads and a margin of profit; 
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•  the Community industry has suffered material injury as a result of the dumping. 
Additionally, a finding of material injury may be made when dumping threatens to 
cause injury or is retarding the development of a Community industry.  But these 
provisions are little used in practice; 
•  the application of measures would be in the Community interest. 
Measures, which usually take the fonn of ad valorem duties or price undertakings, are 
applied at the level necessary to remove dumping unless a lower duty (or price undertaking) 
would be sufficient to remove the injury (the "lesser duty rule").  Measures lapse five years 
from  the date when  they  were last renewed  unless the continuing need for them is 
confirmed by a "Sunset Review". 
Duties paid will be refunded when the importer can demonstrate that they have exceeded the 
dun1ping margin. 
As the Parliament's Committees have recognised, the Community's anti-dumping measures 
include three provisions which make the Community's policy more liberal than the strict 
requirements of the GA Tf  Code: 
•  the Community interest criterion.  Australia and Canada have provision in their 
legislation  for public interest issues to be  taken  into account, but there is no 
requirement to consider them in every case; 
•  apart from the Community, only Australia operates an explicit lesser duty rule; 
•  like the Community, Australia and Canada have five-year sunset clauses; and the 
draft of the new GA  1T  Code makes sunset clauses mandatory. 
Two other key differences between the Community's measures and those of Australia, 
Canada and the United States are that: 
• 
• 
time limits are set for investigations in all three countries; 
in Canada and the United States, the investigation of dumping is undertaken by a 
government department whilst injury investigations are undertaken by a separate, 
independent Commission or Tribunal.  In  Australia, an independent Authority 
reviews as a matter of course proposals to implement anti-dumping measures made 
by the Australian Customs Service. 
The Impact of Dumping (Section Ill) 
The  Background Circumstances 
General perceptions of dumping problems are often based on the assumption that they 
involve a surge of low-priced imports, perhaps when demand is already weak. 
Our desk analysis of 40 dumping investigations shows that significant numbers of cases 
seem to have these characteristics.  Indeed in three of our case studies-Denim, Mini Ball 
Bearings and Polyvinyl Chloride - Community demand and production were falling 
significantly in the period before the investigation. 
llowcver, in  other cases, very different background circumstances applied, and in the 
period immediately before the investigation was launched we found: 
14 European Parliament -The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
•  in almost half the cases, demand in the Community was growing by 3% or more; 
•  in around 25% of cases, Community production was growing by 3% or more; 
•  in around 20% of cases, the imports alleged to have been dumped accounted for 5% 
or less of the Community market; 
•  in around a third of cases, import prices were static or rising. 
Sirnilarly, in  our case studies of Plain Paper Photocopiers  (PPCs) and Small Screen 
Colour Televisions (SCTVs) the Community market was buoyant, although in  the latter 
case overall production was falling. 
Tl1e  Impact of  Dumping 
Dumping can be expected to have various effects on the Community industry and other 
economic agents, according to the background circumstances of the case.  Where the 
amount of  dumping and level of trade is significant, Community prices, profits, production 
and employment levels are likely to be lower than otherwise in the short run.  In markets 
which are !,'TOwing, dumping may manifest itself in loss of market share rather than falling 
production.  Indeed, loss of market share may be a particularly important indicator of injury 
when growth is necessary to maintain or improve cost competitiveness.  In Plain Paper 
Photocopiers  and Small Screen Colour Televisions  the loss of market share by the 
Community industry was significant. 
Other key indicators of injury which were found in each of our case study industries to a 
significant extent are reductions in prices and profitability. 
It is important to distinguish the short term impact of dumping from its longer term effects. 
In  part this will depend on whether or not the dumping is transient.  From the overall 
econon1ic impact viewpoint a critical long term question is whether the competitiveness of 
Community industry is damaged by the dumping.  This could happen if, for example: 
•  there are scale economies or learning effects which are denied to the Community 
industry by the dumping but enjoyed in consequence by the dumper; 
•  necessary R&D and investment is not undertaken due to  short term financial 
difficulties created by the dumping; 
•  the Community suppliers and components industries are damaged. 
The potential future effects of dumping have been a key consideration in a number of cases. 
For example: 
in Mini Ball Bearings  there was concern that the profitability of the industry was 
not sufficient to finance necessary investment and R&D; 
•  similarly, in Plain Paper Photocopiers  the Community industry was found to be 
spending less than Japanese exporters on research and development and it was 
concluded  that  the  future  competitiveness of the  Community  industry  was 
threatened; 
•  in Small Screen Colour Televisions it was feared that continued dumping would 
lead to the cessation of integrated Community production and that there would be 
adverse longer term effects on the development of new generation products. 
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In general, consumers and industrial purchasers are likely to benefit in the short run from 
dumping, due to receiving lower prices than otherwise.  The critical question is whether 
these "prices lower than otherwise" will be sustainable in the future, and indeed whether 
ultimately consumers will face higher prices, and/or poorer quality service as a result of any 
datnagc caused by dumping. 
The Rationale for Anti-Dumping Policy (Section IV) 
Perspectives on Anti-Dumping Policy 
Views on whether there is an economic rationale for anti-dumping policy vary very widely. 
At one extreme, it is argued that dumping is only possible when the exporter's domestic 
market is closed to competition or "isolated".  As such, dumping is at variance with the 
objectives of free  trade and international competition which have been central to the 
development of the international trading system in the last five decades.  Injurious dumping 
is condemned by the GAIT and, when established, advantage should be taken of the rights 
under the GAIT to apply anti-dumping measures.  In  this form, the rationale for anti-
dumping  measures depends  in  large  measure,  not only on the  economic effects of 
dumping, but also on the wider considerations of fairness and the objective of promoting 
open markets identified above. 
At  the  other extreme,  some critics of anti-dumping measures argue  that insufficient 
allowance is made for the price benefits derived by consumers and industrial purchasers 
front dumping.  They believe thai dumping is only economically damaging when it leads to 
the elintination of the Community industry and to the exposure of Community purchasers 
to a monopoly supplier.  In  their view, cases of "predatory dumping" are likely to be very 
rare.  Accordingly, there is only a case for the application of anti-dumping measures in 
highly restricted circumstances. 
We believe that dumping has the potential to be damaging to the economic interests of the 
Community  in  a  wider range of circumstances than  suggested immediately above. 
However, in considering whether there is an economic case for the introduction of anti-
dumping measures, it is vital to  undertake a detailed analysis of the market, why the 
dumping has occurred and the likely effects of anti-dumping measures.  In particular, we 
have found it useful to distinguish the following types of dumping: 
long run dumping: a strategy of setting lower prices in export markets over many 
years, and possibly permanently; 
•  cyclical dumping: exporting at prices which do not allow the recovery of all costs 
when the market is depressed; 
state tr..tde dumping: exports from non-market economies at prices which would not 
allow the recovery of all costs in a market economy; 
•  predatory or strategic dumping: exporting at low (but not necessarily lossmaking) 
prices with the result that competition in the Community market is weakened; 
transitional dumping: exporting at low prices on a temporary basis: 
in order to enter the Community market or develop sales of a new product; 
when there is excess production capacity globally. 
16 European Parliantcnt -The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
Predatory Dumping 
The most contentious issues concerning the Community's anti-dumping policy arise from 
cases which the Commission and the industries concerned regard as examples of predatory 
dumping -predominantly, cases involving exports of electronics products from the Far 
East. 
In these cases, the concern is that exporters benefit from closed domestic markets with the 
result that 
•  they are able to charge high prices and earn high returns which can be used to 
cross-subsidise exports to the Community; 
•  costs can  be  reduced more rapidly since fixed  costs are  spread over greater 
volumes. 
As a result, exporters may be able to undercut Community producers without selling below 
cost. 
The Commission  argues  that,  unless  measures  are  taken  to counter dumping,  the 
Community industry will find that its costs increase, at least relatively, as dumped exports 
take a larger share of  the Community market.  Depressed profitability will make it difficult 
for the Community industry to fund and justify continuing investment in research and 
development.  Over time, the Community industry will either be eliminated entirely or will 
become technologically dependent on exporters to the Community and will cease to be an 
independent competitive force.  Dumping across a range of related products may lead to the 
loss of whole sectors of industry  to  the Community.  The resulting weakening or 
elimination of competition in the Community market will be severely detrimental to the 
interests of both consumers and industrial purchasers. 
We believe that the critical questions to be evaluated when considering whether or not to 
introduce anti-dumping measures in the circumstances described above are: 
•  whether there are strategic reasons to retain a Community capability in the industry 
in question; 
•  the impact on long run effective competition in the Community. 
With regard to the latter, the key questions are whether: 
•  the dumping will force Community firms out of the market or ensure that they are 
permanently weakened; 
•  the extent to which there will remain competition between exporters, irrespective of 
whether they have themselves been engaged in dumping; 
•  the extent of the entry or re-entry barriers in the relevant market. 
These conditions are most likely to be met in sectors in which technological progress is 
rapid and a high level of investment is required in research and development and production 
equipn1ent in order to maintain competitiveness.  Where this is the case, market closure 
n1ay allow the dumper(s) to gain an initial cost advantage which is reinforced by building 
volumes through aggressive pricing in the Community market.  As a result, the Community 
industry may suffer an increasing cost disadvantage. 
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Even if dumping has caused damage, it is still important to consider whether anti-dumping 
measures will rectify the damage.  There may be little point (apart from sending a strategic 
message) in introducing measures if the Community industry has already been permanently 
damaged to the point where it cannot be restored as an effective competitor. 
Other Types of Dumping 
However, whilst the incidence of predatory dumping is a key issue, dumping does not 
necessarily lead to a detrimental reduction in competition.  In general, economic analysis 
suggests that there can be  no  presumption that measures should be introduced when 
dumping has created material injury.  There are four fundamental reasons for this. 
i) Dumping is not Aberrant 
Dumping as measured and defined by GATT does not necessarily reflect an agressive or 
anti-competitive strategy of the dumper.  The economist's concept of perfectly competitive 
markets in which the free and rapid movement of goods ensures that prices in different 
markets are the same is rarely observed in  practice.  Indeed, where a relatively small 
number of producers compete in  a number of national markets, both overall demand 
conditions and those facing individual producers will often vary between markets leading to 
differences  in  prices.  When those demand conditions are stable, firms may adopt 
differential pricing strategies indefinitely unless the products can be easily (re)exported.  In 
other instances, a policy of setting low prices in a market may be transitory.  Even within 
their own domestic markets, firms often adopt a policy of price discrimination, eg. selling 
at different prices to different sub-markets, according to demand and supply sensitivities. 
Sin1ilarly, there will be a degree of price discrimination (dumping) from one country to 
another within the Community as firms adjust their pricing strategies to the different market 
circumstances they face.  Indeed, one of the objectives of the Single Market Programme 
and the Community's competition policy has been to eliminate the frictions which have 
allowed price differentials to persist within the Community in many sectors. 
Examples of how imperfect competition may lead to dumping include: 
•  firms will generally wish and be able to set higher prices in markets in which they 
have a strong brand image; 
•  in entering a new market, firms may well have to set low prices for several years in 
order to persuade consumers to sample their products; 
•  in  industries in  which costs decline over time as output is increased, there is a 
strong incentive to price below (current) costs in order to increase sales and reduce 
(future) costs.  In  these conditions firms may adopt aggressive pricing strategies 
irrespective of whether their domestic market is closed. 
Cyclical Dumpini: 
A determination of dumping would be made if an export price to the Community did not 
exceed the exporter's full costs (plus a margin of profit) in its domestic market.  Thus if 
business conditions and domestic prices are depressed and unit costs are high, an exporter 
n1ay have to set higher prices for sales to the Community in order to avoid a determination 
of dumping. 
ii) Injury is a Partial Measure of  Economic Welfare 
As discussed above, dumping may have very severe effects on the industry directly 
affected both in  the short and in  the longer term.  In addition, there may be detrimental 
indirect effects on  suppliers and,  if dumping reduces competition or efficiency, on 
customers of the Community industry subject to dumping. 
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However, dumping may also have other effects: 
•  new entry by an exporter will increase competition in the Community market and 
may lower prices in the longer term and/or add to the variety of products available 
to consumers; 
•  similarly, forward pricing and cyclical dumping strategies may reduce the general 
level of prices to consumers and industrial purchasers.  Furthermore, if industrial 
purchasers are not allowed to benefit fully from low prices, their competitiveness in 
downstream markets may be  affected  with  a  consequent loss of output and 
employment. 
A focus on the industry directly affected and on any indirect adverse effects on the wider 
sector and on suppliers of materials and components may therefore not fully reflect the 
overall economic impact on the Community. 
iii) There is no General Case for Reciprocal Measures Against Closed Markets 
There is a very powerful economic case for the removal of formal and informal barriers to 
trade which allow price differentials to persist.  This maxim has been the driving force 
behind the GATT and, as  noted above, the Community's Single Market Programme. 
However, faced  with closed markets, there is no presumption that adopting measures 
which have the effect of making imports less competitive in the Community market will 
increase economic welfare in the Community.  Closed markets may, of  course, provide the 
opportunity for dumping.  From the Community's viewpoint, whether measures are 
justified in  such circumstances has to reflect the comparative advantages of supply, the 
ability of the Community industry to compete effectively on equal tenns and whether 
measures help in opening markets.  The long term impact on prices is another key issue.  It 
is important that there is not an emotional response to closed markets. 
iv) Other Measures may be More Appropriate 
More generally, economic policies should, wherever possible be directed at the source of 
the problem.  As discussed above, dumping is not in itself a problem.  It may however 
create problems which require policy intervention.  In some cases, anti-dumping measures 
may be the only available solution.  But other policy measures available to the Community, 
particularly employment and research and development policies may be more appropriate in 
certain circumstances. 
When Measures May be Justified 
The analysis above suggests that anti-dumping measures are not automatically justified on 
economic grounds even when injury is found.  There are clearly, however, circumstances 
when such measures are merited. 
The circumstances when measures may be justified include: 
•  where labour is a significant cost, its opportunity cost in a recession may be low, 
with the result that prices of Community producers may exceed the social costs 
during the relevant period.  This may apply, in particular, if Community producers 
are located in regions with high unemployment; 
•  if capital markets are imperfect, unusually depressed conditions in the Community 
industry could reduce investment below  the  efficient level, or could lead to 
potentially efficient firms going out of business. 
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In any particular case, it is necessary to consider the balance between these considerations 
and the impact on consumers and downstream purchasers to determine whether there is an 
overall case for policy intervention.  A key consideration should be a judgement on the 
overall competitive position of the Community industry after the dumping episode. 
The Community's Use of Anti-Dumping Measures (Section V) 
Analysis of Cases 
Over the  period  1981-91, the Community initiated 422 anti-dumping investigations. 
Analysis by country and sector shows that: 
•  41% of cases  involved  non-market economies;  33%  involved industrialised 
countries; and the remaining 26% of investigations were directed at imports from 
developing countries  (including  the  Asian  Newly  Industrialised  Economies 
("NIEs")); 
there has been a notable increase in the number of cases accounted for by Japan 
and,  particularly,  the  Asian  NIEs.  Taken together,  the  proportion of cases 
accounted for by these countries increased from 10% over the period 1981-85 to 
32°hJ over the period 1986-91; 
whilst  the  overall  proportion  of cases involving  non-market economies has 
declined, there has been a marked increase in the number of cases directed against 
China; 
•  dumping investigations have been initiated in a wide range of sectors; the largest 
proportion has been in the chemicals sector. 
Outcome of Investigations 
In  around 70% of cases closed since 1981, definitive measures were adopted.  In just 
under 20o/o of cases no material injury to the Community industry was found; and only 6% 
of cases were closed with a finding of no dumping. 
Since 1986, no case ha~ been closed on the grounds that, despite the fact that a Community 
industry had  been  injured by dumping, the adoption of measures would not be in the 
Con1n1unity interest. 
Reviews 
The Commission estimates that 75% of cases expire or are repealed under the sunset 
provisions.  Over the period 1989-91, just over a half of all reviews concluded led to the 
repeal of n1easures. 
Investigations of Dumping by Community Exporters 
This study is concerned with the direct economic impact of the Community's own anti-
dumping policy.  Nevertheless, in considering the overall impact of the GATT provisions 
on dumping on the economic interests of the Community, it is notable that Community 
exporters are the most frequent target of anti-dumping investigations by other users of 
measures.  Nearly a quarter of all  anti-dumping investigations notified to the GATT 
Secretariat over the period 1980-89 were of exports from the Community, as compared to 
II% for Japan and 10% for the United States. 
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The Economic Impact of Anti-Dumping Measures (Section VI) 
Only a limited amount of research has been undertaken previously on the economic impact 
of dumping and anti-dumping measures and there is considerable scope for further detailed 
research on specific topics.  Our case studies help to illustrate some of the possible effects 
of measures.  However,  it is impossible to generalise on the basis of a few cases. 
Prices 
As the Commission argues, the impact of anti-dumping measures on prices depends on 
factors such as: 
•  the costs faced by EC producers and the extent of competition between them; 
the prices of undumped imports. 
An increase in prices equivalent to the duty applied is likely to be at the top of the range of 
possibilities.  Nevertheless, there is a strong presumption that measures will raise prices 
above the level that otherwise would have prevailed.  Indeed, removal of the injury to the 
Community industry depends in large part on such an effect.  In the longer term, if the 
application of measures has the effect of preserving competition, prices may be lower than 
they would have been if no measures had been taken against dumping. 
It should be stressed that the relevant comparison is with the trend in prices that would have 
been observed if measures had not been applied.  For products which tend to fall in price 
over time, measures may "raise prices" by stabilising or braking a downward trend. 
We are only aware of one study which has attempted to assess the impact of measures on 
prices across a wide range of products.  This yielded some rather surprising results but 
suggested that, overall, measures had the effect of raising the prices of dumped and of 
undumped imports and of EC manufactured products. 
Our case studies suggest the following results: 
in Denim, there was competition from other low-price imports and it must be 
doubtful if measures would have had any significant impact on prices; 
•  in Mini Ball Bearings, there is some evidence that measures raised prices; 
•  in Plain Paper Photocopiers, the market conditions would suggest that prices would 
have been affected and exporters and some observers claim that this has been the 
case.  However,  we have seen other conflicting evidence and the position is 
unclear, 
•  in Polyvinyl Chloride, a price undertaking at a low level was given and prices seem 
to have recovered before measures could have had an effect; 
•  it  is too early to assess the effects of measures against Small  Screen  Colour 
Televisions. 
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Competition 
Anti dumping measures reduce competitive pressures in the short run.  In the longer run 
they can have the effect of either increasing or reducing the degree of competition. 
Measures may have an  adverse long run impact on competition in certain circumstances. 
l-;or instance, if transitional dumping is used by an importer as a means of market entry, 
rneasures or the  threat of measures,  may deter an  effective entry  strategy.  If the 
Community industry is already highly concentrated, measures by deterring an important 
source of competition, may enhance existing market power. 
In  contrast, measures may be necessary in order to protect effective competition in the 
Community in  the long run.  This applies in cases of predatory dumping, or in other 
dumping episodes if serious damage to the long run comparative efficien~is caused by 
dumping. 
Our finding, confirmed by other research, is that in a significant proportion of cases, there 
are a relatively small number of producers in the Community.  The direction of the impact 
of measures on competition is particularly important in these cases. 
Trade and the Location of Production 
The table below summarises our estimates of the distribution of Community imports 
subject to anti-dumping measures by country and sector.  It demonstrates that currently the 
Community's anti-dumping measures are heavily concentrated on imports from the Far 
East and in the electronics sector. 
Distribution of  Community Imports Subject to Anti-Dumping Measures by 
Country and Sector, 1991 
( 0/o  of  All Community Imports Subject to Anti-Dumping Measures) 
Country Analysis  Sectoral Analysis 
Japan  83  Electronics  86 
Korea  6  Mechanical 
Total Japan  Engineering  3 
& Asian NIEs  91 
Non-Market  Chemicals  2 
Economies  4  Textiles  2 
Other Industrialised 
Countries  4  Iron & Steel  1 
Other Developing  Other  7 
Countries  1 
Source: Commission Annual Report and Eurostat trade statitsics 
In  its  1990 Annual Report, the Commission estimated that 0.6% of Communty imports 
were subject to anti-dumping duties.  This estimate does not take account of the impact of 
undertakings.  Our own  estimate, which includt.s undertakings, is that in 1991  1.1% of the 
C01nmunity's import trade was subject to anti-dumping measures.  In any case, the level of 
trade directly affected by measures is very small. 
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However, anti-dumping measures may also have indirect "trade chilling" effects.  For 
example, exporters may seek a lower market share or price less aggressively in Community 
markets in order to avoid an anti-dumping investigation.  It is very difficult to assess the 
importance of these effects in practice.  However, our interviews did provide some support 
for the view that exporters to the Community do take account of the danger of anti-dumping 
measures being imposed in framing their strategies for the Community market. 
There is considerable variation in the proportion of all trade in the relevant products which 
is  subject to anti-dumping measures.  In  around 40% of cases, the proportion of trade 
affected in  1991  was 20% or less of all trade in the product.  At the other extreme, in 
around  15% of cases, more than 60%  of trade was affected.  In our view, this is an 
important indicator of the economic impact of measures. 
Both previous research and our case studies suggest that measures reduce trade levels with 
the countries affected and increase trade with other countries. 
It is difficult to distinguish  the effects of anti-dumping measures on the location of 
production from those of globalisation strategies.  However, it seems very likely that at 
least the timing of investments in Community countries in industries such as Plain Paper 
Photocopiers  and Mini Ball Bearings was influenced by anti-dumping measures. 
Industrial Purchasers 
More than half of anti-dumping cases involve raw materials and intermediate products 
which are subject to further processing.  These industrial purchasers clearly benefit from 
dumping in the short run at least, and measures may affect their own competitive position 
in  the international markets.  Indeed, when Community purchasers face competition in 
international  markets,  a  loss of competitiveness could lead  to  a  loss of output and 
employment "downstream" which exceeds the  benefit of measures to the EC industry 
directly affected. 
This issue has been raised in a number of cases- including our Polyvinyl Chloride case 
study -- and in  some cases it is clear that this consideration has influenced the measures 
applied. 
Our Case Studies 
Three of our case studies- Plain Paper Photocopiers, Mini Ball Bearings, Small Screen 
Colour Televisions- are regarded by the Commission and the industries concerned as 
cases of predatory dumping. 
In  all  of these cases, our research suggests that if the Community industry were to be 
eliminated or enfeebled, it would be unlikely to re-emerge.  The principal questions are then 
whether: 
dumping did threaten to fundamentally alter the structure of the EC industry; 
•  the loss of the Community industry would so weaken competition that in the longer 
tenn prices would rise; 
•  there are wider or strategic benefits from the protection of the industries. 
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We are not in a position to definitively comment on these points.  However: 
•  it is notable that in each case there are a significant number of non-EC fmns in the 
market.  The question of whether they could be expected to compete in the longer 
tern1 is a vital one; 
•  the  ball  bearings industry is strategic in  the  sense that they are indispensible 
components of a very  wide range of products.  However, the key question is 
whether dumping would lead to a risk of denial of supplies to EC industry or 
supply on less attrc1ctive terms; 
•  in the Small Screen Colour Televisions  case, it appears that an important element of 
the case for measures was the need to preserve the industry's marketing base and to 
fund  the development of new products, including High Definition Television. 
Since there is only an indirect link between the profitability of SCTV sales and the 
development of new technologies, there seem to us to be considerable dangers in 
this line of argument. 
It should  be  recognised that many cases do not involve "strategic" considerations or 
concerns about future competition: 
•  the  Community  imports Denim from a  number of sources.  The production 
technology is readily available.  Price is a key consideration for many buyers.  This 
is therefore an example of a dumping investigation in a highly competitive industry 
in  which dumping would not create an enduring competitive advantage for the 
exporter; 
•  Polyvinyl Chloride is probably representative of a wide range of cases in the steel 
and chemicals sector in which relatively low levels of imports have a major impact 
on prices, particularly when the Community market is depressed.  This is because 
the capital intensive nature of the industries means that when capacity is under-
utilised, there is a large incentive to reduce prices as short run variable costs are 
low.  Again, in the absence of rapid technical advance, there is no necessary reason 
why  the dumper should  gain an  enduring competitive advantage.  However, 
dumping could lead to underinvestment and to a loss of competitiveness. 
The Community's Approach to Dumping Margin Determinations (Section Vll) 
There are a number of controveral issues which merit discussion. 
Sales  at  a  Loss 
As  noted above, exporters may sell at a loss in their domestic markets for a number of 
reasons, including when: 
demand is  weak~ 
•  there are high costs during the early stages of production of a new product or in a 
new factory; 
not all products in a range are able to bear a full share of overheads. 
Following the provisions of the GA TI  Code, the Community will treat (significant) sales at 
a loss (ie. sales at prices which do not recover overheads as well as variable costs within a 
period of a year or less) as not being in the "ordinary course of trade" and will determine 
nonnal value on the basis of production costs plus overheads and a reasonable rate of 
profit. 
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As in the circumstances described above, the exporter may be following identical pricing 
strategies in its home and export markets, there remains the possibility that dumping will be 
found, or dumping margins inflated, in circumstances which would not be regarded as 
prima facie unfair or anti-competitive in competition law proceedings. 
We  recommend  that sales  prices in  the exporter's domestic market should  be 
adopted  as  the  basis  for  normal  value  determinations unless  they are below 
variable cost.  (Recommendation 1) 
Related Sales and Marketing Organisations 
The Community's approach to determining dumping margins when manufacturers sell 
through wholJy or partly owned sales companies or distributors has been widely criticised 
by (particularly) Far East exporters and by some trade lawyers and academic observers. 
They allege  that  asymmetric adjustments are made to the prices  at which the  first 
independent sale is made in the exporter's domestic market and in the Community. 
This is a complex issue which has been at the heart of a number of cases considered by the 
European Court of Justice.  To have reached a definitive conclusion on the Commission's 
policy we would have needed to have had access to specific dumping margin calculations. 
However, we have been  able to discuss the issues involved with exporters and their 
advisers and with the Commission.  This leads us to the conclusion that the considerable 
controversy created by this question turns on two key issues. 
First, as a matter of policy, the Commission argues that normal value should take account 
of what it regards as high cost distribution systems in countries such as Japan, which have, 
in  the Con1mission 's view, the effect of closing the exporter's domestic market.  For this 
reason,  its  policy  is  to  determine normal  value on  the  basis of the prices paid by 
independent customers and only to make limited adjustments to such prices.  However, 
where the exporter can demonstrate that a particular sales channel in the domestic market is 
most comparable to  the export price to the Community, the Commission will determine 
normal value on the basis of sales in that channel. 
Second, as the functions carried out at different stages of distribution vary as between the 
home and export market, there is considerable scope for disagreement as to the appropriate 
level for comparison. 
As we have not been able to review specific dumping margin determinations in detail, we 
cannot con1n1ent on the Community's approach in practice. 
However: 
•  as a matter of principle, we believe it is undesirable that differences in distribution 
costs between the home and export market should be allowed to influence dumping 
margins.  Distribution costs may vary for a  number of reasons other than the 
relative degree of openness of markets; 
•  the problem would not arise if the export price to the Community were compared 
with an estimate of the cost of supplying the Community market rather than with the 
price in the exporter's domestic market; 
•  an alternative way of  ensuring that the distortion of  dumping margins by differences 
in distribution costs is minimised would be to compare export prices and prices in 
the exporter's don1estic market  as "close to the factory gate" as possible; 
25 Europc~tn Parliamenl -The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
•  if price to  price comparisons are adopted, it may not be  possible to make full 
allowance for differences in the level of trade (ie. for differences in the point in the 
distribution chain at which prices are compared) other than by making adjustments 
to remove or add particular costs.  When this is  the case, contrary to current 
practice, allowance should be made for overheads as well as for directly related 
costs. 
In summary, we conclude that: 
•  there is  an overriding requirement for fundamentally economic  reasons 
that normal value and the export price should be on  the same basis.  So 
far  as  possible,  differences  should  be  removed  by  the  adoption  of a 
selective normal  value.  However, to the extent that this is  not possible, 
we  see  little  alternative  to  making  cost-based  adjustments  to  ensure 
comparability.  Thus, any adjustments necessary to achieve comparability 
should include allowance for differences in indirect as well as direct costs. 
This would not appear to be provided for in the Anti-Dumping Regulation; 
•  there is  no economic rationale for treating separately the determinations 
of normal value and the export price and consideration of the need for 
adjustments  to  achieve  comparability  separately.  The  need  for 
adjustments will  crucially depend on the basis of normal value and the 
export price; 
•  since  we  see  no  reason  why  the level  of any  dumping margin  should 
depend  on  the  costs  of distribution  and  marketing  incurred  in  the 
exporter's domestic market, the dumping margin should be assessed at a 
level of trade as "close to the factory"  as possible; 
•  in  any  case,  there are strong economic  arguments for  comparing the 
export  price with  an estimate of the cost of supplying the Community 
market rather than the cost of supplying the exporter's domestic market; 
•  if allowance is  made for the profit that an importer might be expected to 
earn in constructing export prices, care should be taken to ensure that the 
rate of profit is truly representative.  (Recommendation 2). 
Comparison of Export Prices with Normal Value 
At present, dumping margins are determined by comparing the prices of specific export 
transactions with a single average normal value.  If the export price exceeds normal value, a 
value of zero is assigned in determining the overall dumping margin.  It is a longstanding 
criticism of the method adopted by the Community, and other leading users such as US, 
Canada and Australia, that this approach has the potential to inflate dumping margins. 
Subject to certain exceptions, the draft GATT Code requires that dumping margins should 
be determined by comparing average export prices with normal value. 
We  recommend  that, in  implementing this  provision, the Commission should 
provide guidance on the circumstances in which it would not follow the average-
to-average approach.  (Recommendation 3). 
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Our two recommendations above are consistent with the Parliament's recommendation·(t4 
December 1990) that the Commission publish guidelines for business concerning EC anti-
dumping policy, following the example of its guidelines concerning competition policy and 
public  procurement.  The  Parliament believes  such  guidelines  would improve the 
transparency of EC policy, notably with respect to the calculation of the dumping margin. 
Injury and the Community Interest (Section VIII) 
Injury 
As we have recognised above, dumping can clearly cause considerable economic distress to 
the Community industry directly affected by competition from dumped imports.  However, 
in our view, the GATT and Community injury criteria do not provide a sufficient guide to 
when measures will increase economic welfare.  This is because: 
•  the criterion is only a partial indicator of the Community interest.  In particular, no 
account is taken of the impact that anti-dumping measures have on: 
industrial purchasers; 
consumers; 
suppliers of materials and components. 
•  although reference is made to the implications of continued dumping, the injury 
criterion tends to be backward looking.  Policy analysis should recognise that 
bygones are bygones and focus on the effects that anti-dumping measures will have 
on producers and purchasers.  In saying this, we recognise however that measures 
may provide a signal and act as a deterrent to other industries. 
Our consideration of the in  jury criterion has also raised some more technical issues. 
Period of  Analysis 
Whereas in the analysis of injury, trends over three years or more are analysed, dumping 
margins are usually only determined for-one year or for an even shorter period. If  dumping 
is found in the period leading up to the investigation, it is implicitly assumed to have been 
taking place throughout the period for which injury is being assessed.  This need not be the 
case.  For example, exporters may not adjust their prices for movements in exchange rates 
until it is clear that these will not be reversed. 
However, determining dumping margins for several years-as is done in Australia-would 
be onerous. 
We recommend that the Commission should examine and report on pricing trends 
in  the exporter's domestic  market as well  as  in  the  Community during  the 
reference  period  to  verify  that  those  trends are  indeed  consistent  with  the 
emergency or development of dumping and the injury suffered by the Community 
industry.  However, this should not include the estimation of dumping margins for 
the whole reference period.  (Recommendation 4). 
De Minimis Limits 
Under nom1al conditions of competition firms will face significant "shocks" from time to 
tin1e  which reduce the demand that they face or the price that they can realise in their 
tnarkcts.  In addition, there is inevitably a margin of error in the determination of dumping 
margtns. 
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These considerations suggest that increases in import penetration of, perhaps, up to 5% or 
dumping margins of 5-10% would not pose an unusual threat to Community companies. 
Not surprisingly, there is a tendency, although not a very strong one (see pp153-154), for 
proceedings to be closed without measures when dumping margins and import penetration 
are low. 
The draft GATT Code sets a de minimis level for dumping of 2% and 1%  (subject to 
exceptions) for  market shares.  The former will require some change in Community 
practice. 
We recommend that the Commission should adopt and publish de minimis limits 
which  are  significantly  higher  than  those  set  in  the  new  GATT  Code. 
(Recommendation 5) 
This recommendation seems consistent with the Parliament's 1990 Resolution that there 
can only be said to be dumping where a large influx of cheap imports causes substantial 
damage to the domestic industry. 
Community Interest 
It is some years since a proceeding was closed with a finding that the application of 
measures would not be in the Community Interest.  Prima facie this is surprising since: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the Commission takes the view that an investigation should be opened if there is 
reasonable evidence of dumping and injury and that Community Interest issues 
should not be taken into account at this stage; 
dumping investigations have been launched and measures imposed in a variety of 
market circumstances; 
economic analysis suggests that the producer interest is not a good proxy for the 
oventll Community economic interest; 
more than  half of anti-dumping cases involve raw materials and intermediate 
products which are subject to further processing. 
A wide range of views on the Community interest criterion was expressed to us. 
At one extreme, some observers argued that the Commission treats the Community interest 
as equivalent to that of the industry.  At most, the criterion is merely a safety valve which 
allows the Commission and the Council not to adopt or to modify measures when there is 
strong  pressure for this.  This assessment leads some observers to the view that the 
pretence that other interests are taken into account should be abandoned.  Others feel that 
giving substance to the Community interest criterion is a central and necessary reform. 
However, other observers - and particularly industry associations- were concerned that 
Community industry would not get the protection from injurious dumping that it requires 
and deserves if prominence were to be given to Community interest issues.  Some regard 
injurious dumping as of itself contrary to the Community interest.  Others are concerned at 
the  range of commercial, economic and political issues which might be  brought into 
account. 
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Based  on  our  case  studies,  the  interview  programme  and  a  review  of the 
outcome of cases over the last decade, our overall  impression  is  that there is 
scope for  more detailed analysis of the impact that anti-dumping measures will 
have  and a  need  to re-consider the  balance between  producer and purchaser 
interests.  We  recommend that the Commission should report its analysis of the 
impact of dumping ilW1  of imposing anti-dumping measures on  all  economic 
interests from both a long and short term perspective.  (Recommendation 6) 
Measures (Section  IX) 
Design  of Measures 
There are a  number of significant considerations in the selection of ac._anti-dumping 
measure in the circumstances of a specific case, including: 
•  compliance; 
•  effectiveness in removing injury; 
•  its impact on consumer prices and duty revenues; 
•  effects on competition; 
•  flexibility in the face of  changed market circumstances; 
•  administnttive convenience. 
As  noted  above, in  most cases the Community applies fixed rate duties or accepts 
undertakings. 
Some commentators have argued that the Community, and possibly the GA  TI, should 
adopt a variable duty system, ie. one which links the level of duty to the difference between 
the value declared to Customs and some target price.  Such a system would indeed have the 
advantages of: 
•  make the effect on the prices at which Community producers would be able to sell 
more predictable; 
•  creating a positive incentive to cease dumping; 
•  introducing a "self-destruct" mechanism whereby measures would cease to have an 
impact when prices recover and the threat of further injury is removed; 
•  arguably increasing the fairness of the duty system. 
However: 
•  the benefit of the price increase would accrue to the exporter, 
•  it would be more costly to administer, 
•  if there are few suppliers to the Community market, setting a floor price for a 
significant proportion of imports could provide a benchmark and, as a result, have 
an adverse impact on competition. 
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Much the same considerations are relevant in the comparison of undertakings and ad 
valorem duties.  However~ variable duties have the advantage of an inbuilt mechanism to 
ensure compliance. 
The  arguments  are  not  clearcut  but,  on  balance,  we  recommend  that  the 
Community should  adopt a  variable duty system  unless  there are overriding 
concerns  about  the  effect  on  competition  or  when  to  do  so  would  not  be 
administratively practicable.  (Recommendation 7) 
Change in Circumstances 
Anti-dumping measures may in practice provide too much or too little protection to the 
Con1munity industry. 
We  believe  that the Commission should monitor the impact of measures and, 
where the measures are not having the intended effect, open a review on its own 
initiative.  (Recommendation 8) 
Life of Measures 
The five year "Sunset Period" provided for in the Anti-Dumping Regulation and in the draft 
GATT Code would in most cases seem to provide a reasonable period for the Community 
industry to adjust.  In one of our case study sectors-Mini Ball Bearings-measures have 
been in place since the 1970s.  -
We  believe that 
consideration should  be  given  to the adoption of measures for a  lesser 
period, particularly when dumping and the injury it has caused are linked to 
the state of the economic cycle.  Provision could be made (exceptionally) 
for the renewal of these measures; 
•  measures should  only  exceptionally  endure for  more  than  five  years. 
(Recommendation 9) 
Level of Protection 
The "Lesser Duty Rule" has a central role in the Community's anti-dumping policy.  At 
present, the level of duty is set to remove injury. 
Assessing the level of duty (or price undertaking) which will remove injury poses a number 
of technical difficulties.  The Commission has adopted a number of different approaches 
and this has led to allegations of inconsistency.  Since the impact of measures depends on 
the  specific n1arket circumstances, assessing injury margins is very difficult.  We see 
significant scope for further work to develop and evaluate alternative approaches. 
We recommend that the Commission should undertake or commission research 
on  this  question  and should  subsequently  publish  guidance on  its  policy  on 
determining injury margins.  (Recommendation 10) 
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Furthermore,  since  the  impact  of  measures  in  relieving  the  injury  to  the 
Community industry is only a partial indicator of their impact on the Community 
interest,  we  recommend  that  the  Community's  lesser  duty  rule  should  be 
redefined  to  provide  that  the  level  and form  of any anti-dumping measures 
adopted should  not simply  be  set  in  order to remove  injury  but in  order to 
maximise the overall interests of the Community.  (Recommendation 11) 
Anti-Circumvention  Measures 
In  its  1990 Resolution, the European Parliament emphasised the importance of effective 
rules to prevent the circumvention of  anti-dumping measures. 
Prin1ary anti-dumping measures create a clear and powerful incentive to circumvention. 
However: 
•  there is a risk that anti-circumvention measures may create additional distortions; 
•  it may be difficult to distinguish between legitimate inward investment projects and 
those principally stimulated by anti-dumping duties. 
We would therefore stress the need to apply anti-circumvention measures flexibly and to 
take account of the effect that supplementary measures would have on the Community 
interest. 
Refunds and Reviews of Anti-Dumping Duties 
Whatever view is taken of the case for the application of anti-dumping measures, it seems 
desirable that exporters subject to measures should be given an incentive to stop dumping. 
This can be achieved by: 
•  refunding duties when dumping ceases; 
releasing exporters who cease and are not expected to resume dumping from 
measures through a review. 
At present, both Community policy on refunds and reviews and practical difficulties in 
securing refunds appear to weaken the incentive for exporters to stop dumping.  These 
problems would not arise if our recommendation that the Community should adopt a 
variable duty system were to be accepted. 
The policy problem concerns the treatment of anti-dumping duties themselves when 
dumping margins are recalculated to determine whether a refund should be paid or whether 
measures should be renewed or amended.  At present, if the importer is related to the 
exporter, duties paid by the former are deducted in determining whether dumping has 
continued. 
Whilst  recognising  that  the  balance  of  the  arguments  is  not  clearcut,  we 
recommend  that,  as  is  the  case  in  the  United  States,  anti-dumping  duties 
themselves should  not  be  treated as a  cost  incurred  by  importers which  are 
related to the exporter.  (Recommendation 12) 
We also recommend that the system for securing refunds should  be simplified 
(see page 214).  (Recommendation 13) 
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Institutions and Procedures (Section X) 
Our report is concerned with economic issues raised by the Community's anti-dumping 
policy.  However, there are a number of institutional and procedural issues which relate to 
the effectiveness of the policy and our recommendations for future Community policy 
which we should comment on. 
Length of Investigations 
The time taken to reach a final decision is a serious and understandable source of concern to 
Cornmunity industry, upon which the European Parliament has commented on a number of 
occasions.  In its 1990 Resolution, the Parliament called for provisional measures to (as a 
rule) be adopted within six months of the opening of a proceeding. 
It  can  take many months from the emergence of dumping problems to the opening of 
proceedings.  Investigations then last for an average of 18 months, although provisional 
measures may  be applied four to six months before this.  The average time taken  to 
complete investigations has increased significantly within the last decade. 
The complexity of  decision-making in the Community means that investigations will tend to 
take longer than in other countries.  However, this consideration does not explain why the 
average length of investigations has increased. 
It is notable that other leading users of anti-dumping measures (Australia, Canada and the 
US), all operate a system of time limits and several commentators have suggested that such 
a system should be adopted by the Community. 
This issue cannot be divorced from that of Commission resources.  The draft GAIT Code 
includes an overriding limit on the length of investigations of 18 months.  If  our proposals 
for the reform of the Con1munity interest criterion are adopted, the overall amount of work 
needed in the course of the investigation will increase significantly.  In any case there is a 
danger that the system of time limits results in shortcuts being taken. 
However, we do recommend that the Commission should establish and publish 
targets for  the completion of the various stages of anti-dumping investigations 
and that detailed  information on  performance against these targets should  be 
included  in  the  Commission's  Annual  Report  to  the  Parliament. 
(Recommendation 14) 
Consideration of Alternatives to  Anti-Dumping Measures 
Anti-dumping measures may themselves not be the appropriate response to problems 
created by  dumping.  In  some cases, considerations of efficient policy design would 
suggest that explicit subsidies would be preferable to the protection afforded by duties. 
However, while we recognise that subsidies might not be consistent with the Community's 
international obligations, it  may  be appropriate to seek other measures to  assist the 
Community industry, either at the Community or the Member State level.  In particular, 
•  regional  and employment policies may be used when an  industry is likely to 
contract as  a result of international competition; 
R&D measures may be used to foster the development of key technologies. 
We therefore recommend that consideration of the Community interest should 
include whether some alternative policy measure would  be more appropriate. 
(Recommendation 15) 
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Transparency of Anti-Dumping Proceedings 
We believe that the transparency of anti-dumping proceedings could be improved, thereby 
contributing to its effectiveness in  promoting the Community interest.  At present, we 
believe that the Commission's detailed policy is not sufficiently explained and that the basis 
of specific decisions is  not adequately justified in the implementing Regulations.  It is 
notable that in other leading user countries such as Australia, Canada and the US, more 
detailed reports are issued when measures are adopted. 
We recommend that: 
consumer,  trade  union  and  other  organisations  which  wish  to  make 
representations should  have  access  to  non-confidential  information  on 
proceedings; 
•  Regulations  imposing  provisional  and  definitive  measures  (and  indeed 
Decisions  closing  proceedings)  should  include  more  background 
information and a  full  discussion  of the  basis  of the Commission  and 
Council's decisions.  It would  be  helpful if the analysis of market trends 
were to  be separated from the (legal) analysis of injury and the (policy) 
analysis on the Community interest; 
•  the Commission should  publish a  detailed statement of its approach on 
specific issues arising in  dumping proceedings (eg on how  dumping and 
injury margins are determined).  (Recommendation 16) 
This latter recon1mendation is in line with the European Parliament's recommendation that 
the Con1n1ission should publish guidelines for business on its anti-dumping policy. 
Provisions for the Review of Commission and Council Decisions 
Anti-dumping proceedings raise strong emotions on both sides of the argument and it is 
in1portant that the system should contain adequate checks and balances.  We have noted 
above that the Community is unique among leading users of anti-dumping measures in 
having a single agency responsible for all stages of the investigations. 
At present, oversight of the Commission is exercised by the Council of Ministers, the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.  Member States will inevitably 
have particular regard to national interests and the Court has recognised that it is not well 
placed to rule on questions which are often either technical or policy issues rather than legal 
questions. 
The European Parliament may therefore wish  to consider whether a  specialist 
body should be established which  would advise on  issues of general policy and, 
perhaps,  on  the  overall  Community  interest  in  particular  cases. 
(Recommendation 17) 
Provisions for Monitoring of Measures 
In  son1c cases measures may only be justified to the extent that the Community industry 
takes steps to in1prove its competitiveness.  In addition, measures may not in practice be 
having the effects expected or intended. 
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We  recommend  that  the  Commission  should  actively  monitor  anti-dumping 
measures and should  initiate a  review  where  measures are not  having  their 
intended effects.  (Recommendation 18) 
Commission  Resources 
At  present the Commission has  124 posts  (including support staff) allocated to the 
administration of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures.  By contrast, in the United 
States over 200 staff of the  Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commisison work on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations. 
We have not explored the adequacy of the resources available to the Commission in the 
course of this study. 
We recognise that the recommendations in this report would require a  detailed 
review of resourcing requirements.  That review should include consideration of 
the skills required to undertake the detailed analysis of the Community interest 
that is at the centre of our recommendations.  (Recommendation 19) 
Broader Policy  Issues (Section  XI) 
Social and Environmental Dumping 
Within the existing GA  1T framework, it would not be possible for the Community to apply 
measures when exporters to the Community: 
•  do not observe internationally accepted minimim standards for terms and conditions 
of employment and thus benefit from low labour costs ("social dumping"); 
•  use older, more polluting processes or are subject to less stringent environmental 
legislation ("environmental dumping"). 
In  its 1990 Resolution the European Parliament considered that countries should meet ILO 
standards as a condition for securing duty free access to the Community market. 
We found  mixed views on the desirability of adopting measures against social and 
environmental dun1ping. 
We do not  believe that anti-dumping measures are well suited to dealing with these 
problems: 
• 
there is  no obvious reason to apply measures solely against exports which cause 
material injury to the Community industry; 
the cost advantage enjoyed by the exporter would be very difficult to assess and 
there would be a severe risk that an underlying comparative advantage would be 
obscured; 
applying trade protection measures could be counter productive as social and 
environmental standards could well improve with economic growth. 
Less  Developed Countries  and Eastern  Europe 
As noted above, a high proportion of anti-dumping investigations relate to imports from 
non-n1arket economies (  41 o/o  over the period 1981-91) and from the developing countries 
(26% ).  However, (leaving Korea aside) these cases taken together account for less than 
10% of all trade subject to anti-dumping measures. 
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There is a clear scope for conflict between the application of anti-dumping measures and a 
policy stance which generally seeks to promote development in the LDCs and Eastern 
Europe.  However, the point was made to us that it is unreasonable to withhold protection 
fron1  specific industries subject to dumping because of a general policy of promoting 
development. 
Nevertheless, this does not preclude the adoption of higher de minimis limits for these 
cases.  The balance between anti-dumping and other policies is a matter of political 
judgement, but we believe that this deserves consideration.  It can be noted that in its 1990 
Resolution, the  Parliament advocated that no measures should be taken against LDC 
producers if the dumping margin is found to be minimal; a figure of 5% was mentioned. 
This conclusion is consistent with our conclusion about de minimis limits. 
Overall Conclusions 
In  terms of their impact on trade and the Community interest, the most significant anti-
dumping cases in  the Community are those involving what the Commission regards as 
"strategic" products from the Far East.  The rationale emphasised by the Commission in 
these cases is essentially one based on concern about the impact of dumping on competition 
in the Community market.  However, it is recognised that anti-dumping measures do not 
strike at the root of competition problems, ie.  the closure of markets and collusive 
behaviour. 
We believe that it can also be argued that other developments in the world economy have 
made the GATI framework outmoded.  In particular: 
•  it  is very difficult to determine whether a decision to locate production in  the 
Community or in third countries should be treated as a case of  circumvention; 
•  where there are economies of scale, duties may well not be reflected in increased 
prices, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the measure; 
•  the determination of dumping is made very much more complex when producers 
become involved in distribution in both their domestic and export markets. 
For these reasons, there is a strong case for the replacement of anti-dumping measures by 
international competition laws.  Indeed, we have found that it is generally accepted that if 
international trade were subject to the equivalent of the competition laws applied in the 
Community and many other developed economies, the case for anti-dumping policy would 
be substantially removed. 
However, although initiatives to co-ordinate competition policies are emerging (for example 
the recent agreement between the Community and the United States), it will inevitably be 
n1any years, even decades, before agreement can be reached on a system for the regulation 
of competition at the international level. 
In  the n1eantime, the only practicable option for the Community is to use the framework 
created by the GA  TI Anti-Dumping Code. 
Some critical commentators have argued that the Community should redefine dumping and 
injury and only apply measures when: 
the export price to the Community does not cover costs; 
•  dun1ping will injure competition (rather than producers). 
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We have some sympathy with these views.  However, for the reasons set out above we 
would not wish to apply anti-dumping measures only in cases in which there is a threat to 
efft:xtive competition in the Community.  Nor do we regard it as likely that such a reform 
would be implemented. 
Rather, in our view, the priority should be to make the Community interest criterion the 
central focus of anti-dumping proceedings.  Measures would only be introduced when and 
to the extent that they are demonstrably in the Community interest.  We would expect this 
to mean that in some cases in which dumping and injury are found no measures would be 
adopted because to do so would not be in the Community interest. 
More particularly, we  recommend that anti-dumping proceedings should include 
an economic cost benefit analysis of the case for the application of anti-dumping 
measures.  (Recommendation 20) 
The analysis would: 
•  be forward looking.  That is, a comparison would be made of the likely impact of 
measures on the various constituent parts of the Community's economic interests; 
•  focus on whether measures would: 
be necessary to preserve effective competition in the Community market; 
promote the more efficient utilisation of the Community's resources. 
The impact of measures on the competitiveness of the Community industry and on its 
customers in both the short and long term would be central to this appraisal.  That is, the 
analysis would include consideration of  the effe· cts that measures would have on: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
prices in the short and longer term; 
investment and research and development in the industry directly affected; 
the competitiveness of  the wider sector and of  suppliers and purchasers; 
regional employment. 
The GATT does not require signatories to adopt anti-dumping measures; rather it permits 
them to do so.  Indeed, the Code states that it is desirable that the application of measures 
should be permissive rather than automatic.  The reform that we propose would therefore 
be consistent with the Code. 
36 European Parliament- The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN 
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ZlJSAMMENFASSUNG UND SCHLUSSFOLGERUNGEN 
Einfiihrung 
Diese Zusammcnfassung enthalt eine Kurzfassung unseres Berichts an  das Europaische 
Parlament iibcr die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping und die Antidumping-Politik 
der Gemeinschaft, in der unsere wichtigsten SchluBfolgerungen und Empfehlungen dargelegt 
werdcn. 
lnhaltsangabe  des  Berichts 
Tcil I beschreibt den Hintergrund unserer Studie, unsere Aufgabenstellung, 
unser Arbcitsprogramm und unser Konzept. 
Tcil II behandelt die Grundziige der Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft und 
die einschHigigen GATT-Bestimmungen. 
Teil III analysiert die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping und die 
diesbeziiglichen Erfahrungen der Gemeinschaft. 
Teil  IV  erortert  die  okonomischen  Argumente,  die  fiir  Antidumping-
MaBnahmen sprechen. 
Teil V befaBt sich mit der Anwendung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen durch die 
Gemeinschaft. 
Teil VI  behandelt die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping und der 
Antidumping-MaBnahmen  auf  die  wichtigsten  Dimensionen  des 
Gemeinschaftsin  teresses. 
Teil VII und Teil VIII behandeln die wichtigsten Kriterien fur das Dumping, die 
Schadigung und das Gemeinschaftsinteresse. 
Teil IX  befaBt sich mit der Auswahl von geeigneten MaBnahmen und Teil X mit 
institutionellen Fragen. 
Teil  XI  erortert  einige  gesamtpolitische  Fragen,  die  mit dem  Dumping 
zusan1n1enhangen. 
llintcrgrund, Aufgabenstellung und Arbeitsprogramm (Teil I) 
1/intergrund und Aufgabenstellung 
lm vergangenen Jahrzehnt hat sich das Europaische Parlament stark fiir die Antidumping-
Politik  der Gcmeinschaft und  fur den  Antidumping-Kodex des GA  TI interessiert.  Erst 
kiirzlich,  im  Jahre  1990,  hat  das  EP  eine  EntschlieBung  angenommen,  in  der  die 
Notwendigkeit von Antidumping-MaBnahmen betont und mehrere spezifische Empfehlungen 
vorgebracht  werden,  die dazu  angetan  sind, die  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  wirksamer, 
ausgcwogencr und transparenter zu gestalten. 
U  m den Sachverstand des EP beziiglich der wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping und 
dcr Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft zu verbessem, wurde Ernst & Young im Dezember 
1991  mit der Ausarbeitung einer Studie beauftragt, die zum Gegenstand hat: 
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die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping und der Antidumping-Politik 
in der Gemeinschaft zu bewerten; 
die  Bedeutung  und  die  Effizienz  der  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  der 
Gemeinschaft zu beurteilen; 
Optionen fiir Anderungen der gemeinschaftlichen und der intemationalen Politik 
in diesem Bereich zu ermitteln und zu bewerten. 
Arbeitsprogramm 
lm Rahn1cn der Studie haben wir: 
(I) 
ein  Rahmenkonzept entwickelt,  das eine Analyse der Auswirkungen des 
Dumping und der Antidumping-MaBnahmen auf die Gemeinschaft ermoglicht 
und die wesentlichen Entwicklungen in der okonomischen Analyse des Handels 
auf den intemationalen Markten im vergangenen Jahrzehnt beriicksichtigt; 
eine statistische Analyse der okonomischen Daten der Industrien und Markte, 
fiir die Antidumping-Verfahren eingeleitet wurden, sowie des Einsatzes von 
Antidumping-MaBnahmen durch die Gemeinschaft im vergangenen Jahrzehnt 
durchgefiihrt; 
detaillierte Fallstudien von fiinf Antidumping-Verfahren (1) angefertigt. Die 
Auswahl der Fallstudien erfolgte im Benehmen mit der Kommission und der 
Direktion Wissenschaft des EP; 
zahlreiche  Sitzungen  mit  der  Antidumping-Direktion  der  Kommission 
abgehalten, in denen aile Aspekte der Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft 
erortert wurden; 
ein  Interview-Programm mit anderen  Dienststellen der Kommission, dem 
GATT-Sekretariat,  Ministerien  und  Wettbewerbsbehorden  in  einigen 
Mitgliedstaaten, lndustrieverbanden, Verbraucherverbanden, Gewerkschaften, 
Regierungsvertretern  von  Interessen  der  Exportwirtschaft, 
Handelsrechtsan wal ten und Hochschulkommentatoren abgewickelt; 
die Antidumping-MaBnahmen und die diesbeziiglichen Erfahrungen der drei 
anderen  groBten  Anwender  von  Antidumping-MaBnahmen,  namlich 
Australiens, Kanadas und der Vereinigten Staaten, gepriift. 
Unsere  fiinf Fallstudien bcfaBten  sich  mit den Antidumping-Verfahren fiir  die Einfuhren 
folgender Produktc in die Gemeinschaft: 
Denim - ein zur Herstellung von  Bekleidung verwendeter Stoff- aus vier Ulndem (Tiirkei, 
Indonesien,  Hong-Kong  und  Macao).  Dabci  wurdc  nur ein  sehr bcgrcnztes  Dumping 
fcstgestcllt, weswcgen die Kommission zu dem SchluB kam, daB dcr Gemeinschaftsindustrie 
dadurch kein Schaden entstanden sci. Daher wurden auch keine einschlagigcn MaBnahmen 
ergriffen; 
Minikugcllager- die in  Motoren und zahlreichen anderen Produkten zur Verringcrung der 
Rei bung zwischen bcweglichen Teilen verwendet werdcn- aus Japan, Singapur und Thailand. 
In den 70er Jahrcn wurden fUr die Einfuhren aus Japan einseitige Verpflichtungen akzeptiert. 
19R4  wurdcn auf die Einfuhren aus Japan und Singapur Zl>llc vcrhangt und danach auch auf 
lbailand ausgcdehnt. Diesc Mafinahmen sind noch immer in Kraft; 
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Fotokopiercr aus Japan. Seit 1986 werden vorlaufige Antidumping-Zone angewendet, die 
dcrJ.cit ubcrprtift werden; 
Polyvinykhlorid- cin zur Herstellung zahlreicher Produkte verwendcter Kunststoff- aus vier 
ostcuropllischcn  Lllndcrn  (Tschcchoslowakci, Rumanien,  Ungaro, ex-DDR).  Ab  1982/83 
wurden MaBnahmcn angcwcndet, die 1987/88 ausliefcn; 
Klcinfarbfcmscher. 1989 wurden vorHiufige Antidumping-ZOlle auf die Einfuhren aus Korea 
und danach auch auf die Einfuhren aus Hong Kong und China verhltngt 
Rahmen und Konzept 
Bci  unsercm  Konzept gingen wir davon aus, daB  die globalen Wirtschaftsinteressen der 
Gcmcinschaft  genercll  durch  den  Freihandel  optimal  gefordert  werden,  urn  dann  die 
Auswirkungen des Dumping bzw. die Frage zu beurteilen, ob der wirtschaftliche Wohlstand in 
dcr Gcmcinschaft durch  Antidumping-Mallnahmen  in  allen oder nur in einigen Fallen 
verbesscrt wird, in denen eine lndustriebranche unter schadlichem Dumping zu leiden hat. 
Dabci hahcn wir geprtift, ob andere Mallnahmen eine bessere Antwort auf die durch Dumping 
vcrursachten Probleme darstellen wlirden. 
Einc vollstiindige Beuneilung der Auswirkungen von Dumping und Antidumping-MaBnahmen 
h!itte in bestimmten Fallen den Zugang zu sehr empfindlichen Informationen vorausgesetzt und 
fUr die Industric und die Exporteure der Gemeinschaft eine erhebliche Belastung bedeutet: Wir 
h!ittcn  die Untcrsuchung erneut durchftihren  und eine detaillierte Analyse der weiteren 
Entwicklungcn vornehn1en  mtissen. Dies ware nicht machbar gewesen. Daher hat unser 
Bcricht die Forn1 einer okonomischen Analyse der Moglichkeiten einer Antidumping-Politik, 
die (weitgehend) auf unseren ftinf Fallstudien und unseren Gesprachen mit der Kommission 
und andcren Beobachtem und Beteiligten an der Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft beruht. 
Ncben den in diesem Bericht analysierten Fragen gibt es noch mehrere andere wirtschaftliche 
und politische Erwagungen, die fUr  die Festlegung einer praktischen Poltik von Bedeutung 
sind: 
Antidumping-Mallnahmen konnen insofern wirtschaftliche Vorteile bringen, als 
sie  Drittmarkte  offnen.  Eine  wesentlich  umfassendere  Studie  der 
Handelsbeziehungen  ware  vonnoten,  urn  die  Frage  zu  beurteilen,  ob 
Antidumping-Mallnahmen  einen  wirklichen  und  wirksamen  Beitrag  zur 
Liberalisierung der Weltmarkte leisten. Dies lag jedoch auBerhalb unserer 
Aufgabenstellung. 
Weithin wird die Auffassung vertreten, daB  - gabe es keine Antidumping-
MaBnahmen- der protektionistische Druck in der Praxis auf eine Art und Weise 
bewiiltigt  werden  mtillte,  die  eine starkere  Verzerrung  des  Welthandels 
hcwirkcn wtirde.  So gesehen, sind Antidumping-MaBnahmen cine Art von 
Sicherheitsventil. 
Die Vorstellung, daB Dumping "unfair" ist, hat cine starke emotionale Wirkung, 
doch  muB  jeweils erwogen werden, ob es einen okonomischen Grund fUr 
GegenmaBnahmen gibt. 
Es kann starker Druck ausgetibt werden, urn den Interessen gutorganisierter 
Gruppen zu entsprechen. 
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Beschriinkungen 
Wic  im  Auftrag  des  EP  und  in  unserem  Angebot  vermerkt  ist,  haben  wir  unser 
Arhcitsprogramm auf die Gemeinschaft als  solche  konzentriert.  Das AusmaB,  in  dem 
Uberseem~irkte der Gemeinschaft  verschlossen  sind,  sowie  die  von  dem  wichtigsten 
llandcl spartnern der Gemeinschaft verfolgten Handels- und Industriepolitiken sind wichtige 
Faktorcn, die sich auf die Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft auswirken. Die Direktion 
Wisscnschaft des EP war nicht der Auffassung, daB unsere Studie auf diese Punkte ausgedehnt 
werden sollte. 
Aus rechtlichen Griinden wares uns nicht moglich, die Akten der Kommission fiir unsere 
Fallstudien zu benutzen. VereinbarungsgemaB sollten wir die Gelegenheit bekommen, die 
Dumpingspannenkalkulationen einzelner Exporteure mit deren Zustimmung einzusehen. Leider 
lieB  sich dies nicht verwirklichen, was den Aussagewert der Fallstudien einschrankt. Ganz 
allgemein wirkte sich die Tatsache, daB mehrere Exporteure Bedenken hatten, unsere Studie zu 
untcrsttitzcn, negativ auf unsere Fallstudien aus, und wir hatten den Eindruck, daB Finnen und 
Industrieverbande aus der Gemeinschaft bei ihrer Zusammenarbeit mit uns recht zuriickhaltend 
waren. 
Die Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft (Teil II) 
Die Antidumping-MaBnahmen der Gemeinschaft Iehnen sich eng an den Antidumping-Kodex 
des GATT an.  Antidumping-MaBnahmen diirfen  ergriffen werden,  wenn folgende  drei 
Kriterien erftillt sind: 
Die Exporte in die Gemeinschaft werden gedumpt. Dumping wird haufig so 
verstanden, daB die Preise des Exporteurs auf seinem Inlandsmarkt hoher liegen 
als die Preise, die er den Importeuren aus der Gemeinschaft berechnet. Dies 
muB jedoch nicht der Fall sein: Wenn der lnlandsabsatz des Exporteurs nicht 
rentabel  ist,  wird  der  Exportpreis  mit  einem  errechneten  Inlandspreis 
verglichen, der aile Gemeinkosten 
und eine Gewinnspanne umfaBt. 
Die Industrie der Gemeinschaft hat durch das Dumping einen materiellen 
Schaden erlitten. Dariiber hinaus kann ein materieller Schaden dann geltend 
gemacht werden, wenn das Dumping eine Schadigung zu verursachen droht 
oder wenn es die Entwicklung einer Industriebranche der Gemeinschaft hemmt. 
Diese Bestimmungen werden jedoch in der Praxis kaum angewendet 
Die Anwendung von MaBnahmen liegt im Interesse der Gemeinschaft. 
Die  MaBnahmen,  die  gewohnlich  die  Form von Wertzollen oder Preisverpflichtungen 
annehmen,  werden  auf einer Ebene angewendet, die erforderlich  ist,um das Dumping 
unwirksam  zu  machen, es  sei  denn, daB  ein  niedrigerer Zoll (bzw.  Preisverpflichtung) 
ausreichen  wtirde,  urn  die Schadigung abzustellen  ("Regel des niedrigeren Zolls").  Die 
MaBnahmen laufen ftinf Jahre nach dem Zeitpunkt ihrer le~?ten Emeuerung aus, sofem ihre 
wcitcre  Notwendigkeit nicht durch eine abschlieBende Uberpriifung ("Sunset Review") 
bestlltigt wird.  -
Die cntrichtctcn ZOlle werden  zurtic~erstattet, falls der lmporteur nachweisen kann, daB sie 
iibcr der Dumpingspanne lagen. 
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Wic die Parlarnentsausschtisse festgestellt haben, umfassen die Antidumping-MaBnahmen der 
Gen1cinschaft drei Bestimmungen, durch die die Politik der Gemeinschaft liberaler wird als die 
eigcntlichcn Bestimmungen des GA  TT-Kodex: 
das Kriterium des Gemeinschaftsinteresses.  Australien und Kanada sehen zwar 
in  ihren  Rechtsvorschriften  vor,  daB  Aspekte des offentlichen  Interesses 
berticksichtigt werden, doch wird nicht vorgeschrieben, dies in jedem Fall zu 
tun; 
auBer der Gemeinschaft wendet nur noch Australien ausdriicklich die Regel des 
niedrigeren Zolls an; 
wie die Gemeinschaft haben  auch  Australien  und  Kanada auf fiinf Jahre 
befristete "Sunset"-Klauseln; im Entwurf des neuen GA  Tf.;J<odex werden die 
"Sunset"-Klauseln verbindlich vorgeschrieben. 
Zwci wcitere wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen den  MaBnahmen der Gemeinschaft und 
dcnjenigen Australiens, Kanadas und der Vereinigten Staaten bestehen darin, daB: 
in allen drei Landem zeitliche Fristen fiir die Untersuchung festgesetzt werden; 
in  Kanada und den Vereinigten Staaten die Dumping-Untersuchung von einer 
Regierungsbehorde  durchgefiihrt  wird,  wahrend  fiir  die 
Schadigungsuntersuchungen  eigene unabhangige Gremien oder Gerichte 
zustandig sind.  In  Australien befaBt sich eine unabhangige Behorde mit der 
Prtifung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen, die von der australischen Zollbehorde 
vorgeschlagen werden. 
Die Auswirkungen des Dumping (Teil Ill) 
llitltergrulld 
Eincr weitvcrbrciteten Auffassung zufolge entstehen Dumpingprobleme vor allem dadurch, daB 
einc Welle von  Niedrigpreisimponen ein Land tiberflutet, in dem die Nachfrage womoglich 
ohncdics schon rccht niedrig ist. 
Unscrc statistische Analyse von 40 Dumping-Untersuchungen hat gezeigt, daB zahlreiche Faile 
offensichtlich  diese  Merkmale  aufweisen.  In  dreien  unserer  Fallstudien  - Denim, 
Minikugcllager und Polyvinylchlorid - waren Nachfrage und Produktion in der Gemeinschaft 
in dcr Zeit vor der Untersuchung erheblich zuriickgegangen. 
In anderen Eillen sahen die Hintergrundbedingungen jedoch ganz anders aus, und fiir die Zeit 
unmittclbar vor der Einleitung der Untersuchung stellten wir folgendes fest: 
In  etwa  der  Halfte  der  Faile  betrug  der  Anstieg  der  Nachfrage  in  der 
Gemeinschaft 3 % oder mehr, 
in etwa 25 % der Falle betrug der Anstieg der Produktion in der Gemeinschaft 3 
% odermehr; 
in etwa 20 % der Faile betrug der Anteil der mutmaBlich gedumpten Einfuhren 5 
% des Gemeinschaftsmarktes oder weniger; 
in etwa einem Drittel der Faile stagnienen oder stiegen die Imponpreise. 
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In unscrcn Fallstudicn iiber Nonnalpapierkopierer (PPC) und Kleinfarbfernseher (SCfV) war 
dcr  Gemcinschaftsmarkt  lebhaft,  wenn  auch  im  letzteren  Fall  die  Gesamtproduktion 
zuriickging. 
Uic Auswirkungen des Bumping 
Jc nach den Hintcrgrundbedingungen der einzelnen Faile ist zu erwarten, daB das Dumping 
vcrschiedene  Auswirkungen  auf  die  Industrie  der  Gemeinschaft  und  auf  andere 
Wirtschaftsobjekte haben wird. Bei starkem Dumping und groBem Handelsvolumen werden 
Prcise,  Gewinne,  Produktion  und  Beschaftigung  in  der Gemeinschaft  wahrscheinlich 
kurzfristig nicdriger liegen als andernfalls. Bei wachsenden Markten kann Dumping eher zu 
einem Verlust von Marktanteilen als zu einem Riickgang der Produktion fiihren. Der Verlust 
von  Marktanteilen kann ein besonders wichtiger Indikator fiir eine Schadigung sein, wenn 
Wachstun1 notig ist, urn die Wettbewerbsfahigkeit beziiglich der Kosten zu wahren oder zu 
vcrbessern. Bei den Nonnalpapierkopierern und den Kleinfarbfernsehern warder Verlust von 
Marktantcilcn durch die Industrie der Gemeinschaft besonders ausgepragt. 
Sonstige wichtige Indikatoren fiir eine Schadigung, die bei jeder der von unseren Fallstudien 
erfaBten  lndustriebranchen in erheblichem Umfang festgestellt wurden, waren Preis- und 
Rentahiliti\tsriickgange. 
Es ist wichtig, zwischen den kurzfristigen und den Hingerfristigen Auswirkungen des Dumping 
zu untcrschciden. Dies hangt zum Teil davon ab, ob das Dumping vorilbergehender Naturist 
odcr nicht. Unter dem Aspekt der wirtschaftlichen Gesamtauswirkung stellt sich langfristig die 
entschcidcnde Frage, ob die Wettbewerbsfahigkeit der Gemeinschaftsindustrie durch das 
Dumping hceintrachtigt wird. Dies konnte z.B. dann der Fall sein, wenn: 
der  Gemeinschaftsindustrie  durch  das  Dumping  GroBenvorteile  oder 
Lemeffekte vorenthalten werden, die der Dumper selbst aber nutzen kann; 
wegen etwaiger durch das Dumping bedingter kurzfristiger Finanzprobleme auf 
notwendige F & E-Tatigkeiten oder Investitionen verzichtet werden muB; 
die Lieferanten und Zulieferindustrien der Gemeinschaft geschadigt werden. 
In n1chreren Fallen bildeten die potentiellen kilnftigen Auswirkungen des Dumping einen der 
I Iauptaspekte der Studie. 
Im  Fall der Minikugellager hestand die BefUrchtung, daB die Rentabilitat der 
lndustrie nicht ausreichen konnte, urn die erforderlichen Investitionen und F & 
E-T~\tigkeiten zu finanzieren; 
im  Fall der Norn1alpapierkopierer ergab sich, daB die Gemeinschaftsindustrie 
wcniger fur F &  E a us gab als die japanischen Exporteure, woraus geschlossen 
wurde, daB  die  kUnftige Wettbewerbsfahigkeit der Gemeinschaftsindustrie 
bcdroht ist; 
im Fall der Kleinfarbfernseher wurde befiirchtet, daB ein fortgesetztes Dumping 
zur Einstellung der integrierten Gemeinschaftsproduktion fiihren konnte und 
daB  sich  langfristig  negative  Auswirkungen  auf die  Entwicklung  neuer 
Produktgenerationen ergeben konnten. 
Insgcsamt gcsehcn, durften Yerbraucher und industrielle Abnehmer kurzfristig vom Dumping 
profiticrcn, weil sie niedrigere Preise zahlen mtissen als andernfalls. Die entscheidende Frage 
ist jcdoch, ob diese niedrigeren Preise auch in Zukunft gehalten werden konnen, oder ob die 
Yerbrauchcr durch negative Auswirkungen des Dumping letztlich mit hoheren Preisen und/oder 
schlechtcrcm Service konfrontiert werden. 
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Die Argumcnte fiir einc Antidumping-Politik (Teil IV) 
l'erspektiven  einer Antidumping-Politik 
Die Antwortcn auf die Frage, ob es eine okonomische Rechtfertigung fur eine Antidumping-
Politik giht, gehcn sehr weit auseinander. 
Auf dcr cinen  Seite  wird  argumentiert, daB  Dumping nur dann moglich  sei,  wenn der 
lnlandsmarkt des Exporteurs dem Wettbewerb verschlossen oder "isoliert" ist. In diesem Sinne 
stcht das Dumping im Widerspruch zu den Zielen des Freihandels und des internationalen 
Wcttbewcrbs, die in den vergangenen fiinf Jahrzehnten den Mittelpunkt der Entwicklung des 
Wclthandclssystems bildeten. Das schadliche Dumping wird vom GA  TI  verurteilt, und wenn 
cin solches Dumping vorliegt, soli ten die im GA  TI vorgesehenen Rechte, Antidumping-
MaBnahmcn  anzuwenden,  in  Anspruch  genommen  werden.  In  dieser Form  hangt die 
Rechtfcrtigung  von  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  zum  groBen  Teil  nicht  nur  von  den 
wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping, sondern auch von den dariiber hinausgehenden 
Argumcnten dcr Fairness und dem vorgenannten Ziel einer Forderung der offenen Markte ab. 
Auf dcr andcrcn Seite argumentieren einige Kritiker der Antidumping-MaBnahmen, daB die 
Prcisvortcilc, die sich fi.ir Verbraucher und industrielle Abnehmer durch das Dumping ergeben, 
nicht gebiihrcnd beri.icksichtigt wi.irden.  Ihres Erachtens ist Dumping nur dann wirtschaftlich 
schiidigcnd, wenn es zur Ausschaltung der Gemeinschaftsindustrie und zu der Situation ftihrt, 
daB cs die Abnehn1er der Gemeinschaft mit einem Liefermonopol zu tun haben. Sie glauben, 
daB Faile von "ruinosem" Dumping sehr selten sein diirften. Folglich sei die Anwendung von 
Antidumping-MaBnahmen nur unter ganz besonderen Umstanden gerechtfertigt. 
Wir sind der Meinung, daB  Dumping in einer groBeren  Zahl von Fallen als vorstehend 
bcschrichcn den wirtschaftlichen Interessen der Gemeinschaft schaden kann. Bei der Priifung 
dcr wirtschaftlichen Rechtfertigung fiir die Anwendung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen ist es 
jedoch von cntscheidender Bedeutung, eine detaillierte Marktanalyse durchzufiihren, die 
Gri.inde fi.ir das Dumping zu ermitteln und die voraussichtlichen Auswirkungen des Dumping 
abzuschatzen. In diesem Zusammenhang halten wires fiir niitzlich, zwischen den folgenden 
Typen des Dumping zu unterscheiden: 
langfristiges  Dumping: eine Strategic, die darin besteht, tiber lange Jahre 
hinweg und  womoglich auf Dauer niedrigere Preise fiir die Exportmarkte 
festzulegen; 
zyklisches Dumping: Export von Produkten zu Preisen, die nicht aile Kosten 
decken, wenn der Markt gedri.ickt ist; 
Staatshandels-Dumping: Exporte aus nichtmarktwirtschaftlichen Landern zu 
Preisen, die in einer Marktwirtschaft nicht aile Kosten decken wiirden; 
ruinoses oder strategisches Dumping: Export zu niedrigen (aber nicht unbedingt 
vcrlustbringenden) Preisen, der zur Folge hat, daB der Wettbewerb auf dem 
Gemeinschaftsmarkt beeintrachtigt wird; 
vori.ibcrgehendes Dumping: Export zu niedrigen Preisen fiir eine befristete Zeit: 
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verschaffen  oder  den  Absatz  eines  neuen 
Produktes zu fordern; 
wenn  die  gesamte  ProduktionskapaziHit 
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Rui11oses Dumping 
Die umstrittcnstcn Probleme im Zusammenhang mit der Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft 
ergchcn sich in Fallen, die von der Kommission und den Industriebranchen als Musterbeispiele 
des ruinoscn Dumping betntchtet werden und bei denen es sich hauptsachlich urn Exporte von 
Elcktronikprodukten aus dem Femen Osten handelt. 
In dicscn f-allen ist davon auszugehen, daB die Exporteure von abgeschotteten Inlandsmarkten 
profiticrcn, n1it dem Ergebnis, daB: 
sic in1stande sind, hohe Preise zu verlangen und hohe Profite zu erzielen, die 
dazu  verwendet  werden  konnen,  die  Exporte  in  die  Gemeinschaft  zu 
subventionieren; 
die Kosten rascher gesenkt werden konnen, weil die fixen Kosten auf groBere 
Volumen umgelegt werden konnen. 
Das hat zur Folge, daB die Exporteure die Hersteller in der Gemeinschaft unterbieten konnen, 
ohne unter Selbstkosten zu verkaufen. 
Die Komn1ission ist der Auffassung, daB die Gemeinschaftsindustrie - wenn nichts gegen das 
Dumping getan wird- zun1indest mit relativen Kostensteigerungen konfrontiert wird, weil die 
gcdumptcn Exportc cinen groBeren Anteil am Gemeinschaftsmarkt erobem. Die rticklaufige 
Rentabilitat n1acht es der Gemeinschaftsindustrie noch schwieriger, regelmaBige Investitionen 
in  Forschung und  Entwicklung zu  finanzieren und zu rechtfertigen. Mit der Zeit wird die 
Gcmcinschaftsindustrie entweder ganz ausgeschaltet, oder sie wird technologisch von den 
Exporteuren  in  die  Gemeinschaft  abhangig  und  hort  damit  auf,  ein  unabhangiger 
Wcttbewerbsfaktor zu  sein. Dumping bei mehreren verwandten Produkten kann dazu ftihren, 
daB ganzc lndustriesektoren in der Gemeinschaft ausgeschaltet werden. Die dadurch bedingte 
Schwachung bzw.  Ausschaltung des Wettbewerbs auf dem Gemeinschaftsmarkt ist sowohl 
den lnteressen der Verbraucher als auch denjenigen der industriellen Abnehmer sehr abtiiiglich. 
Wir  sind  der  Auffassung,  daB  bei  der Prtifung  der  Frage,  ob  unter den  vorstehend 
bcschriebenen Umstanden Antidumping-MaBnahmen eingeleitet werden sollen oder nicht, 
folgende Kriterien ausschlaggebend sind: 
Gibt es strategische Grtinde, ein Gemeinschaftspotential in dem betreffenden 
lndustriesektor zu erhalten? 
Welche Auswirkungen haben die MaBnahmen auf einen langfristig effektiven 
Wettbewerb in der Gemeinschaft? 
Was den lctztcren Punkt angcht, so stellen sich als wichtigste Fragen: 
Driingt das Dumping Gemeinschaftsfrrmen aus dem Markt oder ftihrt es zu ihrer 
dauerhaftcn Schwachung? 
lnwieweit bleibt ein Wettbewerb zwischen Exporteuren bestehen, und zwar 
unabhangig davon, ob sie selbst Dumping betrieben haben oder nicht? 
Inwieweit  wird  der Zugang  zu  dem  betreffenden  Markt  erschwert oder 
verspem? 
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Dicse  Yoraussetzungen  sind  am  ehesten  in  Sektoren  gegeben,  in  denen  es  rasche 
technologische Fortschritte gibt und ein grolles Volumen von Investitionen in Forschung, 
Entwicklung und Produktionsanlagen vonnoten ist, urn die WettbewerbsHihigkeit zu wahren. 
1st  das der Fall, so kann die Abschottung des Marktes dem Dumper bzw. den Dumpem 
zunachst einen  Kostenvorteil  verschaffen, der dadurch  versUirkt  wird,  daB  durch eine 
aggressive Prcispolitik auf dem Gemeinschaftsmarkt die Volumen erhoht werden. Dies kann 
wicdcrun1 dazu ftihren, daB die Gemeinschaftsindustrie unter einem steigenden Kostennachteil 
zu leiden hat. 
Auch wenn das Dumping eine Schadigung bewirkt hat, muB auf jeden Fall gepriift werden, ob 
die Schiidigung durch Antidumping-MaBnahmen ausgeglichen werden kann. Abgesehen von 
dcr strategischen  Botschaft dtirfte es wenig Sinn  haben,  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  zu 
ergreifen, wenn die Gemeinschaftsindustrie bereits so dauerhaft geschadigt ist, daB sie nicht 
mehr als effektiver Konkurrent in Frage kommt. 
Andere Arlen von  Dumping 
Wahrcnd die Auswirkungen des ruinosen Dumping unbestreitbar sind, ftihrt Dumping nicht 
zwangslaufig zu einer schadlichen Verringerung des Wettbewerbs. In der okonomischen 
Analyse heiBt es allgemein, daB man nicht automatisch MaBnahmen einleiten sollte, wenn 
Dumping eine materielle Schadigung bewirkt hat. Daflir gibt es vier wesentliche Griinde. 
i)  Dumping ist nicht unnatlirlich 
Das vom GA  1T bewertete und definierte Dumping geht nicht zwangsHiufig auf 
eine aggressive oder gegen den Wettbewerb gerichtete Strategic des Dumpers 
zuruck. Das okonomische Konzept des vollkommenen Wettbewerbsmarktes, 
auf dem der freie und rase  he W arenverkehr sicherstellt, daB die Preise auf den 
verschiedenen Markten gleich sind, wird in der Praxis nur selten verwirk.licht. 
Wenn eine relativ kleine Anzahl von Herstellern auf mehreren nationalen 
Markten miteinander konkurriert, dann kommt es haufig vor, daB sich sowohl 
die Gesamtnachfrage als auch die Bedingungen fur die einzelnen Hersteller auf 
den einzelnen Markten unterscheiden, was unterschiedliche Preise zur Folge 
hat.  Sind die  Nachfragebedingungen  stabil,  so konnen die Firmen  nach 
Belieben unterschiedliche Preisstrategien verfolgen, sofem die Produkte nicht 
ohne weiteres (re)exportiert werden  konnen.  In  anderen Fallen kann eine 
Niedrigpreispolitik auf einem bestimmten Markt auch nur vortibergehender 
Natur sein. Selbst auf ihren eigenen Inlandsmarkten verfolgen Firmen haufig 
eine  Politik  der  Preisdiskriminierung,  d.h.  sie  verkaufen  z.B.  an 
unterschiedliche Teilmarkte zu unterschiedlichen Preisen, entsprechend den 
jeweiligen Angebots- und Nachfragetendenzen. Ebenso gibt es ein gewisses 
MaB an Preisdiskriminierung (Dumping) zwischen GemeinschaftsHindem, weil 
die Finnen ihre Preisstrategien an die unterschiedlichen Marktbedingungen 
anpassen.  Eines  der  Ziele  des  Binnenmarktprogramms  und  der 
Wettbewerbspolitik der Gemeinschaft besteht tibrigens darin, die Spannungen 
zu  beseitigen, die ein Fortbestehen unterschiedlicher Preispolitiken in vielen 
Sektoren der Gemeinschaftsindustrie ermoglichen. 
Folgcndc Beispiele zeigen, wie ein unvollkommener Wettbewerb zu Dumping ftihren kann: 
Die Firmen sind im allgemeinen bestrebt und imstande, auf Markten, auf denen 
sie ein starkes Markenimage haben, hohere Preise zu verlangen. 
Bcin1  Vordringen auf einen neuen Markt sehen sich die Finnen oft genotigt, 
einige Jahre  lang  niedrigere Preise zu  verlangen,  urn  die Verbraucher zur 
Annahmc ihrer Produkte zu veranlassen. 
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In  Industriebranchen,  in  denen  die  Kosten  bei  steigender  Produktion 
zurUckgehen,  besteht ein starker Trend, die Preise unter den (derzeitigen) 
Kosten festzusetzen, urn den Absatz zu steigern und die (kUnftigen) Kosten zil 
verringern.  Unter  diesen  Umstanden  konnen  die  Firmen  aggressive 
Preisstrategien verfolgen, wobei es keine Rolle spielt, ob ihr Inlandsmarkt 
ahgeschottet ist oder nicht. 
Zyklisclles Dumping 
Eine Feststellung von Dumping konnte erfolgen, wenn ein Exportpreis in die Gemeinschaft 
nicht hoher liegt als die Gesamtkosten des Exporteurs (plus Gewinnspanne) auf seinem 
eigcnen Inlandsmarkt. Wenn also die Absatzbedingungen und die Preise ungiinstig und die 
Stiickkosten hoch sind, kann es sein, daB ein Exporteur fiir die Exporte in die Gemeinschaft 
hohere Preise festsetzen n1uB, urn einer Feststellung von Dumping zu entgehen. 
ii)  Eine Schadigung kann auch gUnstige Konsequenzen fUr die Wirtschaft haben 
Wie vorstehend beschrieben, kann das Dumping auf kurze und Hingere Sicht 
sehr schwerwiegende Auswirkungen auf die direkt betroffene Industriebranche 
haben.  DarUber hinaus kann es schadliche indirekte Auswirkungen auf die 
Lieferanten  und,  falls  das  Dumping den  Wettbewerb  und  die  Effizienz 
beeintrachtigt, auch auf die Kunden der Gemeinschaftsindustriebranche haben, 
die von dem Dumping betroffen ist. 
Allcrdings kann das Dun1ping auch andere Wirkungen haben: 
Das neue Auftreten eines Exporteurs auf dem Gemeinschaftsmarkt steigert den 
Wettbewerb und kann Hingerfristig dazu fUhren, daB die Preise sinken und/oder 
daB die fUr den Kunden verfiigbare Produktpalette groBer wird. 
Ebenso konnen aggressive Preispolitik und zyklische Dumpingstrategien das 
allgemeine Preisniveau fur Verbraucher und industrielle Abnehmer driicken. 
Wenn es den industriellen Abnehmern nicht erlaubt ist, niedrige Preise voll zu 
nutzen,  kann  es  auBerdem  sein,  daB  ihre  Wettbewerbsfahigkeit  auf 
nachgeordneten Mark  ten beeintrachtigt wird, was sich wiederum ungiinstig auf 
Produktion und Beschaftigung auswirkt. 
Wenn man sich somit auf die direkt betroffene Industriebranche sowie auf indirekte ungiinstige 
Auswirkungen auf den Gesamtsektor und die Zulieferer beschrankt, dann ergibt sich daraus 
nidll unbcdingt die winschaftliche Gesamtauswirkung auf die Gemeinschaft. 
iii)  Es  gibt  keine  automatische  Rechtfertigung  fUr  GegenmaBnahmen  gegen 
abgeschottete Markte 
Es gibt sehr starke winschaftliche Griinde fUr die Beseitigung der formellen und 
inforn1ellen  Handelsschranken, die ein Fortbestehen der Preisunterschiede 
ermoglichen.  Diese  Maxime  war der Motor des GATT und,  wie  bereits 
bemerkt, auch  des Binnenmarktprogramms der Gemeinschaft.  Angesichts 
abgeschotteter Markte kann man jedoch nicht automatisch davon ausgehen, daB 
MaBnahmen, die darauf abzielen, die Wettbewerbsfahigkeit von Einfuhren auf 
dem Gemeinschaftsmarkt zu drosseln, das wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen in der 
Gemeinschaft steigern. NatUrlich konnen abgeschottete Markte Gelegenheit zum 
Dumping bieten. Ob unter diesen Umstanden MaBnahmen der Gemeinschaft 
gerechtfertigt sind, hangt von den Wettbewerbsvorteilen des Anbieters, der 
Fahigkeit der Gemeinschaftsindustrie zu einem effektiven, gleichberechtigten 
Wettbewerb sowie von der Frage ab, ob diese MaBnahmen zur Offnung der 
Mllrkte beitragen. Die langfristige Auswirkung auf die Preise ist ein weiterer 
entscheidender Aspekt. Es ist wichtig, daB man auf abgeschottete Markte nicht 
emotional reagiert. 
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iv)  Andere MaBnahmen konnen angemessener sein 
Wirtschaftspolitische MaBnahmen sollten generell und nach Moglichkeit auf die 
Wurzel des Problems zielen. Wie bereits gesagt, ist Dumping an  sich kein 
Problem. Es kann jedoch Probleme verursachen, die ein politisches Eingreifen 
erforderlich machen. In manchen Fallen dlirften Antidumping-MaBnahmen die 
cinzige praktikable LOsung darstellen. Unter bestimmten Umstanden kann es 
jedoch sein, daB andere politische MaBnahmen der Gemeinschaft, insbesondere 
MaBnahmen in den Bereichen Beschaftigung, Forschung und Entwicklung, 
angemessener sind. 
Wann ko11nen  Maflt~allmetl gereclltfertigt sei11? 
A us dcr vorstehenden Analyse HiBt sich entnehmen, daB Antidumping-MaBnahmen sich nicht 
automatisch mit wirtschaftlichen Argumenten rechtfertigen lassen, auch wenn eine Schadigung 
vorlicgt.  Allerdings gibt es sicherlich  auch  Umstande, unter denen solche MaBnahmen 
gerechtfenigt sind. 
Dcrartige MaBnahmen konnen sich in folgenden Fallen empfehlen: 
Wenn die Lohnkosten ein wichtiger Faktor sind, dann konnen diese Kosten in 
einer Rezession niedrig sein, was zur Folge haben kann, daB  die Preise der 
Hersteller aus der Gemeinschaft die sozialen Kosten in  dem betreffenden 
Zeitraum iibersteigen. Dies gilt insbesondere dann, wenn die Hersteller aus der 
Gemeinschaft in Regionen mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit angesiedelt sind. 
Wenn  die  Kapitalmarkte  unvollkommen  ausgebildet  sind,  konnten 
auBerordentlich rezessive Bedingungen in der Gemeinschaftsindustrie die 
lnvestitionen unter die Effizienzschwelle abrutschen lassen oder dazu fiihren, 
daB potentiell effiziente Firmen aus dem Markt gedrangt werden. 
In  jedem speziellen Fall miissen eine Bilanz dieser Aspekte und die Auswirkungen auf 
Verbmucher und nachgeordnete Abnehmer erwogen werden, wenn entschieden werden soll, 
ob ein politisches Eingreifen insgesamt gerechtfertigt ist. Ein ausschlaggebendes Kriterium 
solltc dabei die Beurteilung der Wettbewerbsposition der Gemeinschaftsindustrie nach der 
Durnpingperiode sein. 
Die Anwendung von Antidumping-Ma8nahmen durch die Gemeinschaft (Teil V) 
Fallat~alyse 
ln1 Zcitraum von 1981-1991  hat die Gemeinschaft 422 Dumping-untersuchungen eingeleitet. 
Eine Analyse nach Landem und Sektoren ergibt folgendes: 
In 41  % der Faile handelte es sich urn nichtmarktwirtschaftliche Lander, in 33 
% der Faile urn Industrielander, und die restlichen 26% der Untersuchungen 
betrafen Importe aus EntwicklungsHindern (einschlieBlich der sogenannten 
"Schwellenlander" aus Asien). 
Die Zahl der Faile, die Japan und insbesondere die asiatischen Schwellenlander 
betrafen, nahm stark zu. Insgesamt gesehen, stieg der Anteil dieser Lander von 
I 0% im Zeitraum 1981-1985 auf 32% im Zeitraum 1986-1991. 
Wahrend der Gesamtanteil der Lander mit nichtmarktwirtschaftlichem System 
zuriickging, nahn1 die Zahl der Untersuchungen gegen China erheblich zu. 
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Dumpinguntersuchungen wurden in zahlreichen Sektoren eingeleitet; der groBte 
Anteil betraf den Sektor der chemischen Erzeugnisse. 
Ergebnisse der  Untersuchungen 
In ctwa 70 % der seit 1981  abgeschlossenen Untersuchungen wurden endgtiltige MaBnahmen 
crgriffcn.  In  etwas weniger als  20  o/o  der Falle wurde keine materielle Schadigung der 
Gcn1cinschaftsindustrie festgestellt, und nur 6 % der Faile wurden ohne eine Feststellung von 
Dumping abgeschlossen. 
Scit 1986 wurde keine Untersuchung mit der Feststellung abgeschlossen, daB die Einleitung 
von MaBnahmen nicht in1 Gen1einschaftsinteresse liegen wtirde, obwohl eine Schadigung einer 
Gcmeinschaftsindustrie durch das Dumping vorlag. 
Oberpriifungen 
Die Kommission schatzt, daB  in etwa 75 % der Falle MaBnahmen aufgrund der "Sunset"-
Bestimmungen aus!~ufen oder aufgehoben werden. Im Zeitraum 1989-1991 wurde etwas mehr 
als die Halfte aller Uberpriifungen mit der Aufhebung der MaBnahmen abgeschlossen. 
U  tllersuchungen von  Dumping durch Exporteure a us der Gemeinschaft 
Diese  Studie befaBt  sich  mit den  direkten  wirtschaftlichen  Auswirkungen der eigenen 
Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft. Allerdings stellt sich bei der Prtifung der globalen 
Auswirkungcn  der GA  1T-Vorschriften  tiber  Dumping  heraus,  daB  die  Exporteure der 
Gcmcinschaft das haufigste Ziel von Antidumping-Untersuchungen der anderen Anwender von 
MaBnahmen sind.  Fast ein Viertel aller dem GA  TT-Sekretariat mitgeteilten Antidumping-
Untersuchungen im Zeitraum 1980-1989 betraf Exporte aus der Gemeinschaft, gegentiber 11 
% ftir Japan und 10% ftir die Vereinigten Staaten. 
Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Antidumping-Ma8nahmen (Teil VI) 
Bisher wurde nur eine begrenzte Zahl von Forschungsarbeiten tiber die wirtschaftlichen 
Auswirkungcn von Dumping und Antidumping-MaBnahmen ausgeftihrt, und es bleibt ein 
wcites Feld ftir weitere detaillierte Studien zu speziellen Themen tibrig. Unsere Fallstudien 
tragen dazu bei, einige der moglichen Auswirkungen der MaBnahmen darzulegen. Allerdings 
ist es unmoglich, aufgrund einiger weniger Faile allgemeingtiltige SchluBfolgerungen zu 
zichen. 
Preise 
Nach Auffassung der Kommission hangt die Auswirkung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen auf 
die Preise u.a. von folgenden Faktoren ab: 
den Kosten der EG-Hersteller und  dem AusmaB des Wettbewerbs zwischen 
ihnen; 
den Preisen von ungedumpten Importen. 
Eine Anhcbung der Preise, die dem angewendeten Zoll entspricht, dtirfte die wahrscheinlichste 
Mi.)glichkeit sein. Trotzdem ist stark anzunehmen, daB durch die MaBnahmen die Preise starker 
stcigen,  als  dies  sonst  der  Fall  gewesen  ware.  Die  Beseitigung der  Schadigung der 
Gemeinschaftsindustrie hangt weitgehend von dieser Wirkung ab. Wenn die Anwendung von 
MaBnahmen die Wiederherstellung des Wettbewerbs bewirkt, dann konnen die Preise auf 
langere Sicht niedriger sein, als sie es ohne die Anwendung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen 
gewesen waren. 
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Bier sei betont, daB der Vergleich mit der Preistendenz maBgeblich ist, die ohne Anwendung 
der MaBnahmen zu beobachten gewesen ware. Bei Produkten, bei denen die Preistendenz 
fallend  ist,  konnen  die MaBnahmen  schon  "preistreibend"  sein,  wenn  sie die  fallende 
Preistendenz stoppen oder stabilisieren. 
Uns ist nur eine Studie bekannt, in der versucht wurde, die Auswirkung von Antidumping-
MaBnahmen auf die Preise einer ganzen Reihe von Produkten zu beurteilen. Diese gelangte zu 
einigen  tiberraschenden  Ergebnissen,  kam jedoch  insgesamt  zu  dem  SchluB,  daB  die 
MaBnahmen dazu ftihrten, die Preise von gedumpten und von nichtgedumpten Einfuhren und 
von EG-Fertigwaren zu erhohen. 
Unsere Fallstudien ftihrten zu folgenden Erkenntnissen: 
Wettbewerb 
Bei Denim gab es einen Wettbewerb mit anderen Niedrigpreisimporten, und es 
muB bezweifelt werden, ob die MaBnahmen eine nennenswerte Auswirkung auf 
die Preise gehabt haben. 
Bei den Minikugellagern HiBt  einiges darauf schlieBen, daB die MaBnahmen 
hohere Preise bewirkten. 
Bei den Nonnalpapierkopierem lassen die Marktbedingungen den SchluB zu, 
daB die Preise beeinfluBt wurden; Exporteure und einige Beobachter behaupten, 
daB  dies der Fall sei.  Andererseits haben wir auch gegenteilige Anzeichen 
festgestellt, so daB die Lage hier nicht eindeutig ist. 
Bei  Polyvinylchlorid  wurde  eine Preisverpflichtung auf niedriger Ebene 
erreicht, und  die Preise dtirften  sich erholt haben, bevor die MaBnahmen 
Wirkung zeigen konnten. 
Bei  den  Kleinfarbfemsehem ist es noch  zu  frlih,  die  Auswirkungen der 
MaBnahmen zu beurteilen. 
Durch  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  wird  der  Wettbewerbsdruck  kurzfristig  verringert. 
Langfristig konnen sie bewirken, daB der Wettbewerb entweder verscharft oder verringert 
wird. 
Unter gewissen  Umstanden  konnen  sich  die MaBnahmen  langfristig unglinstig  auf den 
Wettbewerb auswirken. Wenn z.B.  ein Importeur ein vorlibergehendes Dumping als Teil 
seiner Marktzugangstrategie benutzt, dann konnen MaBnahmen oder deren Androhung eine 
effcktive  Zugangsstrategie  verhindern.  Wenn  die  Gemeinschaftsindustrie  schon  stark 
konzentriert  ist,  dann  konnen  MaBnahmen  durch  die  Abschreckung  eines  wichtigen 
Konkurrenten die existierenden Marktverhaltnisse verfestigen. 
Andererseits konnen MaBnahmen notig sein, urn langfristig einen effektiven Wettbewerb in der 
Gemeinschaft zu sichem. Dies gilt flir das ruinose Dumping oder auch flir andere Faile von 
Dumping,  wenn  die  langfristige  Effizienz des  Wettbewerbs  durch  Dumping ernstlich 
beeintrachtigt wurde. 
Wir sind zu dem- auch von anderen Studien besHitigten- Ergebnis gelangt, daB es in einem 
erheblichen  Anteil  der Faile  nur eine relativ  geringe  Anzahl  von  Produzenten  in  der 
Gen1einschaft gibt.  In  diesen Fallen ist die Wirkung der MaBnahmen auf den Wettbewerb 
besondcrs ausgepragt. 
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llandel und Standort der Produktion 
Die nachstehcnde Tabelle enthalt unsere Schatzungen bezi.iglich der Aufschli.isselung 'der 
Gemeinschaftseinfuhrcn, die Gegenstand von Antidumping-MaBnahmen sind, nach Landem 
und  nach  Sektorcn.  Sic beweist, daB  sich die derzeitigen Antidumping-MaBnahmen der 
Gemcinschaft stark auf die Einfuhren aus Femost und auf den Elektroniksektor konzentrieren. 
Aufschli.isselung der Gemeinschaftseinfuhren, 
die Gegenstand von Antidumping-MaBnahmen sind, 
nach Landem und Sektoren - 1991 
(in f}fl  aller Gcmeinschaftseinfuhren, gegen die Antidumping-MaBnahmen ergriffen wurden) 
Analyse nach Landem  Analyse nach Sektoren 
Japan  83  Elektronik  86 
Korea  6  Maschinen  3 
Japan und asiatische 
SchwcllenHindcr insgesamt  91 
Chen1ische Erzeugnisse  2 
Textilien  2 
Nichtmarktwirtschaftliche  Eisen und Stahl  1 
Lander  4  Sonstige  7 
Sonstige lndustriellinder  4 
Sonstige Entwicklungsllinder  1 
Quel/e:.lahresbericht der Kommission und Eurostat-Handelsstatistik 
In  ihrcm  Jahresbcricht  1990  schatzte  die  Kommission,  daB  auf  0,6  %  der 
Gemeinschaftseinfuhren Antidumping-Wile erhoben wurden. Bei dieser Schatzung sind die 
Auswirkungen der Verpflichtungen nicht beri.icksichtigt. Nach unserer eigenen Schatzung, die 
die  V  crflichtungen  einschlieBt,  di.irften  1991  etwa  1,1  %  der Gemeinschaftseinfuhren 
Gcgcnstand von Antidumping-MaBnahmen gewesen scin. Auf jeden Fall ist der Anteil des 
dirckt von diesen MaBnahmen betroffenen Handels sehr gering. 
Andererscits konnen  Antidumping-MaBnahmen auch eine "abki.ihlende" Wirkung auf den 
llandcJ  habcn.  Es kann z.B.  sein, daB Exporteure einen geringeren Marktanteil oder eine 
we niger aggressive Preispolitik auf den Gemeinschaftsmarkten anstreben, urn Antidumping-
Untersuchungen zu vermeiden. Es ist sehr schwierig, die Bedeutung dieser Auswirkungen in 
der Praxis zu beurteilen. Allerdings ergaben unsere Interviews Gri.inde fi.ir die Annahme, daB 
die  Exportcure  in  die  Gemeinschaft  bei  der  Festlegung  ihrer  Strategien  filr  den 
Gemeinschaftsn1arkt  die  Gefahr  einer  Verhangung  von  Antidumping-MaBnahmen 
hcriicksichtigen. 
Es gibt erhchliche Unterschiede bei demjenigen Anteil des Gesamthandels mit den betreffenden 
Produkten, der Gegenstand von Antidumping-MaBnahmen ist. In etwa 40 % der Faile betrug 
dicscr Antcil  1991  20 o/o oder weniger des Gesamthandels mit dem jeweiligen Produkt. Auf der 
andcren Scitc lag dicscr Anteil in etwa 15 % der Faile bei 60 % oder mehr des Gesamthandels. 
Unscrcs Erachtens ist dies ein wichtiger Indikator filr die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der 
MaBnahmcn. 
Sowohl aus den bishcrigcn Studien als auch aus unseren Fallstudien laBt sich entnehmen, daB 
durch die MaBnahmen der Handel mit den betroffenen Landern verringert und der Handel mit 
andcrcn  L~indcrn ausgeweitet wurde. 
Es  ist  schwicrig, die Auswirkungen von  Antidumping-MaBnahmen auf den Standort der 
Produktion  von  denjenigen  der  Globalstrategien  zu  trennen.  Immerhin  ist  es  sehr 
wahrschcinlich, daB zumindest die lnvestitionsplanung fur Produkte wie Normalpapierkopierer 
odcr Minikugellager in  den Landern der Gemeinschaft durch Antidumping-MaBnahmen 
bccinfluBt wird. 
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Industrielle Abnehmer 
Ober die Halfte der Antidumping-Verfahren betreffen Rohstoffe und Halbfertigerzeugnisse, die 
noch einer Weiterverarbeitung bediirfen. Diese industriellen Abnehmer profitieren zumindest 
auf kurze Sicht eindeutig vom Dumping, und Antidumping-MaBnahmen konnen ihre eigene 
Wctthcwcrbsposition auf den internationalen Markten beeintrachtigen. Wenn sich Abnehmer 
aus dcr Gcn1einschaft dem Wettbewerb auf internationalen Markten stellen, dann konnte eine 
gcringcrc Wcubewerbsfahigkeit zu einem Ri.ickgang der Produktion und der davon abhangigen 
Arbcitspllltzc und damit zu einem Verlust fi.ihren, der die vorteilhaften Auswirkungen auf die 
dirckt betroffene EG-Industrie iibersteigt. 
Diescs  Argument  wurde  in  mehreren  Fallen,  darunter auch  in  unserer Fallstudie tiber 
Polyvinylchlorid, vorgebracht, und es hat in einigen Fallen die angewendeten MaBnahmen 
eindeutig beeinfluBt. 
Unsere  Fallstudien 
Drei von unseren Fallstudien- Normalpapierkopierer, Minikugellager und Kleinfarbfernseher-
wcrden von der Kommission und den betroffenen Industriebranchen als Falle von ruinosem 
Dumping eingestuft. 
In  all  diesen  Fallen  gelangt  unsere  Studie  zu  dem  Ergebnis,  daB  sich  die 
Gen1einschaftsindustrie nicht mehr erholen wi.irde,  wenn sie geschadigt oder geschwacht 
wiirde. In diesen1 Zusammenhang stellen sich folgende wichtigen Fragen: 
Droht das Dumping, die Struktur der EG-Industrie grundlegend zu andem? 
Wiirde durch die Ausschaltung der Gemeinschaftsindustrie der Wettbewerb so 
geschwacht, daB die Preise langfristig steigen wi.irden? 
Sind von dem Schutz der Industrien weitergehende oder strategische Vorteile zu 
erwarten? 
Wir sind nicht in der Lage, diese Fragen endgiiltig zu beantworten. Immerhin sei folgendes 
festgestellt: 
In  jedem einzelnen Fall ist ein erheblicher Anteil von Nicht-EG-Firmen im 
Markt. Die Frage, ob sie auf langere Sicht als Konkurrenten auftreten konnten, 
ist hier von maBgeblicher Bedeutung. 
Die  Kugellagerindustrie  ist  insofern  von  strategischer  Bedeutung,  als 
Kugellager als unerHiBliche  Bauteile bei sehr vielen Produkten verwendet 
werden. Hier stellt sich die entscheidende Frage, ob das Dumping die Gefahr 
beinhaltet, daB die EG-Industrie i.iberhaupt nicht mehr oder nur noch zu weniger 
gi.instigen Bedingungen beliefert wird. 
hn Fall der Kleinfarbfemseher hestand ein wichtiger Faktor fiir die Verhangung 
von MaBnahmen in der Notwendigkeit, die Absatzgrundlage der Industrie zu 
erhalten  und  die  Entwicklung  neuer  Produkte,  darunter  auch  des 
hochauflosenden  Fernsehens,  zu  finanzieren.  Da  es  nur  eine  indirekte 
Verbindung zwischen der RentabiliHit des Absatzes von Kleinfarbfernsehem 
und der Entwicklung neuer Technologien gibt, scheint uns diese Argumentation 
recht gefahrlich zu sein. 
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Man sollte sich bewuBt sein, daB in vielen Fallen "strategische" Erwagungen oder Bedenken 
hinsichtlich des kiinftigen Wettbewerbs keine Rolle spielen. 
Die Gemeinschaft fiihrt  Denim aus mehreren Ursprungslandern ein.  Die 
Produktionstechnologie ist problemlos verfiigbar. Fiir viele Kaufer ist der Preis 
der wichtigste Faktor. Daher haben wir es hier mit einem Beispiel fiir eine 
Dumpinguntersuchung in einem sehr stark umkampften Sektor zu tun, in dem 
das  Dumping  dem  Exporteur  keinen  dauerhaften  Wettbewerbsvoneil 
verschaffen diirfte. 
Polyvinylchlorid ist vermutlich beispielhaft fur eine Reihe von Fallen im Stahl-
und in1 Chemiesektor, in denen Sich relativ niedrige Einfuhrvolumen erheblich 
auf die Preise auswirken, insbesondere dann, wenn der Gemeinschaftsmarkt 
gedriickt  ist.  Der Grund:  Der kapitalintensive Charakter dieser Sektoren 
bewirkt, daB es bei nicht ausgelasteten Kapazitaten einen starken Anreiz zur 
Senkung der Preise gibt, weil die kurzfristigen variablen Kosten niedrig sind. 
Wenn  kein  rascher technischer Fortschritt vorliegt, dann gibt es auch hier 
keinen  zwingenden Grund dafiir, daB  sich der Dumper einen dauerhaften 
Wettbewerbsvorteil  verschafft.  Andererseits  kann  das  Dumping hier zu 
riicklaufigen Investitionen und einem Verlust an Wettbewerbsfahigkeit fiihren. 
Das Konzept der Gemeinschaft bei der Festsetzung der Dumpingspannen (Teil VII) 
In diesem Bereich gibt es eine Reihe von strittigen Fragen, die erortert werden miissen. 
Verkauf mit V erlust 
Wie bereits bemerkt, konnen Exporteure auf ihren lnlandsmarkten mit Verlust verkaufen. 
Dafiir kann es u.a. folgende Griinde geben: 
die Nachfrage ist schwach; 
in  der Anlaufphase eines neuen Produkts oder einer neuen Fabrik entstehen 
hohe Kosten; 
nicht aile Produkte einer Produktionspalette konnen den vollen Anteil an den 
Gemeinkosten tibemehmen. 
GernaB den  Bestimn1ungen des GATT-Kodexes behandelt die Gemeinschaft (erhebliche) 
Verkaufe mit Verlust (d.h. Verkaufe zu Preisen, die in einem Zeitraum von hochstens einem 
Jahr die Gemeinkosten und  die variablen Kosten nicht decken) als nicht zum "normalen 
Handclsverkehr" gehorig  und  setzt den  Normalwert anhand der Produktionskosten plus 
Gemcinkostcn und einer angemessenen Gewinnspanne fest. 
Wenn der Exporteur unter den vorher beschriebenen Umstanden auf seinem lnlandsmarkt und 
auf den Exportmarkten identische Preisstrategien verfolgt, bleibt die Moglichkeit, daB Dumping 
festgestellt  wird  oder die  Dumpingspannen  unter Bedingungen  erhoht werden,  die in 
wettbcwerbsrechtlichen Verfahren nicht von vomherein als unlauter oder wettbewerbsfeindlich 
bctrachtet wtirden. 
Wir empfchlen, die V  crkaufspreise auf dem lnlandsmarkt des Exporteurs als Basis 
fur  die  Festsetzung des  Normalwertes heranzuziehen, sofern sie  nicht  unter den 
variablen Kosten liegen (Empfehlung 1). 
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Verbundene  Verkaufs- und Vertriebsorganisationen 
Das  Vorgehen der Gemeinschaft bei  der Festsetzung von  Dumpingspannen,  wenn die 
Hersteller ihre Produkte tiber ganz oder teilweise in ihrem Besitz befindliche Verkaufs- oder 
Vcrtriebsfirmen verkaufen, wurde (vor allem) von Exporteuren aus dem Fernen Osten sowie 
von  einigen  Handelsrechtsanwalten  und  Hochschulkommentatoren  stark  kritisiert.  Sie 
bchaupteten, daB die Preise, zu denen der erste unabhangige Verkauf auf dem Inlandsmarkt des 
Exporteurs und in der Gemeinschaft erfolgt, in asynunetrischer Weise korrigiert wiirden. 
llicr handclt es sich urn ein komplexes Problem, das im Mittelpunkt einiger Faile stand, mit 
dcncn sich der Europaische Gerichtshof befassen muBte.  Urn die Politik der Kommission 
abschlieBend  beurteilen  zu  konnen,  hatten  wir  einen  Zugang  zu  speziellen 
Dun1pingspannenberechnungen  benotigt.  lmmerhin  war  es  uns  moglich,  diesen 
Problemkomplex mit Exporteuren, deren Beratem und der Kommission zu erortern. Dabei sind 
wir zu  der SchluBfolgerung gelangt, daB der sehr umstrittene Charakter dieses Problems auf 
zwci llauptfaktoren zurtickzuftihren ist. 
Zum einen ist die Kommission grundsatzlich der Auffassung, daB beim Normal  wert die von 
ihr als kostspielig eingestuften Vertriebssysteme in Landern wie Japan berticksichtigt werden 
sollten, wcil  sie  nach  Ansicht der Kommission cine Abschottung des Inlandsmarktes des 
Exportcurs zur Folge haben. Deswegen verfolgt sie die Politik, den Normalwert anhand der 
von unabhangigen Kunden gezahlten Preise nur in begrenztem MaBe zu korrigieren. Kann der 
Exporteur jcdoch nachweisen, daB ein bestimmter Vertriebskanal auf dem Inlandsmarkt dem 
Exportprcis ftir die Gen1einschaft durchaus vergleichbar ist, so setzt die Kommission den 
Non11alwert an hand der Verkaufe tiber diesen Kanal fest. 
Da  sich  zweitens die  in  den verschiedenen Vertriebsphasen anfallenden Funktionen des 
lnlandsmarktes  und  des  Exportmarktes  unterscheiden,  gibt  es  ein  weites  Feld  fUr 
untcrschiedliche Auffassungen tiber das angemessene Vergleichsniveau. 
Da es uns nicht moglich war, die Festsetzung von Dumpingspannen eingehend zu priifen, sind 
wir nicht imstande, uns zum praktischen Vorgehen der Gemeinschaft zu au.Bern. 
Anderersei ts: 
hal ten wires grundsatzlich fiir unangebracht, daB die Dumpingspannen durch 
unterschiedliche Vertriebskosten auf dem Inlandsmarkt und dem Exportmarkt 
beeinfluBt werden. FUr die unterschiedlichen Vertriebskosten kann es mehrere 
andere Griinde geben als die relative Offenheit der Markte; 
wurde  sich  das  Problem  nicht  stellen,  wenn  der  Exportpreis  fiir  die 
Gcmeinschaft  mit  den  geschatzten  Kosten  fUr  die  Belieferung  des 
Gemeinschaftsmarktes und  nicht mit dem Preis auf dem Inlandsmarkt des 
Exporteurs verglichen wurde; 
wurde cine alternative Moglichkeit, die Verzerrung der Dumpingspannen durch 
unterschiedliche Vertriebskosten moglichst gering zu halten, darin bestehen, die 
Exportpreise und die Preise auf dem Inlandsmarkt des Exporteurs moglichst 
nahe "ab Werk" miteinander zu vergleichen; 
wenn Preisvergleiche verwendet werden, kann es sein, daB die unterschiedliche 
Handelsstufe (d.h. die unterschiedlichen Stellen der Vertriebskette, an denen die 
Preise  verglichen  werden)  nur dadurch  beriicksichtigt  werden  kann,  daB 
Korrekturen durch Einbeziehung oder Ausklammerung bestimmter Kosten 
angebracht werden. 1st dies der Fall, so sollten entgegen der iiblichen Praxis die 
Gemeinkosten und die direkten Kosten mitberiicksichtigt werden. 
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Zusammenfassend ziehen wir nachstehende Schlufifolgerungen: 
Aus  fundamentalen  wirtschaftlichen  Grunden  ist  es  unbedingt 
erforderlich, den  Normalwert und den  Exportpreis auf der gleichen 
Basis  festzustellen.  Dabei  sollten  Unterschiede  nach  Moglichkeit 
durch  die  Festsetzung  eines  selektiven  Normalwertes  beseitigt 
werden. 1st dies nicht moglich, so sehen wir kaum eine Alternative fur 
an den  Kosten  orientierte Korrekturen, urn  eine Vergleichbarkeit zu 
gewahrleisten.  Bei  allen  Korrekturen, die  fur  die  Vergleichbarkeit 
vonnoten  sind,  sollten  die  Unterschiede in  den  indirekten  und den 
direkten Kosten  berucksichtigt werden. Dies ist in der Antidumping-
Regelung offensichtlich nicht vorgesehen. 
Es  gibt  keine  okonomische  Rechtfertigung  fur  die  separate 
Behandlung der Feststellung des Normalwertes und des Exportpreises 
und die Berucksichtigung der Notwendigkeit von Korrekturen, urn eine 
Vergleichbarkeit zu  erreichen.  Die  Notwendigkeit  von  Korrekturen 
hangt entscheidend von dem Normalwert und dem Exportpreis ab. 
Da  wir nicht einsehen konnen, warum die Hohe einer Dumpingspanne 
von  den  auf  dem  Inlandsmarkt  des  Exporteurs  herrschenden 
Vertriebs- und  Marketingkosten  abhangen  soli,  sollte  die 
Dumpingspanne auf eine Handelsstufe bezogen  werden, die moglichst 
nahe "ab Werk" liegt. 
Auf jeden  Fall  gibt  es  starke wirtschaftliche  Argumente fur  einen 
Vergleich  des  Exportpreises  mit  den  geschatzten  Kosten  fur  die 
Belieferung des  Gemeinschaftsmarktes statt mit den  Kosten  fur die 
Belieferung des lnlandsmarktes des Exporteurs. 
Wenn bei  der rechnerischen Ermittlung der Exportpreise der Gewinn 
berucksichtigt wird,  den  ein  lmporteur erwarten  kann, dann sollte 
darauf  geachtet  werden,  daB  die  Gewinnspanne  auch  wirklich 
reprasentativ ist (Empfehlung 2). 
Vergleich  der Exportpreise mit dem  Norma/wert 
Gcgcnw~irtig werden die Dumpingspannen dadurch festgesetzt, daB die Preise spezifischer 
Exportgeschafte mit einem einzigen durchschnittlichen Normalwert verglichen werden. Liegt 
dcr Exportpreis  tiber dem Normalwert, so ergibt sich  bei der Festsetzung der gesamten 
Dumpingspanne der Wert Null.  Diese Methode, die von der Gemeinschaft und anderen 
fUhrenden  Anwendern wie den USA, Kanada und Australien angewendet wird, wird seit 
langem kritisicrt, wei I dadurch angeblich die Dumpingspannen aufgebHiht werden. 
Von einigcn Ausnahn1en abgesehen, schreibt der Entwurf des GA  IT-Kodexes vor, daB die 
Dumpingspannen anhand eines Vergleichs der durchschnittlichen Exportpreise mit dem 
Nom1al wert festgesetzt werden soli  en. 
Wir en1pfchlen,  daU  die  Kommission  bei  der Anwendung dieser Bestimmung die 
Umstande  angeben  sollte,  unter  denen  sie  dieses  Konzept  des  Vergleichs  der 
IJurchschnittswerte nicht anwenden wurde (Empfehlung 3). 
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U nserc heiden vorstehcnden Empfehlungen entsprechen der Empfehlung des Parlaments 
( 14.12.1990), wonach die Kommission Leitlinien fi.ir  die Antidumping-Politik der EG nach 
dem Muster der Leitlinien fUr die Wettbewerbspolitik und das offentliche Beschaffungswesen 
vcroffcntlichcn sollte. Das Parlament ist der Ansicht, daB solche Leitlinien die Transparenz der 
EG-Politik,  insbesondere  hinsichtlich  der Berechnung der Dumpingspanne, verbessern 
wi.irden. 
Sclliidigung und Gemeinschaftsinteresse (Teil VIII) 
Scltiidigung 
Wie bercits bemerkt, kann Dumping zweifellos betrachtliche wirtschaftliche Probleme ftir die 
Gen1einschaftsindustrie verursachen, die sich einer direkten  Konkurre~  durch gedumpte 
Einfuhren  ausgesetzt  sieht.  Unseres  Erachtens  bieten  die  vom  GATT  und  von  der 
Gemeinschaft verwendeten Kriterien fUr eine Schadigung nicht geni.igend Gewahr daftir, daB 
durch Antidumping-MaBnahmen das wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen gesteigert werden kann. Das 
hat folgendc Gri.inde: 
Dieses Kriterium ist nur zum Teil ein Indikator fi.ir das Gemeinschaftsinteresse. 
Insbesondere wird nicht beri.icksichtigt, welche Auswirkungen Antidumping-
MaBnahmen haben auf: 
*  industrielle Abnehmer 
*  Verbraucher 
*  Zulieferer von Material und Bauteilen. 
Obgleich auf die Auswirkungen eines anhaltenden Dumping verwiesen wird, ist 
das Schadigungskriterium eher rtickwansgewendet. Bei der Analyse der Politi.k 
sollte man die Vergangenheit ruhen lassen und sich auf die Auswirkungen 
konzentrieren, die Antidumping-MaBnahmen auf Produzenten und Abnehmer 
haben. Dabei sind wir uns jedoch bewuBt, daB MaBnahmen ein Signal setzen 
und ftir andere Industrien als abschreckendes Beispiel dienen konnen. 
Bei unserer Prtifung des Schadigungskriteriums ergaben sich auBerdem einige eher technische 
Fragen. 
Zeitraum der Priifung 
Wiihrcnd bei der Pri.ifung der Schadigung Entwicklungen von drei Jahren oder mehr analysiert 
wcrdcn, werdcn Dumpingspannen in der Regel nur aufgrund von einem Jahr oder weniger 
festgesetzt. Wenn in der Zeit vor der Priifung ein Dumping festgestellt wird, dann wird implizit 
angenon1mcn,  daB  das Dumping innerhalb des gesamten Zeitraums anhielt, fi.ir  den  die 
Schiidigung hcurteilt wird. Das muB jedoch nicht so sein. Zum Beispiel ist es moglich, daB 
Exportcurc ihrc Preise erst dann an Wechselkursanderungen anpassen, wenn feststeht, daB 
dicse nicht rUckgangig gemacht werden. 
Andcrerscits ware eine Festsetzung von  Dumpingspannen ftir  mehrere Jahre, wie es in 
Australien gcschieht, recht aufwendig. 
Wir empfchlcn, da8 die Kommission die Preistendenzen auf dem Inlandsmarkt des 
Exportcurs und in dcr Gcmeinschaft im Bczugszeitraum priifen und beriicksichtigen 
soiUc,  urn  sich  zu  vergcwissern,  da8 diese Tendenzen der Dringlichkeit bzw.  der 
Entwicklung  des  Dumping  und  der  Schadigung  der  Gemeinschaftsindustrie 
cntsprcchcn.  Dies  sollte jedoch  keine  Schatzung  der  Dumpingspannen  fur  den 
gcsamten Bezugszeitraum umfassen (Empfehlung 4). 
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Mindestscllwellen 
Untcr norn1alen Wettbewerbsbedingungen erleben die Untemehmen von Zeit zu Zeit erhebliche 
"Schocks", die dazu fi.ihren, daB die Nachfrage nach ihren Produkten und die Preise, die sie 
auf ihrcn Mark ten erzielen konnen, ri.ickHtufig sind. Darilber hinaus gibt es bei der Festsetz;ung 
dcr Dumpingspanncn unweigerlich eine Fehlermarge. 
Daraus kann man schlieBen, daB Steigerungen der Importpenetration von bis etwa 5 % oder 
Dumpingspannen  von  5-10  %  fUr  die  Unternehmen  in  der  Gemeinschaft  keine 
aulkrgewohnliche Bedrohung bedeuten wilrden. Es ist daher nicht verwunderlich, daB eine -
wenn auch nicht allzu ausgepdigte - Tendenz besteht (vgl. S.  153-154), daB die Verfahren 
ohne Fcstlegung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen eingestellt werden, wenn die Dumpingspannen 
und die Importpenetration niedrig sind. 
lm Entwurf des GATT-Kodcxes werden als Mindestschwellen fUr Dumping Marktanteile von 
2  (~> und  I % (n1it  Ausnahmen) festgesetzt. Der erstgenannte Wert dUrfte eine Anderung der 
Gemeinschaftspraxis erforderlich machen. 
Wir empfehlen, daR die Kommission Mindestschwellen festlegen und veroffentlichen 
sollte,  die  erheblich  hoher  liegen  als  die  im  neuen  GATT  -Kodex  vorgesehenen 
Werte (Empfehlung 5). 
Dicse Empfehlung dUrfte auch der EP-EntschlieBung von 1990 entsprechen, wonach es sich 
erst  dann  urn  Dumping  hanqelt,  wenn  die  inlandische  Industrie  durch  umfangreiche 
Billigimporte erheblich geschadigt wird. 
Gemeinschaftsinteresse 
Vor einigen Jahren wurde ein Verfahren mit der Bemerkung eingestellt, daB die Anwendung 
von MaBnahmen nicht in1  Interesse der Gemeinschaft liegen wiirde. Auf den ersten Blick ist 
das Ubcrraschend, weil: 
die Kommission der Auffassung ist, daB eine Untersuchung eingeleitet werden 
sollte, wenn angemessene Beweise ftir Dumping und fiir eine Schadigung 
vorliegen,  und daB  das Interesse der Gemeinschaft in dieser Phase nicht 
beri.icksichtigt werden sollte; 
unter vielen unterschiedlichen Marktbedingungen Dumping- untersuchungen 
eingeleitet und MaBnahmen ergriffen wurden; 
die okonomische Analyse nahelegt, daB  das Interesse des Herstellers kein 
brauchbarer MaBstab ftir das globale Interesse der Gemeinschaft ist; 
mehr als die Halfte der Antidumping-Faile Rohstoffe und Halbfenigerzeugnisse 
betrifft, die noch weiterverarbeitet werden mUssen. 
In  bczug auf das Kriterium des Gemeinschaftsinteresses sahen wir uns mit einem breiten 
Spektrun1 unterschiedlicher Meinungen konfrontien. 
Auf dcr einen Seite auBerten einige Beobachter die Ansicht, daB die Kommission das Interesse 
dcr  Gcrneinschaft  mit  dem  Interesse  der  lndustrie  gleichsetze.  Das  Kriterium  des 
Gcmeinschaftsinteresses sei nur ein Sicherheitsventil, das es der Kommission und dem Rat 
erlaubc. MaBnahrnen nicht zu ergreifen oder zu andern, auch wenn ein starker Druck in diesem 
Sinne ausgeubt werde. Diese Einschatzung veranlaBt die Beobachter zu der Auffassung, daB 
der Anspruch. auch andere Interessen berUcksichtigen zu  wollen, aufgegeben werden sollte. 
Andere sind der Ansicht, daB eine zentrale und notwendige Reform darauf abzielen sollte, das 
Kriterium des Gemeinschaftsinteresses mit Sinn zu erfUllen. 
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Auf der anderen Seite auBerten andere Beobachter - insbesondere die Wirtschaftsverbande - die 
Bcftirchtung, daB die Gemeinschaftsindustrie nicht den notigen und angemessenen Schutz vor 
schadlichem Dumping bekommen werde, wenn dem Kriterium des Gemeinschaftsinteresses 
Vorrang eingeraumt werde. Einige von ihnen betrachten das schadliche Dumping an sich 
bercits  als  VerstoB  gegen das Interesse der Gemeinschaft.  Andere fragen  sich,  welche 
kommcrziellen,  wirtschaftlichen  und  politischen  Aspekte  in  diesem  Zusammenhang 
berticksichtigt werden konnten. 
Aufgrund  unserer Fallstudien, des  Interviewprogramms und der Ergebnisse der 
Faile des  vcrgangcnen Jahrzehnts haben wir den allgemeinen Eindruck gewonnen, 
daU  eine eingchendere Analyse der Auswirkungen  von  Antidumping-Ma8nahmen 
sowie  cine  Uberpriifung der Gewichtung zwischen  den  Interessen der Hersteller 
und dcnjcnigcn dcr Abnehmer erforderlich sind. Wir empfehlen, da6 die Kommission 
cinco  Bcricht  mit  ihrer  Analyse  beziiglich  der  kurz- und  der  langfristigen 
Auswirkungen des Dumping und der Anwendung von Antidumping-Ma8nahmen auf 
aile wirtschaftlichen lnteressen ausarbeiten sollte (Empfehlung 6). 
MaUnahmen (Teil  IX) 
Konzept  der MajJnahmen 
Bei der Auswahl der Antidumping-MaBnahmen fUr einen speziellen Fall sind mehrere wichtige 
Kriterien zu beach ten, darunter: 
ihre Einhaltung; 
die Wirksamkeit bei der Beseitigung der Schadigung; 
ihre Auswirkungen auf die Verbraucherpreise und das Zollaufkommen; 
ihre Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb; 
die Flexibiliilit angesichts geanderter Marktbedingungen; 
die administrative Angemessenheit. 
Wie bcreits bemerkt, wendet die Gemeinschaft in den meisten Fallen feste ZOlle an, oder sie 
akzeptiert Preisverpflichtungen. 
Einigc  Kon1mcntatoren  haben  sich  daftir  ausgesprochen,  daB  die  Gemeinschaft  und 
mt)glicherweise auch das GA  TI  ein System variabler ZOlle an wenden so  lite, d.h. ein System, 
das die Hohe des Zolls mit dem Unterschied zwischen dem deklarierten Zollwert und einem 
bestin1n1ten Zielpreis verkntipft. Ein derartiges System hatte in der Tat den Vorzug, daB: 
die Auswirkung auf die Preise, zu denen die Hersteller in der Gemeinschaft ihre 
Produkte verkaufen konnen, berechenbarer wtirde; 
ein positiver Anreiz zum Verzicht auf Dumping geboten wiirde; 
ein  "Selbstzerstorungsmechanismus"  eingeftihrt  wtirde,  wonach  die 
MaBnahmen auslaufen, sobald sich die Preise erholt haben und keine weitere 
Schadigung droht; 
die FairneB des Zollsystems erheblich verstarkt wtirde. 
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Andererseits: 
wiirde die Preissteigerung dem Exporteur zugute kommen; 
ware die Vetwaltung dieses Systems kostspieliger, 
konnte die Festsetzung cines Mindestpreises- wenn der Gemeinschaftsmarkt 
nur von wenigen Lieferanten versorgt wird - fiir einen erheblichen Anteil der 
In1porte  einen  Richtwert  darstellen  und  sich  damit  nachteilig  auf den 
Wettbewerb auswirken. 
Etwa die gleichen Argumente gelten bei einem Vergleich von Verpflichtungen und Wertzollen. 
Allerdings haben variable ZOlle den Vorteil eines eingebauten Mechanismus, der die Einhaltung 
gewahrleistet. 
Obgleich die Argumente nicht eindeutig dafur sprechen, empfehlen wir nach reiflicher 
Uberlegung, daB die Gemeinschaft ein variables Zollsystem anwenden sollte, sofern 
keine ubergeordneten Bedenken bezuglich der Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb 
bestehen und sofern ein solches System administrativ durchfiihrbar ist (Empfehlung 
7). 
Veriinderte  Bedingungen 
Es kann sein, daB Antidumping-MaBnahmen der Gemeinschaftsindustrie in der Praxis einen zu 
starken oder einen zu geringen Schutz bieten. 
Wir sind der  Meinung, daB die  Kommission die Auswirkungen der MaBnahmen 
ubcrwachen und aus eigener Initiative eine Uberpriifung durchfiihren sollte, falls die 
MaBnahmen nicht die beabsichtigte Wirkung zeigen (Empfehlung 8). 
Laufzeit der MajJnahmen 
Die in der Antidumping-Regelung und im Entwurf des GA  TT-Kodexes vorgesehene "Sunset-
Periode"  von  fiinf Jahren diirfte der Gemeinschaftsindustrie in  den meisten Fallen einen 
verntinftigcn Anpassungszeitraum bieten. In einem Sektor unserer Fallstudien, namlich bei den 
Minikugellagem, sind MaBnahmen seit den 70er Jahren in Kraft. 
Wir sind der Meinung, daB: 
Scllutz11iveau 
die  Anwendung  von  Ma8nahmen  fur  einen  kiirzeren  Zeitraum 
insbesondere dann gepriift werden sollte, wenn das Dumping und die 
dadurch  verursachte  Schadigung  mit  der  jeweiligen Phase  des 
Wirtschaftszyklus  zusammenhangen.  Eine  Verlangerung  dieser 
MaBnahmen konnte (ausnahp1sweise) vorgesehen werden; 
die MaBnahmen nur in  Ausnahmefallen Ianger als fiinf Jahre in Kraft 
bleiben sollten (Empfehlung 9). 
Die "Regel des niedrigeren Zolls" mull in der Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft cine 
zentrale  RoJic  spielen.  Gegenwartig  wird  die  Hohe  des  Zolls  so  festgesetzt,  daB  die 
SchUdigung hcseitigt wird. 
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Bci der Festsetzung der Hohe des Zolls (bzw. der Preisverpflichtung), die eine Beseitigung der 
Schadigung bewirkt, stellt sich eine Reihe von technischen Problemen. Die Kommission hat in 
diesem Zusammenhang mehrere unterschiedliche Konzepte verfolgt, was ihr den Vorwurf der 
lnkonsequenz  eingetragen  hat.  Da  die  Wirkung  der  MaBnahmen  von  den  speziellen 
Marktbcdingungen abhangt, ist eine Ermittlung der Schadigungsspannen sehr schwierig. 
Unseres Erachtens gibt es betrachtliche Moglichkeiten fiir die weitere Entwicklung und 
Bcwcrtung altcmativer Konzepte. 
Wir empfchlen, dan die Kommission Forschungsarbeiten zu diesem Fragenkomplex 
durchfiihren oder in  Auftrag geben und anschlie8end Leitlinien fur ihre Politik im 
Bereich der Ermittlung der Schadigungssl!annen veroffentlichen sollte (Empfehlung 
1  0). 
I>a  die  Wirkung  der  Ma8nahmen  zur  Beseitigung  der  Schadigung  der 
Gcmcinschaftsindustrie nur ein  teilweiser  Indikator fur ihre Auswirkung auf das 
Gemeinschaftsinteresse  ist,  empfehlen  wir  dariiber  hinaus,  da8  die 
Gcmeinschaftsregel  des  niedrigeren  Zolls  neuformuliert  werden  sollte,  urn  zu 
erreichen,  dan  Niveau  und  Form  von  Antidumping-Ma8nahmen  nicht our zur 
neseitigung  der  Schadigung,  sondern  zur  optimalen  Wahrung  der  globalen 
lnteressen der Gemeinschaft festgelegt werden (Empfehlung 11). 
Maflnalunen zur Verhinderung der Umgebung 
In seiner Entschlid3ung von 1990 hat das EP die Bedeutung von wirksamen Vorschriften zur 
Verhinderung der Umgehung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen betont. 
Einschneidende Antidumpi.ng-MaBnahmen schaffen einen eindeutigen und starken Anreiz zu 
ihrer Umgehung. Allerdings: 
besteht  die  Gefahr,  daB  MaBnahmen  zur  Verhinderung  der  Umgehung 
zusatzliche Verzerrungen bewirken; 
kann es schwierig sein, zwischen legitimen inlandischen Investitionsvorhaben 
und  im  wesentlichen  durch  Antidumping-Zone  bedingten  Vorhaben  zu 
unterscheiden. 
Wir n1ochten daher die Notwendigkeit betonen, MaBnahmen zur Verhinderung der Umgehung 
flcxihel zu handhaben und die Auswirkung zu beriicksichtigen, die zusatzliche MaBnahmen auf 
das I  ntcrcsse der Gemeinschaft haben konnen. 
Riickerstattung und Oberpriifung von Antidumpillg-Zollen 
Wclche Meinung man beziiglich der Anwendung von Antidumping-MaBnahmen auch vertreten 
mag, es scheint jcdenfalls wiinschenswert, daB den Exporteuren nach der Verhangung von 
Mal\nahmcn cin Anrciz zun1 Verzicht auf das Dumping geboten wird. Dies laBt sich erreichen 
durch: 
Riickerstattung der ZOlle bei der Einstellung des Dumping; 
Riicknahme der MaBnahmen gegen Exporteure, die das Dull}ping einstellen und 
vennutlich nicht wiederaufnehmen werden, aufgrund einer Uberpriifung. 
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Qegcnwartig  sind  die Gemeinschaftspolitik im  Bereich  der Riickerstattungen  und der 
Uherprufungen  sowie die  Schwierigkeiten  bei  der  Abwicklung  der  Riickerstattungen 
offensichtlich nicht dazu angetan, den Anreiz ftir die Exporteure zur Einstellung des Dumping 
zu crh6hcn. Diese Problcme ergaben sich nicht, wenn unsere Empfehlung, die Gemeinschaft 
solltc cin variables Zollsystcm anwenden, befolgt wtirde. 
Das grundsatzliche  Problem  betrifft die  Behandlung der Antidumping-ZOlle,  wenn die 
Dumpingspannen neu berechnet werden, urn  zu ermitteln, ob eine Ruckerstattung erfolgen 
sollte oder ob die Mallnahmen verHingert bzw. geandert werden sollten. Wenn der Imponeur 
mit dern Exporteur verbunden ist, dann werden derzeit bei der Feststellung, ob das Dumping 
anhalt, die vom erstgenannten entrichteten zone abgezogen. 
()bglcich  wir uns bewu6t sind, daR  die Abwagung der Argumente nicht zu einem 
cindcutigcn Ergebnis fiihrt, empfehlen wir, die Antidumping-Zone als solche nicht als 
Kosten  zu  behandeln,  die  einem  mit  dem  Exporteur  verbundenen  Importeur 
entstchen, wie  des auch in  den  Vereinigten Staaten gehandhabt wird (Empfehlung 
12). 
Wir empfehlen  ferner,  das System fur  die  Abwicklung der Riickerstattungen zu 
vcrcinfachcn (vgl. S. 214) (Empfehlung 13). 
lnstitutiollen und Verfallren (Teil X) 
In  unserem  Bericht befassen  wir uns  mit winschaftlichen Problemen, die sich aus der 
Antidumping-Politik der Gemeinschaft ergeben.  Allerdings sollten wir auch auf einige 
institutionelle und verfahrenstechnische Fragen eingehen, die die Effektivitat der Politik und 
unsere Empfehlungen fur die ktinftige Politik der Gemeinschaft betreffen. 
Dauer der Untersuchungen 
Die Zeit bis zum Ergehen eines endgiiltigen Beschlusses ist ein ernstliches und verstand.liches 
Problem der Gemeinschaftsindustrie, zu dem sich das Europaische Parlament mehrfach 
geaul\ert hat. In  seiner EntschlieBung von 1990 fordene das EP, daB vorlaufige MaBnahmen 
(in dcr Regel) binnen sechs Monaten nach der Einleitung eines Verfahrens verhangt werden 
sollten. 
Yom Auftreten eines Dun1pingproblems bis zur Einleitung eines Verfahrens konnen viele 
Monate vergehen. Die Untersuchungen dauern durchschnittlich 18 Monate, obgleich vier bis 
sechs Monate davor vorlaufige MaBnahmen angewendet werden konnen. Die durchschnittliche 
Dauer von Untersuchungen hat sich im letzten Jahrzehnt erheblich verlangen. 
Die  kon1plexe  Entscheidungsstruktur  in  der  Gemeinschaft  hat  zur  Folge,  daB  die 
Untersuchungen cher Ianger dauern als in anderen Landern. Dieser Umstand erklart jedoch 
nicht, warun1 die durchschnittliche Dauer der Untersuchungen zugenommen hat. 
Bckanntlich hcdicnen sich andere fuhrende Anwender von Antidumping-Mallnahmen eines 
Systems von  zcitlichen Fristcn, und einige Kommentatoren haben vorgeschlagen, daB  die 
Getneinschaft ebenfalls ein solches System an wenden sollte. 
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Dieses Problem laBt sich nicht von den der Kommission zur Verftigung stehenden Ressourcen 
trennen.  Der Entwurf des GA  TT-Kodexes setzt ftir  die Dauer einer Untersuchung eine 
verbindliche  Frist  von  18  Monaten  fest.  Wenn  unsere  VorschHige  ftir  die Reform des 
Kritcriun1s des Gemeinschaftsinteresses befolgt werden, wird der Gesamtumfang der im 
Vcrlauf dcr Untersuchung erforderlichen Arbeiten erheblich zunehmen. Auf  jeden Fall besteht 
die Gcfahr, daB das Fristensystem zu tibereilten Beschltissen ftihrt. 
Wir cmpfchlen, daB  die  Kommission Ziele fiir den AbschluB der einzelnen Phasen 
der Antidumping-Untersuchungen festsetzen und veroffentlichen sollte und daB sie in 
ihrcm Jahresbericht an  das EP detaillierte Angaben zur Einhaltung dieser Ziele 
machen sollte (Empfehlung 14). 
Priifung von Alternativen zu Antidumping-MajJnahmen 
Es kann vorkommen, daB Antidumping-MaBnahmen nicht die angemessene Antwort auf durch 
Dumping verursachte Probleme sind.  In  manchen Fallen kann es sich aus GrUnden eines 
effektiven politischen Vorgehens empfehlen, dem durch die ZOlle gebotenen Schutz regelrechte 
Subventionen vorzuziehen. Obgleich wir uns bewuBt sind, daB Subventionen nicht mit den 
internationalen Verpflichtungen der Gemeinschaft in Einklang stehen, kann es angemessen 
sein,  andere  MaBnahmen  zur Untersttitzung  der Gemeinschaftsindustrie entweder auf 
Gcn1cinschaftsebene oder auf Mitgliedstaatenebene zu prtifen. 1m besonderen: 
kann auf regional- und beschaftigungspolitische MaBnahmen zurtickgegriffen 
werden, wenn eine Industriebrd.Jlche aufgrund des internationalen Wettbewerbs 
zu schrumpfen droht; 
konnen  F  &  E-MaBnahmen zur Unterstiitzung der Entwicklung wichtiger 
Tcchnologiesektoren eingesetzt werden. 
Wir  empfehlen  daher,  daB  bei  der  Priifung  des  Gemeinschaftsinteresses  auch 
gepriift  werden  sollte,  ob  nicht  eine  alternative  Ma6nahme angemessener ware 
(Empfehlung 1  5). 
Transparenz  der Antidumping-Verfahren 
Wir glauben, daB  die Transparenz der Antidumping-Verfahren verbessert werden konnte, 
wodurch ein Beitrag zur effektiven Wahrung des Gemeinschaftsinteresses geleistet wtirde. Wir 
sind der Meinung, daB die konkrete Politik der Kommission derzeit nicht genug erlautert wird 
und daB die Grundlage fiir spezielle Beschltisse in den Durchftihrungsbestimmungen nicht in 
angemessener  Weise  gerechtfertigt  wird.  Bekanntlich  werden  in  anderen  ftihrenden 
AnwendcrHindem von Antidumping-MaBnahmen, wie Australien, Kanada und den Vereinigten 
Staaten, dctaillienc Berichte veroffentlicht, wenn Antidumping-MaBnahmen verhangt werden. 
Wir empfchlen, daB: 
Verbraucherverbande, Gewerkschaften  und andere Organisationen, 
die  in  dieser  Sache  mitreden  wollen,  Zugang zu  nichtvertraulichen 
lnformationen iiber die Verfahren erhalten sollten; 
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die Beschliisse zur Einleitung vorlaufiger und endgiiltiger Ma8nahmen 
(  einschlie81ich  der Beschliisse zur Einstellung der Verfahren) mehr 
Hintergrundinformationen und eine umfassende Darstellung der Basis 
fur die  Beschliisse der Kommission  und des Rates enthalten sollten. 
Es  ware  niitzlich,  wenn  die  Analyse  der  Markttrends  von  der 
(rechtlichen) Analyse der Schadigung und der (politischen) Analyse des 
Gemeinschaftsinteresses getrennt wiirde; 
die  Kommission  eine  detaillierte  Beschreibung  ihres  Konzepts  zu 
spezifischen  Fragen im Zusammenhang mit dem Dumpingverfahren 
(z.B.  zur  Bestimmung  der  Schadigungs- und  der  Dumpingspanne) 
veroffentlichen sollte (Empfehlung 16). 
Diese Ietztere Empfehlung entspricht der Empfehlung des Europaischen Parlaments, wonach 
die Komn1ission fUr die Wirtschaft Leitlinien ihrer Antidumping-Politik veroffentlichen sollte. 
Bestimmungen fiir die  Oberpriifung der Beschliisse der Kommission und des Rates 
Durch Antidumping-Verfahren werden ~.tarke Emotionen auf heiden Seiten freigesetzt, und es 
ist wichtig, daB das System geeignete Uberpriifungen und Bewertungen umfaBt. Wir haben 
wciter  oben  fcstgestellt,  daB  die  Gemeinschaft  der einzige  fiihrende  Anwender  von 
Antidumping-Mal\nahn1cn ist, bei dem eine einzige Stelle fiir aile Phasen der Untersuchungen 
zustiindig ist. 
Dcr1.cit  wird die Tatigkeit der Kommission vom Rat, vom Europaischen Parlament und vom 
Europaischen Gerichtshof kontrolliert. Die Mitgliedstaaten richten ihr Augenmerk unweigerlich 
auf nationale Interessen, und der Gerichtshof hat eingeraumt, daB er schlecht darauf vorbereitet 
ist,  i.iber  Fragen  zu  entscheiden, die  haufig  technischen oder politischen  und  weniger 
rcchtlichen Charakter haben. 
Daher wiirde es  sich  empfehlen, da8 das Europaische Parlament die Einsetzung 
cines Fachgremiums priifen sollte, das mit der Beratung in Fragen der allgemeinen 
Politik  und  moglicherweise,  in  bestimmten  Fallen, auch  in  Fragen  des  globalen 
Interesses der Gemeinschaft beauftragt wird (Empfehlung 17). 
llestimmungen fiir die  Oberwachung der MajJnahmen 
In  einigcn  Fallen  di.irften  MaBnahmen  nur  insofern  gerechtfertigt  sein,  als  die 
Gcn1cinschaftsindustrie Initiativen  zur Verbesserung ihrer WettbewerbsHihigkeit ergreift. 
Darubcr hinaus ist  es moglich, daB  MaBnahmen in  der Praxis nicht die erwarteten oder 
hcabsichtigten Auswirkungen haben. 
Wir cn1pfchlcn, daB die Kommission die Antidumping-Ma6nahmen aktiv iiberwachen 
und  cine  Ubcrpriifung einleiten  sollte,  wenn  Ma8nahmen  nicht die  beabsichtigte 
Wirkung zeigen (Empfehlung 18). 
Ressourcen  der  Kommission 
Gcgcnwartig verfugt die  Kommission  tiber  124  Planstellen  fi.ir  Beamte (einschlieBlich 
llilfspcrsonal), die mit der Vcrwaltung von Antidumping- und AntisubventionsmaBnahmen der 
Gemcinschaft betraut sind. Im Vergleich dazu arbeiten in den Vereinigten Staaten tiber 200 
Bcan1te  des  Handelsministeriums  und  der  Internationalen  Handelskommission  an 
Untersuchungen in1  Bereich der Antidumping- und AntisubventionsmaBnahmen. 
In1  Rahmen dieser Studie haben wir nicht untersucht, ob die der Kommission zur Verfiigung 
stchenden Ressourcen angemessen sind. 
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Wir sind uns  bewu6t, da6 die in  diesem  Bericht enthaltenen  Empfehlungen  eine 
dctaillierte  Uberprufung  der  notwendigen  Ressourcen  erfordern  wiirde.  Diese 
Uberprufung  sollte  auch  eine  Beurteilung  der  Qualifikationen  umfassen,  die 
vonn(Hen  sind,  urn  eine  detaillierte  Analyse  des  Gemeinschaftsinteresses 
durchzufiihren, das im Mittelpunkt unserer Empfehlungen steht (Empfehlung 19). 
Gesamtpolitische Fragen (Teil XI) 
Soziales Dumping und Umweltdumping 
Innerhalb des existierenden GATT-Rahmens ware es der Gemeinschaft nicht moglich, 
MaBnahmen zu verhangen, wenn Exporteure in die Gemeinschaft: 
die international anerkannten Mindestnormen fiir Beschaftigungsbedingungen 
nicht einhalten und damit von niedrigen Arbeitskosten profitieren ("soziales 
Dumping"); 
altere,  umweltbelastendere  Verfahren  anwenden  oder  weniger  strengen 
U mweltgesetzen unterliegen ("U mweltdumping"). 
In  seiner EntschlieBung von 1990 hat das Europaische Parlament die Auffassung vertreten, daB 
Lander, die einen zollfreien Zugang zum Gemeinschaftsmarkt anstreben, die IAO-Normen 
einhalten miiBten. 
Wir h<.)rtcn  unterschiedliche Ansichten zu der Frage, ob es zweckma.Big sei, MaBnahmen gegen 
das soziale Dumping oder das Umweltdumping zu ergreifen. 
Wir glauben nicht, daB Antidumping-MaBnahmen geeignet sind, urn sich mit diesen Problemen 
zu bcfassen, denn: 
es gibt keinen einleuchtenden Grund, MaBnahmen  nur gegen Exporte zu 
ergreifen, die der Gemeinschaftsindustrie materiellen Schaden zuftigen; 
der Kostenvorteil des Exporteurs ware sehr schwer abzuschatzen, und es 
besttinde  die  groBe  Gefahr,  daB  dadurch  ein  unterschwelliger 
W ettbewerbsvorteil verdeckt wiirde; 
die  Anwendung  von  HandelsprotektionsmaBnahmen  konnte  sich  als 
kontraproduktiv erweisen, da sich die sozialen Normen und die Umweltnormen 
n1it dem Wirtschaftswachstum verbessem konnten. 
Am wenigsten  entwickelte Lander und Osteuropa 
Wic bcrcits bcn1erkt, entflillt ein hoher Anteil der Antidumping-Untersuchungen auf Importe 
aus  nichtn1arktwirtschaftlichen  Landem (41  %  zwischen  1981  und  1991)  und  aus den 
EntwicklungsHindern  (26  %).  (Abgesehen  von  Korea)  machen  diese  Faile 
zusatnmcngcnon1men jedoch weniger als 10 % des gesamten Handels aus, der Antidumping-
MaBnahtnen unterliegt. 
Es  bestcht  ein  eindeutiger Zielkonflikt  zwischen  der  Anwendung  von  Antidumping-
MaBnahrncn und einer Politik, die generell darauf abzielt, die Entwicklung der am wenigsten 
cntwickclten  Lander  und  Osteuropas  zu  fordern.  Allerdings erklarte  man  uns,  daB  es 
unverniinftig sei, bestimmten, einem Dumping ausgesetzten lndustriebranchen wegen einer 
allgen1eincn Politik zur Forderung der Entwicklung den Schutz zu verweigern. 
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Dies schlicBt trotz allen1 die Festsetzung hoherer Mindestschwellen fiir diese Faile nicht aus. 
Die Gcwichtung zwischen Antidumping-MaBnahmen und anderen Politiken ist eine Frage des 
politischen Ermessens, doch wir sind der Meinung, daB dieser Punkt eine Priifung verdient. 
Im  iibrigcn sci darauf hingewiesen, daB sich das EP in seiner EntschlieBung von 1990 daftir 
aussprach,  kcinc  Antidumping-MaBnahn1en  gegen  Produzenten  aus  den  am  wenigsten 
cntwickcltcn LUndcrn zu vcrhUngcn, wenn die Dumpingspanne sehr gering ist, wobei der Wen 
von 5 °!<1  gcnannt wurde. Diese SchluBfolgerung deckt sich mit unserer Empfehlung beziiglich 
der Mindcstschwellen. 
Allgemeine SchlujJfolgerungen 
Was die Auswirkung auf den Handel und das Gemeinschaftsinteresse angeht, so betreffen die 
bcdcutsatnsten  Antidumping-Fane in  der Gemeinschaft diejenigen Produkte, welche die 
Kommission als  "strategische" Produkte aus dem Fernen Osten betrachtet. Die von  der 
Kon1mission in diesen Fallen vertretene Grundhaltung beruht auf der Beschaftigung mit den 
Auswirkungen des Dumping auf den Wettbewerb auf dem Gemeinschaftsmarkt. Allerdings 
wird  anerkannt,  daB  sich  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  nicht  auf  die  Wurzel  der 
Wettbewerbsprobleme,  d.h.  die  Abschottung  der  Markte  und  das  unlautere 
Wettbewerbsverhalten, auswirken. 
Unseres Erachtens kann man auBerdem anfiihren, daB der GAIT-Rahmen auch durch andere 
Entwicklungen in der Weltwirtschaft iiberholt ist. lm besonderen: 
ist  es  schwierig  zu  entscheiden,  ob der  BeschluB  zur Verlagerung  der 
Produktion in die Gemeinschaft oder in Drittlander als ein Fall von Umgehung 
behandelt werden sollte; 
ist es moglich, daB die ZOlle im Fall einer Kostendegression nicht zu erhohten 
Preisen fiihren, wodurch die Wirksamkeit der MaBnahmen beeintrachtigt wird; 
gcstahet sich die Feststellung cines Dumping sehr viel schwieriger, wenn sich 
die  Produzenten  sowohl  auf  ihrem  Inlandsmarkt  als  auch  auf  den 
Exportmarkten am Vertrieb beteiligen. 
A us diesen Grunden spricht viel dafiir, daB die Antidumping-MaBnahmen durch intemationale 
Wettbcwerbsvorschriften ersetzt werden. Wir haben in der Tat festgestellt, daB allgemein die 
Auffassung  vorherrscht,  daB  die  Notwendigkeit  von  Antidumping-MaBnahmen  im 
wesentlichen  entfallen  wiirde,  wenn  der  internationale  Handel  ahnlichen 
Wcttbewerbsvorschriften  unterlage,  wie sie  in  der Gemeinschaft und in  vielen anderen 
ent wickelten Volkswirtschaften gelten. 
Allcrdings wird es sic her viele Jahre, wenn nicht Jahrzehnte dauern, bevor ein System fiir die 
Regulierung des Wettbewerbs auf internationaler Ebene angewendet werden kann, obgleich es 
schon jctzt Initiativen zur Koordinierung der Wettbewerbsregeln gibt (z.B. die kiirzliche 
Ycrcinbarung zwischen der Gen1einschaft und den Vereinigten Staaten). 
Bis dahin bcstcht die einzige praktische Moglichkeit fiir die Gemeinschaft darin, den Rahmen 
des GATl'-Antidumping-Kodexes zu benutzen. 
Einige kritische Kon1mentatoren haben sich dafiir ausgesprochen, daB die Gemeinschaft das 
Dumping und die Schadigung ncu definieren und nur dann noch MaBnahmen anwenden sollte, 
wcnn: 
der Exponpreis in die Gemeinschaft nicht die Kosten deckt; 
das Dumping dem Wettbewerb (und nicht den Herstellern) schadet. 
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Unseres Erachtens spricht einiges fUr diese Auffassungen. Aus den weiter oben genannten 
GrUnden sind wir jedoch nicht daftir, Antidumping-MaBnahmen nur in Fallen anzuwenden, in 
dcncn der cffektive Wettbewerb in der Gemeinschaft bedroht ist. Im iibrigen halten wires fUr 
unwahrscheinlich, daB eine solche Reform verwirklicht werden kann. 
Dcshalb sollte vorrangig angestrebt werden, daB das Kriterium des Gemeinschaftsinteresses in 
den  Miuclpunkt der Antidumping-Verfahren gertickt wird.  MaBnahmen soil  ten  nur dann 
cingcleitet werden, wenn sie nachweislich im Interesse der Gemeinschaft liegen. Dies dilrfte 
unseres  Erachtens dazu  filhren,  daB  in  einigen Fallen, in denen ein Dumping und eine 
Schadigung festgestellt werden, keine MaBnahmen eingeleitet werden, weil dies nicht im 
Gctncinschaftsinteresse liegen wtirde. 
lm  bcsonderen  empfehlen  wir,  da8  Antidumping-Verfahren  eine  okonomische 
Kosten/Nutzen-Analyse  umfassen  sollten, aus der  hervorgeht, ob die Anwendung 
von Antidumping-Ma8nahmen gerechtfertigt ist (Empfehlung 20). 
Dicsc Analyse sollte: 
nach  vorne  gerichtet  sein.  Das  bedeutet,  daB  die  voraussichtlichen 
Auswirkungen  der  MaBnahmen  auf die  verschiedenen  Bestandteile der 
wirtschaftlichen Interessen der Gemeinschaft abgewogen werden mtiBten; 
sich darauf konzentrieren, ob die MaBnahmen: 
= notwendig sind, urn einen effektiven Wettbewerb auf dem 
Gemeinschaftsn1arkt  zu erhalten; 
= einen effizienteren Einsatz der Ressourcen der Gemeinschaft fordem. 
Bei dieser Bewertung wilrde der kurz- und langfristigen Auswirkung der MaBnahmen auf die 
Wcttbcwerhsflihigkeit der Gemeinschaftsindustrie und auf deren Abnehmer eine zentrale Rolle 
zukonunen.  Das  heiBt,  daB  die  Analyse eine  Berlicksichtigung der Auswirkungen der 
Mal\nahn1cn auf folgende Faktoren einschlieBen sollte: 
die Preise auf kurze und lange Sicht; 
die  lnvestitionen, Forschung und  Entwicklung  in  der direkt  betroffenen 
lndustriebranche; 
die WettbewerbsHihigkeit des gesamten Sektors sowie der Zulieferer und der 
Abnehmer; 
die regionale Beschaftigung. 
Das GATT schrciht seinen Vertragsparteien nicht vor, Antidumping-MaBnahmen zu ergreifen, 
sondcrn cs crlaubt ihnen das.  lm Kodex heiBt es namlich, es sei wilnschenswert, daB die 
Anwendung von  MaBnahmen nicht automatisch, sondern fakultativ gehandhabt werde. Die 
Reform, die wir vorschlagen, wilrde daher dem Kodex entsprechen. 
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flli 
RESUME ET CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
Ce resume presente une vue d'ensemble du rapport que nous avons adresse au Parlement 
europeen quant aux incidences economiques du dumping et de la politique antidumping de la 
Communaute, en mettant I'  accent sur nos conclusions et recommandations principales. 
Lignes generales  du  rapport 
La section I decrit la situation generale dans laquelle notre etude a ete effectuee, nos 
references, notre programme de travail, ainsi que  notre maniere d'abgrder la question; 
La section II donne les grandes lignes de la reglementation antidumping de la 
Communaute, ainsi que des dispositions pertinentes du GAIT ; 
La section III analyse les incidences economiques du dumping et relate une partie de 
!'experience communautaire en la matiere ; 
La section IV envisage les motivations economiques de mesures antidumping ; 
La section V reprend !'utilisation faite par la Communaute des mesures antidumping ; 
La section VI discute les consequences economiques du dumping et des mesures 
antidumping sur des dimensions essentielles relevant de !'interet communautaire; 
Les sections VII et Vill envisagent les criteres fondamentaux du  dumping, des 
prejudices qui peuvent en resulter, et de !'interet communautaire ; 
La section IX analyse le choix des mesures adequates et la section X envisage les 
questions institutionnelles ; 
La section XI s'attache a  certaines questions politiques deportee plus large et 
relatives au dumping. 
Situation generale, references et programme de travail (section I) 
Situation  generale  et  references 
Ces dix demieres annees, le Parlement europeen a accorde une attention considerable a  la 
politique antidumping de la Communaute et au Code antidumping mis au point par le GATT. 
Plus  n.~cemment, en 1990, le Parlement a adopte une resolution affirmant la necessite de 
mesures antidumping eta emis uncertain nombre de recommandations precises visant a  etablir 
des nlodifications politiques de maniere a  rendre plus efficaces, equitables et transparentes les 
mesures antidumping. 
De fa~on a  ameliorer Ia comprehension qu'a le Parlement des consequences economiques du 
dumping et de la politique antidumping adoptee par la Communaute, Ernst & Young ont ete 
charge en decembre 1991 d'engager une etude en vue: 
d'evaluer les consequences economiques du dumping et de la politique antidumping au 
sein de la Communaute ; 
d'estimer Ia pertinence et l'efficacite des mesures antidumping prises par Ia 
Communaute; 
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de presenter et evaluer des options visant a  apporter des modifications en matiere de 
politique communautaire et de politique intemationale. 
Programme de  travail 
Au cours de notre etude, nous avons: 
mis au point un cadre conceptuel a  l'interieur duquel analyser !'incidence sur la 
Communaute du dumping et des mesures antidumping, en tenant compte des faits 
nouveaux importants survenus ces dix demieres annees en matiere d'analyse 
economique des echanges sur les marches intemationaux ; 
entrepris une analyse sur documents des caracreristiques economiques que presentaient 
les industries et les marches qui ont fait I'  objet de procedures antidumping, ainsi que de 
I'  utilisation faite par la Communaute de mesures antidumping ces dix demieres annees; 
engage des etudes plus detaillees, au cas par cas, de cinq procedures antidumping (1). 
Le choix de ces etudes a ete realise en consultation avec la Commission et la Direction 
generale des etudes du Parlement ; 
rencontre a  plusieurs reprises la Direction pour I'  antidumping de la Commission de 
maniere a  discuter tous les aspects de la politique antidumping de la Communaute ; 
entrepris un programme d'entretiens avec d'autres services de la Commission, avec le 
Secretariat du GA  TI, les ministeres et les organes charges de la concurrence de certains 
Etats membres, des associations industrielles, des groupes de defense du  · 
consommateur, des syndicats, des representants officiels d'interets des exportateurs, 
des avocats d'affaires et des analystes universitaires; 
examine les mesures antidumping et les experiences realisees en la matieres par trois 
autres grands utilisateurs de mesures antidumping:  l'Australie, le Canada et les Etats-
Unis. 
Nos trois etudes ont porte sur les mesures antidumping de la Communaute frappant : 
les tis sus pour jeans provenant de quatre pays (la Turquie. l'Indonesie. Hong Kong et Macao).  Le degre de 
dumping a ete considere comme faible et la Commission en a conclu qu'aucun dommage materiel n'en avait 
resulte pour la Communaute.  En consequence. nulle mesure n'a ete imposee; 
les mini-roulements a  billes - utilises dans les moteurs et dans un vaste eventail d'autres produits en vue de 
rCduire les frictions entre elements en mouvement- provenant du Japon. de Singapour et de Thai1ande. On a 
accepte de prendre des mesures a  l'encontre du Japon dans les annees soixante-dix.  Des droits de douane ont 
ete appliques aux  importations en provenance du Japon et de Singapour. et ont par Ia suite ete etendus a  Ia 
Tha.Jlande.  Ces mesures sont encore en vigueur; 
des photopieuses en provenance du Japon.  Des mesures antidumping provisoires ont ete appliquees en 1986 
et font actuellement l'objet d'un reexamen ; 
le chlorure de polyvinyle  - matiere plastique utilisee dans la fabrication d'un vaste eventail de produits -
provenant de pays d'Europe orientale (Tchecoslovaquie. Roumanie. et l'ancienne RDA).  Des mesures ont ete 
appliquees en 1982,183  et ont pris fm en 1987/88 ; 
des petis televiseurs couleur.  Des droits de douane provisoires ont ete appliques aux importations provenant 
de Coree en 1989 et ensuite aux  importations provenant de Hong Kong et de Chine. 
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Portee  et  approche 
Notre approche a consiste a  partir de l'idee de base que les interets globaux de la Communaute 
sont, pour l'ensen1ble, maximalises par le libre echange, pour ensuite evaluer les consequences 
du dumping ainsi que Ia mesure dans laquelle les mesures antidumping accroissent le bien-etre 
cconomique au  sein de Ia Communaute, que ce soit pour uncertain nombre de cas ou dans 
l'cnscmble, lorsqu'une industrie a  eu a  subir Ies effets dommageables du dumping.  Ce faisant, 
nous examinons si d'autres mesures politiques constitueraient une reponse plus adequate aux 
problemes crec6s par le dumping. 
Comprendre de maniere pleine et entiere les consequences du dumping et des mesures 
antidumping dans des cas particuliers aurait implique que nous ayons acces a des informations 
particulierement confidentielles et aurait pese lourdement sur l'industrie et les exportateurs de la 
Communaute - il  nous aurait fallu reprendre entierement notre enquete et entreprendre une 
analyse detaillee des evenements subsequents,  ce qui, dans la pratique, etait impossible.  C'est 
pourquoi notre rapport revet Ia forme d'une analyse economique du phenomene de la politique 
antidumping, analyse se fondant sur des informations (en profondeur) provenant des cinq cas 
evoqucs et  de  nos  discussions  avec  la  Commission,  et avec  d'autres  observateurs  et 
participants a  Ia politique antidumping de Ia Communaute. 
En plus des questions analysees dans ce rapport, il ne faut pas perdre de vue uncertain nombre 
d'autres considerations politiques et economiques qui ont leur role a jouer dans la determination 
pratique de Ia politique : 
les mesures antidumping peuvent favoriser l'ouverture de marches tiers, ce qui 
implique des  benefices economiques.  Une etude bien plus large des relations 
commerciales serait de rigueur si l'ou voulait juger la contribution efficace et effective 
de mesures antidumping a  la liberalisation des marches mondiaux.  Ce dernier point 
n'etait pas dans notre propos ; 
il est largement accepte que !'absence de mesures antidumping, la pratique verrait surgir 
des pressions protectionnistes qui exerceraient des distortions beaucoup plus 
importantes sur le commerce mondial.  De ce point de vue, les mesures antidumping 
sont comme une valve de securite; 
Ia notion de dumping n'est pas "equitable".  11 y ala une dimension emotionnelle de 
poids, mais il faut envisager si, d'un point de vue economique, cela suffit a prendre des 
mesures de retorsion ; 
il se pcut qu'existent de fortes pressions visant a  concilier les interets de groupes bien 
organises. 
Limites 
Tcls que  l'envisageaient les  n!ferences du Parlement, ainsi  que notre proposition, notre 
programme de travail s'est concentre sur Ia Communaute elle-meme.  Le degre de fermeture de 
n1archcs  etrangers par rapport a l'industrie de  la Communaute, ainsi que les politiques 
comn1crcialcs  et industrielles adoptees par des partenaires commerciaux majeurs de  la 
Cotnmunaute sont des questions d'importance, et non denuees d'implications pour la politique 
antidumping de Ia Communaute.  La Direction generale des etudes du Parlement n'a cependant 
pas estime que nos recherches devaient s'elargir a  ces questions. 
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Pour des raisons juridiques, nous n'avons pas ete en mesure d'avoir acces aux dossiers de Ia 
Commission relatifs aux cas que nous avons etudies.  11  a ete convenu que nous pouvions 
examiner des details relatifs au calcul de marges de dumping pratiques par des exportateurs 
individuels avec leur accord.  Malheureusement, cela ne s'est pas traduit dans les faits, d'ou, 
im!vitablement, limitation de Ia valeur de nos etudes.  De maniere plus generale, l'etude de nos 
cas s'est heurtee au manque de bonne volonte de Ia part de certains exportateurs, peu desireux 
de nous  prodiguer leur aide;  et, dans certains cas, nous  avons eu !'impression que les 
entreprises et les associations industrielles de Ia Communaute n'etaient pas entierement libres 
de nous accorder leur cooperation. 
La politique antidumping de Ia Communaute (section II) 
Les mesures antidumping  de Ia Communaute se conferment largement aux dispositions du 
Code antidumping du GAIT.  II est permis d'appliquer des mesures antidumping lorsque sont 
presents les trois cTiteres suivants : 
les exportations en direction de Ia Communaute ont fait l'objet de dumping.  On tend a 
considerer que le dumping implique que les prix pratiques par les exportateurs sur leurs 
marches interieurs sont plus eleves que ceux que font payer les importateurs de Ia 
Communaute.  Mais tel n'est pas necessairement le cas, dans la mesure ou, si les ventes 
de I'exportateur ne sont pas beneficiaires sur le plan interieur, le prix a  !'exportation 
sera compare a  un prix interieur fabrique qui comprendra tousles frais generaux ainsi 
qu'une marge b6neficiaire; 
l'industrie communautaire a subi des prejudices materiels a  la suite du dumping.  De 
surcroit, il est possible de conclure a un prejudice materiellorsque le dumping menace 
d'en causer un ou retarde le developpement de l'industrie communautaire.  Mais ces 
dispositions sont peu utilisees dans la pratique ; 
!'application de ces mesures irait dans !'interet de la Communaute. 
Des mesures qui, habituellement, revetent Ia forme de droits ad valorem ou d'engagements de 
prix, sont appliquees a  un  niv~au necessaire pour mettre fin au dumping, a  moins qu'un droit 
inferieur (ou engagement de prix)ne soit suffisant pour mettre un terme au prejudice ("loi du 
droit le moins eleve").  Les mesures viennent a expiration cinq ansa partir de Ia date ou, pour 
Ia  derniere fois,  elles ont fait  l'objet d'un reexamen, a moins qu'une "sunset review" ne 
confinne qu'elles doivent etre maintenues. 
Les droits payes seront rembourses des lors que l'importateur pourra demontrer qu'ils ont 
excede la marge de dumping. 
Con1me l'ont reconnu les commissions parlementaires, les mesures antidumping adoptees par 
Ia Communaute comprennent trois dispositions qui rendent Ia politique de Ia Communaute plus 
liberale que les exigences strictes du Code du GAIT : 
le critere d'intcret communautaire.  La legislation de l'Australie et du Canada prevoient 
que soicnt prises en consideration des questions d'interet public, sans qu'existe 
d'obligation de les envisager dans chaque cas; 
la Communaute mise a  part, seule l'Australie pratique des droits explicitement moins 
eleves; 
comme Ia Communaute, l'Australie et le Canada connaissent un delai d'expiration de 
cinq ans ("sunset") ;  et le pro  jet de nouveau Code du GAIT rendent de telles clauses 
obligatoires. 
II existe entre les mesures communautaires et celles adoptees par l'Australie, le Canada et les 
Etats-Unis deux autres differences fondamentales: 
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dans ces trois demiers pays, les enquetes sont soumises a  des limites dans le temps ; 
au Canada et aux Etats-Unis, les enquetes relatives au dumping sont le fait d'un 
departement gouvernemental alors que les investigations relatives aux prejudices 
relevent d'une Commission ou d'un Tribunal separe et independant.  En Australie, une 
autorite independante examine trdditionnellement les propositions visant a  mettre en 
oeuvre les mesures antidumping formul<!es par le service australien des douanes. 
Lcs incidences du dumping (section Ill) 
Les circonstances de fond 
Les opinions que l'on se fait en regie generate des problemes de dumping se fondent souvent 
sur l'idee  precon~ue que le dumping implique un afflux d'importations a  bas prix, lorsque, 
peut-etre, Ia demande est deja faible. 
Notre analyse operationnelle, portant sur 40 situations de dumping, montre qu'un nombre non 
negligeable de cas semblent presenter ces caracteristiques.  Pour trois de ces etudes en effet- le 
tissu pour jeans, les mini-roulements a  bille, et le chlorure de polyvinyle - Ia demande et Ia 
production communautaire enregistraient une  baisse importante pendant Ia periode qui a 
precede notre enquete. 
Ncanmoins, dans d'autres cas, on a retrouve des donnees de base nettement differentes, et 
pour l'epoque qui a immediatement precede notre etude, nous avons decouvert que: 
dans Ia n1oite, ou presque, des cas, la demande communautaire s'accroissait de 3%, ou 
plus; 
dans 25% des cas, environ, la production communautaire s'accroissait de 3%, ou plus ; 
dans 20% des cas, environ, les importations dont il etait pretendu qu'elles avaient fait 
l'objet d'un dumping ne repesentaient que 5%, voire moins, du marche communautaire; 
dans un  tiers des cas environ, les prix a  l'importation demeuraient statiques ou etaient 
en  augmentation. 
De n1cn1e, dans les etudes auxquelles no us no us sommes livres pour les P hotocopieuses de 
papier uni (PPU) et les Te/eviseurs couleurs a  petit ecran (TCPE), le marche communautaire 
etait en plein essor, meme si, pour le second cas, la production globale diminuait. 
L 'incidence du dumping 
On  peut  s'attendre  que  le  dumping  entrainera  diverses  consequences  sur  l'industrie 
communautaire  et  sur  d'autres  agents  economiques,  en  fonction  des  circonstances 
fondamentales de tel ou tel cas.  Lorsque le niveau du dumping et celui des transactions est de 
taille, les niveaux des prix, des benefices, de Ia production et de l'emploi communautaires 
scront, en toute probabilite, moins eleves a  court terme que dans des circonstances differentes. 
Surles marches en developpement, le dumping peut prendre la forme d'une pene de parts de 
marche plutot que d'une baisse de Ia production.  De fait, une perte des pans de marche peut 
constitucr un indicateur important de prejudice, lorsque Ia croissance est necessaire au maintien 
ou a  I'  amelioration de Ia competitivite en matiere de couts.  Dans le cas des photocopieurs de 
papit.~r  uni et des uJ/eviseurs  couleur a petit ecran,  l'industrie  communautaire  a  subi 
d'irnportantes pertes en parts demarche. 
D'autrcs indicateurs significatifs de prejudice decouverts dans l'etude que nous avons realisee 
de chacun des cas consistait dans des baisses de prix et de benefices. 
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ll est important de distinguer les effets a court tenne du dumping de ses incidences a long 
tcm1e, ce qui dependra en partie du caractere plus ou moins prolonge du dumping.  Du point de 
vue de !'incidence economique globale, une question de taille qui se posera sur le long tenne 
consistera a savoir si  Ia  competitivite de l'industrie communautaire est compromise par le 
dumping,  ce qui pourrait etre le cas, par exemple: 
s'il existe des economies d'echelle ou des effets d'apprentissage dont ne beneficie pas 
l'industrie communautaire, mais dont, en consequence, !'auteur du dumping tire profit; 
si Ia recherche et le developpement, ainsi que les investissements necessaires, ne sont 
pas entrepris en raison de difficultes financieres a court terme qui ont pour origine le 
dumping; 
s'il est porte prejudice aux foumisseurs de Ia Communaute eta ses industries de pieces 
detachees. 
Les effets potentiels du dumping ont joue un role central dans !'analyse d'un certain nombre de 
cas.  Par exemple: 
pour les mini-roulements a  bille, on s'inquietait de ce que les benefices que pouvait 
eventuellement retirer l'industrie ne soient pas suffisants pour fmancer Ia recherche et le 
developpement necessaires; 
de meme, dans le cas des photocopieuses de papier uni, on a decouvert que l'industrie 
communautaire depensait moins d'argent que les exportateurs japonais en recherche et 
developpement, et l'on en a conclu que la competitivite future de l'industrie 
communautaire s'en trouvait menacee ; 
dans le cas des te/eviseurs couleur a  petit ecran, on a craint qu'une poursuite du 
dumping n'ait pour consequence un arret de la production communautaire integree et 
qu'a long terme, Ia mise au point de produits de nouvelle generation n'en subisse les 
effets negatifs. 
En regie generale, les consommateurs et les acheteurs industriels beneficieront, a  court tenne 
du duntping, dans Ia  mesure ou ils auront affaire a  des prix moins eleves que dans le cas 
contraire.  Toute Ia  question consiste a  savoir si ces "prix moins eleves que dans le  cas 
contraire" se maintiendront a  l'avenir, et si, en fait, les consommateurs n'auront pas a  faire face 
a  plus long terme a des prix plus eleves et/ou a  des services de moindre qualite a  Ia suite des 
prejudices engendres par le dumping. 
Motivations generales de Ia  politique antidumping (section IV) 
Perspectives  relatives a Ia  politique antidumping 
Lcs opinions relatives a !'existence de raisons economiques motivant une politique antidumping 
sont loin de s'accorder. 
A l'un des extremes, on avance que le dumping n'est possible que si le marche interieur de 
I'cxportateur est ferme a Ia  concurrence ou "isole".  De Ia  sorte, le dumping s'oppose aux 
objectifs du  libre-echange et de Ia  concurrence internationale qui ont ete au  centre du 
devcloppcment du systeme international des echanges lors des cinquante demieres annees.  Les 
formes de dumping comprenant des prejudices sont condamnes par le GATT et, lorsqu'elles 
existent, il conviendrait de faire usage des droits definis par le GATT pour mettre en application 
des mesures antidumping.  Sous cette forme, les motivations qui poussent a  adopter des 
mesures  antidumping  dependent  dans  une  large  mesure,  non  seuelement  des  effets 
econon1iques du dumping, mais aussi de considerations plus larges impliquant l'equite et 
l'objcctive qui consiste a promouvoir l'ouverture de marches dont il a ete fait etat plus haut. 
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A l'autre extreme, certains critiques des mesures antidumping avancent qu'on ne tien pas assez 
compte des benefices en matiere de prix procures aux consommateurs et aux acheteurs 
industriels par le dumping.  lis considerent que le dumping n'est nefaste d'un point de vue 
economique que lorsqu'il a pour consequences la disparition d'une industrie communautaire et 
le danger de voir les acheteurs de la Communaute exposes a une situation de monopole.  A 
leurs yeux., les cas de "dumping sauvage" seront probablement rares.  En consequence, seules 
des circonstances tres restreintes exigeront !'application de mesures antidumping. 
Nous sommes d'avis que le dumping, potentiellement, est de nature a  mettre en danger les 
interets economiques de Ia Communaute dans uncertain nombre de secteurs plus vastes que 
ceux qui viennent d'etre suggeres.  Neanmoins, lorsque l'on envisage si , d'un point de vue 
economique, }'introduction de mesures antidumping est motivee, i1 est essentiel de se livrer a 
une analyse detaillee du rnarche, des raisons qui ont conduit au dumping et des effets probables 
de mesures antidumping.  Nous avons particulierement mis l'accent sur Ia distinction qui doit 
exister entre les types suivants de dumping : 
dumping a long terme :  strategie consistant a  fixer des prix plus bas pour les marches a 
}'exportation pendant plusieurs annees, voire de maniere permanente; 
dumping cyclique : exportation a des prix qui ne permettent pas le recouvrement de 
tous les cofits dans le cas ou le marche est deprime ; 
dumping commercial d'Etat : exportations provenant d'economies autres que de 
marc he a des prix qui ne permettraient pas le recouvrement de tousles couts dans une 
economie de marche ; 
dumping Sauvage OU Strategique : exportation a des prix peu eleves (mais n'entrainant 
pas necessairement des penes),  avec pour consequence un affaiblissement de Ia 
concurrence sur le marche communautaire ; 
dumping provisoire : exportation a des prix peu eleves de maniere temporaire : 
de maniere a penetrer le marche communautaire ou a  developper les ventes d'un 
nouveau produit ; 
lorsque la capacite globale de production est en exces. 
Dumping sauvage 
Les questions les plus controversees relatives ala politique antidumping de la Communaute 
concernent des cas que Ia Commission et les industries interessees considerent comme des 
exemples de dumping sauvage- essentiellement, des cas qui impliquent des exportations de 
produits electroniques en provenance d'Extreme-Orient. 
Dans ces cas, on se soucie de ce que les exportateurs beneficient de marches interieurs fermes, 
avec pour resultat: 
qu'ils sont en mesure d'imposer des prix eleves et de faire des chiffres d'affaires eleves 
qui peuvent a  leur tour subventionner des exportations en direction de la Communaute ; 
que les cofits peuvent etre reduits plus rapidement dans la mesure ou les frais fixes se 
repartissent sur des quantites plus elevees. 
En  consequence, les exportateurs peuvent vendre moins cher que les producteurs de Ia 
Communaute sans pour autant vendre a perte. 
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La Commission avance que, sides mesures ne sont pas prises pour s'opposer au dumping, 
l'industrie communautaire verra ses cofits s'accroitre, du moins de maniere relative, dans Ia 
mesure ou des exportations beneficiant du dumping s'empareront d'une part plus large du 
marche communautaire.  U ne reduction des benefices permettra moins facilement a  I  'industrie 
communautaire de financer et de justifier une poursuite de ses investissements en matiere de 
recherche et de developpement.  Avec  le  temps,  l'industrie communautaire disparaitra 
entierement ou alors dependra d'un point de vue technologique des exportateurs en direction de 
Ia Communaute, et elle cessera de constituter une force concurrentielle independante.  Une 
forme de dumping s'appliquant a  des produits du meme ordre pourrait conduire a  la perte de 
secteurs industriels entiers de  Ia  Communaute. L'affaiblissement ou la disparition de  Ia 
concurrence qui en resultera sur le marche communautaire sera considerablement prejudiciable 
aux interets des consommateurs comme des acheteurs industriels. 
Nous sommes d'avis que les questions essentielles qu'il convient d'examiner lorsque l'on 
envisage !'introduction ou non de mesures antidumping dans les circonstances que nous 
venons de decrire sont les suivantes : 
existe-t-il des raisons strategiques suffisantes pour maintenir des capacites 
communautaires dans l'industrie en question ? 
quelle sera I' incidence sur 1  'efficacite a  long terme de Ia concurrence communautaire ? 
En ce qui conceme le second point, les questions essentielles portent sur les points suivants : 
le dumping chassera-t-illes entreprises communautaires du marche ou les affaiblira-t-il 
de maniere permanente? 
dans quelle mesure la concurrence continuera-t-elle d'exister entre exportateurs, qu'ils 
aient eux-meme pratique le dumping ou non? 
dans quelle mesure le marche en question sera-t-il SOUmiS a  des barrieres a 
!'importation ou a  Ia reimportation ? 
11 est plus que probable que ces conditions se rencontreront satisfaites dans des secteurs dans 
lesquels le progres technologique est rapide et dans lesquels un niveau eleve d'investissement 
est requis en matiere de recherche et de developpement, et d'equipements de production en vue 
de maintenir les capacites concurrentielles.  Lorsque tel sera le cas, Ia fermeture du marche 
pourra bien permettre aux exportateurs pratiquant le dumping d'acquerir un avantage initial au 
niveau des cofits qui sera renforce par la production de quantites importarites par le biais d'une 
pratique des prix  agressive sur le  marche communautaire.  En consequence, l'industrie 
communautaire pourrait subir un accroissement des desavantages en matiere de cofits. 
Meme si  le dumping a cause des prejudices, il demeure important de se demander si  des 
mesures antidumping mettront un terme aces prejudices.  n pourrait n'etre qu'insignifiant (mis 
a part Ie  message strategique) d'introduire des mesures si I'industrie communautaire a deja 
souffert de maniere permanente au point de ne plus pouvoir retrouver son role concurrentiel. 
Autres types de  dumping 
Neanmoins, alors que !'incidence du dumping sauvage est une question cle, le dumping ne 
conduit pas necessairement a une reduction prejudiciable en matiere de concurrence.  En regie 
generale,l'analyse economique suggere qu'il  n'est pas imperatif de prendre des mesures 
lorsque le dumping a cause des dommages materiels.  Et pour quatre raisons fondamentales. 
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i) Le dumping n'est pas une aberration 
Le dumping, tel qu'il est evalue et defini par le GAIT, ne reflete pas necessairement une 
strategic agressive ou hostile a  Ia concurrence de Ia part de son auteur.  La conception que se 
fait I  'economiste de marches parfaitement concurrentiels sur lequels le mouvement libre et 
rapide des biens garantit que les prix sont les memes sur differents marches ne se verifie que 
rarement dans Ia pratique.  De fait, lorsqu'un nombre relativement peu eleve de producteurs 
sont en concurrence sur un certain nombre de marches nationaux, les conditons globales de Ia 
demande comme celles auxquelles doivent faire face les producteurs individuels varieront 
frcquemment en fonction des marches,  ce qui conduira a  des disparites dans les prix.  Lorsque 
ces conditions de Ia  demande sont stables, les entreprises peuvent adopter des strategies 
differentes de fixation des prix selon leur bon plaisir, a  moins que les produits en question ne 
puissent etre facilement (re)exportes.  Dans d'autres cas, une politique consistant a  fixer des 
prix peu cleves sur un  marche peut n'etre que provisoire.  Meme au sein de leurs propres 
marches interieurs, il n'est pas rare que les entreprises adoptent une politique de discrimination 
en matiere de prix, vendant par exemple a des prix differents sur des sous-marches differents, 
en fonction des imperatifs de l'offre et de la demande.  De meme, il prevaudra uncertain niveau 
de discrimination en matiere de prix (dumping) d'un pays a l'autre au sein de Ia Communaute, 
a mesure que les entreprises ajustent leurs strategies en matiere de prix aux differentes 
situations de marche auxquelles elles doivent faire  face.  De fait,  un  des objectifs du 
Programme du Marche unique et de la politique communautaire en matiere de concurrence a 
consiste a  eliminer les frictions qui ont permis !'existence de disparites de prix dans divers 
secteurs de la Communaute. 
Les exemples suivants montrent la fa~on dont une concurrence imparfaite peut conduire au 
dumping: 
les entreprises seront generalement desireuses et en mesure de determiner des prix plus 
cleves sur des marches ou leur image de marque jouit d'une forte consideration ; 
en penetrant un nouveau marche, des entreprises peuvent tres bien etre contraintes de 
fixer des prix moins cleves pendant plusieurs annees de maniere a persuader les 
consommateurs de faire l'essai de leurs produits ; 
dans les industries ou les couts diminuent avec le temps a mesure que s'accroit Ia 
production, Ia tentation est grande de fixer des prix inferieurs aux couts (du moment) de 
nlaniere a  augmenter les ventes eta reduire les COUtS (futurs).  Dans de telles 
conditions, des entreprises peuvent adopter des strategies agressives en matiere de 
fixation des prix, que leur marche interieur soit ferme ou non. 
Dumpin~  cyclique 
Une definition  du dumping serait possible si  un  prix a  !'exportation en direction de  la 
Communaute  ne  depassait pas  l'ensemble des couts de l'exportateur  (plus  une  marge 
beneficiaire) sur son marc  he interieur.  Ainsi, si les conditions des affaires et les prix interieurs 
etaient en baisse et que les COUtS a  l'unite etaient cleves, un exportateur pourrait tres bien fixer 
des prix plus cleves pour Ia Communaute de maniere a  eviter d'etre defini comme pratiquant le 
dumping. 
ii) Le prejudice fait partie du bien-etre economique 
Comme nous l'avons evoque plus haut, il se peut que le dumping comporte des incidences tres 
severes sur l'industrie directement affectee a Ia fois a court et a  long terme.  De surcroit, les 
foumisseurs pourraient en souffrir de maniere indirecte, et, si le dumping reduit Ia concurrence 
ou l'efficacite, les consommateurs de l'industrie communautaire faisant l'objet du dumping 
pourr~ient egalement en etre les victimes. 
79 European Parliament- The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
Reste que le dumping peut aussi a  voir des consequences differentes : 
Ia penetration d'un importateur nouveau augmentera la concurrence sur le marche 
communautaire et pourra tres bien contribuer a  une baisse des prix a  plus long terme 
et/ou diversifier les produits offerts au consommateur; 
de meme, Ia fixation de prix a  terme et les strategies de dumping cyclique peuvent 
reduire le niveau general des prix au benefice des consommateurs et des acheteurs 
industriels.  En outre, si les acheteurs industriels n'ont pas la possibilite de beneficier 
entierement de prix peu eleves, leur caractere concurrentiel en aval peut en souffrir, 
avec pour consequences, une baisse de la production et de l'emploi. 
C'est pourquoi le  fait de se concentrer sur l'industrie directement touchee et sur des effets 
negatifs indirects frappant !'ensemble du secteur, ainsi que sur les foumisseurs de materiaux et 
de  pieces  detachees  ne  reflete  pas  necessairement !'incidence  globale  sur l'economie 
communautaire. 
iii) 1/ n'existe pas de motif global justifiant des mesures de represaille contre les marches 
fertnes 
D'un point de vue economique, il est possible de s'opposer de maniere virulente aux barrieres 
formelles et informelles au commerce qui permettent Ia persistance de differentiels de prix. 
Cette maxime a ete a  l'origine meme du GAIT et, comme no us l'avons note precedemment, du 
programme communautaire relatif au Marche unique.  Neanmoins, en face de marches fennes, 
il  n'est absolument pas certain que }'adoption de mesures rendant les importations moins 
competitives sur le marche comn1unautaire soit de nature a  accroitre le bien-etre economique de 
Ia Communaute.  II va de soi que des marches fermes peuvent donner !'occasion de pratiquer le 
dumping.  Du  point de vue de la Communaute, Ia  question de savoir si des mesures se 
justifient dans de telles circonstances doit refleter les avantages comparatifs de l'offre, de la 
capacite qu'a l'economie communautaire d'etre reellement concurrentielle sur les memes bases 
et Ia  possibilite qu'offrent ces mesures d'ouvrir de nouveaux marches.  Les consequences a 
long terme sur les prix constituent une autre dimension essentielle.  11 importe que les marches 
fermes ne se heurtent pas a  une reaction emotionnelle. 
iv) D'autres mesures pourraient etre plus efficaces 
D'un point de vue plus general, les politiques economiques devraient, des que la possibilite 
s'en  presente, s'attaquer a Ia  source du probleme.  Comme nous l'avons vu plus haut,  le 
dumping ne constitue pas en soi un  probleme.  Cependant, il peut creer des problemes qui 
necessitent une intervention politique.  Dans certains cas, des mesures antidumping peuvent 
constituer Ia  seule solution  possible.  Mais d'autres mesures politiques dont dispose la 
Communaute, en particulier en matiere d'emploi, de recherche et de developpement, pourra.ient 
bien se reveler plus adaptees dans certaines circonstances. 
A que/ moment des mesures peuvent-elles se justifier ? 
L'analyse  qui  precede  indique  que  des  mesures  antidumping  ne  se  justifient  pas 
automatiquement pour des motifs economiques, meme lorsque l'on peut etablir !'existence d'un 
prejudice.  Reste que, dans certaines circonstances, des mesures de ce type s'imposent. 
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Parmi les circonstances dans lesquelles de telles mesures sont justifiees on peut mentionner les 
suivantes: 
lorsque Ia main-d'oeuvre constitue un cout d'importance, son cofit d'utilisation en 
pcriodc de recession peut etre peu eleve, le resultat etant que les prix des producteurs de 
Ia Communaute peuvent depasser les coOts sociaux pendant Ia periode concemee. Ce 
phenomene peut se manifester particulierement lorsque les producteurs de Ia 
Communaute se situent dans des regions connaissant un fort taux de chomage ; 
si les marches des capitaux sont imparfaits, une baisse inhabituelle des conditions 
presentees par l'industrie communautaire pourrait reduire l'investissement au-dessous 
de son seuil d'efficacite, ou pourrait conduire des entreprises potentiellemnt efficaces a 
cesser leurs activites. 
Dans chaque cas particulier, il est necessaire de prendre en consideration l'equilibre entre ces 
donnees et leur incidence sur les consommateurs ou  les acheteurs en aval de maniere a 
determiner l'opportunite d'une intervention politique globale. Un element essentiel devrait etre 
un jugement relatif a  Ia position concurrentielle globale de l'industrie communautaire une fois 
l'episode du dumping acheve. 
L 'utilisation faite par Ia Communaute de mesures antidumping (section V) 
Analyse de  cas particuliers 
Pour Ia pcriode 1981-1991, Ia Communaute a engage 422 enquetes antidumping.  Une analyse 
par pays et par secteur montre que: 
41% des cas impliquaient des economies non soumises aux lois du marche ;  33% 
portaient sur des pays industrialises;  et les 26% restants concemaient des importations 
en provenance de pays en developpement (y compris les Economies nouvellement 
industrialisees d'Asie (ENI)); 
on a enregist:re une augmentation notable des cas concernant le Japon, et en particulier, 
les ENI asiatiques.  Dans leur ensemble, Ia proportion des cas relatifs aces pays a 
augmente de 10% de Ia periode 1981-85 a 32% pour Ia periode 1986-91; 
alors que la proportion globale impliquant des economies non soumises aux lois du 
marc he a diminue, on a constate un accroissement net du nombre d'actions engagees 
contre Ia Chine ; 
les enquetes relatives au dumping ont porte sur un vaste eventail de secteurs ;  la 
proportion Ia plus elevee a ete enregistree dans le secteur des produits chimiques. 
Resultat  des  enquetes 
Dans environ 70% des cas ayant abouti depuis 1981, des mesures definitives ont ete adoptees. 
Dans  un  peu  moins de 20%  des cas, on  n'a conclu a aucun  prejudice envers l'industrie 
communautaire ;  et 6% des cas seulement se sont tennines sur une conclusion d'absence de 
dumping. 
Depuis 1986, on n'a procede a  Ia conclusion d'aucun cas pour le motif que, meme si l'industrie 
conununautaire avail souffen du dumping, !'adoption de mesures n'aurait pas ete dans le sens 
des intcrets communautaires. 
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Revisions 
La Commission estime que 7  5% des affairs expirent ou sont annulees en vertu des dispositions 
dites "sunset".  Durant la periode 1989-91, un  peu plus de la moitie des revisions menees a 
terme ont conclu a l'annulation des mesures. 
Enquetes relatives au  dumping de  Ia  part d'exportateurs de  Ia  Communaute 
Cette etude se penche sur les incidences economiques directes de la politique antidumping 
propre ala Communaute. Neanmoins, lorsque l'on prend en consideration !'incidence globale 
des dispositions du  GA  TI relatives au dum_ping  affectant les interets economiques de  1~ 
Communaute, il  convient d'observer que les exportateurs de Ia Communaute constituent Ia 
cible la plus frequente d'enquetes antidumping de Ia part d'autres utilisateurs de mesures de cet 
ordre.  Un quart environ des enquetes antidumping signalees au Secretariat du GA  TI  durant Ia 
peri  ode  1980-1989 concernait des exportations en  provenance de  Ia  Communaute,  11% 
n1ettaient en cause le Japon et 10% les Et,ats-Unis. 
L 'incidence economique de mesures antidumping (section VI) 
L'on n'a consacre jusqu'ici qu'un nombre limite d'etudes relatives a  !'incidence economique de 
mesures de dumping et d'antidumping, et il y a largement place pour des recherches plus 
detaillees portant sur des sujets bien precis.  L'etude des cas a  laquelle nous avons procedee 
contribue a  illustrer certains des effets possibles de ces mesures.  11 est neanmoins impossible 
de general iser a  partir d'un materiel aussi reduit. 
Prix 
Comme l'avance Ia Commission, !'incidence de mesures antidumping sur les prix depend de 
facteurs tels que: 
les coGts auxquels doivent faire face les producteurs de la Communaute et la 
concurrence qui regne entre eux; 
les prix des importations ne faisant pas l'objet d'un dumping. 
u  ne augnlentation des prix equivalant a la taxe appliquee constituera probablement la solution 
Ia plus fnSquente.  Neanmoins, on est fortement convaincu que des mesures augmenteront les 
prix  au-dessus du niveau qui se serait instaure en leur absence.  De fait, !'elimination du 
prejudice porte a l'industrie communautaire depend pour une large part d'un effet de ce type. A 
plus long terme, si  !'adoption de mesures a pour effet de preserver Ia concurrence, les prix 
peuvent  etre  moins  eleves qu'ils  ne  l'auraient  ete  si  l'on  n'avait  pas pris  de mesures 
antidumping. 
II convient de souligner que Ia comparaison qui s'impose ici porte sur Ia tendance des prix qui 
aurait etc observee si aucune mesure n'avait ete adoptee.  En ce qui conceme les produits dont 
le  prix a tendance a  baisser avec le temps, des mesures peuvent avoir pour consequence une 
"augmentation des prix" par le biais d'une stabilisation ou de l'arret d'une tendance ala baisse. 
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Nous ne connaissons qu'une seule etude qui ait tente d'evaluer !'incidence de mesures sur les  ~ 
prix  recouvrant  un  large eventail de produits.  Cette etude a  fourni  des resultats plutot 
surprenants,  mais  elle  suggerait que,  dans  l'ensemble,  les  mesures  avaient pour effet · 
d'augn1enter les prix des importations faisant l'objet d'un dumping comme de celles qui n'en 
faisaient pas l'objet des produits fabriques dans la Communaute. 
Les cas que nous avons etudies indiquent les resultats suivants : 
pour ce qui concerne le tissu de jeans, on observait une concurrence provenant d'autres 
importations a bas prix et il n  'est pas sur que des mesures auraient eu des 
consequences significatives sur les prix ; 
pour les mini-roulements a  bille, certains elements indiquent que les mesures ont 
debouche sur une augmentation des prix ; 
pour les plwtocopieuses de papier uni, les conditions du marche auraient tendance a 
suggerer que les prix auraient ete affectes et les exportateurs ainsi que certains 
observateurs affirment que tel a ete le cas.  Neanmoins, nous avons decouvert des 
elements qui vont dans le sens oppose, et la situation demeure floue ; 
pour le chlorure de polyvinyle, un engagement de prix a  un niveau peu eleve a ete 
donne, et les prix semblent s'etre retablis avant que les mesures aient pu avoir des 
effets: 
il est trop tot pour evaluer les effets de mesures frappant les te/eviseurs couleur a  petit 
ecran. 
Concurrence 
Les mesures antidumping reduisent les pressions concurrentielles a  court terme.  A plus long ; 
terme,  elles  peuvent  avoir pour effet soit d'augmenter,  soit de diminuer le  degre  de 
concurrence. 
II  se peut que des mesures aient une incidence opposee a  long terme sur Ia concurrence dans 
certaines circonstances.  Par exemple, si un importateur a recours a un dumping provisoire af"m 
de penetrer sur un  marche, des mesures, ou Ia menace de mesures, peuvent dissuader une . 
strategic efficace de penetration.  Si l'industrie communautaire est deja hautement concentree, 
des mesures qui decouragent une source importante de concurrence peuvent renforcer Ia 
puissance deja existante du marche. 
Par contraste, des mesures peuvent etre necessaires en vue de proteger l'efficacite de Ia 
concurrence a  long terme a l'interieur de Ia Communaute.  Cette remarque s'applique aux cas . 
de dumping Sauvage, OU dans d'autres situations de dumping, si ce demier porte de serieux . 
prejudices a l'efficacite compardtive a long tenne. 
Nos conclusions, confirmees par d'autres recherches, soot que, dans un nombre significatif de 
cas, il existe un nombre relativement peu eleve de producteurs a l'interieur de Ia Communaute. 
Dans ces cas-la, !'incidence de mesures sur Ia concurrence est particulierement importante. 
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Dans son rapport annuel de  1990, Ia Commission a .estime que 0,6% des ill)pQrtat\ons 
communautaires etaient soumises a  des d.roits antidumping.  Cette eva~ua~on ne tient pas 
.compte de l'incidence des engagements de prix  Notre propre estimation, qui, eUe, compr.end 
les  engagements,  est  qu'en  1991,  1,1%  du  commerce  communautaire  en  mat. ,ere 
d'impona~ions etait soumis a des mesures antidumping.  Quoi qu'il  e~ soit, le niv. ·e~u du 
c.ommerce directement touche par ces mesures est tres peu 6.1eve.  ·  ·  , 
Reste que des mesures antidumping peuvent avoir un effet de "gel COilllllercial" indirect.  Par 
exemple, des exportattmrs peuvent rechercher une part de marche moiQs  elev.~  ou p:ratiquer des 
prix o,loins agressifs sur les marches communautaires de maniere a  evi~er Ulte eQqqete p(,Jfl,ant 
sur des mesures an.tidl,lmping.  ll est tres difficile d'evaluer l'imponance de ces effets Q . ans 1a 
p.ratique.  Ne«uu:noin.s, les entretiens que nous avons eus ont bien indique que l~s · exporta.teurs 
en·  direction de la Communaute tiennent effectivement compte du danger de se voir  ~mposer  des 
mesures  antidumping  dans  !'elaboration  de  leurs ·  str.at4~ies  destine- es  ~u  t;na :~che 
con: ur.mnautaire. 
II  existe des divergences considerables dans la proportion des ecbanges meuant en je1;1  des 
produits sou,mis a  <fes  mesures antidumping.  Dans environ 40% des cas, la prQportion du 
commerce touchee en 1991  etait de 20%, ou moins, de tous les echanges c~ncernant ce 
,p~<;>duit.  A ·  l'autre extremite, dans environ 15% des cas, plus de 60%  O,u  co, I.l)fllerce ttait 
affecie.  Selon nous, il y a la un indicateur important quant a  rincidence econc,>mjque de Qe:S 
mesures. 
Les recherches anterieu.res ainsi que les cas que nous avons etudies suggerent que ces mesut;es 
reduisent le volume du commerce avec les pays affectes, et augmentent les echanges av,ecr.Jes 
autres ,pays. 
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II  est difficile de distinguer les effets des mesures antidumping en fonction  du lieu de 
production par rapport a  ceux des strategies globales.  Neanmoins, il semble tres probable qu'a 
tout le moins, le calendrier des investissements pratique par les pays de Ia Communaute dans 
des industries telles que les photocopieuses de papier uni et les mini-roulements a  bille a ete 
influence par les mesures antidumping. 
A clleteurs  industriels 
Plus de la moitie des cas ou se pratique I'  antidumping impliquent des matieres premieres et des 
produits intermediaires qui sont soumis a une elaboration supplementaire.  Ces acheteurs . 
industriels tirent clairement profit du dumping, du moins a court terme, et des mesures peuvent 
affecter leur propre position concurrentielle sur les marches internationaux.  De fait, lorsque les 
acheteurs communautaires font face a Ia concurrence sur les marches intemationaux, une perte 
de competitivite pourrait conduire a une reduction de la production et de+emploi "en aval", 
excedantle profit que peut retirer de ces mesures l'industrie de Ia CE directement concemee. 
Cette question a ete soulevee dans un certain nombre de cas - parmi lesquels figure notre etude 
sur le chlorure de polyvinyle- et, dans certains cas, il  est clair que ce point de vue a influence 
1  'application des mesures. 
Les cas  que nous avons etudies 
Trois de ces cas- les photocopieuses de papier uni, Ies mini-roulements a  bille, les te/eviseurs 
couleur a  petit ecran - sont consideres par Ia Commission et les industries concemees comme 
des cas de dumping sauvage. 
Dans chacun de ces cas, nos recherches suggerent que, si l'industire communautaire devait etre 
eliminee ou affaiblie, elle ne s'en releverait pas.  Les principales questions qui se posent sont 
done les suivantes : 
le dumping a bien risque de modifier fondamentalement Ia structure de l'industrie de Ia 
CE; 
la disparition de l'industrie communautaire reduirait Ia concurrence au point qu'a long 
terme, les prix augmenteraient ; 
Ia protection de ces industries presente des benefices plus larges et strategiques. 
Nous  ne  sommes  pas en  mesure d'apporter  un  commentaire  definitif sur ces  points. 
Neanmoins, 
il est remarquable que, dans chaque cas, un nombre important d'entreprises 
n  'appartenant pas a  Ia CE sont presentes sur le marche.  La question de leur capacite 
concurrentielle a  long terme revet une importance capitale ; 
l'industrie des roulements a bille occupe une position strategique en ce sens qu'il s'agit 
de composants indispensables pour un large eventail de produits.  Neanmoins, Ia 
question cle est de sa  voir si le dumping conduirait au risque d'un refus de foumir ces 
elements a  l'industrie communautaire, ou si les foumitures se feraient en des termes 
moins attractifs; 
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dans le cas des televiseurs couleur d petit ecran, il apparait qu'un element important 
militant en faveur de !'adoption de mesures a ete la necessite de preserver Ia base de 
marc  he de l'industrie et de financer la mise au point de nouveaux produits, y compris la 
television a  haute definition.  Dans Ia mesure ou n'existe qu'un lien indirect entre les 
benefices que l'on peut tirer de Ia vente de TCPE et le developpement de nouvelles 
technologies, il nous semble que cette argumentation presente des dangers 
considcrables. 
11  conviendrait  d'admettre  que  de  nombreux  cas  n'impliquent  pas  de  considerations 
"strategiques" ou d'inquietudes relatives ala concurrence future: 
Ia Communaute importe du tissu pour jeans en provenance de nombreuses sources.  La 
technologic de production est facilement disponible.  Le prix constitue un element cle 
pour de nombreux acheteurs.  C'est pourquoi il y a Ut un exemple d'une enquete de 
dumping portant sur une industrie eminemment concurrentielle, dans laquelle le 
dumping ne creerait pas d'avantage concurrentiel durable pour l'exportateur; 
le chlorure de polyvinyle est probablement representatif d'un grand nombre de cas 
relevant du secteur de l'acier et de la chimie, dans lequel des niveaux relativement 
faibles d'importations ont une incidence majeure sur les prix, particulierement lorsque 
le marche communautaire est en depression.  La raison en est que la nature a  forte 
intensite de capital de ces industries signifie que, lorsque les capacites sont sous-
utilisees, il existe une forte tendance a  diminuer les prix alors que les COUts variables a 
court terme sont peu eleves.  lei encore, en l'absence d'avancees techniques rapides, 
nous ne voyons pas pourquoi l'exportateur pratiquant le dumping pourrait beneficier 
d'un avantage concurrentiel durable.  Neanmoins, le dumping pourrait conduire a  un 
sous-investissement eta une perte de con1petitivite. 
L 'approche communautaire en  matiere de determination des marges de dumping 
(section  VII) 
II existe un certain nombre de question controversees qui meritent d'etre examinees. 
v  entes  a perte 
Comme nous l'avons observe ci-dessus, les exportateurs peuvent vendre a  perte sur leurs 
marches interieurs pour uncertain nombre de raisons, par exemple lorsque: 
la demande est faible ; 
les premieres etapes de Ia fabrication d'un nouveau produit ou de la creation d'une 
nouvelle usine impliquent des COUtS eleves; 
tous les produits d'une gannne ne peuvent pas supporter une part entiere des frais 
gcneraux. 
A  Ia  suite des dispositions du  Code du GATT, la Communaute considerera les ventes 
(importantes) a  perte (c'est-a-dire les ventes a  des prix qui ne sont pas superieurs aux frais 
gcneraux et aux couts variables sur une periode d'une annee ou moins) comme ne relevant pas 
de "Ia n1arche ordinaire des affaires" et fixera une valeur nonnale sur la base des couts de 
production, plus les frais generaux, plus un taux de profit raisonnable. 
Comme dans Ia situation que nous venons de decrire, l'exportateur peut pratiquer des strategies 
de prix identiques sur le marche interieur et le marche exterieur, il restera la possibilite de 
dccouvrir l'existence de dumping, ou les marges de dumping pourront etre grossies, dans des 
circonstances qui, a premiere  vue,  ne  seraient  pas  considerees  comme  deloyales  ou 
anticoncurrentielles lors d'une procedure legale portant sur la concurrence. 
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Nous  recommandons que les  prix de vente sur le  marche interieur de l'exportateur 
soient adoptes comme  base de  Ia  definition normale de valeurs, a moins qu'ils ne 
soicnt inferieurs aux cofJts variables (recommandation 1). 
Ventes  liees  et  organisations  de  marche 
La maniere dont Ia  Communaute definit les marges de dumping lorsque les producteurs 
vendent par l'intermediaire de compagnies ou de distributeurs dont ils sont entierement ou 
partiellement proprietaires a ete largement critiquee (particulierement) par des exportateurs 
d'Extreme-Orient, ainsi que par certains avocats d'affaires et observateurs universitaires.  Ils 
soutiennent que l'on procede a des ajustements asymetriques aux prix auxquels la premiere 
vente independante s'opere sur le marche interieur de l'exportateur et dans la Communaute. 
II  y a Ia une question complexe, qui a ete au centre d'un certain nombre d'affaires examinees 
par Ia Cour europeenne de Justice.  Pour arriver a une conclusion definitive quanta la politique 
de Ia  Commission, nous aurions du avoir acces a des calculs particuliers de  marges de 
dumping.  Neanmoins,  nous  avons  ete en  mesure de  discuter ces questions  avec  les 
exportateurs et  leurs  conseillers ainsi qu'avec  la Commission.  Nous en  avons  tire  la 
conclusion que la controverse de  taille creee par ce probleme s'articule autour de deux 
questions cle. 
Premierement, pour des raisons de politique, la Commission avance que la valeur normale 
devrait tenir compte de ce qu'elle considere comme des systemes de distribution a cofits eleves 
qui existent dans des pays comme le Japon, et qui ont, aux yeux de la Commission, pour effet 
de fermer le  marche interieur de l'exportateur.  Pour cette raison, sa politique consiste a 
determiner une valeur normale sur la base des prix payes par des consommateurs independants 
et a  ne pratiquer que des ajustements limites par rapport a  ces prix.  Neanmoins, lorsque 
l'exportateur est en mesure de demontrer qu'une chaine de ventes particuliere existant sur le 
marche interieur est le plus comparable au prix a  !'exportation en direction de la Communaute, 
Ia Commission fixera Ia valeur normale sur Ia base de cette chaine. 
Secondement, dans la mesure ou les fonctions executees a  differentes etapes de Ia distribution 
sont differentes entre le marche interieur et le marche a  !'exportation, il existe de nombreuses 
possibilites de divergences de vues en ce qui conceme le niveau adequat de comparaison. 
Dans Ia mesure ou nous n'avons pas ete en mesure d'examiner en detail la determination de 
marges specifiques de dumping, nous ne  pouvons pas, en pratique, commenter !'approche 
adoptee par Ia Communaute. 
Neann1oins : 
par principe, nous estimons qu'il n'est pas desirable que des differences dans les cofits 
de distribution entre le marche interieur et le marche a  I'  exportation puissent influer sur 
les marges de dumping.  Les couts de distribution peuvent varier pour un certain 
nombre de raisons autres que le degre relatif d'ouverture des marches; 
Ia question ne se posera pas si le prix a  !'exportation en direction de la Communaute 
etait compare a  une estimation du cout lie a l'approvisionnement du marche 
communautaire plutot qu'au prix pratique sur le marche interieur de l'exportateur; 
une autre maniere de garantir que la distorsion des marges de dumping par le biais de 
differences dans les COUtS de distribution soit roouite au minimum consisterait a 
con1parer les prix a  !'exportation et les prix pratiques sur le marche interieur de 
l'exportateur "le plus pres possible de l'usine"; 
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si l'on adopte des comparaisons de prix a prix, il peut etre impossible de tenir 
pleinen1ent compte des differences dans le degre des echanges (c'est-a-dire de 
differences portant sur le point de Ia chaine de distribution auquelles prix sont 
compares) sans proceder a des ajustements destines a eliminer ou a ajouter des COUtS 
particuliers.  Lorsque tel est le cas, contrairement a Ia pratique courante, il conviendrait 
de prendre en consideration les frais generaux ainsi que des couts qui y sont 
directement lies. 
En resume, nous concluons: 
qu'il est imperatif, pour des raisons economiques fondamentales, que Ia 
valeur normale et le  prix a l'exportation soient fixes sur les memes bases. 
Autant que possible, il conviendrait d'eliminer les differences par le biais de 
l'adoption d'une valeur normale selective. Neanmoins, dans Ia mesure oil Ia 
chose n'est pas possible, nous ne voyons guere d'autre solution que de 
proceder a des ajustements fondes sur les cofJts de maniere a rendre Ia 
comparaison possible.  Ainsi, tous les ajustements necessaires pour que Ia 
comparaison soit possible devraient tenir compte des disparites entre les 
couts indirects et les couts directs.  Cet aspect ne semble pas prevu par Ia 
reglementation antidumping ; 
qu'il n'existe pas de base economique rationnelle permettant de trailer 
scparcment les fixations de valeurs normales et du prix a )'exportation d'une 
part, et d'autre part Ia  prise en compte de Ia  necessite de proceder a des 
ajustements de maniere a rendre possible Ia  comparaison.  La necessite des 
ajustements dependra essentiellement de Ia  base de Ia  valeur normale et du 
prix a  l'exportation ; 
que dans Ia mesure oil nous ne voyons pas de raison pour laquelle le niveau 
d'une  marge de dumping devrait dependre des couts de distribution et de 
politique demarche existant sur le marche interieur de l'exportateur, il 
convient d'evaluer Ia marge de dumping a  un niveau commercial "aussi pres 
de l'usine que possible" ; 
quoi qu'il en soit, il  existe de puissants arguments economiques allant dans le 
sens d'une comparaison entre le  prix a &'exportation avec une estimation des 
couts qu'implique l'approvisionnement du marche communautaire plutot 
qu'avec le cout lie a l'approvisionnement du marche interieur de 
I'exportateur; 
si  I'on tient compte des benefices que l'exportateur peut esperer obtenir dans 
l'ctablissement des prix a )'exportation, il conviendrait de veiller a ce que le 
taux de profit soit rcellement representatif (Recommandation 2). 
Comparaison  des  prix a !'exportation et de  Ia  valeur normale 
A l'hcure actuelle, les marges de dumping sont fixees par une comparaison des prix pratiques 
lors de transactions specifiques a !'exportation avec une valeur normale moyenne unique.  Si le 
prix a  1  'exportation est superieur a  Ia valeur normale, une valeur zero est attribuee a Ia fixation 
de  Ia  marge de dumping generate.  Ce phenomene donne lieu, depuis longtemps, a des 
critiques envers Ia methode adoptee par la Communaute, et par d'autres pays qui en font usage, 
tels que les Etats-Unis, le Canada et l'Australie, critiques selon lesquelles cette approche peut 
gonfler les marges de dumping. 
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~  quelques exceptions pres, le pro  jet de Code du GAIT demande que les ~arges  de dumping 
~b ient etablies par une comparaison entre les prix moyens a  !'exportation avec Ia  valeur 
ri'onnale. 
Nous  recommandons  que,  dans  Ia  mis~ en  pratique  de  cette  disposition,  Ia · 
Commission  donne des  indications relatives aux circonstances dans lesquelles elle 
~e se  conformerait pas a l'approche moyenne-contre-moyenne  (Recommaildation 
3)'. 
Les deux·recommandations qui precedent vont dans le meme sens que la recommandation du 
Parlement ( 14 decembre 1990) selon laquellt...la Commission devrait publier des directives 
relatives aux affaires concernant Ia politique antidumping de la CE, suivant ainsi l'exemple de 
ses directives concernant la politique de Ia concurrence et les equipements publics.  Le 
Parlement est d'avis que de telles directives amelioreraient la trru:tsparence de la politique de Ia 
CE, particulierement en ce qui conceme le calcul de Ia marge de dumping.  · 
Prejudice et interet communautaire (section VIII) 
P.rejudice 
Comme no  us  l'avons reconnu ci-dessus, le dumping peut, de toute ·evidence, causer des 
dommages economiques considerables a  l'industrie communautaire directement frappee par Ia 
conc':lrrence que represente les importations faisant l'objet de dumping. Neanmoins, selon 
nous," les criteres du GA  1T et de Ia communaute en matiere de prejudice ne fournissent pas 
d ~orientation suffisante quant aux mesures destinees a  accroitre le bien-etre economique.  Et ce 
~our les raisons suivantes : 
ce critere n'est qu'un indicateur partiel de !'interet communautaire.  En particulier, i1 
n'est pas tenu compte des consequences du dumping sur: 
- les acheteurs industriels ; 
- les consommateurs 
- les fournisseurs de materiel et de pieces detachees. 
meme s'H est fait reference aux implications d'un dl:lmping continu, le critere du 
prejudice tend a  regarder vers le passe. Une analyse politique devrait reeonnaitre que ce 
qui est fait est fait et accorder son attention aux effets que les mesures antidumping 
auront pour les producteurs et les acheteurs.  Ce disant, nous n'en reconnaissons pas 
moins que ces mesures peuvent constituer un signal et a  voir un effet dissuasif sur 
d'autres industries.  · 
N:otre analyse du critere du prejudice a egalement souleve des questions plus techniques  . 
.  P~riode  de /'analyse 
Alors que dans l'analyse du prejudice, on envisage les tendances portant sur trois ans ou plus, 
les marges de dumping ne sont generalement determinees que pour un an ou pour une periode 
encore plus courte.  Si l'on decouvre une pr&tique de dumping dans Ia periode conduisant a  ·' 
l'enquete, on suppose implicitement qu'elle dure depuis le debut de 1a periode pour laquelle on 
eyalue le prejudice.  Ce qui n'est pas necessairement le cas. Par exemple, des exportateurs 
p~uvent s'abstenir d'ajuster leurs prix en raison de fluctuations dans les taux de change jusqu'a 
ce qu ~il soient clair que ces demieres ne vont pas s'inverser  .  . 
Neanmoins, la determination de marges de dump'ing pour plusieurs annees - comme le pratique 
l'Australie - serait onereuse. 
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Nous  recommandons  que  Ia  Commission  procede a un  examen  et  etablisse ,un 
rapport concernant  les  tendances  en  matiere  de  prix  pratiques sur le  marche 
intcrieur  de  l'exportateur  comme  dans  Ia  communaute  pendant  Ia  periode  de 
reference  de  maniere a verifier que ces  tendances correspondent effectivement a 
&'emergence ou au developpement d'une pratique de dumping et au prejudice subi par 
l'industrie communautaire.  Neanmoins, cette analyse ne  devrait pas comprendre 
une estimation des marges de dumping pour l'ensemble de  Ia  periode de reference 
(Recommandation 4). 
Limites minimales 
Dans des conditions nonnales de concurrence, les entreprises seront mises en presence de 
"chocs" importants de temps en temps, qui reduiront Ia demande qui s'adresse a  elles ou les 
prix qu'elles peuvent obtenir sur leurs marches.  De surcroit, une marge d'erreur est inevitable 
dans Ia determination de marges de dumping. 
Ces reflexions suggerent que des accroissements dans la penetration des importations de, peut-
etre, jusqu'a 5% ou des marges de dumping de 5-10% ne constitueraient pas une menace 
inhabituelle pour les entreprises de Ia communaute.  11  n'est pas surprenant qu'il existe une 
tendance- encore qu'elle ne soit pas forte (cf pp 153-154) a clore les procedures sans que 
soient prises des mesures lorsque les marges de dumping et Ia penetration des importations 
sont peu elevees. 
Le pro  jet de Code du GAIT fixe des niveaux minimaux pour le dumping de 2% et 1% (tout en 
permettant des exceptions) des parts de marche.  Le premier chiffre impliquera certaines 
modifications dans Ia pratique communautaire. 
Nous recommandons que Ia  Commission adopte et publie des limites minimales qui 
soient  considerablement  plus  elevees  que celles  qui  sont  fixees  dans  le  nouveau 
Code du GATT (Recommandation 5). 
Cette recommandation semble s'accorder avec Ia  resolution du Parlement de 1990 selon 
laquelle on ne peut affirmer qu'il y a dumping que lorsque des flux importants d'importations a 
bon marc he cause des dornmages substantiels a 1  'industrie communautaire. 
Interet  communautaire 
II y a quelques annees deja qu'une procedure s'est close sur la conclusion que !'application de 
mesures ne  serait pas dans !'interet de Ia Communaute.  A premiere vue, pareille chose est 
surprenante, dans Ia mesure ou 
Ia comn1ission est d'avis qu'une enquete devrait etre ouverte s'il existe suffisamment de 
preuves de dumping et de prejudice et que des questions d'interet commuautaire ne 
devraient pas etre prises en compte aCe Stade; 
des enquetes en matiere de dumping ont ete engagees et des mesures imposees dans des 
situations de marche diverses ; 
l'analyse economique suggere que !'interet du producteur n'est pas un indicateur ideal 
de I' interet economique global de Ia communaute ; 
plus de Ia moitie des affaires antidumping impliquent des matieres premieres et des 
produits intermooiaires destines a  une elaboration ulterieure. 
Nous avons entendu une large variete d'opinions relatives au critere d'interet communautaire. 
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A l'un des extremes, certains observateurs avan~aient que la Commission considere !'interet 
communautaire comme !'equivalent de l'interet de l'industrie.  Tout au plus, ce critere n'est 
qu'une valve de securite qui permet a  Ia  Commission et au Conseil de ne pas adopter ou de 
n1odifier des mesures lorsque de fortes pressions s'exercent en ce sens.  Cette affrrmation 
conduit certains observateurs a  estimer qu'il conviendrait de renoncer a faire croire que d'autres 
interets sont pris en consideration. D'autres estiment que le fait de donner une substance au 
critere de l'interet communautaire constitue une n!forme fondamentale et essentielle. 
Neanmoins,  d'autres  observateurs  - et  en  particulier  les  associations  industrielles  -
s'inquietaient de ce que l'industrie de la Communaute ne beneficierait pas de la protection dont 
elle a besoin - et qu'elle merite- en face des prejudices du dumping, si l'on devait donner la 
priorite aux questions d'interet communautaire.  Certains se soucient de l'eventail de questions 
commerciales, economiques et politiques qui pourraient etre prises en consideration. 
Sur Ia  base des  etudes que nous avons realisees, de notre programme d'entretiens 
et  d'un  examen  des  resultats  obtenus  dans  diverses  affaires  ces  dix  dernieres 
annees, notre impression  globale est qu'il y a lieu  de  proceder a une analyse plus 
detainee de l'incidence qu'auront des mesures antidumping et qu'il est necessaire de 
repenser  l'equilibre entre  les  interets  des  producteurs et  des  acheteurs.  Nous 
recommandons que Ia  Commission fasse  rapport de son analyse des consequences 
du dumping comme des consequences de ('introduction de mesures antidumping sur 
tous les  intcrets economiques, dans une perspective qui soit a Ia  fois a court et a 
long terme (Recommandation 6). 
Mesures (section  IX) 
Determination  des  mesures 
Le choix d'une mesure antidumping dans une situation donnee est soumis a  uncertain nombre 
de considerations de poids, dont: 
le fait que les parties s'y conforment; 
l'efficacite dans !'elimination du prejudice ; 
son incidence sur les prix a  Ia consommation et les revenus crees par les droits ; 
ses effets sur Ia concurrence; 
Ia souplesse en face de modifications dans la situation du marche ; 
l'opportunite administrative. 
Comn1e nous l'avons note ci-dessus, dans Ia plupart des cas, Ia  Communaute applique des 
droits a  taux fixe ou accepte des engagements. 
Certains commentateurs ont soutenu que la Communaute, et peut-etre le GATT, devrait adopter 
un systeme de droits variables, c'est-a-dire un systeme liant le niveau des droits ala difference 
qui separe Ia valeur declaree a Ia douane et un prix-cible.  Et de fait, un tel systeme presenterait 
les avantages suivants : 
rendre plus previsible l'effet sur les prix auxquels les producteurs de la Communaute 
seront en mesure de vendre ; 
inviter de maniere positive a mettre fm au dumping; 
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introduire un mecanisme "d'auto-destruction" par le biais duquelles mesures 
cesseraient d'avoir des consequences lorsque les prix se retabliraient et que disparaittait 
Ia menace de nouveaux prejudices ; 
augmenter - on peutle croire - le caractere equitable du systeme des droits. 
Neanmoins: 
les benefices resultant de !'augmentation des prix reviendraient a  l'exportateur ; 
la gestion d'un tel systeme serait plus cofiteuse; 
si le marche de la Communaute ne dispose que de peu de fournisseurs, le fait de fixer 
un prix plancher pour un nombre significatif d'importations pourraitqeer une reference 
et, en consequence, avoir des effets negatifs sur Ia concurrence. 
La plupart de ces conditions sont pertinentes dans la comparaison des engagements et des 
droits ad valorem.  Neanmoins, des droits variables presentent l'avantage de constituer un 
mecanisme automatique qui assure que les parties s'y conforment. 
Les  arguments  ne  soot  pas  clairement  tranches  mais,  tout  bien  pese,  nous 
recommandons que Ia  Communaute adopte un systeme de droits variables, sauf en 
cas de  preoccupations prioritaires touchant les effets sur Ia  concurrence ou lorsque 
Ia  gestion d'un tel systeme se revelerait difficile (Recommandation 7). 
Modification  des  circonstances 
Les mesures antidumping peuvent, en pratique, representer une protection insuffisante, ou au 
contr'aire trop importante pour l'industrie communautaire. 
Nous  sommes  d'avis  que  Ia  Commission  devrait  surveiller  l'incidence  de  ces 
mesures,  et,  lorsqu'elles  ne  produisent  pas  les  effets  escomptes,  engager  une 
revision de sa propre initiative (Recommandation 8). 
Duree  des  mesures 
La periode de cinq ans, dite de "sunset" prevue dans la reglementation antidumping et dans le 
pro  jet de code du GA  1T  semblerait, dans Ia plupart des cas, constituer une periode raisonnable 
permettant a  l'industrie de Ia communaute de proceder a  des ajustements.  Dans un des secteurs 
que nous avons etudies -les mini-roulements a bille - des mesures sont en place depuis les 
annees soixante-dix. 
Nous sommes d'avis: 
qu'il convient d'envisager de prendre des mesures pour une periode plus 
breve, particulierement lorsque le dumping et le prejudice qu'il a cause sont 
lies a l'etat du cycle economique.  ,, serait possible de prevoir 
(exceptionnellement)  le  renouvellement de  ces mesures ; 
qu'il ne devrait etre qu'exceptionnel que des mesures soient maintenues 
pendant plus de cinq ans (Recommandation 9). 
92 European Parliament- The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
Niveau  de  protection 
La "regie des droits les moins eleves" joue un role central dans la politique antidumping de la 
Communaute.  A l'heure actuelle, le niveau des droits est fixe de maniere a mettre un terme au 
prejudice. 
Le fait d'evaluer le niveau des droits (ou engagements de prix) qui elirninera le prejudice pose 
un certain nombre de problemes techniques.  La Commission a adopte des approches diverses, 
ce qui l'a conduite a etre accusee de manquer de logique.  Dans la mesure ou !'incidence des 
mesures depend de Ia situation specifique du marche, il est tres difficile d'evaluer les marges 
prejudiciables.  Nous apercevons Ia possiblite de poursuivre des travaux en vue de mettre au 
point et d'evaluer des approches differentes. 
Nous  recommandons  que  Ia  Commission  entreprenne ou  confie a des  tiers  des 
recherches sur cette question, et publie par Ia  suite les grandes lignes relatives a sa 
politique en  matiere de determination de  marges prejudiciables (Recommandation 
10). 
En outre, dans Ia  mesure oil l'incidence des mesures sur l'elimination des prejudices 
causes a l'industrie communautaire ne constitue qu'un indicateur partiel de  leurs 
consequences sur les  interets de Ia  Communaute, nous recommandons que Ia  regie 
des droits les  moins eleves adoptee par Ia  Communaute soit redefinie de maniere 
que les mesures antidumping adoptees ne soient pas uniquement definies en vue de 
mettre fin  a un  prejudice mais en  vue  de  maximaliser les  interets globaux de  Ia 
communaute (Recommandation 11). 
Contre-mesures 
Dans sa resolution de 1990, le Parlement europeen a mis l'accent sur !'importance d'avoir des 
regles efficaces visant a empecher que ne soient contoumees les mesures antidumping. 
Des mesures antidumping fondamentales representent une invitation claire et puissante ala 
circonvention.  Neanmoins : 
on court le risque que des mesures anticirconvention ne creent des distorsions 
supplementaires ; 
il pourrait etre difficile de distinguer entre des projets d'investissements interieurs 
legitimes et ceux qui sont principalement stimules par des droits antidumping. 
C'est pourquoi nous tenons a souligner la necessite d'appliquer avec souplesse les mesures 
anticirconvention et de tenir compte des effets qu'auraient des mesures supplementaires sur les 
interets communautaires. 
Remboursements et revisions de  droits  antidumping 
Quelle que soit l'opinion que l'on a de !'application des mesures antidumping, il  semble 
souhaitable que les exportateurs soumis aces mesures soient invites a mettre fin au dumping. 
Ce qui peut se faire sous les formes suivantes : 
en remboursant les droits lorsque cesse le dumping; 
en liberant des mesures, par le biais d'une revision, les exportateurs qui mettent fin 
au dumping et dont on ne s'attend pas ace qu'ils le reprennent 
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A l'heure actuelle, Ia politique communautaire concernant les remboursements comme l~s 
revisions,  ainsi  que des difficultes pratiques auxquelles  se  heurte le financement  des 
remboursements semblent dissuader les exportateurs de mettre fm au dumping. Des problemes 
de ce type ne  surgiraient pas si  etait acceptee notre recommandation selon laquelle il 
conviendrait que la communaute adopte un systeme de droits variables. 
Le probleme politique porte sur le traitement des droits antidumping eux-memes lorsque les 
marges  de  dumping  sont  recalculees  en  vue  de  determiner  s'il  faut  proceder a un 
remboursement ou si des mesures doivent etre renouvelees ou modifiees.  A l'heure actuelle, si 
l'importateur est en relation avec l'exportateur, les droits payes par le premier sont deduits 
lorsque l'on detennine si le dumping s'est poursuivi. 
Tout en  reconnaissant que Ia  balance ne penche pas en faveur de l'une ou de l'autre 
argumentation, nous  recommandons que, comme c'est le  cas aux Etats-Unis,  les 
droits antidumping eux-memes  ne  soient  pas traites comme  un  cofd  impose  aux 
importateurs qui soot en  relation avec les exportateurs (Recommandation 12). 
Nous  recommandons egalement que le  systeme assurant les  remboursements soit 
simplifie (cf p. 214) (Recommandation 13). 
Institutions et procedures (section X) 
Notre rapport se preoccupe des questions economiques soulevees par Ia politique antidumping 
de Ia Communaute.  Neanmoins, il existe un certain nombre de questions relatives aux 
institutions  et  aux  procedures qui  sont  liees  a  l'efficacite  de  Ia  politique  et  a  nos 
recommendations quanta Ia politique communautaire future.  ll  nous incombe de commenter 
ces points. 
Duree  des  enquetes 
Le temps necessaire a !'obtention d'une decision definitive est une source de preoccupation 
serieuse et comprehensible pour l'industrie communautaire, point que le Parlement europeen a 
commente en de nombreuses occasions.  Dans sa resolution de 1990, le Parlement a demande 
que des mesures provisoires soient (en r~gle generale) adoptees dans un delai de six mois a  pres 
l'ouverture de la procedure. 
II  peut s'ecouler plusieurs mois entre !'emergence de problemes de dumping et l'ouverture 
d'une procedure.  Dans ce cas, les enquetes durent en moyenne dix-huit mois, meme sides 
mesures provisoires peuvent etre appliquees de quatre a six mois avant la fin de l'enquete.  La 
duree moyenne necessaire a Ia conclusion des enquetes s'est considerablement accrue ces dix 
demieres annees. 
La complexite de la prise de decisions au sein de la communaute a pour consequence que les 
enquetes tendront a etre plus longues que dans d'autres pays.  Neanmoins, ce phenomene 
n'explique pas pourquoi Ia duree moyenne des enquetes a augmente. 
11  est remarquable que d'autres pays de taille qui font  usage  de mesures antidumping 
(l'Australie, le Canada et les Etats-Unis) ont tous mis en place un systeme de limites dans le 
temps et de nombreux commentateurs ont suggere que Ia communaute devrait elle aussi adopter 
un tel systeme. 
Cette question ne peut pas etre separee de celle des ressources de la Commission.  Le projet de 
code du GAIT prevoit une limite imperative a Ia longueur des enquetes (dix-huit mois). Si nos 
propositions relatives a Ia reforme du critere de !'Interet communautaire sont adoptees, la 
somme de travail a mettre en oeuvre au cours de l'enquete augmentera de maniere notable. 
Quoi qu'il e~ soit, le systeme de limites dans le temps implique le danger que l'on ne procede 
par raccourct. 
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Ncanmoins, nous recommandons que Ia  Commission etablisse et publie des objectifs 
pour l'achevement des diverses etapes que comprennent les enquetes antidumping 
et que des  informations detainees quant aux  resultats obtenus par rapport a ces 
ohjectifs soient  incluses  dans le  rapport annuel  de Ia  Commission  au  Parlement 
(Recommandation 14). 
Analyse des  solutions autres que les mesures antidumping 
En  soi, il  se  peut que les mesures antidumping ne constituent pas la reponse adequate aux 
problemes crees par le dumping. Dans certains cas, des considerations d'efficacite politique 
suggereraient que des subventions explicites sont preferables ala protection que representent 
les droits.  Neanmoins, alors que nous reconnaissons que les subventions pourraient ne pas 
etre en accord avec les obligations intemationales de Ia Commu~aute,  il peut etre opportun de -
rechercher d'autres mesures 
1destinees a  aider l'industrie communautaire, que ce so  it a  I'  echelon 
de Ia comn1unaute ou des Etats membres.  En particulier : 
des politiques regionales et de l'emploi peuvent etre mises en oeuvre lorsqu'il est 
probable qu 'une industrie regressera en raison de Ia concurrence intemationale ; 
des n1csurcs de recherche et de developpement peuvent etre utilisees en vue de 
prornouvoir Ia mise au point de technologies cle. 
C'est  pourquoi  nous  recommandons  que  l'examen  de  l'interet  communautaire 
envisage  egalement  Ia  possibilite  que  d'autres  mesures  politiques  soient  plus 
adequates (Recommandation 15). 
Transparence  des  procedures  antidumping 
Nous sommes d'avis que Ia transparence des procedures antidumping pourrait etre amelioree, 
ce qui contribuerait a  son efficacite dans Ia promotion des interets communautaires.  A l'heure 
actuelle,  nous estimons que Ia  politique de detail de Ia  Commission ne fait  pas  l'objet 
d'cxplications suffisantes et que les bases de certaines decisions ne sont pas justifiees de 
maniere adequate dans les reglements d'execution.  II  est a noter que dans d'autres pays 
utilisateurs in1portants,  tels que l'australie, le Canada et les Etats-Unis, des rapports plus 
detailles sont publies lorsque des mesures sont adoptees. 
Nous recommandons que: 
les consommateurs, les syndicats et les autres organisations qui souhaitent 
presenter leur point de vue aient acces aux informations non confidentielles 
relatives aux procedures ; 
lcs  rcglements imposant des mesures provisoires et definitives (de meme que 
les decisions cloturant les  procedures) comprennent plus d'informations sur 
Ia  situation d'ensemble et une discussion detaillee des fondements qui on.J. 
motive les decisions de Ia  Commission et du Conseil.  II  serait souhaitable 
que l'analyse des tendances du marche soit separee de l'analyse (juridique) 
des prejudices et de l'analyse (politique) de l'interet communautaire; 
Ia  Commission publie une declaration detainee de l'approche qu'elle a eue de 
questions specifiques qui se sont fait jour dans les procedures de dumping 
(par exemple sur Ia  maniere dont sont determinees les marges de dumping et 
de prejudice) (Recommandation 16). 
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Ccttc dcrnicrc rccommandation va dans le n1eme scns que Ia recon1mandation du Parlement 
curopeen sclon laqucllc il conviendrait que la Commission public des directives sur ses activites 
dans lc cadre de sa politiquc antidumping. 
Dispositions relatives a Ia  revision des  decisions  de  Ia  Commission et du  Conseil 
Lcs procedures antidumping suscitent des emotions fortes dans l'un comme dans l'autre camp 
et il  importe que le systeme comprenne des controles et des equilibres adequats.  Nous avons 
fait observer ci-dessus que Ia  Communaute est la  seule, parmi les utilisateurs majeurs de 
mesures antidumping a  n'avoir qu'un seul organisme responsable pour toutes les etapes de 
l'enquetc. 
A l'heure actuelle, le controle de la Commission est exerce par le conseil des ministres, le 
Parlement europeen et Ia Cour europeenne de Justice.  Inevitablement, les Etats membres se 
preoccuperont particulierement de leurs interets nationaux et Ia Cour a reconnu qu'il n'est pas 
bon de decider de questions qui, souvent, sont de nature technique ou politique, plutot que 
juridique. 
Le Parlement europcen peut done souhaiter envisager qu'un organe specialise soit 
mis en  place, qui donnerait des conseils relatifs aux questions de politique generale, 
et  peut-etre,  a  l'ensemble  de  l'interet  communautaire  pour  certains  cas 
(Recommandation 17). 
Dispositions  relatives a  Ia  verification  des  mesures 
Dans certains cas, des mesures peuvent n'etre justifiees que dans Ia mesure ou l'industrie de Ia 
Communaute entreprend d'ameliorer sa competitivite.  De surcroit, certaines mesures peuvent 
trcs bien, dans Ia pratique, ne pas avoir les effets escomptes ou prevus. 
Nous  rccommandons que Ia  Commission exerce un controle actif sur les mesures 
antidumping et qu'elle soit a l'origine d'une revision lorsque certaines mesures n'ont 
pas I  'effet escompte (Recommandation 18). 
Ressources  de  Ia  Commission 
A l'hcurc actuelle, Ia Commission dispose de 124 emplois (y compris le personnel assistant) 
affectcs a  l'adn1inistration de mesures antidumping et antisubventions.  Par comparaison, aux 
Etats-Unis,  plus de  200 membres du  personnel du Departement du  commerce et de Ia 
Comn1ission  des  echanges  internationaux  s'occupent  d'enquetes  antidumping  et 
antisubventions. 
Nous  n'avons  pas examine,  au  cours de cette etude,  si  les  ressources dont dispose Ia 
Con1mission sont adequates. 
Nous  reconnaissons  que  les  recommandations  contenues  dans  ce  rapport 
dcmandcraient un examen detaille des besoins en ressources.  Cet examen devrait 
comprcndre  une  analyse  des  competences  requises  pour  engager  une  etude 
dctaillce  de l'intcrct communautaire, qui est au centre de  nos  recommandations 
(Recommandation 19). 
Questions de politique plus larges (section XI) 
Le dumping social et environnemental 
Dans le cadre du GA  TI, Ia Communaute n'aurait pas Ia possibilite d'appliquer des mesures 
lorsque les exportateurs en direction de Ia Communaute: 
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n  'observent pas des nonnes mini males reconnues au niveau international en matiere de 
tennes et de conditions d'emploi, et qui done beneficient de COUts ~u  eleves de main-
d'oeuvre ("dumping social") ;  · 
utilisent des methodes obsoletes et qui sont sources de pollution ou sont soumis a  une 
legislation moins stricte en matiere d'environnement ("dumping environnemental:'). 
Dans  s~ resolution de 1990, le Parlement europeen a estime que les divers pays devaient se 
conformer aux nonnes du  BIT~ et ce comme condition d'acces ·exempt de droits au marche 
communautaire. 
Nous avons rencontre des opinions partagees quant a  l'opportunite .d'adopter des mesures 
contre le dumping social et e~vironnemental.  ' 
Nous ne sommes pas d'avis.que les mesures antidumping conviennent pour Iutter contre ce 
genre de problemes : 
il n'existe pas de raison precise d'appliquer des mesures uniquement a  l'encontre 
d'exportations qui causent un prejudice materiel a  l'industrie communautaire; 
l'avantage dont beneficie l'exportateur en matiere de COUtS serait tres difficile a  evaluer 
et il existerait un danger serieux de voir dissimuler un a  vantage comparatifsous-jacent ; 
!'application de mesures protegeant le commerce pourrait etre contre-productives, dans 
Ia mesure ou il est possible que les nonnes sociales et environnementales s'ameliorent 
parallelement a Ia croissance economique.  . 
Les pays moins developpes  et l'Europe de  I'Est 
Comme nous  l'avons observe ci-dessus,  une  proportion elevee d'enquetes antidumping 
touchent des importations provenant d'economies qui ne soot pas des economies de marche 
(41% durant Ia peri  ode 1981-1991) et de pays en developpement (26%  ). Neanmoins - Ia Coree 
mise a part  -,  ces divers cas,  pris dans leur ensemble, representent moins de  10%  de 
l'enser:nble des echanges soumis a  des mesures antidumping. 
11  y a clairement possibilite de co~flit entre !'application de mesures antidumping·et une position 
politique qui, en regie generate, chen;he a  promotivoir le  developpem~nt des pays moins 
developpes et de !'Europe de l'Est.  Neanmoins, on nous a explique qu'il n'est pas raisonnable 
de s'abstenir de se proteger contre certaines industries sujettes au dumping en raison d'une 
politique generate visant a promouvoir le developpement. 
Cependant, rien n'empeche !'adoption de limites minimales plus elevees dans le cas de ces 
pays.  L'equilibre entre Ia  politique antidumping et les autr_es  est une affaire de de<;ision 
politique, mais nous sommes d'avis que cette question merite d'etre examinee.  On peut 
observer que dans sa resolution de 1990, le Parlement a plaide pour qu'aucune mesure ne soit 
prise contre les producteurs des pays moins developpes des lors que l'on  s'aper~oit que la 
marge de dumping est mini  male ;  il a ete fait.  etat d'un chiffre de 5%.  Ceue conclusion 
s'accorde avec nos propres conclusions relatives aux limites minimales. 
Conclusions generales 
En  ce qui  concerne leur incidence sur le commerce et !'interet communautaire, les cas 
d'antidumping les plus significatifs sont ceux qui impliquent ce que la Commission considere 
con1me des produits "strategiques" en provenance d'Extreme-Orient. Le raisonnement sur 
lequel Ia Con1mission met l'accent dans ces cas-la se fonde essentiellement sur un souci cause 
par le dumping sur Ia concurrence sur le marche communautaire.  Neanmoins, il est reconnu 
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que des mesures antidumping ne s'en prennent pas aux racines du probleme de la concurrence, 
a  savoir Ia fermeture de certains marches et des comportements de collusion. 
Nous somn1es d'avis que l'on peut egalement affirmer que d'autres evolutions intervenues 
dans l'economie mondiale ont rendu obsolete le cadre du GAIT. En paniculier : 
il est tres difficile d'etablir si une decision de situer la production a  l'interieur de Ia 
Communaute ou dans des pays tiers devrait etre traitee comme un cas de circonvention 
lorsqu'il existe des economies d'echelle, des droits peuvent tres bien ne passe traduire 
par des augmentations de prix, ce qui reduit l'efficacite de la mesure; 
Ia detennination du dumping est rendue bien plus complexe lorsque les producteurs 
sont impliques dans Ia distribution a  Ia fois sur leurs marches interieurs et sur leurs 
marches a  !'exportation. 
11  exite done de tres bonnes raisons de remplacer les mesures antidumping par des lois de 
concurrence internationale.  De fait, nous avons decouvert qu'il est generalement admis que, si 
le commerce international etait soumis a  des regles de concurrence equivalant a  celles qui sont 
appliquees au  sein de Ia communaute et de nombreuses autres economies developpees, la 
politique antidumping n'aurait virtuellement plus de raison d'etre. 
Neanmoins,  mcme  si  des initiatives  visant a coordonner les  politiques de concurrence 
con1mencent a  voir le jour (par exemple I'  accord recent entre Ia Communaute et les Etats-Unis), 
il  faudra  inevitablement attendre de nombreuses annees, voire des decennies, avant qu'un 
accord soit atteint sur un systeme reglementant Ia concurrence a  I'  echelon international. 
Entre-temps, Ia seule option pratique dont dispose Ia communaute est d'utiliser le cadre cree par 
le Code antidumping du GAIT. 
Certains commentateurs critiques ont fait valoir que Ia  Communaute devrait redefinir le 
dumping et Ia notion de prejudice et n'appliquer des mesures que lorsque: 
les prix a }'exportation en direction de Ia communaute ne couvrent pas les coi'its; 
le dumping nuirait a  Ia concurrence (plutot qu'aux producteurs). 
Dans  une certaine mesure, nous comprenons cette opinion.  Neanmoins, pour les raisons 
exposees ci-dessus, nous ne tiendrions pas a  n'appliquer des mesures antidumping que dans 
les cas ou existe une menace reelle a l'encontre de Ia concurrence dans Ia Communaute.  Pas 
plus que nous n'estimons probable qu'une telle reforme serait mise en oeuvre. 
Selon nous, le  plus important serait plutot de faire du critere de !'interet communautaire le 
centre des procedures antidumping.  II conviendrait de n'introduire des mesures que lorsque et 
dans Ia mesure ou l'on peut demontrer qu'elles vont dans le sens de !'interet communautaire. 
Nous en tendons egalement par Ia que dans certains cas ou l'on constate !'existence de dumping 
et d'un  prejudice, il  ne conviendrait pas d'adopter de mesures, parce qu'une telle decision 
n'irait pas dans le sens de !'interet communautaire. 
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Plus  particulierement,  nous  recommandons  que  des  procedures  antidumping 
comprennent  une  analyse  economique  des  coots  et  des  profits  impliques  par 
('application de mesures antidumping (Recommandation 20). 
Cette analyse : 
regarderait vers l'avenir.  C'est-a-dire que l'on procederait a une comparaison de 
!'incidence probable qu'auraient les mesures sur les divers elements constituant les 
interets economiques de la Communaute; 
envisagerait si d'autres mesures: 
seraient necessaires pour preserver une concurrence reelle sur le marche 
communautaire ; 
promouvoir une utilisation plus efficace des ressources communautaires. 
L'incidence  de  ces  mesures  sur  la  competitivite  de  l'industrie  communautaire  et  ses 
consommateurs a court eta long terme serait au centre de cette estimation.  C'est-a-dire que 
!'analyse comprendrait un examen des effets que les mesures auraient sur: 
les prix a court eta long terme; 
les investissements et la recherche et le developpement dans l'industrie d.irectement 
touchee; 
la competitivite de 1  'ensemble du secteur, ainsi que des fournisseurs et des ac 
teurs; 
l'emploi regional. 
Le GA  TI n'exige pas que les pays qui ont signe l'accord adoptent des mesures antidumping ; 
illeur permet plutot de le faire.  De fait, le code affrrme qu'il est souhaitable que !'application 
de mesures serait discretionnaire plutot qu'automatique.  Ainsi, la reforme que nous proposons 
serait en harmonie avec le Code. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
Background and Terms of Reference 
Background 
Since 1980 the European Parliament has adopted three resolutions on dumping and many 
other resolutions on trade issues have endorsed the Community's anti-dumping policy or 
called for changes in it.  Most recently, in December 1990 the Parliament adopted a 
Resolution  1 which in its preamble: 
•  identified an increase in the prevalence of injurious dumping and a resulting 
increased use of anti-dumping measures in many areas of the world, although not in 
the Community; 
•  suggested that protection of their home markets created an incentive for companies 
to dump in order to achieve scale economies; 
•  noted that steps to open markets would therefore reduce the need for anti-dumping 
measures; 
•  argued that, in order to avoid the use of anti-dumping measures for protectionist 
purposes, they should only be adopted in clear and specific cases of dumping; 
•  called for the GATT Anti-Dumping Code and the Community's Anti-Dumping 
Regulation to strike a balance between the various interests and to provide equitable 
and open procedures for the investigation of dumping cases; and for these measures 
to be made more effective, equitable and transparent. 
The Resolution went on to make a number of technical recommendations for change in the 
Code and Regulation. 
Terms  of Reference 
In July 1991 the European Parliament's Directorate General for Research issued a call for 
tenders to undertake a study of the economic effects of dumping and anti-dumping policy in 
the European Community.  Ernst & Young was invited to undertake the study in December 
1991 and work commenced at the end of January 1992.  The call for tenders specified that 
the study should provide an analysis and assessment of: 
•  the economic effects of dumping on a representative selection of industries in 
different sectors and on the overall Community economy; 
•  the effects of anti-dun1ping measures on these industries and the overall Community 
economy; 
•  the relevance and effectiveness of current EC anti-dumping measures; 
•  options for changes in anti-dumping policy, including: 
the adoption of alternative measures by the Community; 
the development of international competition rules; 
detailed changes in the Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation. 
Resolution of 14.14.90, OJ C 19/633, 28.1.91 Doc. A3-336/90 
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Work Programme, Scope and Approach 
Work  Programme 
Our study of the economic impact of dumping and the Community's anti-dumping policy 
has, as called for by the study specification, included: 
•  the development of a conceptual framework for analysing dumping and anti-
dumping measures.  This area of work has focused on the following key questions: 
why firms adopt dumping strategies; 
the economic impact of these strategies; 
the conditions in which there is an  economic rationale for anti-dumping 
measures. 
This work has been led by our adviser, Professor Tony Venables of the London 
School of  Economics and Political Science.  Professor Venables is an expert on the 
economics of international trade. 
A working paper by Professor Venables is available. 
•  an analysis of 41 dumping proceedings initiated by the Community between 1986 
and  1989.  The analysis was  largely based on  the  Commission and  Council 
Regulations  and Commission  Decisions.  These  were  reviewed to  provide 
information on: 
some of the economic characteristics of the sectors in which dumping in the 
Community has occurred or been alleged; 
the measures taken; 
the time taken to undertake the investigation. 
A working paper reporting this analysis in greater detail is available. 
•  five case studies of  dumping episodes: 
Denim.  An investigation of imports from Indonesia, Hong Kong, Macao 
and Turkey was closed in 1990 with a finding that the injury suffered by the 
Community industry could not be attributed to dumped imports; 
Mini Ball Bearings.  Duties were imposed on imports from Japan and 
Singapore in 1984 and subsequently against imports from Thailand.  They 
remain in force; 
Plain Paper Photocopiers.  Duties were imposed on imports from Japan in 
1986 and anti-circumvention measures were taken in 1988/89.  A Review 
was opened in August 1992; 
Polyvinyl Chloride ("PVC").  Undertakings were accepted in respect of 
imports from East Germany, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 
1982/83  and lapsed in 1987  /88; 
Small Screen Colour Televisions.  Duties were imposed on imports from 
Korea in 1989 and in 1991  measures were extended to cover imports from 
Hong Kong and China. 
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Because of the commercial sensitivity of some of the material contained in the case 
studies, it was agreed that they should remain confidential to Ernst &  Young. 
However, our conclusions and points of  interest arising from them are referred to in 
this report. 
•  a programme of  interviews with: 
the anti-dumping unit and other relevant Commission services; 
the GA  TI  Secretariat; 
Ministries and competition agencies in some Member States; 
industry associations; 
consumer representatives; 
trade unions; 
government representatives of  exporter interests; 
legal advisers; 
economic experts. 
A more detailed list of  interviewees can be found at Annex I; 
•  a comparative analysis of the anti-dumping measures applied by the three other 
largest users of such measures - Australia, Canada and the United States of 
America.  Again, a working paper is available. 
Scope  and Approach 
Economic vs Political Considerations 
A central focus of this study is whether there is an economic rationale for the Community to 
apply anti-dumping measures.  It is important therefore that we should define in general 
terms the circumstances in which we would find that an economic rationale exists and when 
we would describe a justification as "political".  In doing so, we recognise that the precise 
boundary between economic and political considerations is arbitrary. 
In our view, an economic rationale exists in a particular case if, taking one year with the 
next: 
•  the imposition of an anti-dumping measure would raise economic welfare  in the 
Community as a whole.  Gross National Product, ie. the sum total of the income of 
residents of the Community, is normally taken as a proxy for economic welfare; 
•  there is no feasible alternative policy measure which would result in an even higher 
level of economic welfare. 
A political justification would include a wider range of considerations, including: 
•  the possibility that the adoption of anti-dumping measures helps to open overseas 
markets.  Achieving such an objective would undeniably secure economic benefits 
for the Community.  However, a much wider study of trade relations would be 
required in order to judge whether anti-dumping measures make an effective and 
efficient contribution to the liberalisation of world markets; 
•  the argument that anti-dumping measures can be seen as a form of safety valve. 
Many commentators, including a number of the trade lawyers who contributed to 
our study, believe that the economic justification for anti-dumping measures, as 
defined above, is weak or non-existent.  However, in their view, it is necessary to 
have a trade policy instrument which can respond to protectionist pressures and 
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thereby prevent the adoption of other, possibly ad hoc, measures which would be 
more damaging to trade.  Anti-dumping measures are well suited to this role for two 
reasons: 
exporters with a genuine comparative advantage will tend to attract a low 
normal value and thus be less likely to be found to be dumping; 
the complexity and delay associated with anti-dumping measures ensure that 
only the most assiduous and persistent applicants for protection succeed; 
•  the notion that dumping is "unfair".  This view has a powerful emotional appeal. 
However, it does not provide the basis for an economic rationale for anti-dumping 
measures.  The exporter may, for example, benefit from a protected market.  But, 
as argued in greater detail below (Section IV), it does not follow as a matter of 
necessity  that retaliatory  action  will  increase  the  economic  welfare  of the 
Community as a whole.  Indeed, generally it will not; 
•  closely related to this, there may be strong pressure from a well-organised entity or 
group of entities asserting the predominance of its own interests over those of 
others which would be affected by an anti-dumping measure. 
These and other considerations are important in practical policy-making.  However, it is 
also important that the economic rationale for measures in the sense defined above should 
be understood. 
Recognition of  Policy Alternatives 
In this report, we analyse the rationale for anti-dumping measures as an instrument of 
Community economic policy.  Whilst the scope of our study is limited to anti-dumping 
measures, we have inevitably, as implied above, to recognise that other instruments may be 
better suited to dealing with particular problems. 
In general, policies which bear directly on a problem are, where feasible, to be preferred to 
policies which only have an indirect effect and potentially create other distortions.  In 
particular: 
•  since the link between anti-dumping measures and a decision by other Governments 
to take action to open markets is, as previously noted, likely to be very indirect, 
there are strong grounds for preferring other instruments (eg. the New Commercial 
Policy Instrument); 
•  measures to foster directly the development or retention of technologies are likely to 
be  preferable  to  measures  which  protect  companies  which  develop  those 
technologies.  One reason  for concern  is  that  protection  from  international 
competition may reduce the stimulus to innovation; 
•  measures to promote adjustment in particular industries or regions are available if 
they are threatened by keenly priced imports. 
Liberal Perspective 
Some of the arguments that have been put to us in the course of the study would, if taken to 
their logical extreme, amount to a denial of the general case for free trade.  We do not 
regard a restatement of the case for free trade as part of this study.  Rather we start from the 
presumption that economies gain from free trade; even with partners who themselves 
protect their domestic industry.  Among other things, this involves a recognition that 
industries will grow and decline in response to  changing patterns of comparative 
advantage.  Some of the adjustments involved may be painful; but, in general, those costs 
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must be borne unless the Community's economic structure is to be allowed to ossify and its 
income to decline. 
However, it is widely recognised that there are particular circumstances in which the 
general case for free trade does not hold good.  Our approach is to consider whether there 
is a case for treating injurious dumping as one such departure from the general case for free 
trade either in general or in restricted circumstances. 
Economic vs Legal Issues 
In considering the detailed issues about the Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation and 
associated procedures on which we should comment we have adopted a broad definition of 
"economic".  Our criterion has been whether the issue is of general importance to the 
impact and effectiveness of anti-dumping policy.  Many of the issues considered in this 
report can therefore be seen either as "legal" or "economic". 
With the following exception, the distinction between economic and legal issues is of  little 
importance.  However, it must be recognised that this study is a policy analysis and, as 
such, our conclusions on particular aspects of the Community's policy take account of but 
are not bound by existing Community law.  In particular, it is unnecessary for us to take a 
view on various controversial questions concerning the correct interpretation of the GA  TI 
Anti-Dumping Code and the Community's Regulation.  Where we have considered those 
issues, we have asked what the Community's policy should be in order to maximise 
economic welfare and not what the current state of the law is.  In this respect, the role of 
our study is very different from that of  the European Court of  Justice. 
Limitations 
In presenting our report to the Parliament we are conscious of two limitations of our study. 
Focus on the Community 
The terms of reference for the study and our work programme focused on the Community 
itself.  Our research outside the Community has been limited to the anti-dumping measures 
adopted by other leading users. 
The Commission and many of the Community companies and industry associations we 
met: 
•  pointed to the difficulties, and in some cases impossibility, of penetrating some 
overseas markets; 
•  alleged that in some cases in which the Community has faced dumping problems, 
exporters' strategies were co-ordinated as part of the relevant Government's trade 
policy. 
As  we discuss  below,  we  believe  that  the  significance which  is  attached to  these 
considerations as part of an economic rationale for anti-dumping measures is widely 
exaggerated.  Nevertheless, we agree that they are important considerations in determining 
whether a policy response - and this may not be a response involving anti-dumping 
measures - can be justified on economic grounds. 
However, these issues are of importance in a much wider field than anti-dumping policy; 
and the scope of this study was already wide.  Of more particular importance to  the 
evaluation of  dumping policy are the adjustments which exporters claim should be made to 
ensure that the home and export prices are compared at the same "level of trade" in 
dumping determinations.  This is a question of great significance and complexity.  In 
Section VI below, we present an assessment of the true nature of the disagreement between 
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the Community and exporters in certain types of industry.  However, in order to reach a 
conclusion on this issue it would have been necessary to study the  structure of the 
distribution arrangements in these sectors in the Community and in the exporting countries 
concerned.  It was agreed by the Parliament's Research Directorate that this was outside 
our terms of  reference. 
Availability of  Confidential Information and Assistance from Exporters and Community 
Industry 
Since the issues involved in the case studies go wider than the investigation itself, we 
recognised from the outset that we would need to rely heavily on information provided by 
the Community industry and exporters.  In practice, we were disappointed at the level of 
assistance we received: 
•  in two case studies we received a high level of assistance from the Community 
industry which, whilst unwilling to provide us with some commercially sensitive 
material, did give us a full assessment of the investigations and their effects.  It is 
perhaps no coincidence that these were the cases in which measures are not 
currently in force-Denim and PVC; 
•  the remaining case studies involved n1easures which are still in force.  They also 
raised more complex issues.  In these cases the Community industry was willing, 
indeed anxious in at least one case, to give us its views.  However, we sensed a 
reluctance to be open with us and to provide us with hard information on the impact 
of measures.  This is readily  understandable  given  the importance to  these 
industries of protection.  In two of these cases we were able to secure the co-
operation of several exporters.  However, in the remaining case despite repeated 
efforts we were unable to secure the co-operation of  exporters for our study. 
In addition, the Commission was unable to open its files to us for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality.  However, whilst observing these constraints, the Commission did provide 
us with useful background material and answered questions arising from the case studies 
when this was possible. 
For these reasons, the case studies did not achieve the depth of insight into the way that the 
Commission undertakes investigations and on the impact of measures that we had hoped 
would be possible.  We have nevertheless made our best judgement on the basis of the 
information available to us and this is reflected in the report. 
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II  DUMPING AND  ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 
Introduction 
This section provides a  brief outline of the GATT provisions on dumping and the 
Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation  I; and highlights the principal differences between 
the Community's measures and those of Australia, Canada and the USA. 
GATT 
Article VI 
Article VI of the GATT defines dumping and the circumstances in which GATT signatories 
may introduce anti-dumping measures: 
"1.  ....  dumping,  by  which  products  of  one  country  are 
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the 
normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or 
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of 
a  contracting party or materially retards  the development of a 
domestic  industry.  .  ....................  . 
2.  In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party 
may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty  ........... " 
From an economic policy perspective, two points are striking about Article VI: 
•  it only provides grounds for introducing measures when dumping causes or 
threatens material injury or materially retards the development of a domestic 
industry.  Dumping itself is not condemned; 
•  although injurious dumping is condemned, no obligation to introduce measures is 
created. 
The 1979 GATT Anti-Dumping Code 
The GATT Anti-Dumping Code governing the implementation of Article VI includes: 
•  an elaboration of the circumstances in which a detennination of dumping may be 
made (Article 2).  Its provisioqs include: 
following Article VI, that, in certain conditions, the existence of dumping 
may be determined by comparing the (allegedly dumped) export price with 
an export price to third countries or with the "cost of production plus a 
reasonable amount for  administrative,  selling and other costs and for 
profits", rather than with prices in the exporter's domestic market; 
if the importer and the exporter are connected, the export price may be 
constructed on the basis of the price at which the first independent sale is 
made; 
the export price and the don1estic price in the exporter's country shall be 
compared at the same "level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level. .. " 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2423/88  of  11  July  1988  on  protection  against dumped  or 
subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community. L209, Volume 31 
2 August 1988.  Commission Decision No 2424/88/ECSC of 29 July 1988 relates to ECSC products. 
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•  a long list of indicators of injury and a requirement that it should be demonstrated 
that injury has been caused by the dumped imports through the effects of the 
dumping (Article 3); 
•  provision for a determination of injury to be made in respect of producers in a 
region, rather than a territory as a whole, under specified circumstances (Article 4  ); 
•  provision for investigations to be terminated through the acceptance of undertakings 
on prices or to cease exporting (Article 7); 
•  provision for provisional measures to be imposed where this is necessary to prevent 
injury during the investigation (Article 1  0); 
•  a statement that it is desirable that the duties should not be imposed automatically 
and that the duty should be less than the dumping margin if a lesser duty would be 
sufficient to remove injury to the domestic industry.  In any event, the duty should 
not exceed the dumping margin (Article 8); 
•  a requirement that duties should "remain in force only as long as, and to the extent 
necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury" (Article 9); 
•  a requirement to explore "constructive remedies" before applying duties which 
would affect the "essential interests of developing countries"; 
•  a number of  procedural rules covering matters such as: 
the circumstances in which a dumping investigation may be opened (Article 
5); 
a requirement that investigations should be concluded "except in special 
circumstances" within one year of initiation (Article 5); and that provisional 
measures should be limited to four months, with provision for an extension 
to six months (Article 10); 
publication of the initiation of investigations and of their closure, including 
requirements for the publication of conclusions and reasons (Articles 
6,7,8,10); 
the submission, verification and revelation of  evidence (Article 6); 
the rights of interested parties to hearings and to defend their interests 
(Article 6); 
consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement (Article 15). 
The Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation 
Introduction 
The Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation follows the provisions of the GAIT  Code. 
However, in certain key respects, which are discussed below, the Community's Anti-
Dumping Regulation develops the GAIT framework. 
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Criteria 
Following the GATT, the Community requires that three criteria must be met if anti-
dumping measures are to be introduced: 
•  it must be demonstrated that exports to the Community have been dumped; 
•  it must be shown that the Community industry has been materially injured by the 
dumped imports; or that there is a threat of material injury; or that the establishment 
of a Community industry will be materially retarded; 
•  injury caused by other factors must not be attributed to the dumping. 
In addition, the application of anti-dumping measures must be in the interests of the 
Community. 
Definition of  Dumping 
Where the exporter makes a significant level of profitable sales in its domestic market, 
normal value is determined at the domestic price and compared to the export price. 
When there are no (or insufficient) sales in the exporter's domestic market or sales are 
made at a loss, the Community will construct a normal value rather than adopting the price 
in that market.  If the relevant criteria are met, constructed values may be adopted for 
specific  products/models  or for  all  the  products/models  within  the  scope  of the 
investigation. 
The Community's practice in constructing values is to  estimate the cost (including a 
representative rate of profit) that the exporter would incur in serving its domestic market. 
The Community does not make an estimate of the costs that the exporter incurs in serving 
the Community market. 
The inclusion of fixed costs and representative profits in constructed values means that they 
do not provide an estimate of the incremental or marginal cost of serving the domestic 
market.  Rather, the approach yields an estimate of total average costs plus profit. 
Taken together, these points mean that the Community operates a dual definition of 
dumping.  An affirmative determination of dumping will be made if and to the extent that: 
•  the sales price in the exporter's domestic market is profitable and greater than the 
export price to the Community.  On this definition, dumping is a form of price 
discrimination; 
•  where there are insufficient domestic sales or they are not profitable, the constructed 
normal value exceeds the export price.  This definition potentially extends the scope 
for an affirmative determination of dumping to include situations in  which the 
export price is equal to or exceeds the domestic price. 
It is notable that the profitability of the export price is irrelevant to the determination of 
dumping since, under the latter definition, the export price is compared to the costs incurred 
in the domestic market. 
The issues raised by the Community's approach to the determination of dumping, which 
follows the GATT Code, are discussed in Section VI. 
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Injury 
An essential pre-condition for a finding of  material injury is that the dumped imports should 
have undercut the prices of Community producers or have caused them to cut their prices 
("price depression") or not to increase prices ("price repression"). 
The Anti-Dumping Regulation includes a non-inclusive list of indicators of injury to the 
Community industry producing "like products" to the dumped imports: 
production 
capacity utilisation 
stocks 
market share 
sales 
prices 
profits 
return on investment 
cash flow 
employment 
Producers who import the dumped products or are related exporters may be excluded from 
the defmition of the Community industry. 
The Commission considers a period of  three to five years in its investigation of injury. 
When imports from more than one country are under investigation, these will be cumulated 
in the analysis of injury. 
The injury criterion is discussed in Section VII. 
Community Interest 
The Anti-Dumping Regulation provides that provisional and definitive measures shall be 
imposed where affirmative determinations of dumping and injury have been made and the 
interests of the Community call for intervention.  The Regulation does not define 
"Community interest".  However, it is taken to include: 
•  the impact of measures on purchasers, including effects on consumers and on the 
competitiveness of  producers in downstream markets; 
•  preservation of  employment; 
•  the impact on the longer term competitiveness of the Community industry; 
•  the industry's strategic importance. 
The Community interest criterion is discussed in Section VII. 
Lesser Duty Rule 
The Community's Regulations include the provision commended in the GAIT Code that 
the duty imposed should be less than the dumping margin where this be adequate to remove 
injury.  The level of  duty necessary to remove injury is the "injury margin". 
The determination of  injury margins is discussed in Section VIII. 
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Types  of Aleasure 
Primary Measures 
The primary measures available to the Community are duties and undertakings. 
Three types of anti-dumping duty may be distinguished: 
•  ad valorem duties, ie. a fixed percentage of  the value declared to Customs; 
•  specific duties, ie. a fixed amount in ECU per unit of imports; 
•  variable or minimum price duties - the difference between normal value or some 
lesser trigger price and the value declared to Customs.  That is, if the value declared 
to Customs is equal to or exceeds the trigger price, no duty is payable.  If the value 
declared is less than the trigger price, duty is levied at the rate necessary to bring the 
total cost to the importer up to the trigger price. 
Variable duty systems may take several forms: 
•  a  system of periodic (annual) retrospective reviews in which normal value is 
determined definitively and compared to the export prices charged.  An adjustment 
is then made for any under or overpayment of duties made provisionally.  Such a 
system is adopted in the United States and is criticised for the delays in carrying out 
reviews and the uncertainty of their outcome; 
•  a target price is set prospectively and duty is levied definitively on individual 
transactions to the extent that the export price is below the target.  Such a system is 
applied in Canada and was adopted until recently in Australia. 
Duties in the Community may be: 
•  imposed for up to four months on a provisional basis following a preliminary 
investigation; 
•  retroactive, where: 
there has been a history of  dumping which has caused injury; 
the importer was or should have been aware that the exporter practises 
dumping which would cause injury; 
injury is caused by "massively dumped imports in a short period"; 
an undertaking has been violated. 
As noted above, duties are set at the lesser of the dumping margin and the amount 
necessary to remove injury.  Both the level of dumping margins and, in principle at least, 
the level of duty necessary to remove injury may vary between exporters.  Thus the rate of 
duty applied may, and usually does, vary between exporters. 
Undertakin  fiS 
These generally take the form of price undertakings but undertakings to cease or limit 
exports to the Community may be accepted.  The undertaking must eliminate dumping or 
remove the injury that it has caused. 
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Other Measures 
In law, duties and undertakings are the only forms of relief potentially available to 
Community industries which have suffered from injurious dumping. 
However, it has been suggested that some dumping cases have been settled (perhaps even 
before they have been formally opened) by the withdrawal of the complaint by the 
Community  industry  and  the  acceptance  by  the  exporters of Voluntary  Restraint 
Arrangements (VRAs)  or some other measure. 
There is clearly scope in principle for the tactical use of  anti-dumping measures in this way 
since some other measure may be preferred by both parties (ie. afford greater relief to the 
Community industry at lesser cost to the exporters).  However, where such agreements are 
in the private interests of the Community industry and exporters it cannot be assumed that 
they are in the overall Community interest. 
Reviews and Refunds 
Duties and undertakings may be reviewed if circumstances have changed and lapse after 
five years unless renewed.  Duties are refunded when the exporter can show that the duty 
collected exceeds the dumping margin. 
However, as discussed below, the Community's procedures limit the scope for securing 
refunds and for exporters to secure the removal of anti-dumping measures through the 
review process. 
Anti-Circwnvention Measures 
The Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation provides for supplementary measures to be 
applied in two sets of  circumstances. 
Increase in Community Production 
The three formal criteria that must be met when an exporter is suspected of circumventing 
an anti-dumping duty by establishing or expanding Community production are that: 
•  the Community producer and the exporter subject to duties must be related or 
associated; 
•  assembly or production must have increased substantially after the anti-dumping 
investigation was opened; 
•  parts and materials originating from the country of export of  the products subject to 
duties must account for 60% or more of the value of all parts and materials. 
However: 
"account shall be taken of the circumstances of each case and, inter alia, of the 
variable costs incurred in the assembly or production operation and of the research 
and development carried out and the technology applied within the Community." 
Thus the Regulation provides a considerable degree of flexibility for the Commission to 
take account of the perceived contribution of the production or assembly operation to the 
Community economy in cases in which the three formal conditions are met. 
Proceedings under this provision were opened against a number of manufacturers of  Plain 
Paper Photocopiers  in 1988; and in three cases duties were applied for a short period. 
However, they were subsequently replaced by undertakings which remain in force. 
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The draft of the new GATT Code provides for the application of measures to prevent 
circumvention by local production  but in more restricted circumstances than  the 
Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation permits. 
Absomtion of Duties 
The Regulation provides that duties may be increased where these have been absorbed by 
the exporter and provided that such an increase would be in the Community interest.  This 
provision was applied for the first time in 1992 when the original definitive duty on imports 
of silicon metal from China was doubled. 
Key Differences Between the Community's Anti-Dumping Measures and Those 
of Other Major Users 
Like the Community, other leading users of anti-dumping measures have developed their 
policies, procedures and institutions within the GATT framework in the light of their 
political and legal traditions and to meet their specific policy objectives.  The paragraphs 
below highlight some of  the key differences between the Community and the anti-dumping 
systems of Australia, Canada and the United States of America. 
Institutions 
In the Community, anti-dumping investigations are undertaken by the Commission subject 
to oversight by an Advisory Committee of officials from Member States, adoption of 
definitive measures by the Council and appeal to the Court of Justice.  In other leading 
jurisdictions, the institutional arrangements are rather different: 
•  in Australia, investigations of both dumping and injury are undertaken by the 
Customs Sexvice ("ACS").  If the ACS finds that provisional measures should be 
imposed, a second full inquiry to determine whether definitive measures should be 
applied is undertaken by the Anti-Dumping Authority ("ADA"), which makes a 
recommendation to the relevant Minister; 
•  in Canada dumping and injury are subject to separate investigations by  Revenue 
Canada and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal ("CITT") respectively; 
•  similarly, in the United States of America, the Department of Commerce undertakes 
the dumping investigation whilst the International Trade Commission ("lTC") 
investigates injury. 
The ADA, CITT and lTC are all independent of government. 
Public Interest Criteria 
The Community interest criterion is often claimed to be a distinctive feature of the EC 
system.  However: 
•  in Australia, the ADA may take evidence and advise the Minister on wider public 
interest issues and the Minister is not required to impose measures if dumping and 
injury are established.  In practice, these provisions are regarded as equivalent to a 
public interest criterion; 
•  in Canada, the CITT invites representations on public interest issues and may so 
advise the Minister if it believes that the imposition of measures would not be 
justified in whole or in part. In practice, public interest issues rarely arise and the 
CITT appears to interpret narrowly the range of  issues which it should consider. 
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Lesser Duty Rule 
Australia, but not Canada or the United States, operates a lesser duty rule. 
Duty  Systems 
Whereas in the Community duties are usually set on an ad valorem basis and prospectively 
(ie. the duty established during an investigation or review applies until it is amended or 
expires, subject to the refund provisions): 
•  Australia until recently operated a variable duty system, ie. duties were only payable 
if the value declared to Customs exceeded a trigger price.  However, during 1992, 
Australia has adopted a duty system similar to the Community's; 
•  Canada operates a variable duty system; 
•  in the United States duty rates are only established provisionally in advance. 
Following an annual review, duties paid during the previous period are adjusted 
and new duty rates are set provisionally for the next period. 
Sunset  Clauses 
Like the Community, Australia and Canada operate five-year sunset clauses.  (Until 
recently measures expired automatically in Australia after three years with no provision for 
renewal.)  In the United States importers must show that there has been no dumping for 
three years and no likelihood of its resumption. 
Time  Limits 
In the Community the Regulations state that investigations should normally be concluded 
within one year of the initiation of the proceeding.  By contrast, in the three other leading 
user countries, specific time limits are established for each stage of the investigation. 
Transparency 
In the United States and in proceedings before the CIIT confidential information is 
disclosed to independent Counsel. This is not the case in dumping investigations by 
Revenue Canada (although there is a power to make disclosure) or in Australia. 
In all three countries, the outcome of anti-dumping proceedings tends to be communicated 
through freestanding  reports.  These often contain  substantially more background 
information and analysis in support of the decision reached than do Regulations and 
Decisions in the Community. 
The New GATT Code 
When this report was prepared, a new GAIT Anti-Dumping Code was in draft as part of 
the proposals for completing the Uruguay Round.  Adoption of the new Code would 
require amendments to the Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation and the laws of other 
leading users.  In general the new Code makes no fundamental change to the GAIT 
framework for the regulation of dumping.  However, it does include the following 
significant changes: 
•  an absolute limit of 18 months is placed on the length of  investigations; 
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•  territories applying a lesser duty rule may have provisional measures in place for six 
months or, in certain conditions, nine months.  For other countries these periods 
remain unchanged at four and six months; 
•  a de minimis dumping margin of 2%  and a presumption that market shares of less 
than 1% will be treated as negligible (unless the total market shares of countries 
with a share of less than 1% exceeds 2.5%) are introduced; 
•  a Sunset provision is introduced; 
•  the inclusion of an anti-circumvention provision allowing the application of duties 
to imported parts. 
Other detailed and technical changes in the new Code are referred to below as appropriate. 
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III  THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DUMPING 
Introduction 
In this section we discuss: 
•  the economic characteristics of the industries in which dumping investigations have 
been launched in the Community; 
•  the market conditions which must prevail if  dumping is to take place; 
•  five sets of circumstances in which firms may have an incentive to dump: 
long run dumping; 
cyclical dumping; 
predatory dumping; 
transitional dumping; 
dumping by State Traders; 
•  the impact of dumping in our five case study industries. 
The section concludes with some observations on the policy implications of the discussion. 
Economic Characteristics of Sectors Affected by Dumping 
In order to understand the types of sector in the Community which have been subject to 
dumping problems and the dumping episodes themselves, we undertook an analysis of 
investigations of 41 products (a total of 89 product times country cases) initiated over the 
period 1986-89.  The analysis was based on the Commission Decisions and Regulations 
for  these  cases  supplemented  by  some  non-confidential  material  provided by the 
Commission. 
Type  of Product 
As Table 111.1  shows, the 41  investigations covered products ranging from raw materials 
(  eg Oxalic Acid and Iron and Steel Section); through intermediate components (Diesel 
Engines and DRAMS); to consumables (eg Paint Brushes and Video Cassette Recorders). 
Table  111.1:  Product  Characteristics 
Type of  Product/ 
Degree of  Raw  Intermediate  Capital 
Differentiation  Durable  Consumable  Material  Component  Good  Total 
Commodity  1  1  14  3  19 
Some  5  6  11 
High  8  2  1  ·11 
Total  14  1  14  11  1  41 
Source:  Case Analysis 
We judged that 19 of the products were commodities, ie. that price was the most important  · 
factor for buyers.  The remaining 22 products were subject to a degree of differentiation, 
ie. the specific product characteristics would be an important influence on sales. 
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Number of Community Producers 
The level of market concentration is a conventional indicator of the degree of  competition in 
·a market.  Information on the market shares of the leading suppliers in the  Community 
(including both Community producers and importers) was not available and Table 111.2 
. therefore presents an analysis of the number of producers in the Community in the cases 
investigated. 
Table  111.2:  Number of  Producers in the EC 
Number of  Producers  Number of  Cases 
1-2  3 
3-5  14 
6-10  5 
11-20  10 
21-50  3 
51+  1 
Source: Case Analysis 
In over 40% of cases there were five or fewer Community producers and in only 10% of 
cases were there 21 or more Community producers.  In terms of Community production at 
least, it appears that markets in which dumping investigations have been launched are 
relatively concentrated. 
Trends in Demand 
As Figure Ill.1 shows, demand for almost half the products was growing strongly in the 
period immediately before the investigation.  A significant proportion of these cases were in 
the consumer electronics sector. 
Figure 111.1:  Trend in Demand in Year Preceding Investigation 
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Trends in Community Production 
Figure lll.2 shows that in around 30% of cases Community production was already falling 
three years before the investigation.  In the year before the investigation, Community 
production was falling in around 40% of cases.  However, in over a quarter of cases 
Community production was growing strongly (by 3% or more) in the year before the 
investigation. 
Figure 111.2:  Trend in Community Production 
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Source:  Case Analysis- based on 37 product cases for three years before the investigation and on 31 
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Capacity  Utilisation 
Information on capacity utilisation was only available for fourteen cases.  Table III.3 
shows the levels of utilisation of production capacity for both three years before and 
immediately before the investigation.  In most cases there is evidence of spare capacity 
existing.  There was a slight tendency for there to be a higher degree of spare capacity one 
year before the investigation than three years before.  29% of the cases remained in the 
same category; in 29% of  cases capacity utilisation increased over the period; and in 43% of 
cases it declined. 
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Table  111.3:  Capacity Utilisation  in the Period Before the Investigation 
3 Years Before  Year before Investigation  Total 
Investigation  % 
%  31-50  51-60  61-70  71-80  81-90  91-100 
31-50  2  2 
51-60  1  1 
61-70  1  1  1  3 
71-80  1  2  3 
81-90  1  2  1  4 
91-100  1  1 
Total  2  3  2  5  1  1  14 
Source:  Case Analysis 
Trends in Prices and Price Undercutting 
Information on price trends  was available  for only around half the  cases.  Where 
information was available, both EC producer and import prices tended to be falling both in 
the year before the investigation and over the three-year investigation period.  However, in 
around a  third of cases import prices  were  static  or rising in the  year before the 
investigation. 
As Table lll.4 shows, in many cases very high levels of price undercutting (ie. the extent to 
which the prices charged for dumped exports in the Community were less than those of 
Community producers) were found by the Commission:  in 75% of cases undercutting was 
between 11  and 50%. 
Table  111.4:  Levels of Price  Undercutting 
Level of Price Undercutting % 
0-5  6-10  11-20  21-30  31-50  31+ 
Percentage  13  4  25  29  23  7 
Source:  Case Analysis- based on 56 cases 
Import Penetration 
Figure III.3 presents an analysis of import penetration in the year before the investigation 
was launched. 
121 European Parliament - The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
Figure III.3:  Import Penetration  in  the Year Before the  Investigation 
At Product Case Level  At Country Case Level 
Source: Case Analysis 
There is a marked degree of variation in import penetration levels.  In around a quarter of 
cases the total imports investigated (ie. including imports from all the countries included 
within the investigation) accounted for over half of the EC market.  At the other extreme, in 
around 20% of cases, imports alleged to be dumped accounted for 5% or less of the EC 
market.  If  import penetration is analysed for specific countries, in around 20% of cases the 
imports alleged to be dumped accounted for 1% or less of the EC market. 
Not surprisingly, we found that import penetration tended to increase in the period leading 
up to the investigation. 
Fundamental Requirements for Price Discrimination and Dumping 
As discussed in Section II, a finding of dumping may be made when exporters to the 
Community: 
•  discriminate between their home and the Community markets by setting lower 
prices in the latter; or 
•  export to the Community at a price below the costs they incur in supplying their 
domestic market. 
The existence of dumping as price discrimination requires that two conditions should be 
satisfied (however, there are no such requirements for sales below cost): 
•  the firm dumping should face different demand conditions in its home (Country A) 
and export (Country B) markets.  More particularly, it must have a degree of 
discretion in its pricing and face greater competition in its export market; 
•  markets must be segmented.  Firms can only pursue a policy of charging lower 
prices in export than in domestic markets (or vice versa) for any significant period 
of time if, and to the extent that, there is some form of barrier to trade.  Unless such 
barriers exist, profitable opportunities will arise to: 
re-export products from Country B to Country A; 
export Country A's products to Country B. 
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Arbitrage can be expected to continue until the price differentials are removed. 
Market segmentation can exist for a number of  reasons, including: 
•  transport costs.  For products which are difficult or costly to transport, material 
price differentials can persist even if  trade is free; 
•  the existence of  traditional trade barriers (  eg. tariffs and quotas); 
•  where it is difficult or impossible for imports to secure access to a country's 
distribution system; 
•  brand loyalty and product differentiation; 
•  differing national product standards; 
•  patent protection in the exporter's domestic market. 
It can be noted that anti-dumping measures themselves have the effect of (partially) 
isolating the market in which they are applied. 
Dumping, in the form of  price discrimination, generally implies that the dumper has some 
degree of market power or advantage in its domestic market. 
Five Types of Dumping and Their Impact 
We have found it useful to distinguish five different sets of circumstances in which fmns 
may adopt pricing strategies which involve dumping within the meaning of the GATT and 
the Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation: 
•  long run dumping, ie.  circumstances in  which the dumping is likely to be a 
permanent feature; 
•  cyclical dumping, ie. dumping in response to depressed market conditions; 
•  transitional dumping, ie. dumping which occurs as companies and markets adapt to 
changed circumstances; 
•  predatory or strategic dumping,  which is deliberately designed to  limit the 
competition the exporter will face in future; 
•  dumping by exporters from non-market economies ("State Traders"). 
It is clear that there can be a high degree of overlap between the different types of  dumping 
outlined above, and their effects. 
We now discuss in more detail the circumstances leading to the different types of dumping 
and their impact on the affected countries. 
Long Run Dumping 
We have defined long run dumping as a strategy of setting lower prices in export markets 
over a period of many years, and possibly permanently.  It is to be distinguished from 
transitional dumping where the dumping is only expected to be temporary, perhaps to 
secure market entry, or predatory dumping which is designed to eliminate or weaken 
competition thus leading to higher prices in the longer run. 
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Long run dumping may be in fmns' interests for a number of reasons including: 
•  the demand conditions (price elasticities) facing all firms may vary between 
markets, so that the "optimum" price may vary; 
•  competition is restricted in the exporter's domestic market and it can therefore price 
above cost (including normal profit); 
•  the exporter incurs higher costs than its competitors in the Community, and must 
match their prices in order to sell in the overseas market.  .  If the marginal cost of 
producing for the Community market is below the average cost, ie. if economies of 
scale are significant, selling at dumped prices could be profitable; 
•  in a market in which brand names and the supplier's image are important, the 
exporter may have a stronger image in its home market, which makes it profitable to 
set higher prices there than in the Community. 
The second and third of these conditions, requires that the dumper's home market should 
be protected. 
A key feature of long run dumping is that it is sustainable.  That is, from the dumper's 
perspective, sales in the export market are commercially justified at "dumped prices".  The 
rationale for dumped sales does not depend on the ability to increase prices in the future or 
on an increase in market share. 
The economist's concept of perfectly competitive markets in which the free and rapid 
movement of goods ensures that prices in different national markets are the same is rarely 
observed in practice.  The key point to emphasise about long run dumping is that it is a 
normal commercial response by firms to different market circumstances.  Even within their 
own domestic markets, fmns often adopt a policy of price discrimination, eg. selling at 
different prices to different sub-markets, according to demand and supply sensitivities. 
Similarly, there will be a degree of price discrimination (dumping) from one country to 
another within the Community as fmns adjust their pricing strategies to the different market 
circumstances they face.  Indeed, to take the point one stage further, it is easy to envisage 
circumstances in which Community producers were dumping in non-Community markets, 
but were subject to dumping in the Community itself.  For example, Community producers 
of  Polyvinyl Chloride  have: 
•  instigated an anti-dumping investigation against imports from Eastern Europe; 
•  been subject to anti-dumping measures in Australia. 
Long run dumping clearly means that the sales of the Community industry are lower and 
imports are higher than they would be  if no dumping were taking place.  However, 
consumers benefit from lower prices, and given the way in which long run dumping has 
been defined, this position can be expected to be a long run or permanent benefit.  In 
addition, long run dumping per se does not pose any necessary threat to the continued 
existence of  the Community industry. 
Cyclical Dumping 
Cyclical dumping is a temporary phenomenon which occurs when markets are depressed. 
In any market, there are likely to be cyclical fluctuations in profitability, and, during some 
stages of the cycle, firms may sell at a loss in either or both of their domestic and export 
markets.  However, cyclical problems are most prevalent in industries in which there is a 
high ratio of fixed to variable costs.  This creates a significant incentive to cut prices in 
order to contribute to overheads when demand is depressed.  If purchasers who are price 
sensitive, as is particularly the case for "commodity" products, account for a significant 
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proportion of sales, even a limited level of low price imports can set off a round of price 
cutting which significantly reduces the general level of  prices in the Community market 
In times of  recession, companies are more likely to lower prices in their export rather than 
their domestic markets, as they do not want to destroy their "own" price base.  Companies 
are also more likely to attack new markets in times of recession if they have high fixed 
costs. 
This description seems to apply to many dumping episodes in the steel and chemicals 
sectors.  High fixed costs in these industries reflect the large size and high cost of steel and 
chemicals plants.  However, cyclical dumping can also occur in industries in which labour 
is the principal cost if legal or social norms, eg. redundancy laws, mean that firms in one 
country find it more difficult to cut costs during a recession than firms in other countries. 
During a recession: 
•  firms in Country A with strict redundancy laws may tend to seek to maintain output 
by cutting prices; 
•  frrms in Country B will treat labour as a variable cost, cut prices by less and accept 
larger output and employment changes. 
Strict redundancy laws may therefore create incentives for firms to dump. 
Our Polyvinyl Chloride  case study illustrates some of the features of cyclical dumping 
even though it involved an increase in imports from four East European countries.  If the 
Community market had not been depressed at the time, low-priced imports might have had 
a lesser impact on the general level of prices in the Community. 
It is clear that cyclical dumping can and does cause significant injury to the Community 
industries directly affected, in the sense that dumping causes a loss of sales and profits. 
However, as with long run dumping, consumers benefit in the short run at least.  In this 
context, it must be remembered that in many industries the immediate consumers, eg. for 
steel  and  "commodity  chemicals"  are  industrial  purchasers  and  that  their  own 
competitiveness, and hence output, will be greater than otherwise as a result of the 
dumping. 
The long run effects of  cyclical dumping will very largely depend on whether the dumping 
episode influences the long run scale and competitiveness of the Community industry 
affected.  This could happen if: 
•  the dumping episode and the potential for future dumping means that the investors 
regard the industry as more risky, with the result that the cost of capital to the 
industry may be higher than otherwise.  A higher cost of capital could, in turn, 
affect the scale and quality of future investment and Research and Development; 
•  the dumping leads to the elimination of some Community producers or permanently 
damages them, eg.  through delaying necessary investment or crippling them 
financially. 
Cyclical dumping may therefore permanently damage the Community industry affected. 
This is not a necessary result, however, and many companies have the financial resources 
to "ride out" a cyclical dumping episode without there being any effect on their long run 
efficiency and competitiveness.  Indeed, if the cyclical dumping episode is seen as a "one 
off' there is no reason why capital markets should not recognise this in their funding 
arrangements- it must be recognised, however, that many capital markets do take a short 
term perspective. 
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The long run impact on consumers (including industrial purchasers) of cyclical dumping 
depends on whether there has been a long run impact on: 
•  the efficiency, technological progress, etc. of  suppliers to the Community; 
•  whether the degree of effective competition in Community markets has been 
reduced in the long run, ie. whether suppliers have more market power than before, 
with  the  potential  to  charge  higher  prices  than  under  more  competitive 
circumstances. 
Predatory Dumping 
Economists reserve the term "predatory" for use in a restricted set of circumstances.  Here 
we use the term "predatory dumping" to describe dumping which is intended to limit the 
future competition that the exporter(s) will face and allow them to charge higher prices in 
the Community. 
The effects of predatory dumping are similar to those of other dumping episodes in the 
short run, in that: 
•  prices are lower than otherwise to the benefit of consumers (including industrial 
purchasers); 
•  Community production and profitability is adversely affected. 
Predatory dumping is, however, designed to be permanently damaging to the Community 
industry and to eliminate effective competition in the Community in the long run.  In these 
circumstances, consumers (including industrial purchasers) are likely, if the predatory 
dumping is successful, to: 
•  be dependent for their supplies on a restricted number of  companies; 
•  in most circumstances face higher prices in the long term due to the loss of  effective 
competition.  This is likely to be the case except where economies of scale are very 
significant and the exporter's monopoly price would be lower than the cost at which 
Community producers could supply the market. 
Predatory dumping implies that frrms deliberately set low prices and forego profits in order 
to reduce future competition.  Firms will only have an incentive to engage in predatory 
dumping in particular market circumstances and it is useful to discuss the criteria which 
economic analysis suggests need to be satisfied if predatory dumping is to be, potentially, a 
sensible commercial policy to be adopted. 
The Market Must be Highly Concentrated 
Unless predatory pricing eliminates all or most effective competition, the predator will be 
unable to recoup the cost of selling at low prices.  Analysis of  predatory pricing therefore 
usually focuses on a single dominant firm which is seeking to thwart competition from 
actual or potential smaller competitors. 
However, there seems little doubt that in markets in which there are only a very few major 
producers (perhaps up to five) in the world, the requirement that the market should be 
highly concentrated could be satisfied.  But in cases in which there are a number of major 
producers, before concluding that there was predatory dumping one would look for 
evidence either that: 
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•  the world market is actually segmented with the major producers having different 
"spheres of influence" and that this could be expected to endure if prices in the 
Community market were to be raised above the levels prevailing in other markets; 
or that 
•  all, or substantially all, of  the actual and potential competitors to Community frrms 
collude, ie. that there is "collusive predatory dumping". 
Collusive predatory dumping requires that: 
•  the members of the "cartel" can rely on one another not to break the agreement; 
•  unless competition has also been eliminated in third markets, there would need to be 
barriers which prevent the export of the cartel's products from third markets to the 
Community. 
It is important to note that it may be the level of concentration in the market for a key 
component rather than in that for the dumped product which is relevant.  A large number of 
companies may, for example, compete in the assembly of a consumer electronics product 
and most of the components of that product may be available from many sources. 
However, if only one or a few manufacturers have the capability to cost-effectively 
manufacture one or several key components, this may confer substantial market power on 
them which is relevant to the analysis of a dumping episode.  The Commission argues that 
the following sequence of events may occur: 
•  dumping of the assembled product weakens the Community industry and makes it 
particularly receptive to cost-saving opportunities; 
•  Community assemblers are offered supplies of key components on attractive terms 
and, as a result, either cease their own production of these components or stop 
buying them from Community sources; 
•  the conditions of supply of those components are then subsequently made less 
attractive (either by raising prices or by requiring the purchase of sub-assemblies). 
This chain of  events could indeed be predatory in its motivation and effects. 
These concerns are relevant to our case studies of Small Screen Colour Televisions  and 
Plain Paper Photocopiers: 
•  a number of exporters from Far East countries were involved in Small Screen 
Colour Televisions.  However, most were assemblers and the sources of supply of 
at least one major component-the tube -are much more restricted; 
•  PPCs bring together a number of technologies which have developed rapidly and a 
manufacturer either needs to undertake development and manufacture in-house or to 
have access to competitive supplies of  outsourced components. 
The Damage to the Community Industry Must be Irreversible 
For a strategy of predatory pricing to be effective, it must be impossible or very costly for 
the Community industry or other competitors to re-establish effectively.  More particularly, 
if the Community industry were to re-emerge, it must face higher costs than those which 
were incurred by the industry  eliminated by the dumping.  If this condition is met, the 
possibility exists that the predator will, having eliminated or weakened the Community 
industry and provided that it does not face other significant competition, be able to raise 
prices as compared to the position in the absence of  dumping. 
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This condition is most likely to be satisfied in industries in which: 
•  a very high level of sunk costs, notably Research and Development, have already 
been incurred, which a new entrant would need to replicate (or buy in if the · 
technology can be purchased); 
•  there is a continuing requirement to undertake a high level of  R&D expenditure; 
•  there are significant learning economies. 
There can be little doubt that these conditions apply in some industries in which dumping 
problems have occurred in the Community, such as parts of the electronics sector. 
Dumping Must Reduce the Community Industry's Expectations of  Future Profits 
Firms' decisions about whether to invest and remain in markets are determined by their and 
their financiers' expectations of future profitability.  Dumping will reduce profitability in 
the short term, but if  Community firms expect prices to recover and to be able to regain lost 
sales, there will be no reason for them to leave the market.  If  dumping is to force firms out 
of a market, or to seriously weaken them, it must either depress their expectations of future 
profitability or so weaken their fmancial position that appropriate financial resources are no 
longer available to them.  This requirement may be met in the following circumstances: 
•  Community fmns expect dumping to continue. 
Traditional analysis of predatory pricing suggests that the predator must sell below 
marginal cost in order to force its competitor(s) out of the market.  If the exporter is 
selling below marginal cost, then this is unlikely to be a credible strategy as 
persistent dumping would be very costly. 
However, the traditional analysis assumes that the same market opportunities are 
available to all competitors.  Where costs are related to past as well as current sales 
volumes (ie. where so-called learning effects are significant), market closure in the 
exporters' domestic market may give the dumper an initial cost advantage which is 
reinforced by the gain in sales resulting from the dumping strategy.  Thus dumping 
may increase the cost advantage enjoyed by the dumper.  If this is the case, the 
exporter may be able to sell profitably in the Community and still undercut 
Community producers.  Since the exporter is selling profitably such a strategy 
would be credible. 
In addition, if the exporter and the Community industry compete in a number of 
different markets, dumping in one market may earn the exporter a reputation for 
aggressive pricing making it easier to reduce competition from the Community 
industry in other markets. 
•  the dumper is financially stronger. 
If  Community fmns are weakened financially to the point where they are perceived 
to  be  more risky  by  investors,  they  may  withdraw  their backing,  forcing 
withdrawal from the market. 
•  the Community industry will incur considerable costs in regaining market share in 
the form of  lower prices or higher promotional expenditure. 
Again, several of these conditions would seem to be met in parts of the electronics sector: 
•  for at least some products (eg. parts of semi-conductor manufacture) learning 
effects are important; 
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•  where the reputation of the brand is important, it may be very costly to regain 
market share once this has been lost 
Transitional Dumping 
Transitional dumping, as its name implies, is intended to be short term and occurs as 
companies and markets adapt to changed circumstances.  Four specific examples can be 
identified: 
•  in markets in which existtng suppliers' reputation and brand names are important, a 
new entrant may have to undercut its competitors in order to demonstrate the quality 
of its products and establish a position in the market.  If the brand positions of 
some or all established competitors are very strong, the exporter may need to set 
prices below those of the market leader on a continuing basis (ie.  transitional 
dumping may become long run dumping); 
•  if the costs of entering a new market are very high, the entrant may make losses in 
the  early  years  even if it does  not  undercut  Community  firms.  In  these 
circumstances, even though sales in the Community may be loss-making, dumping 
should not be found if  prices in the home and Community markets are the same and 
the former are profitable; 
•  when the costs of  developing and launching a new product are high, prices may be 
set well below full cost in the early years in order to build up volume.  This is 
particularly likely if costs are expected to decline as experience of production 
accumulates. This form of transitional dumping is generally known as "forward 
pricing"; 
•  in markets in which prices are depressed because there is a problem of excess 
capacity which is not expected to be removed by growth in demand, an exporter 
may price aggressively to demonstrate to its competitors that it has lower costs and 
to encourage them to contract rapidly. 
Transitional dumping shares many of the features and short run effects of predatory 
dumping even if  the intentions are different: 
•  a surge in imports at low prices; 
•  a loss of market share by the Community industry and a decline in the prices 
realised by Community producers; 
•  consequent uncertainty about the future viability of Community production leading 
to weakening of the confidence necessary to invest in new and improved products 
and production facilities. 
Transitional dumping is clearly intended to achieve or enhance a significant market share in 
the Community and, if  the strategy is successful, may well cause Community firms to lose 
sales volume and to a decline in prices in the short term.  Indeed, weaker competitors in the 
Community may be forced out of the market.  Transitional dumping may therefore cause 
material injury to the Community industry. 
Transitional dumping is not intended to reduce the competition faced by the dumper. 
Indeed, in the short run competition will be increased; and long run competition may also 
be enhanced if  new entrants establish themselves in the Community market.  Nevertheless, 
in the market circumstances identifed in the discussion of predatory dumping, transitional 
dumping may have the effect of  reducing long run effective competition. 
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Dumping by State Traders 
This form of dumping involves exports to the Community at prices below those prevailing 
in Community markets from non-market economies.  It is frequently alleged that this form 
of dumping is motivated by a need for hard currencies or for other reasons which are not 
commercial in the conventional sense. 
The short and long run impact of dumping by State Traders will be similar to the other 
types of dumping with the actual effects on dumping on: 
•  how long it lasts, or is expected to last; 
•  the impact on the long run efficiency of other suppliers; 
•  the impact on effective competition. 
The  Role of Market Closure 
As discussed above, price differentials between markets can only exist to the extent that 
they are segmented.  In addition, it is worth considering the implications of market 
segmentation, and particularly market closure, for the effects of dumping.  It is clear that 
market segmentation will intensify the effects of  dumping on the Community industry for a 
number of reasons: 
•  the Community will have no (or less) scope to respond to the dumping through 
(increased) sales in the dumper's domestic market; 
•  if the dumper is able to secure high margins in its domestic market, it will be able to 
bear low prices in the Community for longer, thereby increasing the pressure on the 
Community industry; 
•  in industries where there are learning effects (ie.  where costs are related to 
cumulative production) exporters may gain a cost advantage. 
These points are of particular relevance to predatory dumping.  In addition, the ftrst point 
may be a  significant consideration in cases of cyclical dumping.  Several industry 
associations argued to us that, since the Community's economy is generally open to trade, 
Community industry is particularly vulnerable in times of recession.  This vulnerability is 
increased by  the  fact  that other leading importers themselves employ anti-dumping 
measures to protect their domestic industries in times of recession.  A unilateral decision by 
the Community to abstain from using measures against cyclical dumping would therefore 
mean that Community companies had to contend with greater volatility in prices and 
imports than their overseas competitors. 
However, in evaluating these considerations, it is necessary to take account of the extent to 
which the Community industry has the scope to increase its penetration of third markets. 
Indirect Effects on Other Industries 
In addition to its direct effects on the production of comparable products, dumping may 
indirect!  y affect: 
•  suppliers of materials and components.  Particularly where there is a requirement 
for a  "critical  mass"  in order to  achieve  competitiveness in the  supply of 
components, these effects may be significant; 
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•  users of the dumped products.  In the short run they may benefit from dumping. 
However, their longer term competitiveness may be damaged if the continued 
availability of  the latest generation products is threatened; 
•  there may be wider adverse effects on efficiency and competitiveness if other 
industries rely on products or technologies supplied or developed by suppliers to 
the industry facing dumping. 
These considerations are clearly very relevant to the appraisal of the Community interest 
and are discussed further in Section Vill. 
The Impact of Dumping in Practice 
The Regulations adopting anti-dumping measures and Decisions closing proceedings 
generally provide a detailed account of the distress of the Community industry.  The 
following paragraphs summarise: 
•  the key developments in our case study industries in the period leading up to the 
· dumping investigation; 
•  the other factors that did or may have contributed to the economic distress of the 
Community industry; 
•  the concerns that existed about the effects that dumping had had or would have if 
allowed to continue. 
Denim 
In Denim imports from Turkey and three Asian countries were investigated in 1989/90. 
The proceeding was closed with a finding that the Community industry had not been 
materially injured by dumping.  No measures were therefore imposed. 
In the investigation the Commission found that in 1988: 
•  demand in the Community fell by more than 26% as compared to 1987; 
•  sales in the Community by Community producers fell by 11% and their production 
by 12.5%; 
•  stocks accumulated and prices fell by 20 to 30%; 
•  Community producers incurred losses averaging 5.1% as compared to profits of 
10.2% in 1987. 
It is therefore clear that the Community industry was facing very serious difficulties in the 
period leading up to the investigation. 
However, the Commission concluded that the dumping had not itself caused material injury 
to the Community industry: 
•  Community production had fallen by less than the market between 1987 and 1988; 
•  the imports actually dumped only accounted for 2.8% of the Community market in 
1988 and this proportion had fallen from 4.4% in 1987.  Community producers had 
increased their share of the smaller market; 
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•  prices from the export countries had fallen by less than those in the Community as a 
whole between 1987 and 1988; 
•  there were significant imports from countries not under investigation, some of 
which had significantly undercut Community producers. 
Mini Ball Bearings 
Imports of all ball bearings were subject to undertakings following the anti-dumping 
investigation in the 1970s.  However, in 1983 a specific investigation into imports  of mini 
ball bearings  from Japan and Singapore was launched and duties were applied in 1984.  In 
1990 duties were applied to imports from Thailand.  In the same year, duty levels on 
imports from Japan were generally increased following a review. 
In the 1983/84 proceeding the Commission's analysis focused on bearings with a diameter 
of 30mm or less.  It was found that: 
•  the Community industry's sales fell by 13% between 1979 and 1983; 
•  production fell by 4.5% between 1979 and 1982; 
•  capacity utilisation fell by 19%; 
•  the industry was selling at a loss to retain market share in the face of low-priced 
imports; 
•  smaller fmns had reduced employment and larger ones had redeployed staff. 
Against a background of weak demand, EC producers saw their overall Community market 
share for mini ball bearings fall from 79% to 70% over the period from 1979 to the first 
half of 1983.  However,  within  this  total,  the  share of Japanese producers in the 
Community rose.  The share of exports from Japan and Singapore rose from 18% to 28%. 
Other imports into the Community only accounted for a few per cent of the market and 
declined over the period.  The Commission found that exports from Japan and Singapore 
were concentrated on high volume types. 
The analysis of injury in the review of duties in 1988/90 considered all ball bearings and 
not just those with a diameter not exceeding 30mm.  At this level, the share of Japanese 
exporters is significantly lower - 6.1% during the investigation period.  The Commission 
found that: 
•  sales in the Community had risen by 7% between 1985 and the investigation period 
(1987/88); 
•  imports of ball bearings from Japan had fallen by a third, largely as a result of 
increased production by Japanese manufacturers in the Community and elsewhere; 
•  production  by Community producers (ie.  excluding Japanese companies) had 
fallen by 10%; 
•  Community producers' selling prices had fallen; 
•  the profitability of  EC producers had halved since 1985; 
•  employment in the industry had fallen. 
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Ball bearings are used in  a very wide range of products and may be a key component of 
new products.  For this reason concern about the potential effect of dumping has focused 
not only on the industry itself but also on  its  strategic importance for the European 
economy. 
For example,  in  the  1:989/90  review of the  duties,  the  Council  concluded that the 
profitability of the industry was not inadequate to finance investment, R&D and marketing. 
The Council considered that the loss of the industry would have serious consequences for 
research and development in high  technology areas and for the development of new 
products. 
Plain  Paper Photocopiers 
The investigation of imports of PPCs from Japan was opened in  1985 and provisional 
measures were applied at the end of 1986. 
In  this case the Commission examined trends after 1975, when Xerox Corp's patents 
became generally available, although the emphasis was on the period between 1981  and 
1984.  Among the key trends it observed were: 
•  the entry into PPC manufacture of a nUtnber of Community producers and, despite 
the rapid growth in the market, the subsequent withdrawal of many of them.  Only 
five remained when the proceeding was launched and one of these was taken over 
by a Japanese exporter soon after, 
•  the market share of Japanese producers was 78% in 1985 and had risen gradually in 
the early 1980s.  Japanese exporters seem to have developed their position in the 
Community market in the late 1970s, ie. well before the proceeding was opened; 
•  there was a significant decline in prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s; 
•  several Community producers began but subsequently abandoned as unviable the 
development of smaller machines which  would have competed directly with 
Japanese exporters; 
•  Community producers were unable to exploit available scale economies; 
•  the profitability of Community producers declined and one producer was loss-
making in  1985; 
•  employment declined by 8% between 1982 and 1984. 
The Community industry was found to be spending less on research and development than 
the Japanese industry.  The Commission attributed this to  the  low profitability of the 
Community industry and concluded that the future competitiveness of the Community 
industry was threatened. 
There were no other material imports and the Commission therefore concluded that the 
injury to the Community industry  was  attributable to the dumping.  Issues raised by 
exporters included: 
•  the suggestion that Community producers had been slow to develop PPCs.  Against 
this, it was argued that low prices had made the development of new machines 
unviable; 
•  the contention that Japanese machines were of better quality, 
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Polyvinyl Chloride 
The investigation of imports of PVC from four East European counties was opened in 
1981.  Undertakings were accepted in 1982/83 and the measures lapsed in 1987/88. 
Dumped imports increased from 2.3o/o to 5.6o/o of the EC market over the period 1979-81 
and were concentrated in particular markets, notably Germany.  There was significant price 
undercutting.  Between 1979 and 1981: 
•  demand in Western Europe fell by 14%; 
•  production fell by  17o/o; 
•  intra-EC prices fell by around 8o/o; 
•  the Community industry n1oved from profitability to a high level of losses. 
In  reaching its  conclusion that the dumped  in1ports  had caused material injury,  the 
Commission also: 
•  found that the market share of  other imports had changed little; 
•  recognised that excess capacity in the Community was itself depressing prices. 
Thus the Commission concluded that at a time when the market was depressed, dumped 
imports had significantly added to the industry's difficulties. 
Small Screen  Colour Televisions 
An investigation of imports of small screen colour televisions from Korea was opened in 
February 1988 and extended to include imports from Hong Kong and China in November 
of that year.  Provisional duties were applied to imports from Korea in 1989 and to imports 
from Hong Kong and China in  1991. 
The Commission found that over the period 1985-1988: 
•  consumption in the Community rose by 70%; 
•  total sales by the Community industry rose by only 15%; 
•  the Community industry's market share fell from 69% to 39% (from 80% to 53% if 
imports by the Community industry from the Far East are included); 
•  production by the Community industry within the Community fell by nearly 10% 
and production was switched to the Far East; 
•  price realisations by the Con1munity industry fell by 20o/o; 
•  the Comn1unity industry was lossmaking.  Losses increased in  1985/86 before 
stabilising and then increasing significantly in  1988.  In  that year they averaged 
100hi; 
•  employment in the Community fell by 15% in 1986/87. 
The Con1mission found that the worsening in the perfornmnce of the Con1n1unity industry 
coincided with the surge in imports from the three countries investigated - their combined 
n1arket share rose from 3o/o in 1985 to 32% in 1988. 
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In Small Screen Colour Televisions, the Commission concluded that in the absence of 
measures, cessation of fully integrated Community production was "quite probable".  The 
Commission's longer term concerns were that "the large foothold secured in the SCTV 
sector will be used for attacking the Community industry's position in the larger screen 
sizes".  Community producers would then lose their marketing base.  As a result: 
•  exploitation of the industry's development of "High Definition Television" would 
be "seriously prejudiced"; 
•  the development and exploitation of related technologies for products such as video 
cassette players and laser video disc players would be affected. 
Exporters pointed to the increase in imports from other sources as a source of injury. 
It is notable that the undercutting margins found by the Commission were well in excess of 
the dumping margins. 
However, the Commission did not contend that dumped imports from Korea were the sole 
cause of the Community industry's difficultes. 
Policy Implications 
We conclude this section with some observations on policy implications. 
When Dumping /las Adverse Economic  I~Jfects 
In this section we have analysed how different market circumstances and motivations can 
result in the adoption of dumping strategies and how the effects of dumping may vary 
according to the structure and conditions of the market.  In  analysing the case for policy 
intervention, the effects of dumping are of principal importance.  Here we have seen that 
adverse effects may  arise from  dumping strategies  which are  not  intended to limit 
competition.  For example: 
•  cyclical dumping may prevent the Community industry from undertaking necessary 
investment; 
•  in relatively concentrated industries, in breaking into the Community market, new 
exporters could severely weaken the Comn1unity industry leading to concerns about 
the adequacy of con1petition in the longer tern1. 
For this reason, as discussed in  greater detail in the next section, we do not believe that 
there can only be a case for anti-dumping measures when dumping is predatory. 
However, it  is also important that the motivation for the dumping should be considered. 
I low the n1arket will evolve if measures are not adopted will often not be clearcut and it will 
be  useful to consider why exporters have priced at a low level in  the Community market 
and, in particular, how long these low prices will persist in the absence of measures. 
Appropriate Baseline for Policy  Analysis 
In analysing the impact of dumping in this section, we have implicitly compared a position 
in  which  dumping  occurs  with  one  in  which  there  is  no dumping.  However,  in 
considering the case for policy measures against dumping, either in general or in specific 
cases, it must be recognised that the appropriate comparison is between the positions with 
and without anti-dumping measures.  In particular, policy analysis must: 
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•  consider  whether  there  IS  scope  to  restore  the  Community  industry  to 
competitiveness; 
•  take account of distortions and inefficiencies resulting frotn policy intervention as 
well as the benefits to the industry. 
In the later sections of this report, we focus on how the adoption of policy measures will 
affect the position rather than on the effects of the dumping. 
The Importance of Other Factors in the Causation of Injury 
On the basis of our case studies and impressions of other cases, it  is  apparent that it  is 
rarely if ever the case that the economic distress ("injury") of the Cornmunity industry is 
unambiguously and solely attributable to dun1ping.  At least in the view of the exporters, 
other factors have been important in explaining the distress of the industry and the question 
for the consideration in dumping investigations has been whether the dumping has itself 
been a cause of material injury.  (There is no requirement, as there was under the Kennedy 
Round Code and the Community legislation which implemented it, that dumping should be 
the  principal cause of the  injury.)  Where  the Community  industry is facing other 
difficulties, quantification of the impact of dumping alone is very difficult and reliance must 
he placed on qualitative analysis.  For this reason, the conclusions reached in a proceeding 
arc likely to he controversial. 
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IV  THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 
Introduction 
In this section we discuss: 
•  the traditional economic analysis of trade protection measures; 
•  five  specific arguments which may he  made for trade protection with specific 
reference to anti-dumping measures; 
•  the implications for the rationale for the adoption of measures against the five types 
of dun1ping identified in the previous section. 
The discussion is developed in greater detail in Professor Venables' paper. 
The Case for Free Trade and the Impact of Duties 
Anti-dumping measures are applied only against imports from specified countries and, 
subject to the possibility of renewal following a review, for a specified period.  As such, 
their econon1ic effects are likely to differ from those of a tariff which is applied against all 
imports for some unspecified period.  Nevertheless, in understanding the concerns that 
many economists have expressed at  anti-dumping measures, it is helpful to begin by 
summarising how they  have  traditionally  analysed the  impact of tariffs and  then  to 
introduce sotne of the complexities which have been introduced in n1orc recent economic 
analysis. 
The classical economic case for free trade rests on the belief that all participants in the 
international trading system benefit when countries specialise in goods and services which 
they can supply relatively cheaply. By increasing production of (and exporting) goods 
which they can produce relatively efficiently, and reducing production of (and importing) 
goods for which they are relatively high cost producers, countries increase their overall 
level of production and income.  The gains from trade are maximised when domestic and 
world prices are the same (allowing for transport costs) and: 
•  domestic production takes place if, and to the extent that, the costs of domestic 
firms  are less  than  or equal  to  the  world  price  (the  "production efficiency" 
condition); 
•  domestic consumption occurs up  to  the  point at which  the benefit derived by 
consumers  is  also  equal  to  the  world  price  (the  "consumption  efficiency" 
condition). 
Starting from a position in which there is  free trade in a product, the impact of a duty on all 
impons will he to: 
•  increase domestic prices by  up  to  the amount of the duty to the benefit of the 
dmnestic industry and the authorities levying the duty; 
•  increase the profitability of  domestic production leading to an increase in output and 
employment in  the industry concerned.  Whilst this may appear beneficial, it is 
typically achieved by drawing resources from other uses.  Since these uses were 
more remunerative in  the absence of the duty, there is a presumption that the duty 
has led to a reduction in production efficiency; 
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•  reduce domestic consumption below the level at which consumers' valuation of the 
product is equal to the (world) price at which it is available.  The introduction of a 
duty therefore also reduces consumption efficiency. 
Some of the increase in the costs borne by consumers is the counterpart of the increase in 
profits of the Community industry and the duty revenue.  These effects are generally 
regarded as transfers and do not affect overall welfare.  However, in so far as overseas 
owned producers in  the Community benefit fnim  higher prices, this effect is a  clear 
economic loss to the Community.  If the measure is a price undertaking, exporters gain by 
an  amount equivalent to the duty revenue.  For this reason, economists normally prefer 
dutks to price undertakings or quotas which have an equivalent impact on prices. 
The impact of anti-dumping duties on prices is discussed further in Section VI. 
Possible Arguments in Favour of Trade Protection and Anti-Dumping Measures 
The above analysis of the in1pact of trade protection (including anti-dumping measures) on 
prices and production and consumption efficiency only provides a partial assessment.  In 
particular, it  assumes that the prices on which firms and individuals base their decisions 
reflect all the economic costs and benefits of the relevant transactions. When they do not, it 
is well recognised that there may be a case for policy intervention.  There are five reasons 
why  market prices may not reflect social costs and benefits which are of particular 
relevance to the analysis of trade protection n1easures.  Most economic arguments for anti-
dumping measures or other forms of trade protection can be reduced to one or some 
combination of these arguments. 
These  various arguments are discussed below.  It should, however, be noted that even 
though prices may not reflect social costs and benefits, it does not necessarily follow either 
that any form of policy intervention is justified or that trade policy and anti-dumping 
measures are appropriate: 
•  since policy measures usually themselves have distortionary effects, there may be 
no policy measure which increases economic welfare; 
•  policy instruments other than anti-dumping measures may tackle the "problem" 
more directly and efficiently. 
Reduction in World Prices or "Optimal Tariff'' Argument 
Economists have long recognised that trade protection measures will generate benefits for 
the countries that apply them when they reduce import prices (net of duties).  The scope for 
securing gains in this way exists when an importing country or trading bloc accounts for a 
significant proportion of the world market,  since a  fall  in  its demand following the 
imposition of a tariff would be likely to reduce the world price.  However, if all countries 
were to employ trade protection measures in this way, all would be worse off. 
A C(tSe  for anti-dumping measures on these grounds may exist if dumping is expected to 
lead to a weakening of the Community industry, the development of a world monopoly 
posit ion and a subsequent increase in  prices.  In these circurnstances, the saving in the cost 
of in1ports can be counted as an economic benefit from the anti-dumping measures.  Thus 
this argument is relevant to suspected cases of predatory dumping. 
The key issues in evaluating the strength of this argument are: 
•  whether the dumping, if allowed to continue, will lead to the irreversible weakening 
of the Community industry; 
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•  the extent of competition from third countries; 
•  the extent of competition between exporters alleged to be dumping; 
•  the scope for n1easures to restore the competitiveness of the Community industry. 
Spillover Effects 
Expenditure undertaken by one finn may benefit other firms without their sharing the costs 
involved.  In particular, some technologies are "strategic" in the sense that they are used in 
a  number of firms  and  sectors.  If dumping  leads  to  a  reduction  in  research  and 
development effort in such technologies, there n1ay be a case for trade protection measures 
to ensure that other users of the technology continue to have access to it.  However, it must 
be recognised that: 
•  although trade protection measures may encourage R&D, they are likely to do so at 
the cost of higher prices; 
•  there is a danger that, by reducing competition, protection will weaken the incentive 
to  undertake  R&D.  This  risk  is  particularly great  when  competition  in  the 
Cornmunity is limited and when the Community industry believes that protection 
will be renewed. 
The latter consideration suggests that if measures are introduced to foster the development 
of a technology: 
•  they should be linked to a programme of R&D which can be expected to deliver the 
benefits sought; 
•  a commitment to limit protection to a particular period (not necessarily five years) 
should normally be made. 
It must also be retnembered that direct measures to support R&D may be more effective 
than trade measures in encouraging the development of new technologies. 
Imperfectly  Competitive  Community  Markets 
In  markets in which producers have significant discretion in setting prices (ie. in markets 
which are imperfectly competitive), it will be in  their interests to restrict output in order to 
raise prices above marginal cost.  Since, where such a strategy is adopted, the true cost to 
the economy is less than the market price, domestic production will tend to be lower and 
imports higher than would be the case if the production efficiency condition was met. 
Where these conditions exist in  the Cmnn1unity, an increase in  prices following an anti-
dumping n1easure leading to higher Cornmunity output would raise economic welfare. 
Since dumping requires that the dumper should have a degree of pricing discretion, a 
finding of dumping  may  indicate  that  the  relevant Community market is  not  fully 
competitive.  (However, a finding that dumping has occurred certainly does not prove that 
this is the case since the dumper's ability to set differential prices may depend on the fact 
that its domestic market is closed.)  This suggests that this argument n1ay be of relevance 
in some cases.  However, although they may improve welfare by increasing output, trade 
protection measures will tend to raise prices and thus increase the loss of consumption 
efficiency.  Measures to increase competition and drive prices down are therefore to be 
preferred. 
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Unemployment  Problems 
A further reason why firms may set higher prices and produce lower levels of output than 
the conditions of economic efficiency would require is that in times or areas of high 
unemployment, wage and salary costs may not reflect the true opportunity cost of labour. 
T~is argument could be of relevance in cases of dumping when: 
•  Community markets are generally depressed; 
•  the effects of dumping are concentrated in  particular regions or specialised labour 
markets where there are  limited opportunities for jobs lost as a  result of the 
contraction of Community production to be replaced within a reasonable period. 
However, it needs to be remembered that a variety of other measures exist to counter 
unemployment problems.  In particular, there is a severe danger that anti-dumping or other 
trade  protection  measures  will  impede rather  than  encourage  necessary  structural 
adjustment.  Nevertheless, trade protection measures may have a transitional role to play in 
slowing the rundown of a Community industry. 
Imperfect Capital Markets  and Entry Barriers 
The classical economic model assumes perfect capital markets and that entry and re-entry 
barriers are low.  In practice this is not the case. 
For instance, in industries requiring substantial investments in R&D or fixed assets, it is 
often alleged that suppliers of finance restrict investment by requiring rates of return which 
are unrealistically high in the light of the alternatives open to them.  The criticism is made 
with particular force when the payback from the investn1ent is likely to be slow or is subject 
to high risk.  If investors do focus on current returns and undervalue investments which 
appear risky and which are likely to generate their returns over an extended period, this 
would  contribute  towards  an  economic  rationale  for  anti-dumping  measures.  By 
depressing returns in the short term, dumping would then depress investors' expectations 
of future returns making it more difficult for firms to justify their investment programmes. 
This is particularly the case in industries with high entry or re-entry barriers, or where there 
are "learning" economies. 
Modern  Industrial Economics and International Trade  Theory 
The discussion above is largely based on econ01nists' long-established approach to the 
analysis of the benefits of free trade and the case for trade protection measures.  That 
approach starts from an assumption that the norm in international trade is competition 
between a relatively large number of firms.  Arguments for trade protection of the kind 
outlined above are treated as departures from the theoretical ideal of perfect competition in 
international trade. 
In  the last decade, economists have explored in  depth the implications of adopting an 
alternative  framework  in  which a relatively sn1all  number of suppliers arc engaged in 
international competition.  This is likely to he the case in  markets in which: 
•  there are significant economies from large scale production such that even the world 
market as  a  whole can only  support a  relatively small  number of producers 
operating at or near to the levels of  output at which costs are minimised; 
•  existing suppliers have significant advantages over new entrants because of their 
accumulated knowledge and experience of development and production or the 
reputation of their products. 
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This new area of research appears of relevance to the economic analysis of dumping.  The 
starting point of the analysis - markets in which a small number of major firms compete 
and seek to gain enduring advantages by increasing sales- seems to describe many of the 
major cases in which dumping problems have arisen much more adequately than the 
traditional model of perfect competition.  As previously noted, dumping requires a degree 
of market power.  The approach seems particularly applicable to sectors such as electronics 
in  which the rapid rate of technical progress reflects the need for a very high level of 
expenditure on R&D in order to maintain and enhance competitiveness. 
Further, as Professor Venables shows in  his paper, when competition is imperfect, it can 
be in the interests of an exporting country to close its economy or subsidise exports where 
this will allow domestic producers to reduce costs; weaken overseas competition; and 
subsequently allow prices to be increased in the longer tenn.  This description corresponds 
closely to  the concerns expressed by  Community producers which  have experienced 
dumping problems in sectors such as electronics. 
The arguments which flow from modern industrial economics and international trade theory 
are not, in  fact, very different frorn those outlined earlier.  In  particular, the case for an 
exporting country closing its don1estic market or subsidising exports is equivalent to the 
optimal tariff argument.  The discussion below of "predatory dumping" suggests that cases 
of predatory dumping are likely to be unusual. 
Further, although it is clear that the target economies can be damaged if potential trading 
partners close their economies or subsidise exports, it does not automatically follow that 
they should adopt counter measures.  A comparison needs to be made between the two 
available alternatives: 
•  if no measures are applied, the industry directly affected may be further injured and 
there may be wider adverse effects including the possibility that Community 
purchasers will face reduced competition and higher prices; 
•  if measures are applied, the Community industry may continue to be "high cost" 
through the continuing denial of access to third markets. 
Thus, whilst reciprocal free trade will maximise combined welfare, adopting measures to 
counter market closure will only improve welfare in restricted circumstances. 
It also remains the case that, as in traditional analysis, the threat of retaliation can in many 
circumstances be a powerful incentive not to impose trade protection measures as the effect 
of retaliation is to leave all countries worse off. 
Overall, whilst the new trade economics helps to demonstrate why firms may dump and 
why governments may find it beneficial to promote their domestic industry, in fact the 
conclusions it leads to about the case for trade protection are very similar to those resulting 
from traditional analysis. 
Implications for Different Types of Dumping 
Long Run Dumping 
Since long run  dumping does  not  pose  any  threat  to  the continued existence of the 
Community industry, it is unlikely that, even if a dumping investigation were to be opened, 
a finding of material injury would be made.  Certainly, none of our case studies appears to 
satisfy the conditions of long run dumping.  However, the example demonstrates: 
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•  the importance of independent determinations of dumping and injury; dumping by 
no means necessarily threatens the future of the Community industry; 
•  the very imperfect relationship between findings of dumping and injury on the one 
hand and the existence of a possible case for trade policy intervention on the other. 
Cylical Dumping 
It is clear that cyclical dumping can and does cause significant injury to Community 
industries, in  the sense that dumping causes a  loss of sales and profits.  In addition, 
exposure to cyclical dumping is likely to mean that the Community industry is smaller than 
it would be if anti-dumping measures were to be imposed, since for some firms the profits 
made in the upswing will not be sufficient to offset losses or low returns when business is 
depressed.  This tendency will be greater if the Community's trading partners adopt anti-
dumping measures. 
However, equally, protecting Community industry from cyclical clumping will mean that: 
•  consumers forego the opportunity to henefit from cheap import prices during the 
downturn.  Consumption efficiency may therefore he reduced~ 
industrial purchasers tnay face higher prices than their overseas con1pctitors leading 
to an (inefficient) loss of sales, profits and employment in downstream markets. 
The impact of cyclical dumping on the industry affected is relatively complex.  In general, 
demand fluctuations are part of the normal environment that business has to deal with.  The 
fact that those fluctuations are made more intense by exporters cutting prices in the face of  a 
downturn, or the fact that other countries adopt anti-dumping n1easures, does not of itself 
create a case for trade protection. 
However, as argued above, there may be a case for policy intervention when prices in the 
Community market exceed social costs.  In a recession several of the arguments for trade 
protection developed above could apply.  In particular: 
•  where labour is a significant cost, its opportunity cost over the relevant period may 
be low; 
•  other significant inputs may themselves he priced at above their true cost because 
the relevant markets are dcprc~sed; 
•  prices in the Community market for the dumped product may exceed marginal cost 
as a result of imperfect competition; 
•  if capital n1arkets are imperfect, unusually depressed conditions in the Community 
industry could reduce investment below  the  efficient level, or could  lead to 
potentially efficient firms going out of business. 
In any particular case, it is necessary to consider the balance between these considerations 
and the impact on consumers and downstream purchasers to determine whether there is an 
overttll case for policy intervention.  A key consideration should be a judgement on the 
competitive position of the Community industry after the cyclical dumping. 
Episodes of cyclical dumping are by definition of limited duration.  They may develop 
relatively quickly and are unlikely to last for as long as three years.  This suggests that: 
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•  if anti-dumping measures are to be introduced to protect the Community industry 
from cyclical dumping, action needs to be taken quickly.  This point was made to 
us by several industry associations and is illustrated by our case study.  In this 
case, measures were introduced around two years after significant low-priced 
imports fron1  Eastern Europe came onto the Community market.  This was only 
shortly before the market recovered so that, as argued in Section VI, they may have 
had little effect on prices; 
measures should lapse after less than five years.  Cyclical dumping problems are 
unlikely to endure for five years after rneasurcs have been introduced.  Particularly 
if they are ad valorem or a fixed number of ECU per unit of imports, measures may 
distort trade long after there  is  any rationale for them to prevent injury to the 
Community industry. 
Predatory and Strategic Dumping 
It is quite clear that predatory dun1ping is usually economically damaging and that there will 
be a powerful case for policy intervention to prevent and discourage it, since: 
•  the Community industry n1ay be destroyed or reduced to the position in which it is 
no longer a significant competitive force; 
•  although purchasers benefit from low prices in the short term, this benefit may be 
more  than  offset  in  the  longer term  when  competition  has  been  reduced or 
eliminated in the Comn1unity n1arkct. 
Nevertheless, as  Professor Venables shows, it  is  possible to envisage circurnstances in 
which it  would be  in  the Cotnmunity's economic interest to purchase from a monopoly 
exporter rather than  to  protect Community producers.  This could be the case if the 
economies of scale are very significant and the exporter's monopoly price would be lower 
than the cost at which Community producers could supply the market.  However, given the 
size of the Community market, it would be surprising if it could not support at least one 
producer operating at an efficient scale. 
As detailed above, economic theory suggests that only under unusual conditions will there 
will be an incentive for firms to set very low prices and forego profits in order to reduce 
future competition; and this view is reflected or confirmed by the comparative rarity of 
competition proceedings which have concluded that firms' pricing behaviour has been 
predatory.  Further, a  number of economists and other observers and participants in 
Community anti-dumping proceedings told  us that in  their view cases of predatory 
dumping were very rare- several referred to one particular case-Aspartame -as the only 
example they had encountered in recent years.  However, by contrast, the Commission 
argue that predatory (or "strategic") dumping is a n1ajor problem involving, in particular, 
exports of consumer and other electronic products from Japan, Korea and other Far Eastern 
countries in  which Japanese and Korean companies have established manufacturing 
operations  in  their own  ownership  or through  joint ventures.  In  the  view of the 
Commission and the Community industries concerned, three of our case studies -Mini 
Ball Bearings, Plain Paper Photocopiers and SrrUlll Screen Colour Televisions  -represent 
examples of predatory dumping. 
This widely differing assessment of the frequency of predatory dumping, reflects the very 
considerable practical difficulty in assessing whether a particular pricing episode should be 
considered as predatory or whether the dun1ping is unlikely to cause any enduring and 
undesirable reduction in effective competition in the Community market. 
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Transitional Dumping 
Transitional dumping is clearly intended to achieve or enhance a significant market share in 
the Community and, if the strategy is successful, may well cause Community firms to lose 
sales volume and to a decline in prices.  Indeed, weaker competitors in the Community may 
be forced out of the market.  Transitional dumping n1ay therefore cause material injury to 
the Community industry. 
Applying anti-dumping n1easures in cases of transitory dumping may, however, lead to a 
loss of production and consumption efficiency as defined previously.  More particularly, it 
may: 
slow down an  inevitable process of contraction in  an  industry which has lost its 
comparative advantage in world markets or in which there is global excess capacity. 
This may well have been the case in our Denim  case study; 
•  restrict competition in Community n1arkets from new entrants since their pricing 
policies may be influenced by the risk of a finding that they have dumped.  If the 
new entrant in  a growing market is only expected to take a relatively small market 
share, such entry rnay be beneficial to the developn1ent of efficient competition; 
•  inhibit the rapid development of new products the costs of which will fall rapidly as 
volume increases. 
Dumping by State Traders 
From an economic perspective, the issues rJised by State Trader dumping are very similar 
to those arising from cyclical dumping.  The precise rnotivation for the dumping is largely 
irrelevant to the Comn1unity's economic interests.  However, since dumping by State 
Traders can  be episodic and unpredictable,  it  may  have a  greater adverse impact on 
invc'itmcnt if capital markets arc imperfect. 
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V  THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 
Introduction 
This section presents an analysis of the Comn1unity's use of anti-dumping measures.  It is 
largely based on: 
•  the Commission's Annual Reports to the Parliament on its anti-dumping activities  I; 
•  our analysis of 41  anti-dumping investigations initiated between 1986 and 1989. 
Cases Initiated by Sector and Country 
Number of Cases 
Over the period 1981-91, new investigations into imports of an average of 20 products 
were initiated (38 product times country cases) each year.  Figure V.l suggests that there 
has been a small decline in the number of new cases over time.  Over the period 1981-85 an 
average of 23 new product cases (46 country cases) was initiated as compared to an 
average of 21  product cases (39 country cases) over the period 1986-91. 
Figure V.l:  Number of Cases  Initiated 1981-91 
Oa--cf---D---iJ---o--ttJ--o--o--c:J---o--o 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 1991 
Source: Commission Annual Reports 
1 The reports and the statistics quoted in  this section also include anti-subsidy investigations.  However, 
these arc sufficiently small in number that they do not affect the analysis. 
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Analysis  by  Sector 
Figure V .2  shows that investigations have been initiated in a  wide range of industrial 
sectors over the period 1981-91. 
Figure V.2:  Analysis of Cases  Initiated by  Sector 
1981-1991 
Other- 10% 
Iron & steel - 1  4l;i) 
Other mech engineering- 18% 
6% 
13% 
1981-1985 
Source: Commission Annual Reports 
It is notable that: 
Chemical & allied -12°;(1 
Textile & allied - 10% 
Wood & paper- 6% 
Electronics- 3% 
9% 
2% 
36% 
15% 
17% 
7%  3% 
1986-1991 
•  chemicals account for the largest proportion of cases initiated; 
•  as discussed in Section VI, whilst the number of electronics cases has increased, 
the number of investigations in this sector considerably understates the impact of 
measures in this sector on trade; 
•  there has been an increase in  the proportion of cases in the textile sector. 
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Analysis by Country 
Table V .1  presents an analysis of new cases classified by country and by the country's 
economic status. 
Table  V.J:  Investigations Initiated by Economic Status of Country 
Type of Country  No of  lnvestiJ:ations  PercentaJ:e ofTOTAL 
JC)HJ  IIJH5  19H6-/99/  /9HJ · /99/  /911 I · /9H5 
I  ndu.\trialised Countries 
EFTA  10  5  15  4 
Portugal  2  2  I 
Spain  IX  IX  X 
Other  Western Europe (I)  JC)  4  23  X 
USA  15  3  18  7 
Canada  4  1  5  2 
Japan  14  22  36  6 
Olher (2)  5  16  21  2 
Total  87  51  138  38 
Developing Countries 
Asian NIEs (3)  9  40  49  4 
SouiJ, American NIEs (4)  19  14  33  8 
OPEC  7  7 
Olher (5)  9  12  21  4 
Total  37  73  110  16 
Non-Market Economies 
Ea!ilem Europe (6)  94  46  140  41 
China  11  22  33  5 
Other (7)  1  1 
Total  105  69  174  46 
TOTAL  229  193  422  100 
Source:  Commission Annual Reports 
GDR 
Australia, Turkey 
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela 
/9Hfl -/99/  19H 1-1991 
3  4 
() 
4 
2  5 
2  4 
1  1 
11  9 
8  5 
26  33 
21  12 
7  8 
4  2 
6  5 
38  26 
24  33 
11  8 
1  0 
36  41 
100  100 
Growth in 
Imports 
1981-90 
+113% 
N/A 
N/A 
+3X2% 
+73% 
+232% 
+44% 
+108% 
+170% 
+59% 
-47% 
+59% 
+6% 
+41% 
+364% 
+9% 
+68% 
+58% 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5)  Egypt, India, Macao, Malaysia, South Africa, Trinidad, Tobago, Israel, Surinam, 
Zimbabwe 
(6) 
(7) 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia 
Albania 
It is notable that: 
•  non-market economies (including East European countries in the process of making 
the transition to a tnarket economy) have accounted for the greatest proportion of 
cases during the period.  Whilst in general their significance has declined, there was 
a marked increase in  the number of cases initiated against China in  the second part 
of the period; 
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•  the impact of the Community's anti-dumping measures on trade with  North 
America is very limited; and there have been very few cases in recent years; 
•  the number of cases initiated against Japan increased in the second part of the period 
but remained relatively low.  However, as  discussed in  Section VI, measures 
against Japanese imports account for a very high proportion of all trade subject to 
duties; 
•  over  the  period  1986-91,  38%  of cases  involved  imports  from  developing 
countries.  The number of cases involving the Asian NIEs (Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Thailand  and Taiwan) more than quadrupled. 
There appears to be an  association between the increase in  the number of anti-dumping 
cases and the increase in  the level of the Con1munity's import trade with a country.  This 
association can be interpreted in at least two ways: 
•  in its 1990 Annual Report, the Commission asserts that the rapid growth of trade 
with countries subject to an increased number of measures shows that they do not 
frustrate trade; 
•  rapid growth in imports creates frictions which lead to anti-dumping investigations. 
The Dumping Investigation 
For our sample of 41  products  we  analysed  some of the  features  of the  dumping 
investigation undertaken by the Comn1ission. 
Dumping 
Calculation of  Normal Value 
T'ahle V.2 presents an analysis of the method used by the Commission to dctcm1inc nonnal 
value for the 74 country cases in our sample. 
Table  V.2:  Basis of  Calculation of Dumping Margin 
Number of cases 
CYME 
CVDM 
HMP 
HMP/CVDM 
Basis 
Soura:  Ca .\'l~  Analysis 
CVME  CVDM  HMP 
19  18  20 
Constructed values based on Market Economics 
Constructed values based on Domestic Markets 
Home Market Prices 
HMP!CVDM  Basis 
12  5 
Home Market Prices and Constmctcd Values bac;cd on Domestic Markets 
Basis Prices 
In a large proportion of cases, normal value was constructed on the basis of conditions in a 
market economy.  This reflects the high proportion of cases involving imports from non-
market economics.  Leaving these cases aside, normal value was based on prices in  the 
exporter's domestic market and on constructed value for all exporters in  roughly equal 
numbers of cases.  In the remaining cases, normal value was based on domestic prices for 
some exporters and constructed for others.  In no case was normal value based on export 
prices to third countries. 
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Calculation of Export Prices 
l 
I 
In 30% of  cases the export price "actually paid or payable" was determined to be unreliable 
and the export price was constructed on the basis of the first independent sales price within 
the Community. 
Dumping Margins 
Table V.3 analyses the definitive dumping margins determined for each country case. 
Table  V.3:  Dumping Margins 
Dumping Margins  Number of  Country Cases 
(%) 
0-5  6 
6-10  5 
11-20  10 
21-30  13 
31-40  11 
41-50  5 
51-60  8 
61-70  5 
71-80  2 
81-90  1 
91-H)() 
l  100+  6 
Source:  Case Analysis 
Note:  where a range of dumping margins was found,  the highest has been recorded 
The weighted average dumping margin found by the Commission was 39%.  In 31% of 
case.; dumping margins exceeded 50%.  Of the six cases which had dumping margins of 
5% < ,r less, five were closed with findings or no injury or no dun1ping. 
Table Y .4 presents an analysis by sector of the average dumping margin determined by the 
Con1mission and Table Y .5 an analysis by economic status of country. 
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Table · V.4:  Dumping Margin by Sector- (at Country. Level) , 
Elect 
Consumer  Comp- ·Mech 
~ 
Chemical  Textile  Electronics  onents  Metals  -anical  .Other:  Total 
Number  of  24  12  9  2  13  2  11 ·  73 
Cases  : 
Weighted 
; 
avcmge ·  49  21  27  106 '  28  16  48·  39·· 
dumping 
mar~  in 
~ 
Source: Case Analysis 
Note:  where a range of dumping margins was found, the highest .has been recorded 
It is notable that: 
•  above average dumping margins .have been·  found-in electrenic •  components and , 
chemicals cases; 
•  below average margins have been found  in  consumer electronics, texti-les  and 
mechanical engineering cases. 
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Table  V.S:  Dumping Margin by Type of  Country 
Economic Status of 
Country 
Industrialised Countries 
EFTA 
Other Western Europe ( 1) 
Japan 
Other (2) 
Total 
Developing Countries 
Asian NIEs (3)  ' 
South American NIEs (4) 
OPEC 
Other (5) 
Total 
Non-Market Economies 
Eastern Europe (6) 
China 
Other (7) 
Total 
TOTAL 
Source: Case Analysis 
(1) GDR 
(2) Australia, Turkey 
0-5 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
6 
6-10  11- 21-
20  30 
2 
1 
1  3 
I  I 
I  5  3 
3  4  5 
1  2 
2 
5  5  7 
1  2 
1 
1  3 
6  11  13 
(3) Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore 
(4) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela 
31- 41-
40  50 
1 
2 
2  1 
I 
I 
1  1 
3  1 
4  2 
1 
4  3 
9  5 
51- 61- 71- 81- 91-
60  70  80  90  100 
1 
1  1 
1  I  1 
2  2 
2 
4  2 
2  2  1 
1  1 
3  2  2 
8  5  2  1 
(5) Egypt, India. Macao, Malaysia, South Africa, Trinidad, Tobago, Israel, Surinam, Zimbabwe 
(6) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia 
(7) Albania 
151 
100  Weighted 
+  averaf!.e 
16 
36 
3  61 
24 
3  45 
26 
26 
27 
26 
1  43 
2  69 
3  50 
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It is notable that: 
•  below average dumping margins have been found in cases involving developing 
countries; 
•  the dumping margins found for non-market economies, and China in  particular, 
have been above average; 
•  the dumping margins found in cases involving Japan have been above average. 
Injury 
Figure V .3 presents an analysis of the key indicators relied on by the Commission when 
affmnative injury determinations were made. 
Figure V.3:  Key  Indicators of Injury 
Employment 
Cash Flow 
ROI 
Profits 
Prices 
Market Shares 
Sales 
Stocks 
Capacity Utilisation 
Production 
Source: Case Analysis 
Outcome of Investigations 
0  5  10  15  20 
Number  of Cases 
25 
Figure V .4 shows the outcome of all investigations concluded over the period 1981'-91 (ie·. 
it is not restricted to the sample). 
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Figure V.4:  Outcome of Investigations  1981-85 and 1986-91 
Source: Commission Annual Reports 
It is notable that: 
•  whilst the overall  proportion of cases ending with  the  adoption of definitive 
measures has remained constant at around 70%, there has been an increase in the 
use of duties and a corresponding decline in the proportion of cases settled by the 
acceptance of undertakings; 
•  over the period as a whole, only 6% of cases were closed with a finding of no 
dumping; and between 1986 and 1991 the proportion was only 3%; 
•  just under 20% of cases were concluded with a finding of no injury. 
According to the Commission's Annual Reports, no case has been closed with a finding 
that measures would not be in the Community interest since 1986.  In that year and in each 
of the two preceding years one (product) case was closed on Community interest grounds: 
•  in  1986 an investigation into imports of malleable cast iron tube and pipe fittings 
was closed on the grounds that "  ... .it was not in the Community's interest to apply 
protective measures in view of the high market share obtained by imports from 
other countries at prices which were as low as the prices of the imports subject to 
investigation  ..... "; 
•  in 1985 a countervailing subsidy investigation was closed on Community interest 
grounds because the system of  export subsidies in question had been terminated; 
•  in  1984 an investigation of imports of wrought aluminium from four countries was 
closed on Community interest grounds because prices had risen in the Community 
and worldwide since the initiation of the proceeding. 
We used our sample to explore whether the chances of a case being closed without the 
adoption of measures is related to particular characteristics.  The analysis suggests that: 
•  "closure rates" do not vary materially with the number of EC producers; 
•  cases against developing countries are less likely to be closed without the adoption 
of measures (22% a5 compared to an average of 34% ); 
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•  40% of cases involving relatively low dumping margins (up to 20o/o)  were closed 
with a finding of no injury as compared to an average of 20%; 
•  among cases in which undercutting was considered, all cases in which the margin 
of undercutting was 5% or less were closed with a finding of no injury; 
•  cases involving markets in which demand was growing strongly immediately 
before the investigation were slightly more likely to be closed with a finding of no 
injury (20% as compared to an average of around 30%): 
•  nearly 50o/o of cases in which Community production was static or growing in the 
period before the investigation were closed with a finding of no injury (as compared 
to an average of around one-third for all cases for which demand information was 
available); 
•  there is no apparent tendency for cases against countries with a low level of import 
penetration in the Community to be closed with a finding of no injury.  However, 
taking other reasons for closure into account, in around a quarter of cases where a 
country had 5% or less of the EC market, the case was closed without measures, as 
compared to a termination rate of  one-sixth for higher levels of import penetration. 
Several of these findings tend to confirm prior expectations. 
Level of Duties 
Figure V.5 demonstrates the wide range in duty levels applied in our sample of  cases. 
Figure V.S:  Analysis of Duty  Levels 
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In cases in our sample in which duties were imposed, the average level of duties was 30%. 
For those same cases the average level of dumping found was 52%.  In 58% of cases the 
duty applied was below the dumping margin, ie the injury margin was below the dumping 
margin. 
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The Commission estimate that in 50% of  cases concluded over the period 1981-90 the level 
of duty was below the dumping margin for some or all exporters (Commission Annual 
Report for 1990). 
Length of Investigations 
The average length of investigations in our sample - from initiation to closure - was 18 
months.  This is the same as the figure given in an answer to a Parliamentary Question in 
November 1991.  In our sample of cases initiated in  the late 1980s, cases in which no 
measures were ultimately introduced were concluded on average in 15 months whilst cases 
in which definitive measures were introduced took an average of 19 months to reach a final 
determination. 
Table V .6 shows that the time taken to complete investigations varied significantly. 
However, only 17% of cases were concluded within a year. 
Table  V.6:  Length of Investigation  by Outcome 
Outcome  Number of Months  Average in 
days 
9-12  12-15  15-18  18-21  21-24  24-27  27-30  30-33  33+ 
Definitive Measures  5  4  8  7  - 2  1  1  2  577 
No  Mca.~urcs  2  3  3  1  1  1  - - - 458 
To1.al  7  7  11  8  1  3  1  1  2  542 
Source: Case Analysis 
Until 1987, the Commission recorded the time taken to complete investigations in its 
Annual Report.  Over the period 1983-87 investigations were completed on average in 7.8-
9.3 months.  At the beginning of the 1980s the average period within which provisional 
measures were adopted was around 6 months. 
Reviews 
Table V.7 presents a summary of review activity. 
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Table  V.7:  Reviews of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Investigations  1981 
to  1991. 
198/  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  /987  1988  1989  1990 
Reviews in progress at lhe  l  16  24  2  2  20  27  11  20  15 
beginning of lhe period 
Reviews opened during lhe  17  24  10  7  30  24  8  24  17  26 
period 
Reviews in progress during  18  40  34  9  32  44  35  35  37  41 
lhepcriod 
Reviews concluded by: 
- imposition of definitive  - 1  8  1  1  1  7  4  4  6 
duty in lieu of price 
undertaking 
- amendment of definitive  - - 11  2  5  7  8  - 4  2 
duty 
- suspension of definitive  - - 3  - 1  - -
duty 
- acccpumce of price  2  2  1  1  1  3  I 
undertaking in lieu of 
definitive duty 
- amendment of price  13  8  1  2  4  2  1 
undertaking 
- repeal or expiry of  1  - - - 2  2  2  1  9  6 
definitive duty 
- repeal or expiry of price  - - 3  - - 3  - 5  4  5 
undertaking 
- no change of the  1  2  - - - 1  1  - -
measures in force 
Total reviews tenninated  2  16  32  7  12  17  24  15  22  20 
during the period 
Reviews in progress at the  16  24  2  2  20  27  11  20  15  21 
end of lhe period 
Provisional duties imposed  1  13  3  3  2  8  - 7  1  -
during lhe reviews 
Source: Commission Annual Reports 
The effect of the sunset clause introduced in  1984 on the level of review activity is evident. 
According to  the Con1mission's  1991  Annual  Report, 75% of measures expire or are 
repealed under the sunset review provisions. 
The effect of the sunset clause is funher demonstrated by Figure V.7, which analyses the 
outcome of reviews: the proportion of reviews concluded with the expiry of measures 
increased from 7%  over the  period  1981-85  to  38%  over the period  1986-91.  The 
significant proportion of reviews concluded by the replacement of undertakings by duties is 
also notable. 
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Figure V.7:  Outcome  of Reviews 
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At the end of 1991, imports of 64 products were subject to anti-dumping measures. The 
n1easures involved a total of 143 country cases. 
Revenue 
We estimate that in  1991 the EC would have raised about ECU 650 million through anti-
dumping duties.  This sum amounts to about 10% of the value of all imports affected by 
anti-dumping measures. 
Use of Anti-Dumping Measures by Other Countries 
Whilst this study is concerned with the economic impact of  dun1ping in the Community, it 
should not be forgotten that the anti-dumping policies of other countries have a major 
impact on exports from the Community.  The Community is not only a major user of anti-
dumping measures, its companies are also a major target for anti-dumping investigations. 
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Over the period 1980-89: 
•  of the 1,456 anti-dumping investigations notified to the GAIT Secretariat 271  were 
initiated by the Community; 
•  344 anti-dumping investigations of Community exports were launched.  On this 
very crude measure, the Community's export trade was subject to the highest level 
of anti-dumping intervention of any territory.  The Community was followed by 
Japan (159 cases) and the United States (144 cases). 
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VI  THE COMMUNITY'S EXPERIENCE OF THE IMPACT OF ANTI-
DUMPING MEASURES 
Introduction 
In  this section we discuss the Community's experience of the impact of anti-dumping 
measures drawing on our case  studies, our programme of interviews and  previous 
research.  Specifically, we discuss the impact of anti-dumping measures on: 
Prices 
prices; 
competition; 
trade; 
Community producers and their employees; 
industrial purchasers; 
consumers; 
exporters; 
the overall Community interest. 
The effect of anti-dumping measures on prices in  the Community is a vital, if partial, 
indicator of their economic impact. 
In  considering this issue it is important to  recognise that the  relevant comparison is 
between: 
•  the trend in prices after measures were introduced; 
•  the  trend in  prices that would have been observed if measures had not  been 
introduced. 
Comparison with the level of prices at the time measures were introduced is only of 
relevance in so far as it indicates how prices might have developed in the absence of anti-
dumping measures.  This is an issue of some importance in markets in which there is a 
tendency for costs and prices to fall over time; it is not infrequently asserted that, since 
prices did not rise after measures were introduced, they have not had the impact intended or 
claimed by criticsl. 
The traditional framework for the analysis of trade protection measures outlined in Section 
IV has been widely adopted by economists to estimate their impact on prices and the 
resulting loss of production and consumption efficiency.  A study by the UK National 
Consumer Council2 on the impact of anti-dumping measures applied on imports of eight 
products in  the electronics sector (including two of our case studies) argues that anti-
dumping measures have imposed a heavy burden on consumers and that the  cost to 
consumers exceeds any gain to Community producers. 
1  For example, an article in the Financial Times of 23 August 1992 on the review of 
the anti-dumping duties on Plain Paper Photocopiers reports a statement by a spokesman 
for one of the leading companies in the industry asserting that the fact that the prices of 
photocopiers has fallen shows that Japanese exporters have absorbed anti-dumping duties 
and have continued to dump in the Community.  This conclusion may (or may not) be valid 
but it does not follow simply from an observation that prices in the Community have fallen. 
2  International Trade and the Consumer:  Working Paper 1:  Consumer Electronics 
and the EC's Anti-dumping Policy, 1990, National Consumer Council. 
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The study calculates the impact of measures on consumers by: 
•  deriving  the  average  effective rate  of protection  (including  allowance  for 
undertakings as well as duties); 
•  assuming that duties/undertakings are fully reflected in consumer prices; 
•  estimating the impact of higher prices on sales; 
•  calculating  the  itnplied  additional  annual  costs (ie.  higher  prices)  borne  by 
consun1ers at the lower level of consumption. 
The study's estimates of the  annual  costs  imposed  on  consumers  by  anti-dumping 
measures are summarised in Table VI.l. 
Table  V/.1  Annual Costs  Borne by  Community Consumers as  a Result of Anti-
Dumping Measures 
ECU million  ECU million 
Video Tape Recorders  250  140 
Dot Matrix Printers  486  Daisy Wheel Printers  63 
Video Cassettes and  48  Electronic Typewriters  105 
Tape Reels 
322  Photocopiers  Small Screen TV  s*  9 
* Assumes only prices of Korean imports were affected. 
Source:  National Consumer Council ( 1990) (op cit) 
The study acknowledges that these estimates are "little more than a guess at rough orders of 
magnitude". 
The Commission rejects estimates of the  impact of measures on prices based on  the 
effective rate of duty arguing that price increases do not take place across the whole of a 
product's consumption; or even, necessarily, in  the prices of products subject to anti-
dumping duties.  Rather, in the Commission's view, the effect of duties is felt on market 
shares and the transfer of production as well as on prices.  In particular, the Commission 
point to the fact that duties will often not be payable on all imports and that competition 
between Community producers will often be sufficient to keep prices down. 
The Commission's concerns seem to  us to  have considerable validity.  The impact of 
measures on prices in the Community will depend on the conditions of competition in the 
Community market and the strategies that Community producers and exporters follow. 
Generalisation is difficult, but the impact on prices, which may vary over time, of a given 
level of  duty is likely to be greater: 
•  the  lesser the extent to  which  there  is  competition  from  imports from  other 
countries.  If  the export prices of these other countries are the same as or a little above those 
of the country(ics) subject to measures and these third countries can expand their exports to 
the Community, anti-dumping measures will impose little or no costs.  llowever, equally, 
little relief will  be provided to the Community industry.  As discussed below, in  cases 
initiated between  1980 and  1985,  imports  from countries subject to investigation on 
average accounted for 50% of all  extra-EC imports between  1980 and  1985, but the 
proponion varied very significantly; 
•  the more inelastic is the demand for the product; 
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•  the lesser the extent of competition between Community producers.  In markets in 
which there are few Community producers, import competition is likely to be an important 
restraint on prices and to provide an incentive to efficiency; 
•  the lesser the scope for circumventing duties by relocating production without 
significantly increasing costs; 
•  the less significant are returns to scale in the industry. The more costs fall with 
output, the greater will be the tendency for: 
Community producers  to react to anti-dumping duties by increasing output rather 
than prices; 
exporters to absorb duties in an effort to maintain sales volume. 
In practice, an increase in prices equal to the effective rate of duty is likely to be at the top 
of the range of possibilities. 
Nevertheless, estimates like those made by the National Consumer Council do demonstrate 
the potentially very significant impact of anti-dumping duties on prices and costs in the 
Community. 
Professor Messerlin investigated trends in import prices excluding duties for products 
subject to anti-dumping proceedings1 •  He found that: 
•  overall, in  real term_ s, the (pre-duty) prices of imports from countries subject to 
dumping investigations rose by 7% in the year following the initiation of the investigation 
and by 24% over a five-year period; 
•  as would be expected, prices of imports subject to duties decreased whilst those 
subject to undertakings increased.  Somewhat surprisingly, the greatest increase was in 
cases in which mixed measures were applied; 
•  prices in intra-EC trade of goods subject to investigations tended to be declining 
before the investigation and subsequently stabilised.  However, intra-EC prices continued 
to decline in cases in  which only ad valorem duties were applied.  In cases in  which 
undertakings were accepted, price trends were erratic; 
•  overall, prices of extra-EC imports not subject to investigation tended to be falling 
before the investigation and to intTease slightly afterwards; 
•  relative to intra-EC prices, those of dumped imports subject to measures rose by 
17% over the three years following the initiation of the investigation. 
A World Bank study of the impact of US anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures on 
import prices found that experience varied between sectors2.  Whilst in some cases prices 
were increased, in others the study suggests that duties were treated as an unavoidable tax 
and pre-duty prices were reduced. 
1  Messerlin, The EC Anti-dumping Regulations:  A First Economic Appraisal, 1980-
85, Weltschaftliches Archiv, Band 125, Heft 3 (1989). 
2  Harrison, The  New  Trade  Protection:  Price  Effects  of Anti  dumping  and 
Counterrailing Measures in the United States, World Bank Trade Policy Working Paper, 
November 1991 
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Our case studies suggest the following observations. 
Denim 
The imports subject to investigation in this case amounted to around 20% of all denim 
imports into the Community during the investigation.  In the course of the investigation it 
was established that there had been significant other low price imports which undercut 
Community producers.  It must therefore be doubted whether, if measures had been 
imposed, there would have been a significant impact on prices in  the Community since 
buyers would have been able to switch to other sources of low price imports.  Equally, and 
for the san1e reason, it seems doubtful whether measures would have provided significant 
relief to the Comn1unity industry. 
Mini Ball Bearings 
The industry's view is that the duties applied in 1984 had the effect of slowing the rate of 
decrease in  prices.  The implication that measures have had some impact on prices is 
consistent with the views of  exporters: 
•  one exporter gave us  a comparison of prices for a single representative bearing 
which was 40% more expensive in the Community than in Japan; 
•  another exporter told us that prices were 20-30% higher in the Community than in 
Japan. 
Plain  Paper Photocopiers 
By  the  time anti-dumping duties were  imposed  in  1986,  there  were few  remaining 
"Community producers" (as defined in  the  proceedings) and there was little scope for 
imports from non-Japanese producers to increase.  Although Community production by 
subsidiaries of Japanese producers developed during and after the proceedings, it is widely 
believed that costs have been higher in Europe than in Japan. 
It would appear that there was significant scope for the duties to lead to prices being higher 
than they would otherwise have been in the Community.  We have received a range of 
conflicting evidence and opinion, much of it (necessarily) partial.  The question requires 
(and deserves as part of the current review of measures) more detailed study. 
Polyvinyl Chloride 
In the year in which the investigation was launched ( 1981) consumption and prices fell 
significantly and imports from Eastern Europe rose.  During 1982 consumption began to 
recover and prices rose.  Provisional measures were applied against imports from four East 
European countries during the year.  Subsequently, prices increased until  1991  when 
consumption again turned down. 
A number of factors  suggest that the  measures did  not have any significant impact on 
prices: 
•  the highest level of injury margin determined was 12% and measures took the form 
of price undertakings.  An undertaking involving a 12% increase in prices would have been 
quickly rendered irrelevant by the recovery of prices that occurred; 
•  during the 1980s it appears that import~ from Eastern Europe continued to be priced 
at well below the levels realised by EC manufacturers; 
•  the removal of measures in 1987/88 does not seem to have influenced price trends. 
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Measures would need to have been implemented very rapidly for their effect to be felt while 
prices remained depressed.  The Commission Regulation records that the dumped imports 
increased their market share from 2.3% in 1979 to 5.6% in 1981. 
A further study by Professor Messerlin has argued that the measures imposed in this case 
raised prices in the Community by up to  14%1•  However, the industry argues that the 
measures were imposed as the industry recovered from the recession and that there was 
little or no impact on prices.  Since the price undertakings were set to allow the industry to 
recover its variable costs, it seems unlikely that there would have been a significant impact 
on prices once the market recovered. 
Small Screen  Colour Televisions 
Provisional measures were only introduced in late 1989 and it is premature to attempt to 
assess their impact on prices.  There are indications that EC prices continued to fall after 
measures were applied.  However, as noted above, this does not mean that measures have 
not had an effect. 
It appears that production in this industry is highly mobile and there is production in SE 
Asia by EC producers as  well as  by Far East producers.  Unless the duties were to be 
applied to a wider range of countries, the scope for circumventing duties by relocating 
production would appear to be a significant restraint on price increases. 
Competition 
The impact of anti-dumping measures on competition is clearly very closely related to their 
impact on prices.  Two possibilities may be distinguished: 
•  in  the  absence  of anti-dumping  measures, Community  firms  set  prices and 
determine other aspects of their strategy in the light of the competition they actually or 
potentially face from  imports.  If the constraints imposed by  import competition are 
removed or relaxed, Community producers may gain the power to increase prices or to 
restrict competition within the Community; or existing market power may be enhanced. 
Thus, in  principle, the application of anti-dumping measures may create a competition 
problem in a market which was previously acceptably competitive; 
•  in markets in which import competition (actual and potential) is limited, anti-
dumping measures may safeguard competition and keep prices down by ensuring that the 
Community industry remains an effective force in the market. 
The risks  that measures will  increase prices is  clearly greatest when  there are few 
Community producers in the relevant market and the anti-dumping measure covers a high 
proportion of actual and potential imports.  In Section III we estimated that in 40o/o of cases 
there are five or fewer producers in  the Community.  In some cases in which measures 
have been imposed there have been only one or two EC producers.  Recent examples 
include Glycine and Linear Tungsten Lightbulbs.  In another study, Professor Messerlin 
found  that there was only one EC complainant in  39 of the 255 cases initiated between 
1980 and  19852 .  This evidence suggests that the  impact of anti-durnping measures on 
competition is a significant issue. 
1  Messerlin, 1990 Anti-dumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Law?  The EC Chemical 
Cases, World Economy, Vol.  13 No.4 
2  Messerlin, ( 1991) op cit 
163 European Parliament- The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
The importance of the problem in practice cannot be assessed without detailed investigation 
of a large number of anti-dumping cases.  In 1988 the Commission adopted a Decision 
against 14 EC PVC producers for an infringement of Article 85.  They were alleged to have 
operated schemes to raise prices from 1980, ie during the period in which imports from 
Eastern Europe were rising.  Clearly, the application of anti-dumping measures which 
raised export prices to the Community would have assisted the cartel.  However, the price 
undertakings seem to have been set at a sufficiently low level to avoid this danger. 
Professor Messerlin has analysed Decisions under Articles gs &  86 during the 1980s to 
determine how frequently anti-dumping proceedings were launched in the same industries. 
Overall,  he  finds  that  in  22%  of competition  cases  there  were  also  anti-dumping 
proceedings; and that this was the case for 52% of decisions on infringements of Article 
85(1 ).  Also drawing on two case studies (including one of Polyvinyl Chloride), he argues 
that  members  of cartels  have  captured  anti-dumping  procedures  to  enforce  their 
agreements1. 
The Commission argues that it is well aware of the dangers that anti-dumping proceedings 
will be  mi~used but that in practice problems are rare.  In any case, competition problems 
fall to be dealt with under the Community's competition legislation. 
Professor Messerlin's analysis does not, in our view, justify his strong conclusion.  It 
appears that many of the industries in which there have been both competition and anti-
dumping proceedings have high fixed costs and large scale plants.  These conditions appear 
to be related to both a tendency to collude and vulnerability to dumping.  Thus, there may 
have been both competition and anti-dumping proceedings in the same industry during the 
1980s without there being any "capture" of anti-dumping proceedings.  However, the clear 
scope for conflict between the Community's competition and anti-dumping policies must be 
recognised. 
Trade 
In its 1990 Annual Report, the Commission presented an  analysis of the proportion  of 
Community trade which was subject to anti-dumping duties in  1989.  Trade subject to 
undertakings was excluded.  The table below summarises and extends the analysis. 
Messerlin (1990) op cit 
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Table  Vl.2  Analysis of Community  Imports  Subject  to  Anti-Dumping Duties, 
1989 
Share of  EC Imports  Share of  All EC Imports 
from Country Subject to  Subject to Duties 
Duties  % 
% 
EFTA  0.2  7 
Japan  3.5  65 
tJ SA and Canada  0.1  I 
Turkey  0.6  I 
Yugoslavia  2.0  6 
Other  0.0  0 
Total  0.7  80 
Developing Countries: 
South American NIEs  0.5  4 
Asian NIEs  0.9  10 
Other  0.1  2 
Total  0.6  16 
Non-Market Economies  0.2  3 
WORLD TOTAL  0.6  100 
Source:  Derived from Annex S of  the Ninth Annual Report of the Commission on the Community's Anti-
Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities (  1990) 
Overall, the Commission estimates that 0.6% of Community imports were subject to anti-
dumping duties.  Imports from Japan accounted for two-thirds of all Community imports 
subject to anti-dumping duties. 
In addition, we have made our own estimates of the trade impact of anti-dumping measures 
(including undertakings as well as duties) in force at the end of 1991.  We estimate that the 
total value of imports affected by anti-dumping measures (undertakings or duties) in 1991 
was about 5,200 million ECU, approximately 1.1% of all extra-EC imports. 
Although the imports of many countries are subject to measures: 
•  over four-fifths of imports subject to duties come from Japan: 
•  the Asian newly-industrialised economies together comprise approximately 7.4% of 
imports affected by anti-dumping measures.  The most prominent country in this group is 
South Korea which produces about 5.5% of affected imports; 
•  the next most affected countries (aside from Japan and the NIEs) are the USA and 
China; 
•·  Eastern European economies account for  1.7% of total imports subject to anti-
dumping measures. 
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Table  Vl.3  Geographical  Distribution  of.  Imports  Subject  to  Anti-Dumping 
Measures  1991 
Reg  ion/Count!}'  Share of  All Imports Subject to Duties 
China  2.5% 
EFTA  1.0% 
NIE  7.4% 
Eastern Europe  1.7% 
USA  3.3% 
Japan  83.3% 
Other  0.8% 
Source:  Ernst & Young Estimates Based on 1991 Eurostat Data 
We have also analysed imports subject to measures by product sector.  The results are 
given in Table Vl.4.  Again, the effect of the measures appears concentrated in  one area. 
The electronics sector accounts for H6°k of the value of all affected imports. 
Table  Vl.4  Distribution of Imports Subject to Anti-dumping Measures, 1991 
Product Sector  Proportion of  Imports Affected 
Chenucals  2.1% 
Mechanical Engineering  3.1% 
Iron and Steel  0.5% 
Other Metals  0.2% 
Textiles  1.5% 
Electronics  85.8% 
Other  6.8% 
Source:  Ernst & Young Estimates Based on 1991 Eurostat Data 
Neither the Commission nor our estimates take account of the impact that measures have 
had on trade levels.  That is, it is likely that trade in products subject to measures would 
otherwise have been higher.  Nor do the estimates take account of a "trade chilling" effect 
from anti-dumping measures, ie. the impact on trade of the threat or potential for anti-
dumping  measures  to  be  introduced.  The existence of such  an  effect  is  widely 
hypothesised by economists but cannot be estimated.  However, we were told by trade 
lawyers that exporters ask them·to advise on the pricing policy they should follow to avoid 
a determination of dumping.  Whilst this can be viewed as a deterrent effect, it suggests that 
estimates of  the imports subject to measures do underestimate the overall impact on trade of 
anti-dumping measures. 
Trade  Levels  and Composition 
Professor Messerlin's study of Community anti-dumping cases initiated between  J  980 and 
1985  suggests that measures significantly reduce  imports from  countries subject to 
investigation and inc..Tease imports from other countries: 
•  a year after initiation - when the level of any definitive measures will generally not 
be known - the  (unweighted)  average reduction  in  import volumes from countries 
investigated was 18%; and after three years the reduction in in1ports was around 35%. 
Imports from other non-EC countries rose by 20% in the year following initiation and by 
nearly 50% over four years; 
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•  as a result, the share of imports from countries subject to investigation fell from an 
average of  49% when cases were initiated to 38% three years later, 
•  the impact on import volumes from dumping countries was less in cases which 
were closed by the acceptance of undertakings than in cases in which duties were applied; 
•  measures had a significantly lesser impact on imports from industrialised countries 
than on imports from LDCs, NMEs and NICs.  Messerlin suggests that this reflects the 
tendency to apply duties against industrialised countries and to accept undertakings from 
LDCs and NMEs. 
In our Polyvinyl Chloride  case study, imports from countries against which measures 
were adopted (with the exception of the GDR, for which data are not available) peaked in 
1981 -the year in which the investigation was opened- and fell back subsequently before 
rising again in the last few  years.  By contrast, imports from other countries increased in 
the years after measures were introduced. 
This pattern is consistent with a trade diversion effect, although it is difficult to reconcile 
with the conclusion above that measures did not influence the competitiveness of imports 
from countries subject to measures. 
In Plain Paper Photocopiers  it seems clear that imports from Japan were to some extent 
replaced by trade with other Asian countries.  However, the principal effect was an increase 
in imports of parts from Japan as production in the Community by Japanese manufacturers 
built up. 
In Small Screen Colour Televisions, imports from countries subject to measures (Korea, 
Hong Kong and China) fell or stabilised after the opening of the investigation.  However, 
imports from other countries rose, as did imports from Korea of televisions of a slightly 
larger size. 
Proportion of Trade  Subject to  Measures 
Professor Messerlin found that, on average, Community anti-dumping proceedings related 
to 49% of trade in the year in which the case was initiated.  However, the proportion varied 
from 0.3% to 98.9%. 
As Figure Vl.1  shows, our ~nal  ysis of measures in force at the end of 1991  suggests that 
in a high proportion of cases measures only affect a relatively small proportion of the 
Community's trade.  However, in a minority of cases, a high proportion of trade is subject 
to measures.  On average, imports from countries subject to measures accounted for 19% 
of all imports of the relevant products.  This proportion is rather higher- 33% -in the 
electronics sector. 
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Figure  Vl.l  Impact  on  Trade  in  Products  Subject  to  Anti-Dumping Measures, 
1991 
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Community Producers and Employees 
As one industry association pointed out, as a major exporter the Community's industry has 
a strong interest in encouraging open markets for its products.  If  protection measures 
induce retaliation, the overall impact on the Con1munity's industry could well be negative. 
Equally, if the (threat of) trade protection measures encourages countries to open their 
markets, they would have a positive impact.  However, leaving these points aside, it is 
clear that the application of anti-dumping measures, and indeed any other form of trade 
protection, will generally be in the interests of Cornmunity producers by reducing import 
competition and pcnnitting some combination of an increase in sales volun1e and prices. 
Furthermore, as indicated previously, if capital markets are imperfect, dumping may have 
an adverse effect on the level of investment.  This may be manifested either in a gradual 
loss of competitiveness or, simply, in the Community industry being smaller than the 
optimum size.  However, the converse is  also possible.  In  addition to encouraging 
Community industry to invest, expand and increase its competitiveness in world markets, 
anti-dumping  measures  may  shelter  producers  with  little  chance  of  achieving 
competitiveness in world markets. 
The interests of  employees in industries subject to dumping are generally similar to those of 
the industry itself.  However, it should not be forgotten that employees are also consumers. 
As such they have a general interest in low prices. 
Industrial Purchasers 
As noted above, the application of anti-dumping measures may have significant adverse 
effa~ts "downstream" on purchasers for which the products are a significant cost item. 
If  downstream  Conununity  producers  do  not  face  competition  from  outside  the 
Community, the effect on their costs of anti-dumping measures would be largely or wholly 
passed through.  As such, the incidence of the anti-dun1ping measures would be felt by 
consumers.  Whilst the effect of anti-dumping measures on consumption efficiency is 
itself, as discussed above, of great importance, concerns about the impact of anti-dumping 
measures on industrial purchasers have focused on cases in which the purchaser faces 
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international competition.  Where this is the case, if anti-dumping duties raise prices above 
the level in world or key national markets, they will clearly place Community producers at a 
competitive disadvantage.  Indeed, any increase in prices will reduce the competitiveness of 
EC purchasers in world (and EC) markets.  Although such circumstances would be rare, 
the loss of output and employment downstreatn could then exceed the output gain by the 
Community industry affected by dumping.  This issue has been recognised in cases in 
which  the  impact of measures  could  very  clearly  have  a  crucial  impact on  the 
competitiveness of the Community industry.  For example, the undertaking given  by 
Japanese exporters of DRAMS linked the floor price to the costs incurred by the most 
efficient producer.  (However, this action was not sufficient to meet the concerns of 
EUROBIT, which  represents  national  associations of Community manufacturers of 
business machinery and data processing and telecommunications equipment, which has 
argued vigorously against the application and level of anti-dumping measures on DRAMS.) 
Users made representations in  the proceeding against dumped imports of Polyvinyl 
Chloride  from Eastern Europe. 
No  representations were made by users of Mini Ball Bearings.  An exporter told us that 
customers have now become aware of the price differential between the Comtnunity and 
Japan (see above).  However, this exporter's experience is that customers are not willing to 
take sides in what appears to them a dispute between valued suppliers. 
Consumers 
Consumers' general interest in low prices and product variety means that the application of 
anti-dumping measures is clearly against their short term interests.  However, more deeply: 
•  the distinction between the overall impact on consumers of any higher prices and 
the loss of consumptio·n efficiency (which will be much less) is an important one.  As 
stated above, the effect of duties in redistributing income from consumers to producers 
does not represent a net loss of economic welfare to the Community (except in so far as the 
producer is a subsidiary of a company owned outside the Community).  Nevertheless, the 
loss of consumption efficiency should not be neglected as a trivial consideration.  As is the 
case for industrial purchasers, economic analysis suggests that the impact of measures on 
consumer welfare should be a central consideration in anti-dumping investigations; 
•  the consumer interest clearly includes the longer run impact of dumping and anti-
dumping duties on prices and the products available.  In cases of predatory dumping, low 
prices in the short term are not generally in consumer's interest once account is taken of the 
increase in prices that will follow successful predatory dumping. 
Exporters 
Anti-dumping measures are likely to influence the strategies and opportunities open to 
exporters in a number of ways, many of which are often regarded as attempts to avoid or 
circumvent the anti-dumping measure. 
Pricing: Trade Chilling and Deterrent Effects 
The threat of a dumping complaint may itself influence the pricing behaviour of exporters. 
If this is the case, many of the effects of anti-dumping duties discussed above may occur 
without an investigation or the imposition of duties.  Such a result would be seen as a 
beneficial deterrent effect by advocates of anti-dumping measures and as an additional 
source of concern by critics. 
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Assessing the significance of this possibility in practice is very difficult.  However, several 
lawyers that we spoke to in the course of the study said that they are asked to advise clients 
on whether proposed pricing policies could lead to a finding of dumping. 
Pricing: Absorption of Duties 
The discussion of the impact of anti-dumping measures on prices above shows that it 
should not be regarded as surprising if companies do not increase their prices by the full 
amount of an  ad valorem duty.  However, there is  no incentive to absorb duties under 
variable duty systems since the duty is set at the level necessary to achieve a specified duty 
inclusive price. 
Product  Strategies 
Anti-dumping measures create incentives to develop and promote products which will be 
outside the scope of the protection.  This possibility is greatest when: 
•  products are developing rapidly.  This can then lead to controversy as to whether 
new or improved products should be dutiable; 
•  there are close substitutes for products subject to duties.  For example, in Plain 
Paper Photocopiers the largest copiers were excluded from the scope of duties.  This 
created an incentive to exporters to promote sales of these products. 
In the extreme, anti-dumping measures may lead exporters to either abandon the EC market 
altogether or to withdraw specific products.  Our discussions with exporters indicated that 
the latter effect, at least, does occur in practice. 
In the ball bearings market prices vary very significantly according to purchase volume and 
end use.  One exporter told us that it had increased its efforts to secure low volume, high 
price sales in order to reduce the chances of being found to be dumping in reviews.  This 
inevitably implied a reduction in competition for high volume, low price sales. 
Impact on Location of Production 
Anti-dumping measures create an incentive to replace exports to the Community by local 
production.  Whilst some advocates of anti-dumping measures see this effect as a benefit, it 
is unlikely to be in the Community's interest if Community production is more costly than 
exports.  High cost Community production will only be viable if measures have raised 
prices. 
During and after the Plain Paper Photocopier proceeding a number of Japanese  exporters 
established production facilities in the Community for the first time (and in the case of the 
one Japanese manufacturer which already produced in  the Community, added to those 
facilities).  Whilst many of these companies may have established such facilities sooner or 
later, it seems that the timing of these investments was influenced by the intervention.  This 
case therefore appears to demonstrate the powerlul impact that anti-dumping measures may 
have in encouraging exporters to establish Community production. 
However, it should be noted that several commentators we spoke to confirmed Professor 
Messerlin's belief that Japanese PPC production in the Community was relatively high 
cost•. 
1  Messerlin and Noguchi (1991 ), The EC Anti-dumping and Anti-circumvention 
Regulations:  A Costly Yet Futile Exercise, the Case of Photocopiers. 
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Production of mini ball bearings in the Community by Japanese manufacturers was already 
increasing in the late 1970s and continued to do so after duties were introduced (however, 
exports from Japan were already subject to an undertaking).  Our interviews with exporters 
confmn that anti-dumping measures have been a significant influence on their decisions to 
invest in Community production. 
Community Productioh: Sourcing 
If  exporters do switch production to the Community, the associated increase in sourcing 
will benefit suppliers in the Community directly; and there may be indirect benefits to 
Community producers if: 
•  additional volumes reduce the prices of key components; 
•  the range and quality of components is increased. 
Several  PPC  manufacturers  told  us  that the  increase  in  Japanese production in  the 
Community  has  had  a  beneficial  effect on  the  components industry and that some 
components were now available from Community sources for the first time in many years. 
Since they create an  incentive to local sourcing, the application of "screwdriver" anti-
circumvention measures will tend to increase this effect. 
Whilst the effects of anti-dumping measures on inward investment and the availability of 
components from Community sources is indeed a potential source of economic benefit, 
there are of  course other measures available to achieve these benefits. 
The Community Interest Criterion in Practice 
The analysis of the Community interest in our five case studies and our comments may be 
summarised as follows. 
Denim 
This case was closed with a finding of no material injury to the Con1munity industry. 
Community interest issues were therefore not considered in the Decision closing the 
proceeding. 
The Community imports denim from a number of sources and the market appears to be 
highly competitive. The exporters seem to  have enjoyed a cost advantage over the 
Community industry.  The low returns earned by  the Community industry since the 
investigation suggest that this position persists. 
The variety of competitively priced sources of supply suggests that there was no threat that 
future competition would be damaged.  By the time that the investigation was concluded in 
1990 production had recovered and it is therefore not apparent that there was a case for 
measures for one or two years to  allow  the industry to  survive a  period of intense 
competition.  Overall, in a competitive industry such as this it is difficult to see how the 
application of measures could be in the Community's economic interests. 
Mini Ball Bearings 
In  both  the original case and  in  the  1988/90 review, consideration of the  Community 
interest balanced the difficulties faced by the Community industry against the effect of a 
price rise on consumers.  The 1984 Council Regulation referred to the strategic importance 
of the industry whilst the  review led  the Council to the conclusion that the industry's 
viability  was  threatened and  that  its  loss would  have adverse effects on investment, 
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employment, research and development and the development of new products in fast 
growing sectors. 
Against this, the Council recognised that there might be an impact on prices but argued that: 
"Any such benefit would be minimal, since the bearings in question account for 
only a tiny fraction of the final price of most products.  "I 
As noted in Section III, this is regarded by the Commission as a case of predatory or 
strategic dumping. 
As argued by the Council, this case involved a balance between price benefits to purchasers 
in the short term and any longer term effects on the price or availability of ball bearings to 
Community. purchasers.  This market is a relatively concentrated one - we have seen it 
suggested that the top 10 world producers account for 90% of the supply of bearings.  The 
apparent economies of large scale production and the need for "know how" suggest that the 
prospect of an industry re-emerging once it  has lost competitiveness seems remote.  In 
these circumstances the key judgements are whether: 
•  the viability and competitiveness of the European industry was threatened.  As 
noted, in  1990 the Council judged that it was; 
•  if the industry were to be weakened or destroyed, would there have been adequate 
competition between Japanese companies or between Japanese and US suppliers; 
•  if  competition would be restricted, would prices ultimately rise above the levels that 
would prevail if measures were to be applied; 
•  alternatively, for defence and economic strategic reasons the Community cannot 
afford to risk the elimination of the industry. 
The treatment of the effect on prices in this case appears to reflect the Commission's 
general policy and deserves comment.  The fact that the impact of a price increase would be 
widely spread does not reduce its overall significance, although this helps to explain why 
few representations are made in such cases.  The implicit assumption seems to be that price 
rises are only of significance when they have a significant impact on the competitiveness of 
purchasers. 
Anti-dumping measures have now been in place in this sector for 15 years.  It seems very 
unlikely that Japanese companies would have sold below cost for such a period; and, as 
noted above, we were  told  by  exporters that prices are lower in  Japan than  in  the 
Community.  This would suggest that Japanese producers may be more cost competitive in 
parts of the market.  Such greater competitiveness could reflect the effects of dumping, but 
it would then appear that anti-dumping measures have not been effective in allowing the 
industry to regain competitiveness. 
Although it is not possible for us to reach definite conclusions, after 15 years there must be 
a worry that purchasers have had to pay higher prices without securing the benefits of an 
industry which has been restored to full international competitiveness. 
Recital47 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685/90. 
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Polyvinyl Chloride 
This is an old case and it was impracticable to discuss Community interest considerations in 
detail.  The Commission Regulation notes that users argued that the application of measures 
would make them less competitive.  However, the Commission took the view that the 
serious difficulties of the industry meant that the immediate application of measures was in 
the Community interest. 
It was suggested above that the measures did not have any significant effect on prices. 
Thus, in practice, it does not seem that the measures applied provided the Community 
industry with any significant relief.  Until the late 1980s when there was a further surge in 
imports from Eastern Europe, the EC industry appears to have retained its market share, 
which may suggest that it did not suffer any long term damage from the dumping.  Thus, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the case for applying measures to assist the industry to 
rationalise would seem weak. 
Plain  Paper Photocopiers 
The following issues were raised in this case: 
•  the impact on the industry.  The Commission argued that without measures the 
current structure of the industry could not be sustained; 
•  the importance of PPC technology for other manufacturers of reprographic products 
and the key role of PPCs in the office equipment industry; 
•  the interests of own label distributors.  They argued that they could not absorb 
duties and that their other reprographic interests would be threatened.  The Commission 
argued that "their difficulties result principally from the nature of the business arrangements 
they have concluded  ....... ".  Some had contracted to take minimum quantities.  The 
Commission noted that they were vulnerable to their suppliers setting up sales companies. 
It concluded that the interests of the Community lay more in preserving manufacturing 
capacity than in protecting OEMs; 
•  employment.  Only a limited overall effect from measures was anticipated by the 
Commission; 
•  compeuuon.  The Commission dismissed concerns about the (short run) impact of 
provisional measures on competition by saying that measures were only temporary. The 
Council Regulation argued that there was a danger that Community producers would be 
taken over if measures were not imposed.  It also drew attention to the prospect that six of 
nine exporters would begin EC manufacture; 
•  worries about shortages.  The Commission concluded that the Community industry 
had adequate capacity and that exports would still be available; 
•  the impact on prices.  The Commission accepted that there might be a short term 
price increase.  However, the importance of the industry and the extent of the injury meant 
that the stability of  the industry was more important.  In the long term, consumers' interests 
lay in having a Community industry which would be able to compete with imports. 
The overriding interest of the Community lay, the Commission concluded, in protecting the 
Community industry from further injury.  The Council subsequently confirmed this view 
stating that: 
"  ... on balance, it is in the Community's long tenn interest to eliminate the injurious 
effect to the Comn1unity industry concerned of the dumped Japanese imports, and that the 
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benefits of such protection clearly outweigh any effects, particularly on price, which could 
be said not to be in the interests of the consumer." 
In our view the key considerations in this case, as in Mini Ball Bearings, were the impact 
of measures on prices in  the short and longer term and the strategic importance of the 
technology. 
On the former point, although the impact of measures on prices in practice remains unclear, 
they were intended to raise prices in the short term.  The longer term effect of measures in 
preserving competition in the Community market is therefore the central issue. 
Whilst there are only a relatively small number of suppliers of producers of photocopiers in 
the world and the prospect of new suppliers entering the market seems remote, the structure 
of the industry in Europe seems reasonably competitive.  However, at the time of the 
investigation (and since), Japanese companies have accounted for over 70% of placements 
in  the overall market and for a significantly higher proportion of placements of smaller 
machines.  Thus the longer tenn prospects for competition turned on: 
•  how the structure of the Comnumity industry would have evolved if measures had 
not been applied; 
•  given any reduction in  the  number of EC-owned producers, would Japanese 
exporters  have acted competitively in the longer term? 
Our best judgement is that measures have affected the structure of the Community industry. 
We are not in a position to judge how Japanese exporters would have reacted to a loss of 
competition from Comn1unity producers but note that there would remain a number of 
independent (Japanese) suppliers to the Community market. 
The industry appears to be  "strategic" in that it brings together a  number of rapidly 
developing technologies of wider application.  However, it  is not apparent that the 
possibility of preserving or promoting the development of these technologies in other ways 
was considered. 
Small Screen  Colour Televisions 
The respective interests of producers and consun1ers and the possible longer run impact of 
dumping were the focus in this case.  The Commission was concerned about the potential 
impact of continued dumping  on  the  viability  of Community  production  and  the 
development of High Definition Television. 
To be balanced against these concerns was  the  impact of measures on prices.  The 
Commission argued that competition between EC producers and from other imports would 
ensure that the impact on prices would  be "limited".  Consumer choice would not be 
reduced. 
Technology in the SCfV market itself is mature and there seems to be intense competition 
between manufacturers of several different nationalities with production throughout Asia. 
Thus, there would not seem to be any threat that the demise of the EC industry would 
reduce effective competition in the SCfV market itself.  Indeed, this seems to have been the 
Commission's own conclusion as it argued that measures would not materially reduce 
competition and consumer choice. 
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There remains the impact on the development of new and related technologies.  Here the 
Commission's argument appears to be that purchasers of small screen televisions should 
pay higher prices or buy.EC rather than imported SCTV's in order to fund the development 
of these  technologies.  In  the  apparent absence of a  strong  link  between  the  two 
technologies, there seem to us to be considerable dangers in this line of argument.  If the 
development and exploitation of these technologies is economically justified, this should be 
funded either commercially or through an R&D support programme. 
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VII  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ANTI-DUMPING  MEASURES:  DUMPING 
DETERMINATIONS 
Introduction 
In  this section we discuss detailed issues raised by the Community's approach to the 
determination of  dumping margins: 
•  the basis for comparison of normal value and export prices; 
•  the treatment of sales below cost in the exp01ter's domestic market; 
•  the treatment of sales from non-market economies; 
•  the treatment of related sales and marketing organisations; 
e  the comparison of export prices with nonnal value. 
In many cases these same issues are a source of  controversy in other leading anti-dumping 
jurisdictions. 
The Basis for Comparison of Normal Value and Export Prices 
Dumping is often described as international price discrimination. 
Since  the  costs of serving  individual  markets  may  vary,  n1ost  definitions of price 
discrimination focus on differences in  profit margins rather than differences in  prices. 
Unless margins are compared or allowance is made for cost differences, it is impossible to 
assess whether a company is truly pursuing a discriminatory pricing strategy (ie. whether it 
is cross-subsidising its export sales). 
This consideration would appear to underlie the provision in the GATT Code that the 
export and domestic price should normally be compared at the ex-factory level.  If  this is 
not done, then the comparison will be influenced by different cost conditions in the two 
markets.  For example, if the distribution costs of a product in the exporter's domestic 
market are very high, as is often alleged is the case in Japan for examplel, the dumping 
margin will be increased correspondingly unless prices are compared at a point before 
significant differential costs are incurred or an appropriate adjustment is made. 
However, the Commission told us that its view is that: 
•  distribution systems in Japan and other markets which it regards as closed are high 
cost and  also have the effect of making it very difficult or impossible for European 
exporters to penetrate the Japanese market; 
•  it is therefore appropriate not to fully adjust prices in the Japanese market for these 
costs in determining normal value. 
However,  the discussion  of this  topic  in  the  U.S.  National  Bureau of Economic Research 
symposium on Trade with Japan (Krugman ed (1991)) suggests that overall distribution margins are no 
higher in Japan than in other developed economies. 
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The Parliament appears to have accepted this view when it argued in its 1990 Resolution 
that: 
"  .... the new GATT Anti-Dumping Code must not restrict the possibility to compare export 
prices with domestic prices or constructed value,  as  such restrictions would favour 
exporters in those countries where domestic prices are high because their markets are 
protected. 
11 
We have some doubts about the Commission's view for a number of reasons: 
•  prices may be higher in  the exporter's domestic market for a number of reasons 
other than market closure; 
•  the argun1ent comes dose to redefining the purpose of dumping measures as being 
to open closed markets to exports rather than to prevent injurious dumping of imports; 
•  in  any case, dumping measures are not necessarily an  efficient instrument for 
opening markets. 
For these reasons, we do not accept that it is appropriate to distort dumping margins by 
making less than full allowance for cost differences. 
Sales Below Cost in  the Exporter's Domestic Market 
The Community's Regulation provides that, in determining normal value, sales below cost 
may be treated as "not having been made in the ordinary course of trade" if: 
•  they have been made in "substantial quantities during the investigation period"; 
•  the prices charged will not recover costs incurred during the investigation period. 
There are a variety of possible bases for measuring cost and thus for assessing whether 
domestic  sales  are  made  below  cost.  The cost concept  adopted  in  anti-dumping 
proceedings is one which includes overhead costs.  This can be described as a measure of 
"average total costs"  or "fully allocated costs". 
When sales have been made below costs, normal value may be determined: 
•  as the price at which any domestic sales which recovered costs were made; 
•  on the basis of export prices to third countries; 
•  "by adjusting the sub-production-cost price referred to above in order to eliminate 
loss and provide for a reasonable profit.  II 
In practice, the Community does not use export prices to third countries to determine 
normal value. 
Economic theory suggests that marginal or incremental cost will be an important or even 
overriding influence on firms' pricing decisions.  Prices which do not cover full costs and 
provide a reasonable rate of profit should not automatically be regarded as aberrant and 
unfair. 
On a practical level, it  can be  argued that the Con1munity's practice (and  that of other 
leading jurisdictions) penalises companies following  perfectly normal  pricing policies 
which  would not be  regarded as anti-competitive if adopted  within  the Community. 
Specifically, this is the case when: 
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(i)  prices in the exporter's domestic market are depressed as a result of excess capacity 
due to: 
(a)  the state of the economic cycle; 
(b)  a fall in demand which is expected to persist; 
(ii)  the exporter has recently commenced production and is incurring start-up costs. 
Particularly when the exporter's competitors face lower costs, start-up costs may have to be 
absorbed in order to gain a foothold in the market; 
(iii)  output is expected to increase, if fixed costs and overheads are allocated as a fixed 
amount per period, average costs will fall.  For marketing reasons firms may not wish to 
adopt the pricing strategy that would be required to cover costs allocated on this basis in 
each period; 
(iv)  production costs are expected to fall over time as a function of cumulative output. 
As previously discussed, where "learning effects" are present, there is an incentive to price 
below the costs incurred in the period in question; 
(v)  companies decide not to allocate general overheads across different products pro 
rata with turnover.  Specifically, overhead recovery may be lower from the products 
subject to the dumping investigation.  This strategy may be followed for a number of 
reasons: 
(a)  a judgement that the market for products subject to dumping will not bear its share 
of overhead costs; 
(b)  although classified as overheads, some costs may actually disproportionately be 
attributable to other products; 
(c)  there may be economies of scale or scope in  some overhead cost items.  For 
example, the incremental cost of promoting a new product may be less for companies 
which have similar products already established in the market. 
(vi)  the  exporter discriminates between different customers (rather than  different 
products) in its domestic market.  In this situation, which may reflect the buying power of 
major purchasers, some prices may be below cost in the sense defined in the Regulation. 
It should be stressed that in  all  circumstances described above the exporter may be 
following identical pricing strategies in its home and export markets.  The Community's 
approach may therefore find dumping where there are no price differences or may inflate 
dumping margins. 
Mini  Ball Bearings appears to provide an  example of the dangers or an overly rigid 
definition of sales below cost.  In this market there are many thousands of specific products 
with  widely  varying  market sizes and  a  significant  level of joint costs.  In these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that producers appear to seek to disproportionately 
recover fixed and common costs in particular segments of the market:  as noted in Section 
VI, prices appear to vary by volume and end use. 
Pricing below average total cost in these conditions would not be regarded as prima facie 
unfair or anti-competitive in competition law proceedings.  Where allegations of unfair or 
predatory  pricing  are  made,  many  economists  would  advocate  a  test  involving  a 
con1parison of the price complained of with marginal costs.  However, other economists 
would argue that sustained pricing close to n1arginal cost can lead to a significant and 
detrimental reduction in competition.  But it is generally recognised that pricing below full 
cost is not presumptively malign. 
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In any case, the concept of cost employed in competition law proceedings is the cost of 
serving the market in question.  By contrast, when a price in the exporter's domestic 
market is not available or fails to meet the standards prescribed in Community law (e.g. 
because sales are at a loss), the Comntission constructs a price on the basis of costs in the 
exporter's domestic market.  The Commission contends that this is appropriate since the 
GA  TI envisages a comparison of prices in the home and export markets.  However, if 
costs differ between two markets, this should be taken into account in determining whether 
a firm is discriminating or cross-subsidising its export sales.  Equally, if the intention is in 
fact to determine whether a firm is selling below cost in  its export markets, the costs 
evaluated should be those incurred in serving that market. 
Because standards of the kind adopted in competition proceedings have a firmer foundation 
in  economic analysis,  some commentators  have advocated that dumping should be 
redefined as pricing in export markets at below marginal cost. 
To a significant extent, these problems arise because the determination of  dumping margins 
focuses on a relatively short period, usually a year.  In examples i- iv above (except i(b)), 
it is quite probable that costs would be recovered over some longer period. 
The new GA  TI Code sets some standards for the assessment of whether sales should be 
treated as below cost.  The draft states that: 
•  the extended period over which sales must be made at a loss "should normally be 
one year but shall in no case be less than six months"; 
•  sales shall be treated as having been made below cost in substantial quantities when 
the weighted average selling price is below the weighted average cost or when 20% or 
more of the volume of sales were made below cost; 
•  cost allocations should "normally" be on the basis of the records of the exporter 
provided that these are in accordance with norn1al accounting principles in the exporting 
country "and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the 
product under consideration"; 
•  "costs shall be adjusted appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost which 
benefit future and/or current production, or for circumstances in  which costs during the 
period of investigation are affected by start-up operations". 
The periods set in the first two of these provisions only go a little way towards recognising 
that non-uniform recovery of costs over time, different products and different customers is 
a pervasive and unexceptionable (in itself) feature of commercial life.  This would be of 
little consequence if costs are appropriately allocated (and accepted as such) under the 
remaining provisions.  However, for the following reasons the provisions in the new Code 
seem likely to be an inadequate response to the problems identified above: 
•  the provisions would seem to leave much scope for interpretation.  For example, 
even where costs are allocated in accordance with accepted accounting principles, such 
allocations may be rejected if they do not "reasonably reflect the costs associated  ...... "; 
•  the appropriate accounting principles depend on the purpose for which accounts 
were prepared.  In  particular, it is normal to charge R&D costs in the year in  which they 
were incurred in  financial accounts.  However, R&D costs are typically incurred in the 
expectation that they will yield benefits in later years.  As such, economic analysis suggests 
that they should be treated as an investment and charged over a period; 
•  even where they produce accounts on an appropriate basis for particular activities, 
firms may not in practice prepare detailed product specific accounts. 
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The adoption and implementation of the letter of the new Code will therefore not, in our 
judgement, be a sufficient response to the problem of how to deal with sales at a loss.  In 
our view, the usual presumption should be to adopt sales prices in  the exporter's 
domestic market as the basis for normal value determinations unless they are 
below  variable cost. 
Profit  Rates 
When  normal value is constructed on the  basis of production costs, overheads and  a 
reasonable rate of profit, the Commission's normal approach is to use the rate of profit 
earned on profitable sales either by the exporter in question (when sales of some models are 
profitable and others are not) or the profit earned by other exporters. 
If a fully allocated cost approach to constructing normal value is adopted (which we do not 
regard as appropriate), it is open to question whether profitability should be routinely 
assessed on a model specific basis.  A significant proportion of costs are likely to be 
allocated more or less arbitrarily across specific products.  If  this is the case, it may be 
perfectly normal for a manufacturer to earn lower margins on some products on the range 
than  others  according  to  the  size of the  market  for  particular  models  and  their 
competitiveness.  In our view, it is not consistent with ordinary commercial practice to 
describe sales of models which cannot support their full share of allocated overheads as 
"not in the ordinary course of trade". 
The reasonableness of the specific profit rates adopted by the Commission in some cases 
has been criticised.  In Mini Ball Bearings, a n1ark-up of 48% (a margin of 32%) was used 
in the construction of the normal value of exports from Thailand.  This was based on the 
profitability of sales which were re-imported into Thailand.  The profit margin used far 
exceeded the dumping margin of 7% determined by the Commission. 
We have not been able to explore the circumstances of this case in detail.  However, if the 
rationale for basing constructed values on conditions in the exporter's domestic market is 
that profits in that market are used to cross-subsidise exports, the rate of profit should be 
representative of conditions in that market. 
Non-Market Economies 
The determination of the normal value of exports from Non-Market Economies (NMEs) 
poses obvious problems in so far as domestic prices are administered rather than being 
determined by market forces.  The Community's Regulation provides that normal value 
may be determined on the basis of: 
•  domestic prices in a third market economy country; 
•  export prices fron1 third market economy countries; 
•  constructed value in a third market economy country; 
•  if none of these is adequate, "the price actually paid or payable in the Community 
for the like product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a reasonable profit margin",  ie. 
the price needed for the community industry to be profitable. 
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The last of these possibilities clearly involves a formidable barrier to price competition from 
NMEs and it seems difficult to see how its adoption could be justified.  However, it 
appears that this approach has been followed in a number of  recent cases, particularly those 
involving China  I. 
Basing normal value on circumstances in third countries runs the risk that an underlying 
comparative advantage will be obscured.  In addition, it is difficult for NME exporters to 
know when they will be found to be dumping. 
However, these problems seem largely unavoidable if a policy of pursuing anti-dumping 
proceedings against NMEs is adopted. 
Related Sales and Marketing Organisations 
Introduction 
In comparing normal value and the export price at the "ex-factory level" it is crucial that a 
symmetrical concept of "ex-factory" is adopted on both sides of the comparison and that the 
same approach is adopted to making any adjustments. Since the early major cases against 
imports from Japan (eg. Ball Bearings and Electronic Typewriters) it has been alleged that 
the Commission's methodology is not symmetrical and that in these and in later cases there 
was an inflation of the dumping margin to a significant extent (one exporter mentioned a 
figure of 25-30%  ).  Despite (apparent) changes in the Commission's methodology in later 
cases, exporters from the Far East and trade lawyers who represent them who we have met 
in the course of the study still perceive that the Commission's dumping methodology does 
not compare like with like. The Commission reject this and point to the fact that the Court 
of Justice has considered and rejected the complaints of exporters on a  number of 
occasions. 
The issue of symmetry is a major source of concern to Far East exporters and their 
Governments.  To be able to reach a definitive conclusion on this issue would require: 
•  detailed study of the  structure of distribution  in  both  the  Far East and the 
Community; 
•  in-depth scrutiny of the Commission's dumping margin calculations. 
The former was outside our terms of reference and the latter was not possible as exporters 
were unwilling to agree to our seeing and discussing with the Commission their dumping 
margin calculations. 
Nevertheless, we present here an assessment of the issues that have been raised concerning 
level of trade adjustments based on our discussions with the Commission, our case studies, 
judgments of the  Court of Justice and interviews with  exporters, trade lawyers and 
academic commentators.  In  so far  as  we are able  to,  we  have put forward  some 
conclusions and suggestions for changes in policy.  In particular,  the substance of any 
problems and the frictions created by clear and strongly felt perceptions of injustice could 
be minimised by the inclusion in the Regulations and Decisions closing investigations of a 
detailed description of the basis of  dumping margin calculations. 
It should be remembered that the analysis is an economic one and takes no position on 
whether the Commission is legally required or entitled to.  make or not to make particular 
adjustments under the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Regulation. 
Vermulst &  Wacr, The Calculation of Injury Margins in EC 
Anti-Dumping ProcC<~dings, Joumal of World Trade, Vol 25. No.6, (1991) 
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The  Problem 
Both the GA  TI  and the Anti-Dumping Regulation state that normal value in the exporter's 
domestic market .and the export price should normally be compared at the "ex-factory" 
level.  If the  manufacturer merely  produces  and  sells to  independent wholesalers/ 
distributors in its home and.  export markets, comparison of the home and export price is 
relatively straightforward; and, in any case, any adjustments are likely to be of limited size. 
However, in many markets one or more of the following conditions apply: 
•  the supplier's reputation is important in the consumer's purchase decision and there 
is a consequent need to invest in advertising and promotional activity; 
• 
• 
there is a need for technical sales support and/or after sales service; 
setting up a distribution network is costly  . 
Where these conditions apply, manufacturers often decide that they need to be closely 
involved in marketing and/or distribution.  The manufacturer's objectives may be achieved 
through a contract with an independent distributor.  However, in many cases the interests 
of the manufacturer and distributor differ and the manufacturer will decide to undertake a 
high level of marketing and distribution activity itself. 
Figure VII.l illustrates some of the possible distribution channels to the export and home 
markets: 
•  in the export market, an exporter's sales company or department sells to either an 
unrelated importer, which acts as a distributor in a Member State, or to a subsidiary which 
carries out these functions, or to a mixture of the two (perhaps to subsidiaries in the larger 
Member States and  to  unrelated  importers in  the  smaller  Member States).  These 
distributors then sell direct to retailers, or perhaps through wholesalers; 
•  similarly  in  the  domestic  market,  sales  may  be  made  by  a  sales 
department/subsidiary to related and/or unrelated subsidiaries and then to retailers.  Some 
of these retailers may themselves be related. 
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Figure Vll.l  Distribution Channels in  the Exporter's Domestic Market and in the 
Community 
lnclcpc:mlcnl 
Community  t---+----+ 
Rctailt:n 
Thus there may be differences between the domestic and export market: 
Community 
End Users 
•  in the level of integration into distribution and marketing activities and their nature; 
•  since sales may be made at varying levels of distribution to independent companies 
or indeed to end users, in the composition of sales to independent customers; 
•  in the costs of undertaking distribution/marketing functions. 
In addition, the functions undertaken by different levels of distribution may vary. 
Where there are differences, significant adjustments need to be made to the prices charged 
to independent customers in the home and export market before they can provide a basis for 
comparison. 
Alternative approaches are to: 
•  base the comparison on  transfer prices between the n1anufacLurer and related 
companies responsible for various distribution and marketing activities.  Even the first 
transfer price may provide for the recovery of differential costs as between the home and 
export market.  However, the degree of the problem is likely to be less.  Where sales are 
not "at arms length", it would be necessary to construct this price; 
•  construct a hypothetical "ex-factory price" which is on a comparable basis to the 
export price. 
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The controversy raised by these problems has mostly concerned cases involving imports 
from the Far East; and notably Japan and Korea.  In the case of Japan in particular, this 
may  in  part  reflect  differences  in  the  structure  of distribution.  However,  more 
fundamentally, the problems are due to the fact that manufacturers may (for good reasons) 
decide to integrate forward into distribution and marketing.  Strategies of this kind arc 
adopted by producers of all nationalities.  That the same problen1s have not arisen in cases 
involving, for example, imports from the United States is probably merely a reflection of 
the  pattern of trade  and  the  small  number of anti-dumping cases which  are opened 
concerning imports from other developed economies. 
The  Commission's Approach 
Where the exporter is closely and directly involved in distribution and marketing in the 
home and export market, the Commission's general approach is to: 
•  construct the export price on the basis of the price at which the first independent 
sale is made in the Community; 
•  determine normal value on the basis of the prices at which the first independent 
sales are made in  the exporter's domestic market except in  so far  as  the exporter can 
demonstrate that only a sub-set of sales should be considered; 
•  make any adjustments for direct costs which are needed to achieve comparability. 
Until Compact Disc Players,  the Commission's general practice was to base dumping 
margins on sales to all independent buyers in the exporter's domestic market and in the 
Community.  Claims that this would involve the comparison of sales at different levels of 
trade were made but were not generally substantiated to the Commission's satisfaction. 
Export Price Before the Compact Disc Players Case 
Starting from the prices at which sales are made to unrelated customers in the Community, 
the Commission will deduct: 
•  the direct and indirect costs incurred by the exporter's Community subsidiary (the 
related importer); 
•  any costs incurred directly by the exporter which would normally be incurred by the 
importer, 
•  a margin for profit based on the returns typically earned by independent distributors 
of the same or similar products. 
The size of the resulting adjustments is significant. 
In some cases, exporters have sold through subsidiaries in some Community countries and 
through independent distributors in others.  In these cases, separate durnping margins are 
calculated for related and independent importers. 
Normal Value Before the Compact Disc Players Case 
The Commission's normal practice before Compact Disc Players  was to determine normal 
value as the weighted average of prices at which sales were made to the first independent 
buyers.  In cases in which the product was not sold in the domestic market or sales were 
unprofitable, normal value was constructed.  In doing so, the Commission included S, G 
&  A expenses at the level incurred by the manufacturer on other models or by other 
manufacturers and a rate of profit determined on the same basis.  In either case, the level of 
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S, G & A costs included those incurred by sales offices and related sales companies and 
distributors. 
Adjustments 
The Anti-Dumping Regulation provides that adjustments should be tnade for differences in: 
•  physical characteristics; 
•  duties and taxes; 
•  selling expenses resulting from sales made at: 
different levels of trade; 
in different quantities; 
under different tem1s and conditions of sale. 
The Regulation requires the party claiming an adjustment to prove that the claim is justified. 
Under the Regulation, adjusunents for selling expenses are limited to directly related costs. 
That is, no adjustment is made for overheads.  Notwithstanding the reference to trade level 
differences in the section of the Regulation dealing with "Comparison" (Articles 2(9) and 2 
(10)), the Commission takes the view that trade level differences should be removed by the 
selection or construction of a comparable normal value.  Subsequent adjustments are 
limited to any remaining differences in directly related costs.t 
The Compact Disc Player Metlwdology 
In Compact Disc Players (CDP), the Commission accepted the argument of four exporters 
that there were differences in  the level of trade at which sales to independent buyers were 
first n1ade in the Japanese 1narket and in the Comn1unity. 
In  order to evaluate the  exporters' claims, the  Commission examined  the  functions 
undertaken by the exporters' customers and whether these were "clearly reflected in the 
quantities sold and the pattern of prices charged".  This led the Commission to accept that: 
•  separate export prices and  normal  values  should  be  established for  sales to 
importers with their own brands; 
•  the export sales to the Community of five exporters should be regarded as sales to 
distributors; 
•  on the basis of an examination of functions, quantities, pricing policies and patterns 
of prices in Japan, there was a distinction between different types of independent customer 
for four of these five exporters.  Accordingly, normal value was determined on the basis of 
the prices to the class of customers most comparable to the customer in  the Community. 
For this reason, the methodology used in this case is  also known as  "selective normal 
value". 
In terms of Figure YI.l the effect of the COP methodology is that Prices A and B (export 
prices to independent and related distributors in the Community) are compared to Price E 
(the price to independent distributors in  the exporter's domestic market) rather than to 
Prices C, D & E (ie. prices confirmed to be at a different level of trade).  If, on average, 
independent sales are first made further down the distribution chain in the domestic market 
1  See for example Recital 59 of the Commission Regulation in Compact Disc Players, OJ L 205/5-
21, 18 July  1989. 
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than in the export market, the adoption of the CDP method will tend to reduce normal value 
and the dumping margin. 
The  Views  of Exporters 
The approach to the dctcnnination of dumping margins in cases in  which the exporter is 
closely and directly involved in rnarketing and distribution has been criticised in a number 
of articles and other publications1 and similar views were expressed by expc:>rters and trade 
lawyers who we met.  The criticisms concern: 
•  the allowance made for the profit of related Community distributors in constructing 
export prices; 
•  the limited adjustments made to  normal value before this is compared to  the 
constructed export price; 
•  the detailed analysis of trade level differences; 
•  the basis of constructed values where this approach is adopted. 
Allowance for Profit in Constructing Export Prices 
Many critics argue that the allowance made for profit in constructing export prices has been 
excessive in  some cases; and some would argue that it is not appropriate to make any 
adjustment. 
In a number of cases (eg. Compact Disc Players  and Plain Paper Photocopiers), the 
Commission has used a 5% profit margin in constructing the export price on the basis of 
the price at which the first sale to an  independent buyer in the Community is made. 
However, in another of our case studies - Small Screen  Colour Televisions - a 10% 
margin was adopted on the basis of an examination of the profitability of independent 
importers which co-operated with the investigation. 
Level of  Trade Adjustments 
Figure VII.2 summarises in simplified form the essence of the critics' views on how the 
Community's methodology inflates dumping margins.  In this example: 
•  the costs and returns earned by both the manufacturing and sales subsidiaries are 
the same in the domestic and export market; 
•  the price to the first independent buyer in the export market (A) is higher than the 
price in the domestic market (C), reflecting greater duty, freight and insurance costs.  Once 
these costs are deducted, the net price is the same in ooth markets (D). 
See for example: Hindley ( 1988}, Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community, 
World Economy, Vol.  11, No.4; NoraH  (1986) New Trends in Anti-Dumping Practice in Brussels, World 
Economy, Vol 9.  For an alternative view, see Lesguillons et Pangratis (1991), Le Niveau de Commerce 
dans les Calculs Anti-dumping de La Commission des Communautes Europeenes apres le Cas des Disques 
Compact, Droit Economique, No 4. 
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Figure V11.2  Level of Trade Adjustments in Dumping Margin  Calculations:  the 
Critics'  View 
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In constructing the export price, the Commission deducts all the costs incurred by the 
Community sales subsidiary and a margin for profit.  In the figure, the constructed export 
price is B.  However, the critics argue, in the domestic market only directly related costs 
are deducted.  Overall, therefore, it is said, the Community's approach to determining 
dumping margins inflates the margin by an amount which, in this example, is equal to the 
indirect S, G & A costs and profit margin of the domestic sales subsidiary. 
Basis of  Constructed Values 
The critics argue that  the Commission's practice of constructing values at the level of the 
first independent sale  has the effect of building into normal value costs which are deducted 
from the export price.  In particular, they allege that indirect S, G & A costs and profit are 
included and then subsequently not deducted. 
The Effect of  the Compact Disc Player Methodology 
The critics acknowledge that the CDP methodology meets some of their concerns since, 
where a distinct and comparable class of independent customers can be identified in the 
domestic market, normal value will be based on the price at which sales are made to those 
customers.  However, it was argued to us that: 
•  not all exporters will make sales of sufficient magnitude in the domestic market at a 
level of trade comparable to that of the constructed export price; 
•  even where a distinct class of independent customers exists in the domestic market, 
the functions and costs involved in export sales are less than those required to serve the 
selected domestic customers. 
The Impact of  Community Metlwdology 
The  Community's  methodology  in  this  area  differs  from  that  adopted  by  the  US 
Department of Commerce in two respects: 
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•  the Department of Commerce does not make an allowance for profit in constructing 
export prices; 
•  the Department of Commerce makes adjustments to nonnal value for S, G &  A 
costs up to the amount of  costs deducted in constructing the export price. 
The potential  significance of differences  in  methodology  between  the US  and  the 
Community is illustrated by our Small Screen Colour Television case study.  In this case 
there was a review of dumping margins  relating to almost exactly the same period in the 
US.  The dumping margins found are shown in Table VII. I below. 
Table  V/1.1  Comparison  of  Dumping  Margins  for  Small  Screen  Colour 
Televisions  Determined  by  the  Community  and  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce 
us  Community 
%  % 
Samsung  0.11  10.5 
Golds.tar  3.79  10.4 
Daewoo  1.64  10.2 
Note:  US dumping margins arc those resulting from the administrative review for the period 1 April  1987 
to 31  March 1988.  The investigation period in lhe Community was the calendar year 1987. 
Since, we were told, prices of these products are generally lower in the US, and this 
remains the case after allowance for the different costs of production resulting from 
differences in standards, this suggests the differences in dumping margins must reflect the 
different methodologies followed by the Community and the US. 
One exporter of Plain Paper Photocopiers provided us with  an analysis of S, G & A costs 
included in  the export  price and  normal value for one model  (after allowance for 
differentials in conditions and tenns of sale).  This showed t~at: 
•  overall, the level of S, G &  A expenses in nonnal value was around four times the 
level in the export price; 
•  around 60% of the S, G &  A costs included in nonnal value were incurred by the 
manufacturing division; the remaining 40% were incurred by domestic sales offices and 
related sales companies.  In the view of the producer, this demonstrates the level of sales 
and marketing activity within the manufacturing division; 
•  the S, G  &  A expenses of the manufacturing division alone included in nonnal 
value were more than twice the level of such expenses included in the export price; 
•  significant cost items incurred by the manufacturing division itself were included in 
nonnal value which in the export market were borne by the importer and so were excluded 
from the constructed export price. 
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Thus, in the producer's view, the dumping margin had been inflated by the inclusion in 
nonnal value of: 
•  costs incurred by its sales offices and related sales companies; 
•  costs incurred by its manufacturing division in the domestic market which were 
excluded from the export price. 
Unfortunately, the exporter was  not prepared  to  permit us  to  seek the Commission's 
comments on these points. 
Impact of tl1e  New  Code 
In cases in which the export price is constructed, the draft GA TI  Code requires that: 
"the authorities shall establish the normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of 
trade of the constructed export price, or make due allowance as warranted under this 
paragraph.  The authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is 
necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of 
proof on those parties." 
Conclusions 
The controversy over the Commission's approach to determining dumping margins in 
cases which the manufacturer is closely and directly involved in distribution and marketing 
raises three sets of issues: 
•  the appropriate basis for comparison; 
•  the adequacy of adjustments made for differences in the level of trade; 
•  detailed adjustments made in constructing prices. 
The Appropriate Basis for Comparison 
As noted above, as a matter of policy, the Commission takes the view that normal value 
should reflect the  sales,  marketing and distribution costs incurred by a  producer in 
supplying its domestic market.  The Commission's general policy is therefore not to accept 
arguments for trade level adjustments to normal value which are based on cost differences. 
In practice, this means that the Commission seeks to allow for any trade level differences 
by determining normal value on the basis of a price which is at a level of trade comparable 
to that of the (constructed) export price. 
As we have explained above, we believe that the comparison should be made as close to the 
factory as possible.  One suggestion is that normal value should reflect all the costs that are 
necessarily associated with production and direct sales by a manufacturer to an unrelated 
purchaser.  If a sale to related company meets this condition, normal  value could be 
constructed on the basis of the costs incurred in n1aking that sale.  If the condition is not 
met, normal value could be determined by deduction of costs on the basis of the first 
independent sale. 
Alternatively, normal value could based on the costs of supplying the export rnarket. 
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The Adequacy of  Adjustments for Level ofTrade Differences 
The Commission will base normal value on the weighted average of the prices at which 
, sales are first made to independent buyers (or on the constructed value of such sales) unless 
the exporter can demonstrate that: 
•  the functions undertaken by the (generally related) Community importer differ from 
those undertaken by distinct classes of customer in the domestic market; 
•  one of these distinct classes of customer undertakes functions comparable to those 
performed by the Comn1unity importer. 
In the course of this study we have unfortunately not been able to study specific dumping 
calculations in the depth necessary to comment on the adequacy of the adjustments made by 
the Commission. 
However, it is clear that there continues to be major disagreement between exporters and 
the Comn1ission and the Court of Justice on the appropriate interpretation of the provisions 
of the Anti-Dumping Regulation relating to the determination of normal value and the 
provisions relating to adjustments to normal value and the export price in order to achieve 
comparability.  As previously stated, we are not competent to comment on questions of 
legal interpretation; nor is it necessary that we should comment for the purposes of this 
study.  However, the appropriate basis for determining dumping n1argins in these cases is a 
major and difficult policy issue. 
The root of the disagreen1ent between the Commission and its critics appears to be differing 
assessments of the level of trade at which the exporter makes the first independent sale in 
its domestic market.  In the view of the critics, the level of trade at which the Commission 
has determined normal value is further down the distribution chain than that at which the 
export sale takes place.  If this view is accepted, normal value and the dumping margin are 
inflated. However, in the Commission's view its determinations of normal value have been 
made at a comparable level of trade. 
The issue is illustrated by one of the Court cases arising from Plain Paper Plwtocopiers1; 
•  Matsushita argued that Matsushita Electrical Industries (MEl) was not merely a 
manufacturer but also performed a  number of sales functions.  MEl argued that the 
Commission should have treated MEl as a producer and determined normal value on the 
basis of sales to related sales companies; 
•  the Council contended that the functions of the sales department in the export 
market were partly undertaken by MEl's related sales companies. 
If this assessment is correct, complex legal and economic disputes turn on an issue which 
is essentially empirical: the functions undertaken at differing levels of distribution in the 
domestic and Community markets and the allocation of the associated costs to particular 
classes of sale.  Such disagreements should be capable of being reduced if not eliminated 
through detailed analysis of the functions undertaken by the various levels of distribution. 
The need for such analysis would be minimised if normal value was determined "close to 
the factory" as discussed above. 
In  any  case, the new GA TI Code, if adopted, would  seem to  lower the standard of 
evidence needed to support claims for level of trade adjustments. 
Report for the Hearing in Case C 175/87. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. Ltd and Matsushita 
Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities. 
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Detailed Adjustments 
If dumping is  viewed as  sales  below  marginal  cost,  it  would  follow  that only the 
incremental costs incurred by the Community subsidiary should be deducted in computing 
the ex port price. 
However, if a fully allocated cost approach to the determination of dumping margins is 
adopted, it does seem appropriate to make an allowance for reasonable profit. 
We have not been able to review in detail the profit margin used.  However, the margin of 
10% used in Small Screen Colour Televisions  does seem high to be regarded as typical of 
all  companies, especially as  5%  is  the margin normally adopted.  We believe that the 
margin employed should be clearly representative of the normal returns earned in the sector 
of distribution concerned and that care should be taken to ensure that abnormal figures are 
not adopted. 
Guiding Principles 
In summary, we conclude that: 
•  there is  an overriding requirement for  fundamentally economic reasons 
that normal value and the export price should be on the same basis.  So far as 
possible, differences should  be  removed  by  the adoption of a  selective normal 
value.  However, to the extent that this is  not possible, we see little alternative 
to  making  cost-based  adjustments  to  ensure  comparability.  Thus,  any 
adjustments necessary  to  achieve comparability should  include allowance for 
differences  in  indirect as  well  as  direct costs.  This would  not  appear to be 
provided for in the Anti-Dumping Regulation; 
•  there is  no economic  rationale for treating separately the determinations 
of  normal  value  and  the  export  price  and  consideration  of  the  need  for 
adjustments to achieve comparability separately.  The need for adjustments will 
crucially depend on the basis of normal value and the export price; 
•  since  we  see  no  reason  why  the  level  of any  dumping  margin  should 
depend on  the costs of distribution and marketing incurred in  the exporter's 
domestic market, the dumping margin should be  assessed at a  level  of trade as 
"close to the factory"  as possible; 
•  in  any  case,  there are strong economic  arguments for  comparing the 
export price with an estimate of the cost of supplying the Community market 
rather than the cost of supplying the exporter's domestic market; 
•  if allowance is  made for the profit that an importer might be expected to 
earn in  constructing export prices, care should be taken to ensure that the rate 
of profit is truly representative. 
Comparison of Export Prices with Normal Value 
Like other major users of the anti-dumping measures, the Community computes dumping 
margins by: 
•  establishing a normal value (or where appropriate a series of normal values for 
specific products); 
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•  comparing export prices with nonnal value on·  a transaction·by . .  transaction·basis to 
determine the margin of dumping for each transaction; 
•  assigning a value of zero to transactions where the export -price exceeds normal 
value; 
•  averaging the transaction specific dumping margins (including zero values-for all 
undumped transactions). 
This procedure has been criticised as creating a bias towards a finding of dun1ping since 
transactions at prices above normal value arc not permitted to offset transactions below 
norrnal value.  In  particular, a positive dun1ping n1argin may be found when both prices in 
the exporter's domestic market and the export price to the Comn1unity are the same on 
average but vary from transaction to transaction.  The simple example below illustrates this 
possibility. 
Table  V/1.2:  Illustrative Example of t/Je  Averaging Problem 
Transaction 1  Transaction 2  Transaction 3  Average 
Prices in Exporter's 
Domestic Market  110  100  90  100 
Export Price  110  100  90  100 
Dumping Margin (o/o of 
Ex port Price)  0  0  11  3.7 
The Commission argue that: 
•  the issue only arises in cases where there is a significant degree of price variability; 
•  the obvious alternative procedure - comparing average export prices with normal 
value - could obscure cases in which injurious dumping has occurred.  For example, the 
dumped exports may be concentrated in a single country or region of the Community or in 
a particular product niche. 
As noted above, the prices paid by specific customers for ball .bearings can vary very 
significantly.  An exporter showed us that the range of prices paid by large customers for 
one type of bearing was DM1.05- DM1.5.  Small custon1ers paid up to DM3.  With this 
degree of price variability, there would seem to be significant scope for the comparison of 
specific export prices with average normal values to distort dumping margins. 
The draft of the new GATT Code states that dumping margins should  normally. be 
established by comparing normal values and export prices which have both been computed 
as weighted averages.  However, it allows comparison of (weighted average) normal 
values with transaction specific export prices if: 
"the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among 
different purchasers, regions or tin1e periods and if an explanation is provided why such 
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-
weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison." 
We agree that as a matter of normal practice the average-to-average method should.be used 
but that allowance needs to be made for exceptional circumstances.  However, the :above 
form of words would seem to allow considerable scope for interpretation.  We therefore 
recommend that, in  implementing this change, the Commission should  provide 
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guidance on  the circumstances in  which  it  would  not  follow  the average-to-
average approach. 
Differences in market circumstances during the investigation period could dictate the need 
to make an average-to-average comparison for sub-periods (however, computing margins 
for sub-periods would not be a change in policy for the Community).  However, it would 
only seem appropriate to calculate specific margins for particular producers or regions 
where there is a systematic policy of undercutting or price repression. 
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VIII  THE  C<>MMUNITY'S  ANTI-DUMPING  MEASURES:  INJURY  AND 
THE COMMUNITY INTEREST 
Introduction 
In this section we discuss: 
•  issues raised by the injury and Community interest criteria; 
•  the definition of the relevant market for anti-dumping proceedings. 
Injury 
The analysis of whether the Community industry has suffered injury raises a number of 
detailed issues relating to: 
•  indicators of injury; 
the causal link between dumping and injury 
•  the significance of injury as an indicator of the economic effects of dumping. 
Indicators of Injury 
The Community's injury criterion, like the GATT code, defines material injury to the 
Community industry in terms of the impact of dumped imports on a range of indicators of 
economic loss or distress.  The indicators included in the Anti-Dumping Regulation are: 
production; 
utilisation of capacity; 
stocks; 
sales; 
market share; 
depression of prices or prevention of price increases that would otherWise have 
occurred; 
profits; 
returns on investtnent; 
cash flow; 
employment. 
As the discussion of our case studies and the analysis in Section V show, a determination 
of  material injury will rely on a number of these indicators. 
A pre-condition for a finding of material injury is that the dumped imports should have 
either undercut the prices of Community producers or caused them to: 
•  cut their prices in response to the prices of dumped imports "price repression"; 
•  not  increase  their  prices  when  they  would  otherwise  have  done  so  "price 
suppression". 
Determining whether dumping has led to prk:e repression or suppression requires analysis 
and judgement since the prices that Community producers would have realised  in  the 
absence of dumping cannot be known. 
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Price undercutting would seem to  be directly observable and thus relatively clearcut. 
However, the prices of exporters and Community producers may not be comparable for a 
number of reasons: 
•  exporters and Community producers may not distribute their products in the same 
way.  In the market for Plain Paper Photocopiers, exporters largely sold through dealers 
whilst Community producers sold to end users; 
•  the products themselves may not be comparable.  In Plain Paper Photocopiers, only 
limited evidence of undercutting was found.  However, the Commission argued that the 
exporters' nearest equivalent products tended to have additional features; 
•  high volume purchasers will tend to get keener prices.  One exporter of Mini Ball 
Bearings  argued to us that undercutting margins had been exaggerated in this case by the 
comparison of prices for bearings which exporters tended to sell in high volumes, whilst 
Community producers tended to sell smaller volumes of the same bearings. 
Thus, even determining whether an essential pre-condition for material injury is met is far 
from straightforward. 
One industry association argued that the analysis of injury should not have regard to the 
profitability of the Con1munity industry as this would weaken incentives to take measures 
which would enable Comn1unity industry to meet aggressive price competition.  We agree 
that there must be some risk that this will happen.  However, the same point could be made 
about other indicators and we believe that this risk should be counted as one of the potential 
distortions arising from the operation of anti-dumping measures. 
The Causal Link Between Dumping and Injury 
The Appropriate CounterfactUill 
Analysis of the impact of dumping on the Community industry requires (implicitly at least) 
the specification of the position that would have prevailed in the absence of dumping.  The 
(apparently) obvious solution is to base the analysis on the presumption that exports would 
otherwise have been made at the product's normal value.  If this approach is adopted, the 
dumping margin is itself a measure of the capacity of dumping to injure.  However: 
•  if the exporter sells at a loss in its domestic market, it is unlikely to be able to export 
to the Community at prices which match its (constructed) normal value; 
•  if the exporter benefits from a protected home market, removal of the conditions 
which permit dumping would bring prices in the exporter's domestic market down. 
Thus the dumping margin may well exaggerate the potential impact of dumping on prices in 
the Community. 
Period of  Analysis 
The analysis of injury will typically cover a period of three years prior to the investigation. 
However, in Plain Paper Photocopiers, the Commission also examined trends before the 
formal reference period.  By contrast, dumping determinations typically relate to the year 
preceding the investigation.  Thus it is generally assumed that, if exporters were dumping 
during the year preceding the investigation, they were also dumping during the longer 
period over which the injury analysis is conducted. 
By contrast, in Australia dumping margins are determined for two or three years. 
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In principle, it seems to us desirable that the existence of dumping should be investigated 
for the whole of the reference period.  At present, the Commission analyses trends in prices 
over a period of three years or so before the investigation.  However, pricing trends in the 
exporter's domestic market are not considered.  Circumstances may change within the 
reference period with the result that a dumping margin determined for a relatively short 
period could be misleading.  For example, when significant and rapid movements in 
exchange rates take place, it may take several years for exporters to adjust their strategies. 
However, we recognise that it would be very costly to make formal determinations of 
dumping on the basis of the reference period as a whole. 
We therefore recommend that the Commission should examine and report on 
pricing trends in the exporter's home market and in the Community during the 
reference  period  to  verify  that  those  trends are  indeed  consistent  with  the 
emergence or development of dumping and the injury suffered by the Community 
industry.  However, this should not include the estimation of dumping margins for 
the whole reference period. 
Other Causes of  Injury 
The GA  TI Code contains a substantial list of factors other than dumping which could be 
responsible for injury.  Whether dumping has itself caused material injury is a matter of 
analysis and judgement in the circumstances of the particular case.  Section IV includes a 
discussion  of injury in  our case  studies.  However, we  would make  the following 
observations: 
•  it would seem important that the extent of imports which have actually been dumped 
should be examined closely.  In Denim the fact that a high proportion of imports from the 
countries investigated were not in fact dumped played a significant part in the decision to 
close the proceeding.  But in our other case studies, it is not apparent that the injury 
analysis distinguished between dumped and (any) undumped imports; 
•  where, as in Small Screen Colour Televisions, the margin by which Community 
production was undercut significantly exceeded the dumping margins, it would appear that 
the exporter had a significant comparative advantage over Community producers.  The 
application of a duty equal to the dumping margin would not prevent the exploitation of that 
advantage.  But  whether dumping  is  itself a  source  of "material  injury"  in  such 
circumstances needs to be considered. 
As discussed further in Section VIII, where injury is partly due to other factors, this should 
be taken into account in the determination of the injury margin. 
Cumulation and De Minimis 
Like other leading jurisdictions, where imports from a number of countries are under 
investigation, the Community will cumulate the market shares involved.  Focusing on the 
injury criterion alone, this seems to us appropriate since there seems little reason to treat 
dumped imports accounting for, say, 10% of the Comnmnity market differently according 
to  the  number of exporting countries.  However, as  we discuss below, the number of 
independent sources of exports to the Community is of considerable relevance to  the 
consideration of the Community interest. 
As noted in Section II, the new GA'"IT Code sets a de minin1is level of 2% for dumping and 
1% for market shares (subject to a provision that the total for countries with a share of less 
than  1% should not exceed 2.5%  ).  However, one industry association that we met told us 
that its policy was not to make a complaint unless dumped imports have a Community 
market share of  5% or more. 
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In  practice, as noted in Section V, there are a  significant number of cases in which 
investigations have been launched which have only involved small market shares and the de 
minimis threshold for dumping in practice is 1.5%. 
As our analysis of the outcome of proceedings shows (Section V above), cases in which a 
low dumping margin was determined are more likely to have been closed with a finding of 
no injury. 
A decline in prices of 1.5% or 2% or a decline in sales of 5% would not seem out of the 
range of normal experience for most industries.  Indeed, dumping margins of a few per 
cent must be within the margin of error of the calculations. 
The interdependence of the levels of dumping and import penetration must be recognised. 
For example, a low but rising level of import penetration will tend to have a greater capacity 
to injure the Community industry if the level of dumping is high. 
We recommend that the Commission should adopt and publish guidance on non-
binding de minimis thresholds which are significantly higher than those applied at 
present. 
The Partial Nature of "Injury" 
As discussed in Section IV, dumping and anti-dumping measures have a significant impact 
on economic interests other than those of the Community industry affected.  In particular: 
•  when anti-dumping measures increase prices there will be: 
a transfer of income from consumers to Community producers and possibly to 
exporters; 
downstream  effects  on  industrial  purchasers,  which  may  themselves  be 
significantly "impaired"; 
•  suppliers of components  and  other imports  will  benefit  from  anti-dumping 
measures to the extent that they have the effect of increasing Community output. 
Whatever damage may have been done to Con1munity industry by dumping, an economic 
analysis of the impact on producers would also focus on whether and to what extent future 
production in the Community would be efficient and the measures necessary to achieve 
this.  This would involve consideration of questions such as: 
•  the competitiveness of EC producers in world markets and in particular with the 
exporters alleged to be dumping; 
•  the impact that dumping, if allowed to continue, would have on the scale of the 
industry and its future competitiveness; 
•  where there is a lack of competitiveness, the scope for the EC industry to improve 
its perfonnance and the level of protection needed to achieve this; 
•  the impact that protection would have on competition and pricing in the Con1munity 
market. 
In  the light of the above, we  believe that whatever damage may have been done to the 
Community industry by dumping, an important policy question is whether there is scope to 
secure economic benefits by the adoption of measures.  Equally, a focus on the future 
suggests  that  there may  be  circumstances in which  measures should be adopted in 
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anticipation of the effects that dumping will have if allowed to continue, that is on the basis 
of a threat of injury. 
This brings us to the related question of the treatment of the 'Community interest. 
The Community Interest 
The Commission's Anti-Dumping Regulation does not define the Community Interest. 
Clearly it can embrace a wide range of issues in  the fields of politics and international 
relations as well as economic questions.  Here we focus on economic considerations, 
whilst recognising that in practice other factors have to be taken into account. 
Economic analysis suggests that: 
•  the  effects  on  industrial  purchasers,  component  suppliers,  consumers  and 
employment are all potentially very significant, as well as the impact on the Community 
Industry; 
•  there is no reason to believe that the effects on the industry subject to dumping are 
predominant; 
•  it is important that long term issues as well as the immediate and transparent effects 
of dumping are taken into account.  The dangers of pre-occupation with the short term 
include the potential failure to recognise that: 
dumped prices may not be sustainable; 
"injury" to the Community industry may be a symptom of a desirable reallocation of 
resources  towards  industries  in  which  the  Con1munity  and  its  industries  are  fully 
competitive. 
As noted in Section Y, it is some years since a proceeding was closed with a finding that 
the application of n1easures would not be in  the Community interest.  This is surprising 
since: 
•  the Commission takes the view that an investigation should be opened if there is 
reasonable evidence of dumping and injury and that Community interest issues should not 
be taken into account at this stage; 
•  dumping investigations have been launched and measures imposed in a wide variety 
of market circumstances; 
•  analysis suggests that the producer interest is not a good proxy for the overall 
Con1munity economic interest. 
Many of the experts and observers we met in  the course of the study commehted on the 
Community interest criterion and a wide range of views were expressed. 
A  number of experts - including several  trade  lawyers  - felt  that,  in  practice, the 
Con1n1ission  treats the Community interest as that of the industry.  At  the  n1ost,  the 
criterion acts as a form of safety valve allowing the Commission and the Council not to 
in1pose measures, or to modify them, when findings of dumping and injury have been 
made.  Following from this position, some observers felt that the pretence that other 
interests are taken into account should be abandoned.  Others felt that giving substance to 
the analysis of the Community interest was a central and necessary reform. 
198 European Parliament- The Economic Impacl of Dumping and lhe Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
By contrast, some of our interviewees - and particularly industry associations - were 
concerned that application of the Community interest criterion could prevent Community 
industry from obtaining the protection it needed and deseiVed.  The principal themes were: 
•  concern at the range of  considerations that could be brought into account.  One view 
was that the Community interest should be limited to those of the Community industry and 
industrial purchasers.  Consun1ers were felt to pay excessive attention to short term issues. 
Political considerations should be excluded; 
•  dumping and other unfair trading practices are contrary to the Community interest. 
One view was that since the Community only applies measures up to the level necessary to 
remove injury, the Community interest criterion is superfluous. 
Recommendations on  the Community Interest 
Based on our case studies, the interview programme and a review of the outcome of cases 
over the last decade, our overall impression is that there is scope for more detailed analysis 
of the impact of measures and a need to reconsider the balance between purchaser and 
producer interests. 
Economic theory  suggests that the  evaluation of whether measures would be  in  the 
Community interest should be forward looking.  That is, it should seek to compare how 
relevant economic magnitudes will develop if measures are imposed compared with the 
position if no measures are adopted.  As previously discussed, considerations of efficient 
policy design indicate that measures outside the realm of anti-dumping policy should also 
be considered where relevant as responses to problems created by dumping. 
We believe that the cases in which dumping may call for some form of policy response fall 
into two main categories: 
•  those in which the underlying problem is  the possible effect of dumping on long 
term competition, that is those in which dumping n1ay ultimately lead to an increase in the 
prices faced by Community purchasers; 
•  those in which dumping may lead to an undesirable effect on the scale or structure 
of the Community industry, such that what would otherwise be an internationally efficient 
Community industry does not develop. 
In addition, on occasions there may be special reasons for dumping measures outside these 
categories, eg. the need to maintain a "strategic" industry or to combat short term regional 
unemployment problems. 
It is, of course, not an easy matter to assess the in1pact of anti-dun1ping n1easures on the 
future competitive position and efficiency. 
However, in  terms of assessing the impact on competition, the key question is  whether 
there  will  be  effective competition  in  future,  ie.  a  situation  wherchy companies arc 
competing actively with each other in  terms of prices, services offered, etc, and there is a 
stirnulus to efficiency, new product development, etc.  It is not possihlc to he prescriptive 
about how to detem1inc "effective competition" but key considerations arc: 
•  number of competitors; 
•  country of origin of competitors; 
•  entry barriers; 
•  customer sensitivity to changes in product offering, including price; 
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•  what is the apparent rationale for dumping and whether the dumped price covers the 
exporter's costs in serving the EC market. 
In terms of assessing the impact on efficiency, it is important to consider whether exporting 
countries have "natural" advantages over the Community industry, or whether following 
the dumping episode and any resultant damage, there are reasons to believe that if measures 
are imposed, the Community industry can become internationally competitive again. 
The checklist developed by the OECD and included at Annex VIII. A outlines some of the 
key questions which might be considered in the analysis of the Community interest. 
Key  Conclusions on the Community Interest 
The discussion  in  this and the  previous sections  lead  us  to the following  key 
conclusions: 
•  a finding that imports into the Community have been dumped does not of 
itself  demonstrate  that  the  economic  welfare of the  Community  has  been 
damaged or that the application of measures would increase economic welfare; 
•  a Community industry could be materially injured by free and fair trade; 
•  the Commission should report its analysis of the impact of dumping, ilWl of 
imposing anti-dumping measures on all economic interests from both a long and 
short term perspective. 
There is a need for a balanced assessment in the light of the specific circumstances of the 
case.  For example, the following statement, while eminently reasonable in its own right, 
nevertheless provides a  starting point of analysis  that injurious dumping is  per se 
detrimental to the Community interest.  The danger is that such a starting point means that 
effects on other interests may not be given proper attention.  Recital121 of the Commission 
Regulation adopting provisional measures on imports of Compact Disc Players states that: 
"The purpose of anti-dumping duties is to eliminate dumping which is causing 
injury to the Community industry and thus re-establish a  situation of open and  fair 
competition which is fundamentally in the general Comnmnity interest." 
Definition of the Relevant Market 
The injury  and Community interest criteria require different approaches to market 
definition: 
•  the analysis of injury focuses on producers of "like products" in the Community; 
•  the analysis of the Community interest has the effect of widening the scope of the 
proceeding to include the wider impact of anti-dumping measures. 
The Anti-Dumping Regulation defines like products as those which are identical to or 
closely resemble the exported product under investigation.  Thus, the test would appear to 
be one which emphasises the physical likeness of the Community manufactured products to 
the dumped imports. 
Economic analysis suggests that dumping n1ay  also adversely affect tnanufacturers of 
products which, whilst not physically identical, are regarded by purchasers as being (at 
least) close substitutes for the dumped imports.  Specifically, the conventional economic 
approach to market definition focuses on how responsive demand for product A is to the 
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price of product B.  If  the level of "cross price elasticity" is high, products A and B would 
be regarded as being in the same economic mru:ket:  The relevance of this approach to 
dumping is clear.  Manufacturers who suffer a stgntficant loss of sales as a result of the 
dumping potentially suffer "material injury" even if there is no great physical similarity 
between their products and the dumped imports. 
In addition, as discussed in Sections IV and V, dumping may have wider effects which are 
very similar to those on the products directly affected: 
•  it is very likely that suppliers to Community producers willluse sales as a result of 
dumping and their own viability may be threatened; 
•  in some cases (eg. Mini Ball Bearings) it has been argued that the loss of the 
Community industry would reduce the competitiveness of purchasers; 
•  if  other products rely on the same technology or production facilities, dumping may 
increase the cost burden which these other products have to bear making their development 
less attractive.  This would seem to be the case in the consumer electronics sector. 
However, whilst these possibilities require consideration under the Community interest, 
they are outside the scope of an injury criterion which is consistent with the GA  TI  Code. 
Commission practice on market definition appears to vary: 
•  in Mini Ball Bearings, the Commission's injury analysis in the original proceeding 
considered only those bearings.  However, in the  1988/90 review the injury analysis 
examined the ball bearings market as a whole; 
•  in Plain Paper Photocopiers, it adopted a broad economic approach to market 
definition arguing that the various segments of the market (defined in terms of  copy speed) 
overlapped and that users regarded large machines and (a number of) small machines as 
alternatives.  However, it concluded that there had not been material injury to Community 
production of the largest machines and these were excluded from the scope of the duties 
applied; 
•  in Small Screen Colour Televisions, the proceedings were concerned with TVs with 
a diagonal screen measurement of more than 6 inches and not more than 16 inches.  In this 
case emphasis was placed on physical characteristics and on the distinct uses of TV  s with 
screen sizes in this range. 
In our other case studies (Denim  and Polyvinyl Chloride), the appropriate definition of the 
market is reasonably clear.  However,  ball  bearings,  PPCs and  televisions are all 
differentiated products.  That is, either or both of the following conditions apply: 
•  on the demand side of the market individual models are regarded by purchasers as 
alternatives but are not perfectly substitutable for one another.  This would seem to be the 
case for different sizes of PPC and television, although the degree of suhstitutahility may 
differ; 
•  on the production side of the market, production of a range of models reduces costs 
because the same equipment or technologies are used or bec~use there are marketing 
synergies.  Manufacturers therefore typically produce a full or nearly full range. Although 
there are examples of  companies which focus on market niches, this appears to be the case 
in each of the three industries. 
We believe that economic considerations suggest that a broad approach to market definition 
is likely to be appropriate in most cases.  Adopting a narrow approach creates two principal 
risks: 
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•  the relative competitiveness of exporters and Community producers may vary 
across a (differentiated) product range.  If proceedings focus only on niches in which 
exporters are competing aggressively, a  distorted impression of the implications of 
dumping for the wider sector may be created; 
•  equally, where the wider impact of dumping of a restrictej range of products is 
significant, this should be taken into account. 
These considerations demonstrate the very close link between the injury and Community 
interest criteria.  Whilst it may be possible to take a broad approach to market definition in 
the injury analysis, wider effects on the sector and on suppliers and users must clearly fall 
for consideration under the Community interest criterion. 
We believe that there is significant scope for the Commission to show more clearly that it 
has fully evaluated the implications of product differentiation in proceedings.  For example: 
•  in Mini Ball Bearings, the overall level of import penetration by Japanese exporters 
is  very much lower in  the sector as a  whole than  in  mini  ball  bearings alone.  The 
impression given about the impact of the dumped exports therefore depended on the market 
definition selected; 
•  in Small Screen Colour Televisions , whilst the injury analysis focused on products 
within this narrow market definition, the (Community interest) argument for applying 
duties on imports rested to a significant extent on the existence of a threat to the wider 
profitability of Community producers and the implications of this for the development of 
new generation products. 
We  suggest that a  single analysis of all  relevant  past and prospective market 
trends  should  be  presented  as  a  basis  for  conclusions  on  injury  and  the 
Community interest. 
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Appendix VIII.A 
OECD  INDICATIVE  CHECKLIST  FOR  THE  ASSESSMENT  OF TRADE 
POLICY MEASURES (S) 
a)  Is  the measure in  conformity with  the country's international obligations and 
commitments? 
b)  What is the expected effect of the measure on the domestic prices of the goods or 
services concerned and on the general price level'! 
c)  What are the expected direct economic gains to the domestic sector, industry or 
firms in question (technically, the increase in producers' surplus)? 
d)  What types of jobs are expected to be affected by the measure?  What are the net 
employment effects of the measure in the short and long term? 
e)  What are the expected (direct) gains to government revenues (eg. from tariffs, 
import licences, tax receipts) and/or increased government costs (eg. export promotion, 
government subsidies, lost tax revenues)? 
f)  What are the direct costs of the measure to consumers due to the resulting higher 
prices they  must pay  for  the  product in  question  and  the reduction  in  the level of 
consumption of the product (technically, the reduction in consumers' surplus)?  Are there 
specific groups of  consumers which are panicularly affected by the measure? 
g)  What is the likely impact of the measure on the availability, choice, quality and 
safety of goods and services? 
h)  What is the likely impact of the measure on the structure of the relevant markets and 
the competitive process within those markets? 
i)  In  the  medium  and  longer term  perspective,  will  the  measure,  on  balance, 
encourage or permit structural adaptation of domestic industry leading over time to 
increased productivity and international competitiveness, or will it further weaken and delay 
pressures for such adaptation?  Is the measure of a temporary nature?  Is it contingent on, 
or linked to,  other policy  measures designed  to  bring  about the  desired  structural 
adjustment? 
j)  What will be the expected effect on investment by domestic firms in the affected 
sector, by potential new entrants and by foreign investors? 
k)  What could be the expected economic effects of the measure on other sectors of the 
economy, in particular, on firms purchasing products from, and selling products to, the 
industry in question? 
I)  What are the likely effects of the measure on other countries'!  I low can prejudice to 
trading partners be n1inin1iscd'! 
m)  How are other government and foreign frrn1s likely to react to the measure and what 
would be the expected effect on the economy of such actions?  Is the measure a response to 
unfair practices in other countries? 
203 European Parliament - The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
IX  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ANTI-DUMPING  MEASURES:  SELECTION 
AND DESIGN OF MEASURES 
Introduction 
In  this section we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different types of anti-
dumping measure from an economic perspective and the consi·terations relevant to the 
determination of the level ·of protection provided  to the Conununity industry; and  in 
particular, 
•  the design of primary measures (duties and undertakings); 
•  the determination of the appropriate level of protection; 
•  anti-circumvention measures; 
•  refunds and reviews. 
The discussion pre-supposes that a case for the application of anti-dumping measures 
exists.  As discussed at length elsewhere in this report, in many instances in  which 
determinations of dumping and injury may be made, we do not believe that it would 
necessarily be in the Community's economic interests to apply anti-dumping measures, 
although there  may be a case for some other form of policy intervention. 
Comments on the I>esign of Measures 
Criteria for Selecting Primary Measures 
Duties and undertakings, on the one hand, and the different types of duty on the other, are 
likely to have different economic effects.  In particular, the following considerations are 
relevant. 
Dete"ence Effects 
Variable duty systems remove the incentive to dump and, like undertakings, will therefore 
not normally impose any financial cost on the dumper.  However, the threat of  removal of 
pricing flexibility may itself provide an incentive not to be made subject to anti-dumping 
measures.  By contrast, ad valorem and specific duties, taken  in  isolation, impose a 
financial penalty but leave the dumper with the discretion to absorb duties; and they are 
levied irrespective of whether exports are in fact sold at dumped prices.  The incentive to 
absorb duties is greater under ad valorem duty systems since the reduction in the net of 
duty price is geared up by the effect of the duty. 
Effect of  Refund and Duty Absorption Provisions 
It is arguable that the Community's refund and duty absorption provisions have the effect 
of making all three duty systems equivalent in so far as: 
•  the duty absorption provisions remove any incentive to SPt prices below the target 
level; 
•  exporters are able to secure refunds (with interest) if they raise prices, which 
removes any incentive to continue dumping. 
Whilst the fact that these provisions modify the incentives created by specific and ad 
valorem duty systems should not entirely be neglected, there appear to be significant 
barriers to obtaining refunds and the duty absorption provisions are far from automatic. 
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For these reasons, we believe that the different duty systems should not be treated as 
equivalent. 
Compliance 
Undertakings raise issues of compliance; and several Community industry associations 
expressed  concern  on  these  grounds.  However,  the  Commission  does  monitor 
undertakings and the threat of retrospective application of duties would appear to represent 
a significant incentive to comply. 
Effectiveness in Removing Injury 
As discussed in detail below, setting measures at a level which will remove injury requires 
a judgement about the impact of those measures on the strategies of players in the market. 
Both undertakings (subject to compliance) and variable duties ensure that the measure has 
the intended effect on the import price and, to that extent, provide a greater degree of 
reassurance  that  the  intended  effect on the  Community industry  will  be achieved. 
Nevertheless, it remains necessary to predict the impact on market shares. 
However, where the importer and exporter are related, variable duties would provide scope 
for the exporter/importer to declare a value to Customs at or above the trigger price and 
continue to dump in the Community n1arket.  Thus the duty would need to be linked to the 
first independent resale price in the Community. 
In the Commission's experience, exporters from non-market economies may absorb duties; 
and for this reason undertakings are preferred. 
Incidence of  the Measure 
Economists tend to advocate duties rather than quotas or price undertakings.  The revenues 
from duties accrues to the Community whereas the benefits of any higher export prices 
achieved through undertakings accrues to the exporter.  In addition, companies which 
produce in the Community but are owned outside it benefit from higher prices achieved 
through undertakings. 
The incidence of measures is an important consideration for non-economic reasons.  The 
Community normally accepts undertakings from developing countries in order to avoid the 
burden of duties.  Since LDC exports will generally be made by  smaller enterprises 
operating in  highly competitive markets, they are unlikely to be able to raise prices 
significantly when duties are applied and their impact is therefore likely to be severe. 
Effects on Competition 
Although the level of price undertakings is treated as confidential, they and variable price 
duties may have the effect of setting a floor price in the Community market, which is 
widely seen as a cause for concern on competition grounds.  We find this objection slightly 
surprising  since the objective of anti-dumping measures  is  to  provide Community 
producers with a degree of protection from competition. However, it  is arguable that ad 
valorem duties leave exporters with discretion to amend their prices as market conditions 
change.  This means that, with such duties, the Community industry is not provided with a 
benchmark against which to align prices. 
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Flexibility 
The effect of both undertakings and variable duties may be dramatically altered by changing 
market circumstances: 
•  if prices in the Community rise, undertakings and variable price duties may cease to 
have any impact on exporters.  If the rise  in  prices has removed the injury to the 
Community industry, this may be a considerable advantage.  However, if the price rise 
simply reflects a cost increase, measures could cease to provide relief at a time when the 
pressure on the Community industry has increased; 
•  if prices fall, exporters may be unable to compete and be driven from the market. 
Changed market circumstances may also alter the impact of ad valorem and specific duties. 
In  particular, the impact of specific duties will  be eroded by inflation.  However, ad 
valorem duties in particular are likely to be more robust to changes and require less frequent 
review. 
Administrative Complexity 
The US and Canadian variable duty systems both include provision for annual reviews 
including  the recalculation of product  specific  normal  values.  As  such,  they are 
administratively burdensome.  However, if greater use was made of the Community's 
refund system, it too would impose a high administrative cost. 
Conclusions on the Design of Primary Measures 
The above discussion demonstrates there are a number of significant considerations in the 
selection of an anti-dumping measure in the circumstances of a specific case.  In addition, 
the  selection  of a  measure  will  be  influenced  by  the  priority  given  to  specific 
considerations. 
Some commentators! have argued that the Community, and possibly the GATT, should 
adopt a variable duty system.  Such a system would indeed have the advantages of: 
•  removing the incentive to dump and as a result making the effect on the prices at 
which Community producers would be able to sell more predictable; 
•  introducing a "self-destruct" mechanism whereby measures would cease to have an 
impact when prices recover and the threat of further injury is removed; 
•  arguably increasing the fairness of the duty system. 
However: 
•  the benefit of  the price increase would accrue to the exporter; 
•  it seems likely that a variable duty system would be more costly to administer 
(however, we have not explored this issue); 
For example, Vermulst, The Anti-dumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC 
and the USA:  Have Anti-dumping Laws Become a Problem in International Trade?, in 
Jackson  and  Vermulst ed,  Anti-Dumping  Law  and  Practice,  A  Comparative Study, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, ( 1990) 
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•  in some market circumstances, there would be a danger of an adverse impact on 
competition. 
Much the same considerations are relevant in the comparison of undertakings and ad 
valorem duties.  However, variable duties have the advantage of an inbuilt mechanism to 
ensure compliance. 
The arguments are not clear-cut but, on balance, we  recommend that the Community 
should adopt a  variable duty system unless there are overriding concerns about 
the effect  on  competition  and  when  to  do  so  would  not  be  administratively 
practicable. 
Change in Circwnstances 
Anti-dumping measures may in practice provide too much or too little protection to the 
Community industry.  Whilst unpredicted changes in market circumstances could lead to an 
application for a Review, we believe that the Commission should.  monitor the impact of 
measures and, where the measures are not having the intended effect, open a 
review on its own initiative. 
Life of  Measures 
The five-year "Sunset Period" provided for in the Anti-Dumping Regulation and in the draft 
GAIT Code would in n1ost cases seem to provide a reasonable period for the Community 
industry to adjust.  However: 
•  we  believe that consideration should be given to the adoption of measures 
for a lesser period, particularly when dumping and the injury it has created are 
linked  to  the  state  of  the  economic  cycle.  Provision  could  be  made 
(exceptionally) for the renewal of these measures; 
•  measures should only exceptionally endure for five  years and from the 
introduction of definitive measures (rather than, as now, from the date when they 
were confirmed or amended) unless a full  review of the Community interest has 
been conducted. 
Determining the Level of Protection 
Introduction 
As noted in Section II, the Community and Australia, but not the United States or Canada, 
have implemented the statement  in Article 8 of the GAIT Code that it is desirable that: 
"the duty be less than the (dumping) margin, if such lesser duty would be adequate 
to remove the injury to the domestic industry." 
The Anti-Dumping Regulation requires that any duties adopted should be  less than the 
dumping margin "if such lesser duty would be  sufficient to remove injury."  Similar 
provisions govern the acceptance of undertakings. 
The lesser duty rule is of considerable practical importance as the duties of some or all 
exporters have been set on the basis of injury margins in around 50% of cases; and 
particularly cases involving exports from Japan and from non-market economies  (Section 
V above). 
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Policy  Considerations and Objectives 
The rationale for lesser duty rules is to limit protection to the minimum level necessary to 
remove the injury.  If  measures are above this level, it is very likely that trade with the 
countries subject to measures will be reduced by more than is necessary to allow the 
Community industry to recover.  Further, if market conditions are such that duties raise the 
general level of prices in the Community, a higher than necessary duty would impose or 
enhance the economic costs of the measures (discussed in Sections IV and V) by reducing 
Community consumption/use of the product. 
It is immediately apparent that, as a tnatter of analysis and policy, if not law, lesser duty 
rules and public interest criteria are closely related.  If the impact of a measure above the 
level necessary to remove injury would be  to  (further) raise prices, it is clear that the 
adoption of such a measure would not be in the Community interest. 
Indeed, (as noted in Section VIII) it was argued to us that, since the Comn1unity applies the 
lesser duty rule, the Community interest criterion is superfluous.  On this view, the lesser 
duty rule is intended to ensure that price levels are restored to fair and non-injurious levels 
and no higher.  Although, in the short tenn the prices paid by consumers/purchasers may 
be higher, the restoration of non-injurious prices ensures that their longer term interests are 
protected. 
This argument has considerable merit when dun1ping is predatory.  However, if there is no 
reason to believe that dumping will damage competition and ultimately lead to a higher 
general level of prices in the Community, then the restoration of non-injurious prices will 
impose costs on consumers/purchasers.  Since the impact of measures on competition is a 
central consideration in the framework for the analysis of Community interest that we have 
outlined above, we conclude that the lesser duty rule does not remove the need for a 
Community interest criterion. 
Indeed, in view of the dose link between the lesser duty rule and the Comn1unity interest 
criterion, we  believe that it would be appropriate to  redefine the Community's 
lesser duty rule and provide that the level and form of any duty or undertaking 
should  be  set  in  order  to  maximise  the  interests  of  the  Community.  The 
desirability, on its merits, of removing the injury to the Community industry would fonn 
part of this analysis, as would the impact of measures on consumers/purchasers. 
In practice, issues such as the impact of differing levels of duty on prices are taken into 
account.  For example, in DRAMS from Japan, the Commission was concerned to ensure 
that measures should not cause "unnecessary hindrance" to user industries.  To achieve 
this, price undertakings linked to the cost of Japanese producers were accepted.  Provision 
was made for these to be revised quarterly.  However, since it is not clear that this is the 
Commission's habitual practice, such a change would be consistent with  the general 
conclusion of this report that greater account should be taken of Community interest issues 
other than injury. 
Implementation  Issues 
The application of lesser duty rules raises a nun1ber of practical problems and issues. 
Definition of  Objectives 
In  order to determine the appropriate level of any duty (or price undertaking) a clear 
statement of the objectives to be achieved is needed.  If the objective is to remove the injury 
this  must be  given  substance by the specification of the  circumstances in  which  the 
Community industry will be judged to no longer be suffering injury.  As discussed further 
below, the Commission's normal practice is to set a target rate of profitability on the basis 
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of information relating to the investigation period.  This general approach seems to us 
appropriate as the link between duty levels and other indicators of the Community interest 
(including injury indicators) is too indirect.  However, careful consideration should be 
given to the level of profitability that it is appropriate for the industry to earn in the light of 
the various factors relevant to the Community interest and those outlined below. 
Impact on Prices/Sales 
Account should be taken of the impact that measures will have on the sales volumes and 
prices of the  Community industry.  Any  benefit  to the  Community industry  may, 
depending on the conditions of competition in the market, be reflected in an increase in the 
sales and market share of the Community industry.  Indeed, we understand that it is often 
the Commission's objective in imposing measures that the Community industry should 
react to increased import prices by maintaining its own prices and increasing market share. 
An assessment of how measures will affect the pricing decisions of the Community 
industry and its competitors (including imports from countries not under investigation) is a 
central feature of the evaluation of the Community interest.  However, in any case, since 
sales volume is a principal driver of profitability in most industries, an assessment of the 
impact of measures on sales is required for the successful application of the lesser duty 
rule. 
Product Differentiation 
If the products under investigation are commodities, the prices of Community producers 
and importers can be expected to be broadly uniform.  In  these circumstances, a uniform 
level of duty, target price or price undertaking is likely to be  appropriate.  However, if 
products are - although judged to be "like products" -differentiated, or if the prices of 
exporters vary for some other reason, a uniform rate of duty may not be optimal, since: 
•  the dumping margin may vary from product to product and exporter to exporter; 
•  by definition, competition in the markets for differentiated products depends on 
issues such as product quality and characteristics and brand image as well as on price. 
Applying a uniform rate of  duty -even one below the overall dumping margin found for an 
exporter - could therefore have differential effects on Community producers and on 
exporters: 
•  Community producers specialising in particular niches of the market could receive 
either insufficient or excessive protection; 
•  conversely, exporters whose sales are not price sensitive (perhaps because they 
have a strong bn1nd image) might be little affected whilst other exporters could be driven 
from the market. 
There is therefore a strong case in principle for considering specific duty levels for each 
exporter in markets for differentiated products. 
Market Conditions 
Where dumping is not the sole cause of the injury, this should be reflected in the level of 
protection.  If  some or all Community producers are partly experiencing difficulties for 
some other reason (eg. depressed demand, competition from other imports or a lack of 
competitiveness) seeking to remedy this through measures against a subset of exporters to 
the Community will create distortions. 
In addition, as discussed above, the need for and effect of a given measure may vary 
through time as market conditions change. 
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Our Polyvinyl Chloride case study illustrates these points; 
•  dumping from Eastern Europe was clearly not the sole cause of.  the industry's 
problems as the European market was depressed at the beginning of the 1980s as a result of 
the second OPEC price rise and the recession; 
•  given competition within the Community and from other sources, no measure could 
have had the effect of allowing the Community industry to cover its full costs.  A measure 
intended to provide more than marginal relief would have had the effect of driving East 
European exports from the market. 
Apparently  in  recognition  of these  points,  the  Commission  therefore  accepted  an 
undertaking related to the variable costs of production, ie.  not including full contribution to 
overheads and profit.  The recovery of the market ensured that its effect was only felt, if at 
all (see discussion in Section VI), for a short period. 
The  Commission's Approach 
A recent article1 identifies a variety of different approaches which the Commission has 
adopted to determine injury margins: 
•  price undercutting.  This involves the comparison of the prices of representative 
imported and Community - produced models in some national markets.  To determine the 
injury margin, the weighted average margin by which imports have undercut Community 
producers is expressed as a percentage of the CIF price.  Since the comparison must be 
made on a like for like basis, trade level adjustments may be necessary. 
This approach is only appropriate when the prices of Community producers have 
not been affected by dumped imports and assumes that  prevailing Community prices are at 
the level necessary to remove injury.  Trade level adjustments, if undertaken, inevitably 
make the comparison an unreal one.  If  the prices constructed are those observed in the 
market, the adjustments are unnecessary.  If they are not the prices observed in the market, 
the  undercutting margin  is  hypothetical  and  not  representative of the conditions of 
competition in which the injury has occurred. 
•  target prices. This approach may involve either: 
the comparison of the export prices for representative models with the prices EC 
producers would need to realise in order to earn a target rate of profit; or 
estimating the increase in prices necessary for the EC industry to achieve the target 
rate of profit either overall or on a model specific basis. 
In either case, issues raised include: 
whether average production costs or those of a specific EC producer should be 
adopted; 
the rate of profit which the EC industry is believed to need; 
whether the same margin should apply to all producers. 
In  addition, where the injury margin is based on target prices for EC producers 
without any comparison being made with  export prices, even exporters who did  not 
undercut Con1munity producers attract injury n1argins. 
Vermulst and Waer (1991) op cit. 
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In one recent case (Audio Tapes in Cassettes), adjusunents were made: 
•  to the target price in the Community to reflect loss of profits due to loss of capacity 
utilisation; 
•  for the level of expon volume and the degree of price undercutting by specific 
exporters. 
It is difficult to understand why the various versions of the target price approach should be 
adopted unless the objective is to allow the Community industry to raise its prices.  Unless 
the sole effect is expected to be an increase in prices, it would be appropriate to make an 
adjustment for the effect of measures on sales volumes. 
Conclusion on the Lesser Duty Rule 
The lesser duty rule plays a very important role in the Community's anti-dumping policy. 
Several trade lawyers commented to us on the absence of a clearly defined and consistent 
policy for determining injury marginsl.  Given the inherent difficulty and subjectivity of 
assessing injury margins we do not think it is possible to use a single approach in all 
circumstances, nor that it is feasible to determine injury n1argins mechanistically.  Further, 
the approach followed by the Commission will develop over time. 
The approaches outlined above make the assumptions that: 
•  exporters will increase their prices in line with the duty; 
•  the Community industry will react by raising its own prices; 
•  the sales volume of the Community industry will be unaffected. 
None of these results will necessarily follow and, indeed, it would not appear to be the 
Commission's intention that the Community industry should raise its prices.  For example: 
•  if duties are ad valorem, exporters may well decide to absorb the duty to some 
degree; 
•  the Community industry can be expected to benefit from an increase in sales unless 
it increases prices in line with those of exporters.  The impact on its revenues and profits 
will depend on demand conditions in the industry. 
There therefore appears to be a fundamental tension between the methods used to assess 
injury margins and the likely effects of the duties implemented as a  result of those 
calculations. 
1  Vermulst and Waer comment that "  .. the lack of binding rules in GATT and of 
detailed rules in EC law offer the Community institutions ample latitude in resolving 
precisely how injury margins ought to be calculated.  From the interested parties' point of 
view, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that cost and pricing data of the EC producers 
are considered confidential and therefore not available to foreign producers while the export 
prices of the foreign producers are considered confidential vis-a-vis the EC complainants. 
This means that only the Community institutions have the complete picture and makes it 
exacting, if not impossible, for interested parties to divine -in advance or ex post facto -to 
what degree injury margins will operate as an adequate limit on the level of anti-dumping 
duties in concrete cases." 
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We see considerable scope for further detailed research to evaluate different approaches and; 
to develop tools for use in determining injury n1argins.  For example, sin1ple computer 
models such as the CADIC model used by the US International Trade Con1n1ission could 
be  of considerable value  in  assessing  the  in1pact  of differing  levels of duty.  w.e 
recommend  that  the  Commission  should  commission  research  into  the 
methodology for the determination of injury margins and .should subseq:ue1,1tly, 
publish guidance on its policy. 
Anti-Circumvention Measures 
Definitive anti-dumping measures are not payable to the extent that exporters: 
•  commence or increase production in the Community and reduce.  exports; 
•  source their requirements for the Community market from third countries; 
•  substitute or develop new products which are outside the scope of the measures. 
In  addition, measures will  not have their intended effect if the  prices charged in  the 
Community and other aspects of the exporter's strategy are unaffected by the duty. 
As discussed in Section II, the Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation includes provision 
for "anti-circumvention measures" to be applied in certain circumstances when: 
•  the exporter begins or increases Community production after the opening of an anti-
dumping investigation; 
•  duties are absorbed. 
The first of these provisions- the Screwdriver Regulation- was applied on a number of 
occasions in the late 1980s but is now in abeyance having been criticised by  a GATT 
Panell.  The duty absorption provision was only invoked for the first time in 1992. 
The  argument before  the GATT Panel  on  the  Screwdriver Regulation  was almost 
exclusively concerned with  legal questions of GATT consistency and not with the 
economic merits of the measure.  However, by  way of background, the Commission 
explained that the Screwdriver Regulation had been introduced in response to concern on 
the part of the Community industries at the ineffectiveness of primary measures in a 
number of cases involving exports from Japan.  In  these cases, local assembly was 
economic and had enabled exporters to circumvent duties on the assembled product  . . 
Appraisal 
There can be little doubt that exporters may have both the opportunity and the incentive to 
"circumvent" anti-dumping ~neasures.  However, there arc two sides to the story. 
From the Community industry's perspective, if, following the application of anti-dumping 
measures, exporters comn1ence or expand Community production and  prices do, not 
increase, the measure is failing to have the effect sought and intended. 
1  General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, EEC -Regulation on Imports of  Parts 
and Components, Doc L/6657,  22 March 1990. 
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From the exporter's perspective: 
•  market conditions may make point towards absorbing the duty (either wholly or 
partly) in order to maintain growth; 
•  anti-dumping duties may be one of a number of factors pointing towards local (ie. 
Community) production. 
If the application of primary measures has been determined to be in  the Community 
interest, there may well be a case for supplementary measures when these are not having 
their intended effect.  However, there must be a risk of piling distortion on distortion since: 
•  the application of duties on local Community production will tend to encourage 
exporters to adapt their plans to escape the supplementary duty (eg.  by increasing local 
sourcing and, in doing so perhaps increasing costs); 
•  further increasing duties when these have been absorbed may force exporters out of 
the market or lead them to devote less attention to the Community market. 
A  particular problem with  measures against Community production is  the  need to 
distinguish  between  "legitimate inward investment"  and projects wholly or largely 
motivated  by  the  opportunity  to  avoid  anti-dumping  measures.  Assembly  in  the 
Community of imported parts sourced from traditional suppliers may well be merely the 
first  step  towards either integrated Community production or to  a position in which 
Community plants play a major or key role in a global production system.  Many Japanese 
companies, and before them US corporations, have followed this path. 
Thus in practice, it is difficult to find objective criteria for making a distinction between 
screwdriver plants and legitimate investments.  It is necessary to recognise that the sourcing 
patterns of a plant may change and its contribution to  the Community economy may 
increase. 
Thus, overall, whilst we  recognise the need for anti-circumvention measures, we 
would  stress  the  need  to  apply  them  flexibly,  recognising  the  particular 
circumstances of the case and the effects  that further measures may  have on 
the Community interest. 
Refunds and Reviews of Anti-Dumping Duties 
A number of criticisms have been made of the Community's provisions for the refund of 
anti-dumping duties.  In one case, the same point arises in relation to the provisions for the 
review of measures. 
Basis of Refund Applications 
The refund provisions of the Anti-Dumping Regulation require the importer to show that 
the "duty collected exceeds the actual dumping margin".  However, duties are set at the 
lower of the dumping and injury margins.  Thus where the duty is determined by the injury 
margin, importers may not obtain a refund which is commensurate with the reduction in the 
dumping margin.  For example, if a duty of 5%  was levied in a case in which a  10% 
dumping margin had been determined, refunds would only be payable to the extent that the 
dumping margin was reduced below 5%.  Equally, if the actual dumping margin calculated 
when a refund application is made is below the injury margin, a refund would be made 
even if  export prices have not risen by the amount necessary to remove injury. 
This provision could have the effect of causing the exporter to increase prices by more than 
the duty rate in order to ensure that the importer receives a refund.  In such circumstances 
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the objectives of the lesser duty rule -limiting protection to the level necessary to remove 
injury - would be undermined. 
However, since injury margins are calculated independently of dumping margins, linking 
refunds to injury margins would raise a number of difficulties.  Whilst recognising that the 
current position is not adequate, it is difficult to see how it could be improved. 
Institutional Barriers  to  Refunds 
Several trade lawyers who we met argued that there were significant institutional barriers to 
refund applications.  In particular: 
•  the application for a  refund must be made by the importer.  An independent 
importer will not be well placed to judge whether dumping continues since it has no way of 
knowing the normal value of the product; 
•  refund applications must be made in the Member State into which the goods were 
imported and within three months; 
•  refund investigations can take two to three years; 
•  interest is not generally payable on duties which are subsequently refunded. 
As a result of these points, the costs of making refund applications is increased and the 
returns to doing so are reduced and made less certain.  As a result, as discussed below, 
importers may pass duties on to their customers even when dumping has ceased. 
We  therefore  recommend  that  the  refund  system  should  be  amended.  In 
particular, consideration should be given to: 
•  centralising applications for refunds and making provision for an annual 
application; 
•  allowing exporters to apply for refunds on behalf of importers where the 
necessary authority is  given; 
•  paying  interest  at  market  rates  on  duties  which  are  subsequently 
refunded. 
Treatment of Duties in Review and Refund Calculations 
As noted in Section VII, when the importer and exporter are related, in making dumping 
determinations, the export price is constructed on the basis of the first independent sale. 
Inter alia,  the Anti-Dumping Regulation provides that anti-dumping duties  should 
themselves be deducted in constructing the export price. 
Thus in the example below it would not be sufficient for the related importer to raise the 
price in the Community by the dumping margin and duty (ie. by 1  0) since in calculating the 
export price for the purposes of a review or refund the export price would remain 100, i.e. 
the dumping margin would be unaltered.  Rather, the related importer would need to 
increase the Community price by the sum of the dumping margin and the duty. 
214 European Parliament- The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
Table  IX.l:  Illustrative Example of Refund Calculations for a Related Importer 
Normal Value  110 
Implications for Refunds 
First Independent Sales Price 
Costs of  Related Importer 
Constructed Export Price 
Dumping Margin 
Duty 
140 
40 
100 
10 
10 
This treatment has been criticised, particularly because of the barriers it appears to place in 
the way of refund applications.!  However, the Commission's position has recently been 
upheld in a judgment by the Court of J  ustice2 in a case brought by the associated importers 
in the Community of a ball bearing exporter.  As throughout this report we are concerned 
with the policy substance rather than the presence or absence of legal grounds for the 
Commission's interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Regulation. 
The Commission argues that: 
•  a related importer could increase prices by the sum of the duty and the dumping 
margin and then, when the refund is paid, reimburse its customers; 
•  if duties were refunded, it would be open to the associated importer to pass the 
refund on to its customer, thereby negating the impact of the duties; 
•  any other treatment would disadvantage independent importers. If the exporter 
raises prices to eliminate dumping, the importer must continue to pay the duty and seek 
refunds. 
The relative favourability of the positions of related and independent importers was a key 
issue in the case. In particular, the Court accepted that independent importers will not be in 
position to judge whether a refund application will proceed or, perhaps to bear the cost of 
financing the duty, with the result that they will tend to pass the duty on to their customers. 
By contrast, related importers were well placed to judge whether a refund application 
would succeed. 
As a result of the imperfections in the refund system discussed above, there is a danger that 
the level of protection (and so the costs imposed by measures) will exceed those envisaged 
in setting primary measure.  In our view, if duty were not treated as a cost in refund 
applications, the effect would be to  make the position more favourable  for related 
importers.  However, the fact that the refund system does not work well for independent 
importers (for the reasons discussed above) does not seem a good reason for requiring 
related importers to increase prices by more than the amount necessary to eliminate 
dumping. 
Duty is not treated as a cost in the equivalent calculations in the United States. 
We  recommend that duty should  not  be  treated as  a  cost in  constructing the 
export price for the purpose of refund calculations. 
1  See for example, NoraH (1986) op cit and Bellis (1990), The EEC Anti-dumping 
System, in Jackson and Vermulst (1990) op cit. 
2  Case C-188/88, NMB (Deutschland, GmhH, NMB, Italia Sri and NMB (UK) 
Limited V Commission of the European Communities, 10 March 1992. 
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It can be observed that this problem would not arise under a variable duty system which, 
when the importer and exporter were related, linked duties to the difference between the 
frrst independent sales price and a target price. 
Implications for Reviews 
The treatment of duty as a cost and the other imperfections in the refund mechanism also 
have implications for reviews since: 
•  a related importer will be found to be still dumping unless it has raised its prices by 
the sum of the dumping margin and the duty; 
•  an exporter which sells to unrelated importers may be found to still be dumping if, 
in recognition of the problems of importers in obtaining refunds, it absorbs duties. 
In our view, reviews raise very similar issues to refunds and we recommend that anti-
dumping duties should not be treated as a cost in review proceedings. 
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X  THE  COMMUNITY'S  ANTI-DUMPING  MEASURES: 
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Introduction 
This report is primarily concerned with the substance of the Community's anti-dumping 
policy.  Nevertheless, there are a number of institutional issues which we feel we should 
comment on because they relate to the efficiency and effectiveness of anti-dumping 
measures or because we believe that the·  implementation of our recommendations on the 
substance of the policy would require changes in institutions or procedures if they are to 
succeed.  In particular, we discuss: 
•  the length of  investigations; 
•  criteria for determining whether investigations should be opened; 
•  consideration of alternatives to anti-dumping measures; 
•  the transparency of anti-dumping proceedings; 
•  the provisions for the review of Commission and Council Decisions; 
•  provisions for monitoring of measures; 
•  Commission resources. 
The Length of Investigations 
A number of Community industry associations expressed concern at the length of time 
between the emergence of dumping problen1s  and the application of anti-dumping 
measures.  In its 1990 Resolution, the Parliament considered that provisional measures 
should be imposed within six months of the opening of the proceeding. 
It is helpful to consider separately the time taken to initiate proceedings and the length of 
proceedings. 
Opening of Proceedings 
The Commission does not formally log complaints and there are therefore no statistics on 
the time taken from the receipt of a complaint to the opening of proceedings.  Probably 
because the complexity of the issues and the difficulty of substantiating complaints differs, 
it appears that experience varies.  One industry association which is frequently involved in 
anti-dumping cases told us that it typically took a year to substantiate a complaint; another 
that its experience was that proceedings were opened within three to four months. 
The time taken to open proceedings clearly depends to a significant extent on the standards 
applied in deciding whether "sufficient evidence" of dumping and injury has been 
provided.  Perhaps not surprisingly, representatives of Community industry feel that the 
Commission adopts strict standards whilst exporters and importers feel that proceedings are 
initiated too readily.  The Commission argues that 50% of complaints are rejected, although 
the basis of this figure is unclear in the absence of a system for logging complaints. 
It would require a detailed investigation of a significant number of  cases, including access 
to confidential material of the  kind that we  were unable to see,  to reach any firm 
conclusions on the  standards  applied  by  the  Community.  However,  amongst our 
interviewees the Community does have the reputation of being relatively challenging in its 
scrutiny of  complaints. 
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Since anti-dumping investigations impose costs on importers and exporters and can 
themselves have adverse effects on trade, it is important that strict standards should be 
applied.  This relates most particularly to injury and to the existence of a link between 
dumping, if found, and injury, since the Community industry ought to be able to assemble 
information on these issues.  However, a lesser standard must inevitably be applied to 
dumping since it is difficult for the Community industry to assess normal value. 
Equally, it is important that measures should be implemented rapidly where they can be 
justified.  It is therefore important that the Commission should have adequate resources to 
respond to complaints rapidly.  We comment on the issue of Commission resources further 
below. 
Length of Proceedings 
As shown in Section V, in the last few years the length of time between the opening of 
proceedings and a final determination has averaged 18 months and has been considerably 
longer in a number of cases.  Thus the Community does not meet the provision in the 
existing GATT Code that investigations should be concluded within one year "except in 
special circumstances".  The draft of the new GATT Code adds a requirement that 
investigations should be completed within 18  months.  The draft also provides that 
jurisdictions applying the lesser duty rule may apply provisional measures for a maximum 
of nine months, as compared to six months at present.  This goes some way to meeting the 
concern that measures should be applied more quickly as the Commission will be able to 
apply provisional measures at an earlier stage. 
Time Limits for Investigations 
If dumping is damaging to the economic welfare of the Community, it is important that 
measures are taken as quickly as possible. 
Several commentators we have spoken to advocate the adoption of time limits for the 
completion of investigations.  Australia, Canada and the United States all operate a system 
of time limits.  These vary according to the circumstances of a particular case and account 
needs to be taken of the institutional environment.  However, briefly: 
•  in Australia the maximum time allowed between the filing of a complaint to a 
provisional determination is 125 days (145 days in large or complex cases).  The second 
stage of the investigation leading up to the adoption of definitive measures takes a further 
120 days; 
•  in  Canada,  provisional  measures  may  be  imposed following  a  provisional 
determination of dumping 120 days from the filing of a complaint (165 days in complex 
cases).  The investigation of  injury adds up to a further 120 days to the proceeding; 
•  in the United States, provisional measures may be adopted following a provisional 
determination of dumping after a maximum of 180 days from the filing of the complaint 
(230 days in complex cases).  The second stage of the investigation takes 120 days (180 
days in complex cases). 
The key steps in each stage of an anti-dumping investigation and the Commission's broad 
view as to the minimum feasible period for each stage which could be consistently achieved 
are set out below. 
218 European Parliament- The Economic Impact of Dumping and the Community's Anti-Dumping Policy 
Stage One:  Complaint to Opening: 8 Weeks 
•  Consultation with Member States 
•  Translation of Opening Notice 
•  Preparation of Questionnaires 
Stage Two:  Opening to Provisional Measures: 38-41 Weeks 
•  Response to Questionnaires 
•  Preliminary Assessment 
•  Injury Verification and Analysis 
•  Dumping Verification 
•  Assessment and Preparation of  Working Document 
•  Internal Review 
•  Consultation with Commission Services 
•  Consultation with Member States 
•  Preparation and Translation of Regulation 
Stage Three:  Provisional to Defmitive Measures: 16-26 Weeks 
•  Disclosure 
•  Comments on Disclosure 
•  Preparation of Final Working Document 
•  Internal Review 
•  Consultation with Commission Services 
•  Consultation with Advisory Committee 
•  Preparation and Translation of  Draft Regulation 
•  Consideration by Council 
We have not reviewed the reasonableness of these periods; nor do they represent the 
outcome of detailed consideration by the Commission.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that 
there are a number of substantial steps in an anti-dumping investigation which reflect the 
particular circumstances of the Community. 
Whilst in principle it is desirable for all parties that investigations should be swiftly 
concluded, there is a danger that time limits will cause shortcuts to be taken.  However, we 
see no reason why a system of published targets should not be adopted.  Achievement of 
these targets could then be monitored by the Parliament through the Commission's Annual 
Report on its Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities. 
We recommend that the Commission should establish and publish targets for the 
completion of the various stages of anti-dumping investigations and that detailed 
information  on  performance against  these  targets should  be  included in  the 
Commission's Annual Report to the Parliament. 
Criteria for Determining Whether Investigations Should be Opened 
At present, the Commission takes the view that if dumping and injury are demonstrated, a 
proceeding should be opened.  That is,  Community interest issues are  not formally 
considered when a complaint is  evaluated.  It would be consistent with our general 
conclusion that public interest issues should be considered at an early stage. 
However, this would inevitably slow down the process of responding to complaints and 
would arguably lead to  the creation of a  two-stage investigation.  In  addition,  the 
Commission fear  that the  opening of an  investigation  would  be  made in  effect a 
discretionary act which would be challenged in court. 
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We accept that Community interest issues cannot be brought into account before the 
proceeding is opened.  However, this adds to the importance of a statement of general 
policy on the Community interest.  If it were clear that measures would not be adopted, 
complaints would be deterred. 
Consideration of Alternatives to Anti-Dumping Measures 
A key conclusion of this report is that, even where it is concluded that injurious dumping 
has occurred and that a policy response is required, anti-dumping measures may not be the 
appropriate form of  intervention. 
We do not underestimate the difficulty of ensuring that alternative policy measures are 
adequately and quickly considered when dumping problems arise.  There is a danger that 
no measures will be taken when some form of intervention would be justified in economic 
terms or is deemed imperative for other reasons.  However, equally, we do not accept that 
these difficulties justify acceptance of the severe distortions and economic costs that may be 
imposed by the adoption of  inferior policy measures. 
We recommend that consideration be given to the adequacy of other Community 
measures  which  might  be  adopted  in  place  of anti-dumping measures.  In 
particular, the following measures may be relevant: 
•  to assist with the preservation or development of a  technology which is 
threatened by dumping; 
•  to assist in the orderly rundown of industries facing severe competition; 
•  to assist labour - intensive industries in time of recession. 
The Transparency of Anti-Dumping Proceedings 
A number of issues related to the transparency of anti-dumping proceedings have arisen in 
the course of our research: 
•  access by Counsel (and possibly other advisers)  to confidential information 
provided by other parties; 
•  the rights of interests other than the Community industry, exporters and importers 
to non-confidential information to enable them to comment on Community interest issues; 
•  the extent of the information and analysis supporting decisions to adopt provisional 
measures and close proceedings; 
•  the extent to which the Commission's detailed procedures and policy are codified 
and made public. 
Access to  Confidential Information 
The provisions for the disclosure of confidential information to advisers to directly 
interested parties varies between and indeed within other jurisdictions.  The views of trade 
lawyers we met varies as to whether it would be desirable for the Community to adopt a 
mechanism like the US Protective Order System. 
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This issue raises complex questions of legal procedure on which we are not competent to 
conclude.  However, we will comment that, as several lawyers pointed out, the absence of 
a right to disclosure makes it difficult for the parties to comment on the determination of 
injury margins since this involves information provided by exporters, importers and the 
Community industry. 
Access to  the Non-Confidential File 
A recent decision by the Court of Justice confirmed that consumer organisations do not 
have a right of access to the non-confidential file maintained by the Commission in order to 
allow them to make representations on whether the adoption of measures would be in the 
Community interest. 
In Section VIII we have argued that the impact of measures on consumers and other 
purchasers should be a central focus of anti-dumping investigations.  This should include 
actively consulting consumer organisations.  Since they lack the resources to marshal 
evidence on each case, they require assistance if they are to  represent the interests of 
consumers.  The same point applies to other representatives of general interests, such as 
trade unions. 
The need for what are presently considered to be "indirectly interested parties" to have 
access to the non-confidential file would be reduced if our recommendation below that the 
Commission and the Council should justify their decisions much more fully were to be 
in1plemented. 
We recommend that the Commission should make available to consumer and 
other organisations non-confidential information which they feel will enable them 
to promote the interests that they represent. 
Justification for Decisions 
The Regulations and Decisions closing anti-dumping initial investigations and reviews or 
imposing provisional measures have become more detailed in the last decade.  However, it 
is striking how little information and analysis they provide on: 
•  the market and market developments; 
•  the dumping episode; 
•  the determination of dumping margins; 
•  the injury suffered by the Community industry and the causal link to dumping; 
•  the determination of injury margins; 
•  Community interest issues. 
By contrast, in the United States and Canada, detailed free-standing reports are published 
justifying findings on dumping and injury. 
More detailed analysis in support of decisions would considerably assist scrutiny of the 
Commission's and Council's exercise of their powers under the Anti-Dumping Regulation 
by the Parliament and by commentators. 
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We recommend that, within the constraints of confidentiality, decisions imposing 
provisional measures or closing proceedings should be supported by a  detailed 
analysis  of the  issues  listed  above.  We  believe  this  is  a  necessary  step  to 
ensure full and explicit attention is given to the wider Community Interest issues. 
Greater openness on the determination of dumping margins would also help to 
allay concerns in this area. 
Codification of Practice 
A number of trade lawyers commented on the high level of discretion that the Anti-
Dumping Regulation leaves the Commission and expressed concern at what they regard as 
a lack of consistency in its application.  Examples include: 
•  the various approaches that exist to the determination of injury margins which have 
been outlined in Section IX; 
•  the criteria for determining whether selective normal values will be determined. 
In its 1990 Resolution, the Parliament recommended that the Commission should publish 
guidance for business on anti-dumping policy. 
Closely related to this, we were surprised to learn that the Commission does not have an up 
to date set of Guidelines describing the various technical issues that arise in anti-dumping 
investigations and the approach that staff undertaking investigations should adopt.  This 
may explain in part a lack of consistency in approach. 
We recommend that the Commission should: 
•  prepare and maintain Technical Guidelines for its staff; 
•  publish from time to time a detailed statement of its practice. 
Provisions for the Review of Commission and Council Decisions 
We have noted that the  Community is unique among leading users of anti-dumping 
measures in having a single agency responsible for all stages of the investigations.  Anti-
dumping proceedings raise strong emotions on both  sides of the  argument and it is 
important that the system should contain adequate checks and balances. 
At present, oversight of the Commission is exercised by the Council of Ministers, the 
Advisory Committee, the European Parliament and by the European Court of Justice. 
Member States will inevitably have particular regard to national interests and, in the view of 
many, the Court is not well placed to rule on questions which are often either technical or 
policy issues, rather than legal questions.  Indeed, the Court has itself expressed this view 
in a number of cases.  For example, in one of the cases arising from the Plain Paper 
P  lwtocopier proceeding (Case C-177  /87 San  yo Electric) the Court said that; 
"  ....  the question whether the interests of the  Community call for Community 
intervention involves appraisal of complex economic situations and judicial review of such 
an appraisal must be limited to verifying relevant procedural rules have been complied 
with  ... " 
The  Parliament  may  wish  to  consider  whether a  specialist  body  should  be 
established which would advise on  issues of general policy and on  whether the 
interests of the Community call for the adoption of measures in particular cases. 
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Provisions for Monitoring of Measures 
For a number of reasons we believe that the Commission should systematically monitor 
anti-dumping measures: 
•  as we argued in Section VII,  in many cases anti-dumping measures should be 
regarded as an industrial policy measure.  That is, they are justified to the extent that the 
Community industry takes advantage of the protection provided either to contract or to 
increase its competitiveness in  world markets.  In  these cases, we  believe that the 
application of measures should be accompanied by  an  action plan which  should be 
monitored; 
•  measures may not be having their intended effect in other respects and may need to 
be amended on the Commission's initiative.  For example, the effect on prices may have 
been less or greater than expected; 
•  particularly  where  new  approaches  have  been adopted,  (for example to  the 
determination of injury margins) there is a need to assess whether these techniques have 
been successful and should be applied in other cases, 
We  therefore  recommend  that  the  Commission  should  devote  significant 
resources to the monitoring of anti-dumping measures in place.  The monitoring 
plan should form an integral part of the initial measure. 
Commission  Resources 
The Commission presently  has  124  posts  (including support staff)  allocated to  the 
administration of its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy activities, of which 26 are national 
experts on two to three-year placements with the Commission.  The Commission argue, 
and we endorse this view on the basis of our experience of carrying out this study, that the 
complexity of carrying out anti-dumping investigations means that the contribution of 
national experts in the first year of their placement is inevitably limited. 
By contrast, in the United States the Department of Commerce has 160 staff working on 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations.  The International Trade Commission has 43 
professional accountants, lawyers, economists and investigators who  work on injury 
inquiries. 
The Parliament has called for an increase in the resources available to the Commission on a 
number of occasions. 
We have not assessed the adequacy of the resources available to the Commission as part of 
this study.  However: 
•  we recognise that the recommendations we have made in this report for more in-
depth analysis, monitoring of measures and a reform of the refund system have significant 
implications for resources; 
•  we see considerable scope for the increased use of accountants and economists by 
the Commission. 
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XI  BROADER POLICY ISSUES 
Introduction 
In this section we discuss from an economic perspective some broader questions raised by 
the Community's existing anti-dumping policy: 
•  social and environmental dumping; 
•  dumping of services; 
•  policy towards less developed countries. 
Social and Environmental Dumping 
Despite the obvious differences in the rationale for applying measures against social and 
environmental dumping, they raise substantially the same issues. 
Social Dumping 
Social dumping is the term used when exporters to the Community have benefited from 
low labour costs which reflect non-observation of minimum terms and conditions. 
Originally it was applied to goods produced by prison labour or other sweated labour. 
The arguments for linking trade and workers' rights run as follows: 
•  workers' conditions in a number of countries are very poor; 
•  there is a role for the industrialised countries to seek to prevent such exploitation; 
•  trade policy is one legitimate mechanism that can contribute. 
Trade Unionists argue that, just as the European Community is seeking to prevent unfair 
competition between Member States through a common Social Chapter, it is reasonable for 
the industrialised countries to prevent erosion of workers' rights by insisting on respect for 
minimum standards as specified by international agreements.  The Trade Unions are calling 
for minimum labour standards to be: 
•  specified by the International Labour Organisation; 
•  enforced by national legislation in all countries; 
•  encouraged by the industrialised countries through their trade policy with non-
complying countries. 
Such minimum standards would relate not only to remuneration, but also to issues such as 
age of workers, minimum breaks, minimum levels of safety, and the right to belong to a 
trade union. 
In the GATT Round there has been pressure for formal links between workers' rights and 
trade; and, specifically, for the inclusion of a social clause in the GATT.  The International 
Confederation of Free Trades Unions (ICFI'U) and others are also lobbying for respect of 
the ILO minimum standards to be made a  condition for the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP).  Countries not respecting internationally-recognised workers' rights 
would  be removed from the GSP.  The Parliament supported this view in its  1990 
Resolution on dumping. 
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In line with their general views on trade, the union organisations we met initially supported 
the view that any social dumping should be taken into account in  dumping margin 
calculations since they regard competition from exporters who benefit from labour costs 
which do not reflect minimum standards as unfair.  However, no branch of the movement 
appears to be lobbying specifically on the issue of dumping. 
Environmental Dumping 
Environmental dumping arises when exporters to the Community have a significant cost 
advantage over Community firms because they use older, cheaper (but more polluting) 
production methods, or processes or are subject to less stringent environmental legislation. 
An economic argument for protecting Community industry from environmental dumping 
can be made as an extension of the general economic case for (domestic) environmental 
protection measures.  Where the pollution affects a shared environmental resource, those 
effects and the costs of cleaning up will be borne by the Community as well as by the 
country engaged in dumping.  In order to avoid these costs, the Community may be 
justified in applying measures which compensate for the cost advantage enjoyed by the 
dumper. 
A further, non-economic argument is that, even where the environmental consequences of 
less stringent legislation is confined to the producing country, it is morally wrong to allow 
people there to be subject to such pollution. 
Social and Environmental Dumping: The Case for Measures 
Within the existing GATT framework, it would not be possible for the Community to apply 
measures against cases of social and environmental dumping. 
In the case of environmental dumping, the argument outlined above could be used to justify 
an extension of the scope of dumping measures on economic grounds to the extent that it is 
clear that the Community will or may bear the costs of pollution.  However, arguments for 
protection against social dumping would need to be based on political considerations as it is 
difficult to see how low- cost imports reflecting low labour costs could be contrary to the 
Community's economic interests.  · 
Applying measures against these forms of dumping would require multilateral agreement 
on the minimum standards to be observed. 
We discussed social and environmental dumping with the Anti-Dumping Directorate of the 
Commission.  The Commission has not studied these issues in detail and stresses that 
social and environmental dumping cannot be  taken into account in  dumping margin 
calculations under the current legislation.  However, in principle, the Commission's view 
was that adjustments could be made if such a policy were to be adopted. 
The Bureau Europeen des Unions be Consommateurs has argued that instruments to deal 
with environmental dumpiong should be developed.1 
One industry association expressed concern that action against social and environmental 
dumping would be open to exploitation by interests seeking protection for other reasons. 
In our view, anti-dumping measures are not well suited to meeting an objective of  putting 
pressure on trading partners to ensure that minimum labour and environmental standards 
and conditions are observed: 
1 Consumers Demand a Conclusion to the GAIT Round, November 1991. 
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•  it is arguable that both environmental and social conditions in trading partners will 
improve as their economies grow.  Applying trade protection measures could therefore be 
counter-productive; 
•  there is no obvious reason for applying measures specifically and solely against 
imports which have caused material injury to the Community industry.  Exports to the 
Community could impose environmental costs or involve exploitation of workers without 
meeting the injury criterion; 
•  closely linked to this, dumping investigations are initiated by the Community 
industry; 
•  the cost advantage enjoyed by the exporter would be very difficult to assess.  Any 
resort to constructing normal values on the basis of their country conditions would run the 
risk of obscuring any underlying comparative advantage. 
Service Dumping 
The GAIT Anti-Dumping Code and the Community's Anti-Dumping Regulation only 
relate to trade in  goods.  However, the Community does have a separate trade policy 
instrument relating to dumping of marine transport services. 
We discussed dumping of services in the course of our programme of interviews and 
contacted a number of trade associations for the service sector.  It appears that there is at 
present little concern about dumping of services and little thought has been given to 
problems that might arise and how these can be dealt with in the framework set by the 
GATT Code (if it were decided to amend this to encompass services). 
Less Developed Countries and Eastern Europe 
Anti-dumping cases involving imports from less developed countries and Eastern Europe 
have in the past accounted for a significant proportion of cases.  As Table [  ] shows, over 
the period 1981-91: 
•  overall, LDCs accounted for 26% of cases.  However, around half the LDC cases 
involved imports from the Asian Newly Industrialising Economies; 
•  a third of  cases involved imports from Eastern Europe. 
However, the trade impact of cases involving these countries is very much less than this 
would suggest.  Whilst cases involving the Asian NIEs accounted for 7% of all trade 
subject to measures in 1991: 
•  imports from other LDCs accounted for less than  1%  of all trade subject to 
measures; 
•  imports from  Eastern Europe  only  accounted for 2%  of all  trade  subject to 
measures. 
Views of LDC Exporters 
In the course of the study, we held discussions with representatives of several LDCs and 
also considered submissions prepared by others. 
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LDC critics of Community anti-dumping policy also argue that complaints are likely to be 
made in sectors in which  developing countries are efficient, such as textiles.  This threat of 
protection and denial of access to EC markets is a particularly important issue for countries 
that are in the process of  opening their economies to competition. 
The specific concerns expressed include: 
•  many of the industries are subject to intense world competition, where it would not 
be practical or possible for one company to practise predatory dumping. Firms accused of 
dumping may be privately owned, very small fmns that have no incentive to dump; 
•  some of the products investigated are governed by the Multi-Fibre Agreement.  The 
governments argued that if a quantity quota for a product has been agreed, then it is not 
possible for those imports to cause injury to European industry as the quantitative quotas 
cannot be exceeded; 
•  anti-dumping investigation is that as it creates uncertainty in the market for exports, 
this uncertainty can lead to delays in investing in new technology as exporters are uncertain 
whether future orders from the EC will be placed.  Hence accusations of dumping in even a 
small proportion of the EC's imports can be extremely harmful to the development and 
success of industry in LDCs; 
•  the calculation of normal value and export prices may take atypical and asymmetric 
sets of cases.  LDCs expressed concern about some of the issues relating to the calculation 
of dumping margins discussed in Section VI. 
Some LDCs also expressed concern at a trade chilling effect  from anti-dumping measures. 
In some cases, orders must be placed some months in advance of delivery.  If a measure is 
introduced between the  placing of an  order and importation  to  the  Community, the 
Community-based buyer then faces a higher-than-anticipated cost, as it is the buyer that 
must pay the duties.  For this reason, it is argued, importers may become reluctant to place 
orders in  countries which  are  subject to  frequent  anti-dumping investigations.  The 
governments of developing countries argue that this is the case, and that the atmosphere of 
investigations and the threat of measures can harm trade in other products.  Hence dumping 
investigation may have the potential to seriously disrupt a wide range of exports from 
accused countries. 
LDC representatives suggested a number of changes that they would wish to see made to 
the Community's anti-dumping policy: 
•  cases in products that are subject to world competition should not be opened; 
•  companies accused of dumping should have a minimum market share, say, over 
5%; 
•  alternatively, companies investigated should be of a minimum size; 
•  products covered by the MFA should not be investigated. 
Comment on LDC and Eastern European Cases 
Cases involving imports from LDCs and Eastern Europe are typically relatively small and 
do not involve strategic industries.  However, there is a potential for conflict between 
policies favouring and promoting development in these countries and anti-dumping policy. 
The balance between the two policy objectives is a matter of political judgement rather than 
economic analysis.  However, the clear potential exists to apply stricter standards in anti-
dumping cases involving these countries. 
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ANNEX I  ORGANISATIONS AND EXPERTS CONSULTED 
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS 
EUROBIT (Business Machines and Data Processing) 
CEFIC (Chemicals) 
EACEM (Consumer Electronics) 
EUROCOTON (Textiles) 
COMITEXTIL (Textiles) 
Associazione Cotoniera 
EUROFER (Steel) 
Electronic Industries Association of Japan 
CONSUMER BODIES 
Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs, Brussels 
National Consumer Council, London 
TRADE UNION BODIES 
European TUC 
International Confederation of  Free Trades Unions 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES 
GATT Secretariat 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
DGI 
DON 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 
B undeskartellamt, Berlin 
Department of Trade and Industry, London 
Federal Ministry of Economics, Bonn 
Ministere des Finances and Ministere de l'Industrie et Commerce Exterieur, Paris 
TRADE LA  WYERS 
Jean-Francois Bellis, van Bael & Bellis, Brussels 
Dietrich Ehle, Ehle, Schiller & Partner, Cologne 
James Lockett, Dorsey & Whitney, Brussels 
Chris Norall, Forrester, Norall, Sutton, Brussels 
Edwin Vermulst, De Smedt & Dassesse, Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, Brussels 
ACADEMICS AND RESEARCHERS 
Harald Grossman and Georg Koopman, Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg 
Brian Hindley, London School of  Economics and Political Science, London 
Patrick Messerlin, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris 
Phedon Nicolaides, European Institute of  Public Administration, Maastricht 
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